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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Handbook on the
**Management of Violent
Extremist Prisoners and
the Prevention of Radicalization
to Violence in Prisons**

CRIMINAL JUSTICE HANDBOOK SERIES



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UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
Vienna

Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons

CRIMINAL JUSTICE HANDBOOK SERIES



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1.

Introduction and context

1.1 Who the Handbook is for and what it covers

This Handbook is one of a series of tools developed by UNODC to support Member States in the implementation of the rule of law and the development of criminal justice reform. It is designed to be used by prison managers and prison staff, in particular, but will also be relevant for other actors involved in the criminal justice system, such as policymakers, legislators and members of non-governmental organizations. It can be used in a variety of contexts, both as a reference document and as the basis for staff training. While some elements of the Handbook may not be achievable immediately in some jurisdictions, particularly in post-conflict situations, the Handbook provides national authorities with guidelines for the development of policies and protocols that meet international standards and good practice.

This Handbook constitutes the first technical guidance tool to address the manifestation of radicalization to violence and violent extremism in prison settings at the level of the United Nations. It provides practical guidance on:

- The management of violent extremist prisoners (prisoners who have embraced violent extremism)
- Preventing the progression to violent extremism in prisons (prisoners who may be vulnerable to radicalization to violence)
- Interventions aimed at disengaging violent extremist prisoners from violence and at facilitating their social reintegration upon release.

Within these parts, the Handbook covers key prison management policies and mechanisms, such as the need for: overall prison conditions to be in line with international minimum standards; effective assessment and classification systems; physical, procedural and dynamic security; professional prison staff training; fair, humane and non-discriminatory treatment; preventing corruption; various categories of disengagement interventions involving experts from different disciplines; and social reintegration and post-release support.


Overall, the Handbook advocates an approach aimed at strengthening these key components of prison management. Not only is such an approach explicitly called for in the international good practice documents, it also provides value by creating sustainable benefits for the entire prison system. The following considerations summarize the key principles underlying all recommendations made in the Handbook:

- *Adherence to fundamental rights, international standards, and good prison practice:* It is crucial that any efforts in prison to address violent extremism must not lead to undermining human rights to which all persons, including violent extremist prisoners, are entitled. Under international human rights law, no exceptions or restrictions are permissible to the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Equally relevant is the protection of the right to hold an opinion and to have or adopt a religion or belief of one's choice,¹ although certain manifestations may be subject to limitations, if strictly necessary and provided by law (e.g. for the protection of public order or the respect of others' rights). At the same time, Member States should prohibit by law any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.
- *Relevance of overall prison conditions and prison management:* Guidance on the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalization to violence in prisons must ensure that any proposed intervention is closely embedded in broader prison reform efforts. Stand-alone disengagement interventions, which are implemented in isolation of the broader prison context are unlikely to yield positive results, in particular if the latter fails to adhere to international standards and norms. Vulnerability to radicalization to violence is exacerbated in prisons that are overcrowded, understaffed, fail to provide basic services to prisoners, or are otherwise managed in a disorderly manner.

The most powerful weapon in the fight against radicalization in prisons is without a doubt a humane detention policy that respects the fundamental rights of the detainees and focuses indefatigably on rehabilitation and reintegration. Therefore, a custodial sentence or measure has to be executed under psychosocial, physical and material conditions that respect the dignity of the human person, has to render the preservation or growth of the self-respect of the detainee possible and has to appeal to their individual and social responsibility.

Belgium Federal Public Service–Justice (2014): Action Plan against Radicalization in Prisons, pp. 4 and 6.

- *The importance of definitions and differentiation:* This Handbook reiterates that prisoner radicalization, far from being a new phenomenon, is a very old issue which is not in itself a threat to the prison administration or society if not connected to violence. Not all radicalization is negative or a precursor to violent extremism. Only a very small number of radicals actually become violent extremists. Definitions and differentiation are important, therefore, when dealing with the sensitive topic of (violent) extremism and radicalization (to violence), in particular in order to differentiate between thought and action.

 *See the glossary for a definition of key terms used for the purpose of this Handbook.*

¹Arts. 7, 18(1), 19(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Art. 2(2) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 20, para. 3; General Comment no. 22, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, paras. 2-3; and General Comment no. 34, CCPR/C/GC/34, para. 9.

- *Specific challenges posed by violent extremist prisoners:* The above notwithstanding, prison managers should not forget that while both violent extremists and other criminals may employ violence to attain specific goals, most violent extremists are motivated by ideological, religious, or political gain, and believe that they are fighting for a cause. This can have a significant impact on the way violent extremist prisoners should be managed, as this Handbook will set out.

The focus of this Handbook is on adult male and female violent extremist prisoners. The specific issue of children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having committed violent extremist offences will be dealt with in a separate UNODC publication, recognizing the different legal regime applicable to children deprived of their liberty. Collective disengagement from violent extremism is also not covered in this Handbook, as its focus is on the individual prisoner and interventions aimed at individual disengagement from violence. Groups may also abandon their use of violent methods, but the reasons for them doing so are not necessarily the same as when an individual disengages from violence.²

1.2 The overall context of violent extremism

Violent extremism is an affront to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It undermines peace and security, human rights and sustainable development. No country or region is immune from its impacts... Violent extremism is a diverse phenomenon, without clear definition. It is neither new nor exclusive to any region, nationality or system of belief... Definitions of "terrorism" and "violent extremism" are the prerogative of Member States and must be consistent with their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law... Violent extremism undermines our collective efforts towards maintaining peace and security, fostering sustainable development, protecting human rights, promoting the rule of law and taking humanitarian action.

Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism—Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, A/70/674 (2015), paras. 1, 2, 5 and 12.

While most of the media's attention has been on acts of systematic terror committed by groups such as ISIS, Boko Haram and Al Qaida in the name of Islam, it is important to note that the growth in extremist violence is not limited to one religion. Even in the Middle East, crimes have been committed in defense of Judaism, and Christian militias exist in many parts of the world. In Asia, groups have committed violations in the name of Hinduism and Buddhism, and in other parts of the world, political ideologies have led groups to take up arms.

Countering Violent Extremism While Respecting The Rights And Autonomy Of Women And Their Communities in: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing The Peace—A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, (2015), p. 222.

Many countries are currently facing a threat from violent extremism and hardly a week goes by without an act of violent extremism taking place somewhere in the world. The threat of terrorism is rated "high" in many countries, and most regions of the world have seen the

²For a discussion on group disengagement, see: Cronin, A. (2009) *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, Princeton: Princeton University Press; and Bjorgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009) *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement*, London: Routledge.

consequences of different acts and types of violent extremism. Attacks undertaken by violent extremist cause more than loss of life and economic damage; they can sow the seeds of division between communities, giving rise to increasingly reactionary and extremist views in other parts of society. This contributes to a breeding ground for violent extremism, perpetuating a vicious cycle of radicalization to violence, aggression, and violent responses.

The main motivations to resort to violent extremist acts can be grouped under three headings, notwithstanding the fact that people can also be motivated to use violence by more than one issue:

- *Ideological violence*
 - (a) Political ideologies such as nationalist, neo-Nazi groups, white supremacy or hate groups that advocate the use of violence; (b) extreme interpretations of religious ideologies and beliefs that advocate the use of violence; or (c) violent left-wing, anarchist, and right-wing ideologies.
- *Issue-based violence*
 - (a) Violent animal liberation and animal rights movements; (b) environmental or eco-related violent extremism; or (c) anti-government, anti-globalization or anti-capitalist movements that advocate the use of violence.
- *Ethno-nationalist or separatist violence.*

Violent political or independence struggles based on race, culture, geography or ethnicity.

Violent extremism has evolved and taken on new forms and capabilities. Extremist groups now occupy large amounts of territory, have seized and generate substantial resources (for example, oil, kidnappings and illicit trade), and make sophisticated use of social media and communication tools to propagate their messages, disseminate their ideology and incite violence. The trends, means and patterns of radicalization to violence equally continue to broaden.³ Violent extremism now finds its inspiration in a larger variety of ideologies, and its activities are no longer the exclusive domain of centralized and hierarchical organizations. The threat has progressively evolved to include smaller groups, cells and lone actors operating in a more unconstrained and unpredictable way. They plan attacks with limited or no direction from an organization, making prevention even more difficult. Violent extremists are capitalizing on advances in technology to find new ways of engaging with disaffected youth, taking advantage of social networking sites, online video channels and radical chat rooms. They tend to spread their propaganda more widely, more rapidly and more effectively, and usually with more alacrity, than governments.

Very little attention has been paid historically to the idea of working with violent extremists to disengage them from violence, except perhaps by the traditional means of physical force or imprisonment. More recently, countries have realized that they cannot solve violent extremism with force and imprisonment alone (referred to as the “hard” approach).⁴ They have also realized that relying on repressive means alone may actually cause more problems than it

³Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: strengthening the EU’s response (2014).

⁴Cronin, A. (2009): *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns*, Princeton Press.

solves. Consideration is therefore increasingly being given to adopting a more systematic and holistic way of understanding and managing the risk of individuals entering and re-entering violent extremist groups, and of exploring methods aimed at getting individuals to disengage from violent extremism voluntarily, and then reintegrating them back into society (referred to as the “soft” approach).⁵

1.3 Prisons and violent extremist prisoners

It is impossible to give a figure for the number of violent extremist prisoners that are currently held around the world. Some countries have only a few violent extremists within their prison systems, while other countries have many hundreds or thousands in detention. Given the number of violent extremist prisoners currently incarcerated, there is no doubt that prisons have a significant role when it comes to tackling violent extremism—a role which has been increasingly recognized by the United Nations and the international community at large.

I therefore recommend that Member States: (f) Reform national legal frameworks and penitentiary systems to ensure the security of inmates, personnel and facilities and establish procedures to prevent and counter radicalization in prisons based on human rights and the rule of law;

Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism—Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/67 (2015), para. 50(f).

Law and order cannot be established, and the safety and security of citizens and of the State cannot be preserved, without police and other law enforcement agencies operating in conjunction with functioning justice and corrections systems. Functional corrections systems are also a prerequisite to efforts to tackle “new” global threats, such as violent extremism and transnational organized crime, which are affecting an increasing number of conflict and post-conflict settings.

Prison Support in United Nations Peace Operations (2015), United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2015.11.

Obligation to Prevent Terrorism: To ensure that States fulfil their obligation to prevent terrorism, States must provide the responsible authorities the necessary specialized training and technical and material assistance. States must also adopt, as needed, non-punitive counter-radicalization and deradicalization policies and programs that include engaging and working with ... prison rehabilitation programs ... to ensure effective implementation and sustainability of these related measures.

Principles and Guidelines on Human and Peoples’ Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa (2015), Part 1,B.

An effective system for incarcerating convicted terrorists is a critical part of an effective criminal justice response to terrorism. Such a system should ... prevent further radicalization of prisoners, prevent terrorist activities from being directed or supported from within the prison system, and provide for the deradicalization and reintegration of prisoners into society where possible and thereby reduce recidivism.

Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (2012): Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector, Good Practice 11.

⁵Bjorgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement*, London: Routledge, p. 2.

The primary function of prisons holding alleged, accused or convicted violent extremist prisoners remains equal to that of any other prison, namely to contribute to public safety. In order to carry out this function, prisons must keep them securely and ensure that they do not escape from lawful custody. Prison administrations are also expected to work towards their disengagement from future violence and, by doing so, to prepare many for their social reintegration into the community.

In light of the risk that prisons constitute potential locations for the radicalization to violence of prisoners sentenced for offences unrelated to violent extremism, prisons should further strive to prevent other prisoners from being radicalized to violence. At the same time, prison administrations should keep in mind that prisons also provide an opportunity for prisoners to disengage from violence. Time in prison may bring about a transformation away from violent extremism—and could even prove a catalyst for positive change.⁶

Properly managing violent extremist prisoners reduces the opportunities for escape, misconduct and inappropriate external communications. Improving the prison environment can also help ensure that prisons do not become locations in which radicalization to violence takes place. Interactions with prison staff who engage in humane and positive behaviour towards violent extremist prisoners can create openings for changes in prisoners' thinking and behaviour.

Prison systems in many Member States face up to the challenge of imprisoning violent extremist prisoners by seeking to improve all aspects of prison management. The implementation of such an approach improves the management of the general prison population while at the same time enabling the prison administration to identify more clearly those who need specific interventions to disengage from ideologically-based violence. In general terms, focusing on and investing in violent extremist prisoners should not divert attention from the general prison population, including other individuals or groups who have specific needs or may present a different threat to society. It is imperative, therefore, that any additional material or financial support for prisons should benefit the whole system if it is to have a sustainably positive impact and avoid discrimination.⁷

The selection and training of staff working with violent extremist prisoners is one particularly important element. Prison staff working in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners need to be able to resist attempts to condition, manipulate and, in some circumstances, to radicalize them to violence. At the same time as working to prevent escapes, prison staff should be actively involved in efforts to get prisoners to disengage from violence. Care should also be taken to ensure that staff do not adopt an overzealous and discriminatory approach to categories of prisoners based on their faith or criminal charges, as this can antagonize them, as well as their sympathizers.

Finally, it must be noted that empirical studies measuring the extent of prison-based radicalization to violence in different regions on the one hand, and the effectiveness of programmes that promote disengagement from violence in Member States on the other, are still limited. On the basis of currently available analysis, research findings and practical examples from a variety of Member States, this Handbook seeks to provide knowledge and options on how best to manage and intervene with violent extremists in prison settings.

⁶Jones, C. (2014): "When foreign fighters return: Managing terrorists behind bars", *The Conversation*, 1 September 2014.

⁷See International Committee of the Red Cross (2016): Responding to radicalization in detention: An ICRC perspective.

1.4 Existing guidance

This Handbook does not seek to duplicate existing guidelines on the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalization to violence in prisons, or to provide another high-level checklist of key themes. Rather, the intention is to reference and build on existing guidance and research, and to provide more detailed information and practical examples of management approaches related to this particular category of prisoners. The following international organizations, fora and research institutes have drafted documents to provide guidance on various aspects of the approach to the management of violent extremist prisoners, which are referenced throughout this Handbook:

- Council of Europe
 - Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism (2016)
- Global Counterterrorism Forum
 - Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (2012)
 - Sydney Memorandum on Challenges and Strategies on the Management of Violent Extremist Detainees (2012)
- International Centre for Counter-Terrorism
 - The Hague Core Principles and Good Practices Paper on the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (2012)
- International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law
 - Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization (2015)

As the core standard applicable to prisons adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, the *United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules)* are considered as an overall lens through which all other guidelines and recommendations should be read and interpreted.⁸

⁸A/RES/70/175 (17 December 2015) entitled “United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules)”, hereinafter referred to as the “Nelson Mandela Rules”. In the case of women prisoners, also see A/RES/65/229 (16 March 2011) entitled “United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules)”, hereinafter referred to as the “Bangkok Rules”.

2.

Managing violent extremist prisoners: fundamental issues

2.1 Introduction

To a great extent, managing institutions holding violent extremist prisoners requires the same “core” prison management approach as managing prisons detaining any other group of prisoners. Violent extremist prisoners, like other prisoners, need to be kept securely, provided with basic necessities such as food and clothing, looked after with humanity and given opportunities to reform and rehabilitate themselves.

Research shows that harsh treatment in detention facilities can play a disconcertingly powerful role in the recruitment of a large number of individuals who have joined violent extremist groups and terrorist organizations. Several factors have been identified as spurring prisoners to seek protection by joining groups, including inhumane prison conditions and inhumane treatment of inmates, corrupt staff and security officers, gang activity, drug use, lack of security and proper facilities, and overcrowding ...

Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism—Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674 (2015), paragraph 31.

Good management and good order in prison shall respect diversity, tolerance and human dignity of both prisoners and staff as this helps avoid situations conducive to radicalisation and violent extremism.

Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 8.

Respect for the dignity, and protection of the physical and psychological integrity of all persons deprived of their freedom is the basis for any successful treatment and programmes in detention.

International Committee of the Red Cross (2016): Responding to radicalization in detention: An ICRC perspective.

On the other hand, managing violent extremist prisoners can also bring additional challenges around security, dealing with the risk of radicalization to violence of other prisoners and prison staff, and manifestations of anti-authority behaviour.

2.2 Upholding human rights

It is important that there is a clear legal basis and procedural framework for the detention and management of violent extremist prisoners which complies with obligations under international law, and which clearly delineates the institutions and agencies involved, as well as their respective roles, responsibilities and powers in this area.

A fundamental principle set out in international law and all relevant international standards and norms related to the treatment of prisoners is that their treatment should be humane and respect the inherent dignity of the human person. Torture, inhuman and degrading treatment is prohibited with respect to all prisoners, including violent extremists, and prison administrations may not invoke any circumstances whatsoever as a justification for torture or ill-treatment.⁹

All prisoners shall be treated with the respect due to their inherent dignity and value as human beings. No prisoners shall be subjected to, and all prisoners shall be protected from, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, for which no circumstances whatsoever may be invoked as justification. The safety and security of prisoners, staff, service providers and visitors shall be ensured at all times.

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 1.

Preventing and tackling radicalisation and violent extremism shall always be based on the rule of law and shall comply with international human rights standards because respect for human rights and the rule of law is an essential part of a successful counter-radicalisation effort. Failure to comply with these is one of the factors which may contribute to increased radicalisation.

Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 1.

While this absolute prohibition is arguably the most fundamental aspect of the respect for the human dignity of prisoners, the principle of humane treatment encompasses many other aspects of prison management.¹⁰ Respecting prisoners' dignity as human beings also means that prison authorities must ensure that their conditions of detention meet at least their basic needs, which include their accommodation, bed, bedding and clothing, drinking water and nutrition, access to open air and exercise, natural and artificial light, a temperature appropriate to health as well as personal hygiene, sanitation facilities and access to health-care services. All prisoners, including violent extremist prisoners, are entitled to the general living conditions addressed in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules):

⁹ See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts. 7 and 10; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Arts. 2 and 16; Nelson Mandela Rules, Rule 1; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principles 1 and 6; European Prison Rules, Rules 1 and 72.1; Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of People Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, Principle I; Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa, Recommendations 1-3.

¹⁰ See the basic principles of the Nelson Mandela Rules, which are applicable to all prisoners, including Rules 3 and 5(1).

“General living conditions addressed in these rules, including those related to light, ventilation, temperature, sanitation, nutrition, drinking water, access to open air and physical exercise, personal hygiene, health care and adequate personal space, shall apply to all prisoners without exception.”¹¹

States are under a positive obligation to meet these basic standards without discrimination of any kind, and cannot claim that a lack of material resources and funding prevents them from doing so—a point reiterated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment to Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR):

“Treating all persons deprived of their liberty with humanity and with respect for their dignity is a fundamental and universally applicable rule. Consequently, the application of this rule, as a minimum, cannot be dependent on the material resources available in the State party.”¹²

It is important to note in this regard that treating prisoners with humanity does not hinder safeguarding security and order in prisons, but on the contrary, is fundamental to ensuring that prisons are secure and safe. Good practice in prison management has shown that when the human rights and dignity of prisoners are respected and they are treated fairly, they are much less likely to cause disruption and disorder, and more likely to accept the authority of prison staff. Treating violent extremists prisoners with respect can also undermine “us and them” thinking, demonization, dehumanization and attitudes that justify offending. Psychologically, it can directly challenge ways of thinking and perceptions of groups that facilitate violent extremism.

In low-resource countries and post-conflict environments, meeting these basic requirements may pose significant challenges, especially where prisons are overcrowded, which is often the case. In such jurisdictions, there may be significant reliance on support from donor agencies to meet basic requirements, and such support is not always available. Prisoners will usually be dependent on their families to provide them with adequate food, and will not have access to sufficient space or other conditions that promote and protect physical and mental health. Such situation not only contravenes international standards, but failure to meet these basic needs can further be exploited by violent extremist groups to facilitate recruitment and retention of existing violent extremists, for example when violent extremist groups provide food, safety, or education to prisoners (and their families).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Rule 42. For further details, see Rules 12 to 17 on accommodation, Rule 18 on personal hygiene, Rules 19 to 21 on clothing and bedding, Rule 22 on food, Rule 23 on exercise and sport, and Rules 24 to 35 on health care.

¹² Human Rights Committee, General Comment 21, para. 4 (1992).

TUNISIA: The dangers of prison overcrowding

The living conditions in prisons must be safe and humane, where the prison's administration is easily able to determine and diagnose the danger of recruitment and intervene to protect individuals and offenders. Overcrowded rooms will create insecurity and reduce control, which will provide opportunities for recruitment and converting to extremist thought. Overcrowding also represents a real danger inside prisons because it negatively affects basic caring services and rehabilitation and corrective programmes. Overcrowding will also cause frustration, violence and tension, which will lead to prisoners seeking protection by joining or belonging to violent extremist groups, as they will provide the psychological and material care that is absent from the prison administration.

Contribution submitted by the Direction générale des prisons et de la rééducation of Tunisia in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

While not in itself sufficient to trigger radicalization to violence, poor living conditions and prison overcrowding can generate resentment and provide the ground for antisocial narratives to take root.¹³ Tackling poor conditions in prison should therefore be considered as an integral part of the effort to counter violent extremism in prisons.¹⁴ In Somalia, for example, tackling overcrowding and providing prisoners with running water, beds and televisions has contributed to the reduction in violence in prison and has enabled staff to engage prisoners more effectively in disengagement activity. At the same time, any specific attention paid to violent extremist prisoners must not result in other (groups of) prisoners being denied humane treatment and the fulfilment of their basic needs.

Focusing on, and investing in one group of detainees should not divert attention from other individuals and or groups who have specific needs or may present a different threat to society. Any additional material or financial support for detention should benefit the whole system if it is to have a sustainably positive impact and avoid negative discrimination. This applies also to external interventions, such as bilateral and governmental cooperation initiatives. (...)

The specific attention paid to detainees perceived as "radicalized", or detained in relation to terrorist acts sometimes results in other groups of detainees receiving neither the humane and dignified minimum, nor the necessary management and staff attention. This is particularly the case in situations where penitentiary systems already face serious problems (for example, where there is severe and chronic overcrowding and a high level of violence). This can create new threats to safety and security.

International Committee of the Red Cross (2016): Responding to radicalization in detention: An ICRC perspective.

¹³ Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 9.

¹⁴ Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 2; ICCTR Paper on the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, Subsection II (Prison Context, International Standards); Global Center on Cooperative Security (2015): Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa: an Action Agenda, Action 8.

Measures that need to be taken to improve conditions in prisons should start with a review of criminal justice policies, aiming to reduce the use of pretrial detention and imprisonment when not absolutely necessary. Furthermore, steps must be taken to mitigate the impact of overcrowding and to maximize the use of existing capacity by careful planning and by using available space creatively.

Programmes such as parole, early release based on good behaviour, or sentencing alternatives to imprisonment may reduce the time ordinary inmates are in contact with (suspected) violent extremist prisoners, and thereby reduce both overcrowding and recruiting opportunities. Alternatives to imprisonment can also potentially repair harm suffered by victims, provide benefits to the community through community service, better treat dependencies or mental illness, and rehabilitate offenders. Alternatives to imprisonment can also allow the prison administration to better focus their often limited prison resources on those prisoners assessed to be of high risk. If courts have options other than imprisonment, they can better tailor a cost-effective sentence that fits the offender and the crime and at the same time protects the community.

➤ *For further detail, see the UNODC Handbook on Strategies to Reduce Overcrowding in Prisons (2013)¹⁵*

From a prison management perspective, it is not just the issue of overcrowding that can be a challenge in terms of accommodation. Even where there is sufficient accommodation, that accommodation may not be appropriate for the housing of violent extremist prisoners if it consists of large rooms or dormitories holding hundreds of prisoners with minimal supervision by prison staff. Prisons holding violent extremist prisoners require capacity to manage those prisoners in smaller groups rather than in large numbers.

*Right to family life and contact with the outside world:*¹⁶ Violent extremist prisoners retain, within certain limits, their right to family life and not to be totally isolated from society, even though they may be prevented from physical interaction with the outside world. Prisoners' ability to maintain contacts with the outside world, in particular their families, is also fundamental to their prospects of successful social reintegration, as emphasized in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules). Therefore, enabling such contact is an essential part of strategies that aim to ensure that their human rights are respected and that their chances of social reintegration are strengthened. As appropriate prison facilities may be located far from prisoners' families in some countries, prison administrations should make special efforts to prevent the breakdown of family ties, with visits, letters and phone calls being allowed to the maximum possible extent, while ensuring that the requisite security precautions are in place.

While the above is all the more important in the case of violent extremist prisoners, who are likely to serve long sentences, the prison administration's duty to encourage contact with the outside world must also be balanced against the risks that may be associated with the ability of violent extremist prisoners to communicate with those outside. Communication

¹⁵Also see the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights implications of overincarceration and overcrowding, United Nations Doc. A/HRC/30/19, 10 August 2015, paras. 66-68.

¹⁶Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 58-63, 106; also see the Bangkok Rules, Rules 23 and 26; Body Of Principles For The Protection Of All Persons Under Any Form Of Detention Or Imprisonment, Principles 19 and 20; United Nations Recommendations On Life Imprisonment, para. 11.

must be managed to prevent crime, inhibit the trafficking of unauthorized items, ensure the protection of the public from unwanted communications, and prevent escapes. When appropriate, prison officials may need to monitor and control violent extremists' communication with people outside the prison or visitors coming to the prison, without prejudice to the violent extremists' legal defence rights. This may apply to family visitors, telephone calls, mail or e-mail. Prison officials should take steps to detect, deter and disrupt all communications that would benefit violent extremists' objective.¹⁷

States could consider, on a case by case basis and taking into account relevant domestic and international law, the introduction of specific control mechanisms with regard to the inmates' communication, both within and outside the prison. Prison officials could consider, where necessary and appropriate, limiting or restricting contact between the general population and specific segments of the prison population, especially dangerous violent extremist prisoners.

Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (2012), Good Practice, Number 6.

It is important, however, that restrictions placed by the prison officials on violent extremist prisoners' communications be in accordance with the level of threat, and applicable domestic and international law. Both the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SPT) and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CPT) have on a number of occasions criticized the unjustified restrictions placed on prisoners with long prison terms and those held in high-security settings in their contacts with the outside world. As a general rule, all prisoners should be allowed, under necessary supervision, to communicate regularly, by letter, telephone and visits with their families and other persons.

Any supervision and restriction of contacts, communications and visits to prisoners, due to radicalisation concerns, shall be proportionate to the assessed risk and shall be carried out in full respect of international human rights standards and national law related to persons deprived of their liberty and shall be in accordance with Rule 24 of the European Prison Rules concerning contact by prisoners with the outside world.

Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 3.

*Access to legal representation:*¹⁸ Violent extremist prisoners, like all prisoners, should have access to a legal advisor or a legal aid provider. As a rule, visits with legal representatives may only

¹⁷Some violent extremist groups have included in their training manuals the need to maintain contact with violent extremists outside of prison. See, for example: Al-Qaeda training manual – Lesson 18: Prisons and Detention centres (available at: www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2002/10/08/manualpart1_4.pdf), which recommends to “[t]ake advantage of visits to communicate with brothers outside prison and exchange information that may be helpful to them in their work outside prison ... The importance of mastering the art of hiding messages is self-evident here”.

¹⁸Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 61, 119-120.

be restricted in exceptional circumstances, i.e. ordered by a judicial authority.¹⁹ Meetings with lawyers should take place out of hearing of prison staff, though it is normal procedure to have them within sight of staff. Legal documents and correspondence should be treated as confidential and the searching of lawyers should be undertaken with particular sensitivity.

*Freedom of religion:*²⁰ International standards are very clear that all prisoners have the right to practise their religion. The Human Rights Committee, for example, stressed that prisoners “continue to enjoy their rights to manifest their religion or belief to the fullest extent compatible with the specific nature of the constraint”.²¹ Freedom to have, adopt and manifest a religion or belief of one’s choice can also be regarded as a component of a constructive and balanced prison regime. In practical terms, religion may help some prisoners come to terms with their sentences and restrictive custodial settings, while offering an opportunity, for those who are convicted, to reflect on the crimes they have committed. Researchers have found that increased levels of religiosity are associated with high levels of in-prison adjustment and significantly related to a smaller numbers of violations of prison rules.²²

For religiously inspired extremism, it is very important not to confuse people who might have (re) discovered their faith with people who have developed radical views. Most people who convert or revert, e.g. to Islam, during imprisonment are doing so for peaceful individual motives or to bond with a group of other prisoners. However, prejudices around the linkage between religion and extremism remain very present and may hamper good risk assessment.

Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016): Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, RAN Prisons and Probation—practitioners working paper, p. 3.

There should be clear policies for dealing with faith issues in prison and for respecting all religious beliefs represented in prisons, including those holding violent extremist prisoners. Demonstrating such respect can contribute to undermining violent extremist thinking, for example, a lack of tolerance for difference. Prison staff should be provided with adequate training to raise awareness and enhance their sensitivity about their duty to promote and respect the right to freedom of religion or belief.²³ Religious officials can be used to provide such training and to act as reference points for other staff on faith matters. Likewise, nobody should be obliged to subscribe to any religion or join religious services, either by prison staff or other prisoners. No prisoner should be disadvantaged because of his or her religious beliefs or lack of them, and measures need to be in place to protect prisoners from being coerced into converting to a certain religion or into practising a religion.

¹⁹The European Prison Rules, for example, restrict such exceptional circumstances and corresponding restrictions on confidentiality to the prevention of serious crime or major breaches of prison safety and security (see Rule 23.5).

²⁰Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 65-66.

²¹Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 (1993) on freedom of thought, conscience or religion, United Nations Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para. 8.; also see the Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, 30 January 2015, United Nations Doc. A/HRC/28/66/Add.2, para. 59.

²²See, for example: Clear T., Sumter M. (2002): “Prisoners, prison and religion”, *Journal of Offender Rehabilitation*, 35(3-4), pp. 125-156; O'Connor T. and Perreyclear M. (2002), “Prison religion in action and its influence on offender rehabilitation”, *Journal of Offender Rehabilitation*, 35(3-4), pp. 11-34.

²³See the interim report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, United Nations Doc. A/60/399, 30 September 2005, paras. 69-91.

The Government judges the greatest threat to the UK at this time to be from Al Qaeda inspired extremists. This must not be confused with the Islamic faith. Islam is one of the major world religions. It is based on the Unity/Oneness of God and tolerance towards all mankind. It is one of the three great Monotheistic Religions. The others are Judaism and Christianity. Islam means "Peace", and complete submission to the will of God. A Muslim is "one who spreads peace". There is no suggestion that legitimate expressions of faith are in any way indicative of radicalisation or extremism. We respect all faiths and we will continue to facilitate the variety of faiths practised in our prisons. Faith can play a positive role in the lives and rehabilitation of prisoners. Muslim chaplains are the source of specific advice on Islam within prisons.

National Offender Management Service (NOMS) – England and Wales, Extremism and Radicalisation–Guidance for Staff.

Prisoners should be allowed to pray, to read approved religious books and to meet other relevant requirements, e.g. those related to diet and hygiene. Violent extremist prisoners of the same religion may be allowed to gather to celebrate special days or collectively worship, taking into account individual risk assessments. Appropriate facilities, such as prayer rooms, should be provided. Prisoners should also have the opportunity, if they so wish, to be visited by qualified representatives of their own religion in private or in group services.

In order to facilitate the above, prison administrations should establish agreements with religious denominations, and religious representatives should be properly trained on how to exercise their functions in a prison environment.²⁴ The number of religious officials in each prison should reflect the numbers of prisoners of each faith in that prison. Religious officials may be hired directly by the prison or prison officials when permitted by law. Alternatively, respected religious leaders from the local community may be allowed to hold services within the prison. In any case, prison authorities have the right to screen religious representatives entering prisons in order to prevent violent extremist views from being disseminated among prisoners. Some prison administrations have developed competency profiles to use when selecting spiritual counsellors.²⁵ All groups and individuals must be subjected to the same screening and review process.²⁶

Next to granting religious officials access to prisoners, prisons should have an adequate supply of approved religious texts written by qualified representatives of the different religions that are represented in a prison. The availability of authoritative literature on religious issues is one way of ensuring that prisoners who wish to develop their knowledge on such matters do not have to rely on texts smuggled into prison, which may advocate for national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.²⁷



For faith-based interventions as a means of disengagement from violence, see chapter 5

²⁴ Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 24.

²⁵ See, for example: Ajouaou, M. (2008): Religious competency profile for Islamic spiritual counsellors in the Justice Department—working document on behalf of the Muslims and the Government Liaison Committee, The Netherlands.

²⁶ IJ Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization, Recommendation 14 (Support the role that religious and other services can provide to prisons as means to countering radicalization).

²⁷ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 20(2). See also the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, 11 January 2013, annex, appendix.

2.3 Ensuring secure custody

The credibility of any prison system rests on its ability to keep prisoners in custody safely and securely—in other words, to prevent violence or harm within the prison setting and to prevent escapes. Preventing escapes is a fundamental activity of prison management as it protects the public from further criminal acts; contributes to giving the public, media and politicians confidence in the criminal justice system; and enables prisoners to benefit from rehabilitation activities provided within the prison system. The consequences of escapes by violent extremist prisoners can be severe. There have been instances where escaped violent extremist prisoners have perpetrated acts of terrorism; murdered and/or seriously injured members of the public and law enforcement; and committed other serious criminal activity.

KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: An escape incident related to violent extremism

As of June 2016, the prison system of the Kyrgyz Republic accommodated 239 violent extremist prisoners, including 159 persons in closed-type prisons, 30 in open-type prisons and 50 offenders registered in the probation department. The escape of nine prisoners, including violent extremist prisoners, from a high-security prison on 12 October 2015 resulted in the death of 13 people, including four prison staff, and sparked a massive political and public outcry. As a result, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic took emergency measures and allocated funds for the construction of a specialized high-security prison facility and provision of resources for recruiting additional prison staff. In addition, in April 2016, the President of the Kyrgyz Republic approved Law No. 44 of the Kyrgyz Republic on amendments to the Penal Code, which envisages the separate accommodation of violent extremist prisoners in cell-type facilities.

Contribution submitted in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Security in prisons is ensured by physical means of security, such as the walls, bars on windows, locks and doors, alarm systems and so on; by procedural means, which are procedures that must be followed, such as rules relating to prisoners' movement around the prison, the possessions they may keep, searches of prisoners and their accommodation, among others; and dynamic security, which requires an alert staff who interact with prisoners in a positive manner and engage them in constructive activities, allowing staff to anticipate and prevent problems before they arise. A proper balance should be maintained between the physical, procedural and dynamic security in the case of all prisoners, including violent extremist prisoners. The right balance to prevent escape and maintain order will depend on a number of factors such as the condition of the prison facilities, the level of technology available, the number of staff and type of prisoners being held. For example, where physical security is weak (as may be the case in low-resource and post-conflict environments), procedural and dynamic security becomes all the more important.

Prison administrations should also be aware that escape attempts do not just involve violent extremist prisoners trying to break out of the prison from inside. Violent extremist groups, particularly those that have large quasi-military organizations with significant command of territory and resources, are increasingly staging attacks on prisons and instigating large scale prison riots to effect the escape of imprisoned members. In some cases, violent extremist groups have attacked prisons to facilitate the escape of prisoners, who are then recruited into the violent extremist group as payment for being freed by the group.

Finally, prison security refers not only to the means by which escapes are prevented but also to measures that are necessary to prevent violent extremist prisoners from directing violent extremist and other criminal activity taking place outside the prison. Next to directing terrorist activity, such criminal activity may also include seeking to intimidate or corrupt witnesses, judiciary, lawyers or jurors.²⁸

A fundamental principle of good prison management is that prisoners should be subject to the least restrictive measures necessary for the protection of the public, other prisoners and staff.²⁹ Most violent extremist prisoners tolerate being in prison when conditions are fair and appropriate, and the majority accepts the reality of their situation. Provided that they are subject to appropriate security measures and fair treatment, most prisoners will not try to escape or seriously disrupt the normal routine of the prison.

A small minority of violent extremist prisoners, however, may well do everything in their power to try to escape or to initiate activities intended to undermine the good order of the prison. Others will seek to corrupt or manipulate staff and attempt to have illicit goods smuggled into the prison. Similar to criminal networks, violent extremist groups can continue to exist within prisons. They can make contacts while in prison and, in some cases, extend their activity beyond the prison system. Violent extremist prisoners might also use their time in prison to learn criminal techniques from, or rely on the services of, “regular” criminals (for example, concerning the supply of weapons or forged passports) to prepare or coordinate terrorism activities outside of prison. This means that the prison authorities should be able to assess the risk posed by each individual prisoner in order to make sure that each one is subject to the appropriate conditions of security.

• For the risk of corruption, conditioning and manipulation of prison staff, see chapter 3.6; for the security categorization of violent extremist prisoners, see chapter 4

Furthermore, security measures applied to violent extremist prisoners should be reviewed regularly and modified as necessary. The implementation of this principle contributes to ensuring that only a small number of prisoners will need to be held in high security conditions, thereby ensuring their effective supervision and management. It also ensures that human and financial resources are not wasted on holding large numbers of prisoners in custodial settings that are more restrictive than necessary.

• For more detail on prison security, see the UNODC Handbooks on Dynamic Security and Prison Intelligence (2015) and on the Management of High-Risk Prisoners (2016)

²⁸The commentary (in paragraph 21) to the Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)3 of the Committee of Ministers to member States concerning dangerous offenders makes clear that offenders whose dangerousness is determined by their involvement in organized crime and/or terrorism create specific demands, in particular as far as questions of security and public order are concerned: the development of phenomena such as violence and/or proselytism in prisons needs to be avoided; when necessary, these dangerous offenders should be detained in penitentiary establishments located far from places where criminal organizations have a strong presence; these dangerous offenders should not be able to carry on with their criminal activities while in detention (for example, they should not have the opportunity to transmit orders to their accomplices on the outside).

²⁹Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules, Rule 36; European Prison Rules, Rules 3 and 18.10; Recommendation CM/Rec (2014)3 of the Committee of Ministers of member states concerning dangerous offenders (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 February 2014), para. 4.

2.4 Importance of prison intelligence

In order to ensure that the prison authorities can identify illicit activities, all prisons should have in place a structured prison intelligence system to gather security and related information in a secure environment, consistent with national legislation and international standards. All prison staff should have a responsibility to actively gather security information and pass this information to the security department. This is a key aspect of dynamic security and requires staff to actively engage, and maintain professional relationships, with prisoners if they are to obtain good quality information.

By being more attentive to what is going on throughout their individual correctional facilities, correctional personnel, especially “Line Staff”, can be instrumental in identifying those doing the radicalizing and those being radicalized. Seasoned correctional personnel can develop a sixth sense about the “feel” of certain correctional environments. They know when something is not right or normal. Gathering intelligence is just refining those learned traits and reporting and documenting observations, conversations, associations, changes in offenders’ actions and behaviors, etc.

Sturgeon, W. (2015) Radicalization and Intelligence Gathering In Correctional Institutions.

The ability to collect, evaluate, collate, analyse and disseminate information related to violent extremist prisoners is critical not only to the safe operation of prison facilities but also to the prevention of radicalization to violent extremism. Prison intelligence systems aid in security, assist in intake, assessment and classification, and inform interventions and rehabilitative measures. Accurate intelligence information also assists prison management in making sound strategic decisions about prisoner placement and allocation of human resources and funding in the prisons to address security issues, including the prevention of radicalization to violence of members of the larger prison population.

GERMANY (State of Hesse): A prison intelligence network on violent extremist prisoners

In 2016, a new department in the Prison Service (Ministry of Justice) was set up. The overall objective was to establish a central contact point and centre of competence, which would collect relevant knowledge generated through the implementation of projects, and make such knowledge available to other institutions. In addition, seven “structural observers” (*Strukturbeobachter*) were deployed in various prisons in the state of Hesse, who act as the focal points for relevant information on site. Their work involves close cooperation and information-sharing with prison staff from various department and disciplines, trainers from the Violence Prevention Network, prison imams, structural observers in other prisons, as well as with the Ministry of Justice, the State Office of Criminal Investigations (*Landeskriminalamt*), and the Agency for Internal Security (*Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz*), as appropriate. Their tasks also involve the supervision and monitoring of violent extremist prisoners’ (a) postal correspondence; (b) telephone calls; (c) visits, according to circumstances; and (d) money transfers; as well as (e) the participation in and/or initiation of case conferences related to violent extremist prisoners.

Identification of violent extremism includes the: (a) diligent evaluation of existing information and intelligence (e.g. documentation related to the individual’s imprisonment, etc.); (b) detailed observation of the individual in the course of his or her imprisonment; and the (c) continuous information-sharing, such as with the Police and the Agency for Internal Security (*Landesamt für*

Verfassungsschutz). With regards to the latter element, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior and Sports and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration of the state of Hesse have developed dedicated guidelines on the cooperation of the Police, the Agency for Internal Security and the Prison/Probation Services in cases of politically motivated violence and organized crime, as well as for countering violent extremism.

Case study submitted by the Prison Service, State of Hesse, Germany, in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

As with most elements of prison operations, how officials gather and utilize intelligence depends on a number of factors including their legal frameworks, cultures and resources. Prison systems should have a central information-gathering unit, which provides prison management with accurate and timely information about radicalization to violence activities and improves prison security protocols. This is best accomplished by observing, documenting and addressing the behaviour of violent extremist prisoners. Regular written reports on each violent extremist prisoner is one approach to support consistent and individualized attention.

The effective management of violent extremist prisoners further requires the collaborative sharing of intelligence throughout their incarceration (pretrial, post-conviction and pre-release). All legal sources for gathering information on what is happening within prisons should be utilized as a way to identify potential radicalization to violence in prison.³⁰ Prisons and prison intelligence units do not exist in isolation, and dealing with violent extremist prisoners, and preventing radicalization to violence, requires a comprehensive approach based on approved professional standards at all levels—local, national and international. Prison services should therefore cooperate with probation services, where they exist, other law enforcement and security agencies, public and private bodies and civil society in order to achieve successful disengagement and reintegration of prisoners.³¹

At the point a violent extremist prisoner enters prison, there is a wealth of information already held on the individual by the police, the prosecution service, the judiciary, social services and other agencies. It is essential that, at this point, the prison intelligence unit captures all available intelligence on that violent extremist prisoner and creates a prisoner profile for him or her. To do this effectively and in order to avoid working at cross purposes, it is essential that there is a good working relationship between the prison intelligence unit and their police, security services and other counterparts tasked with tackling violent extremism. Most police services and some security services will have an intelligence department that will gather and process prisoner-related intelligence.

Prisons should be open to receiving and sharing intelligence and prison staff aware of how information will be utilized. Officials should consider appropriate protocols and procedures to put in place, in order to share information internally and externally. In order to facilitate the sharing of information between all public safety sectors, such protocols should be reciprocal. If outside agencies are involved in collecting intelligence from within the prison system, such

³⁰ IJ Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization, Recommendation 12 (Utilize all legal sources for gathering information on what is happening within prisons as a way to identify potential violent extremist radicalization in prison).

³¹ See Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principles 26-27.

efforts should be coordinated with prison officials to avoid disruption to the proper management of the prison or ongoing interventions. Prisons are valuable sources of intelligence relevant to criminal justice and national security and should therefore be as open to sharing their intelligence information as they are to receiving such information from partner agencies.

ENGLAND AND WALES: The Extremism Unit of the National Offender Management Service

The Extremism Unit (ExU) is part of NOMS [prison administration] Security Group and is responsible for developing the strategic, policy and procedural responses appropriate to the risks presented by terrorists, extremists and radicalisers. It receives intelligence and information on extremism from all prisons in England and Wales and uses this information to produce strategic analysis to assist operational colleagues in prisons and to inform future intelligence gathering. The ExU works with Regional Counter Terrorism Coordinators (RCTCs) based across the regions in England and Wales to develop intelligence and to monitor and manage terrorist or extremist prisoners in custody. RCTCs work with key partners such as Probation, Police and Security Services to share information and help manage the risk these offenders pose.

National Offender Management Service (2014) : Managing Terrorist and Extremist Offenders in the Community, p. 10.

Inter-agency cooperation, in practice, often needs to be supported by detailed cooperation agreements and protocols that articulate clearly the respective responsibilities of all agencies, the resources that they will engage and their service commitment. Inter-agency cooperation is usually well served by being formalized and accompanied by clear protocols for resource-sharing, information-sharing and problem-solving. The respective roles and responsibilities of each agency must be clearly defined and understood, and personnel from each agency can benefit from an understanding of the respective, and often differing, policies and practices of other agencies.

CANADA: Information-sharing arrangements between agencies

The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) identifies persons of credible concern to national security in three primary ways: individuals convicted of a terrorism offence (Section 83.01 Criminal Code of Canada); those identified by partners or third party agencies (e.g., the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Agency); and those identified internally by CSC. Early detection and identification is of paramount importance and affords CSC the ability to closely monitor these cases through existing security intelligence processes. Existing external partner information sharing arrangements (via memorandums of understanding) are an integral component in the process of identification, detection, and prevention. CSC possesses MOUs with various criminal justice and law enforcement partners that allow for sharing of information on national security cases. This includes support of active operational and criminal investigations.

Contribution submitted by the Correctional Service of Canada in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

It is good practice to have an Information Sharing Agreement in place at local level to facilitate this process and, wherever possible, to be transparent about this process. Information should only be shared where it is strictly necessary to the intended outcome and

proportionate to it. Key to determining the necessity and proportionality of sharing information will be the professional judgement of the risks to an individual or the public. In many jurisdictions, the sharing of data by public sector bodies requires the existence of a legal power to do so. The information collected by organizations must also comply with the relevant national guidelines and/or legislation for the management of information.

 *For further detail on privacy, personal data protection and informed consent to data sharing, see chapter 6.6*

2.5 Safe and orderly institutions

The management of violent extremist prisoners presents a challenge to prison authorities, in that they have to achieve a balance between the threat that such prisoners may pose to order inside prisons, including the risk that they will seek to radicalize others to violence, and the obligation of the State to treat all prisoners in a decent and humane manner.

It is possible to plot a spectrum of the potential activities violent extremist groups and individuals may undertake in a custodial environment. Some, or even many, of these activities may be seen in normal prison behaviour and, taken individually, may not be seen as reliable indicators of violent extremist behaviour at the individual or group level. There are four categories of potential activity which can have a negative impact on the safety and order in prison: (a) forming groups and the emergence of organizations; (b) using passive or non-violent resistance; (c) using violent means to resist the prison authorities actively; and (d) intimidation through threats of violence to families of prison staff or other prisoners. A characteristic displayed by a number of violent extremist groups is their use of paramilitary-style hierarchical command structures, which are imported from external organizational structures into the prison. The use of such paramilitary structures and roles (such as “officer commanding”) is in keeping with the view of some violent extremist groups that their prisoners should be seen as prisoners of war.

Violent extremist prisoners may voluntarily self-segregate themselves from the rest of the prison population. For example, prisoners may seek to move into cells or rooms with fellow violent extremists as a means of promoting solidarity and avoiding conflict with other prisoners. Such segregation may become a problem for prison administrations where organized groups of violent extremist prisoners engage in deliberate efforts to take over the exercise of organizational discipline in the prisons. Self-segregation may also manifest itself in other aspects of prison life, such as refusing to share religious facilities or communal religious services. On the other hand, a fundamental aspect of any organization’s existence is its ability to recruit and integrate new members. Some violent extremist groups may therefore proactively seek to recruit new members from the general prison population. In some cases, different groups may compete over these new recruits, who are coerced or intimidated into joining them.

 *For more detail on radicalization to violence within prisons, see chapter 7*

A recurring aspect of collective resistance by violent extremists is refusing to engage in normal prison behaviour and activities. This may include the refusal to wear a prison uniform or to participate in prison work. Such refusal serves to both distinguish the violent extremist group from ordinary criminal prisoners, and to appropriate power from the prison authorities. Making consistent allegations of mistreatment at the hands of the authorities can also be used as part of a deliberate strategy to disrupt the normal operation of a prison.

Physical violence may occur in all prison environments. Confrontations between prisoners, and between prisoners and staff, occur over a variety of issues, such as control of resources, access to privileges or simply as a means of self-preservation. However, violence can also be used collectively and to further specific aims in a prison. Violent extremist groups may seek to launch violent assaults on prison staff as a direct challenge to the prison authorities and as a means of appropriating power. There have also been examples of violent extremist groups taking hostages in prison and starting riots.

Violent extremist documentation seized by security services indicates that violent extremist groups seek to build up their organizational networks inside prison through carefully developed practices.³² Some violent extremist groups provide training manuals on how to behave and organize within prison, recommending a structure that closely parallels violent extremist cell structures.³³ There is also some evidence that violent extremist prison groups use ethnic languages and script as codes—a practice adopted from existing prison gangs and the use of ancient scripts as code by right-wing extremist groups—to communicate secretly and to smuggle violent extremist materials undetected.³⁴ Staff should be attentive to such activity. Finally, some violent extremist prisoners may remain well-behaved, passive and compliant (“model prisoners”) in order to convince prison staff that they are not a risk to the order of the prison. However, they may well be undermining staff control by seeking to radicalize other prisoners to violence, running prison gangs and manipulating the weaker prisoners into breaking the rules. Good training and experience will enable staff to identify the real causes of actual or threatened disorder in prison.

Order in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners could be achieved through excessive control, but to do so would make the prison punitive, restrictive, oppressive and over-controlled. Oppressive confinement and repressive brutality and intimidation have no place in a modern prison system, even when managing violent extremist prisoners.

Discipline and order shall be maintained with no more restriction than is necessary to ensure safe custody, the secure operation of the prison and a well-ordered community life.

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 36.

[R]adicalisation processes can be accentuated and reinforced when disproportionate measures are deployed by the prison administration. Therefore punitive measures, use of force and means of restraint shall be proportionate to direct and serious threats of disruption of good order, safety and security in a given prison in order to preserve to the extent possible relations of trust and support in helping the reintegration of the offender.

Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 10.

³²See for example: Central intelligence Agency (2002) *Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars*, p. 1. “Some terrorist groups ... not only encourage members to organize in prison but also provide training on how to create a network that closely parallels terrorist cell structures ... members there are trying to put their training into practice by establishing cellblock leaders and dividing responsibility among deputies for greeting new arrivals, assessing interrogations; monitoring the guard force, and providing moral support to fellow detainees, among other tasks.” Available at: www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/ctc082002.pdf

³³See for example, “al-Qaeda training manual – Lesson 18: Prisons and Detention centres”, quoted above.

³⁴Criminal Investigative Division, “Gangs Use Ciphers and Secret Codes to Communicate,” Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Bulletin (Unclassified), 20 July 2006.

Where prison managers cannot provide safe conditions, however, prisoners will turn to other prisoners for protection. Feeling unsafe will lead prisoners to: join prison gangs; pay for protection (in goods or services); or undertake illicit activity (such as smuggling goods, participating in disturbances or assaulting other prisoners or staff) in return for protection. In the case of prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, there is the added risk that if the institution is not safe, prisoners may create alliances with violent extremist groups for their own survival. An institution can diminish the appeal of these violent extremist groups by ensuring that they do not provide protection and other services that the prison itself should offer. All prisoner vulnerabilities, including feeling unsafe, provide potential opportunities for recruitment and radicalization since violent extremist ideologues will have the time, space and opportunity to target individuals who may be susceptible to radicalization.³⁵

Incentives: The challenge in any prison system is to respond to indiscipline in a way that ensures the security and safety of prisoners and staff, and encourage prisoners to learn to respect existing rules and regulations. The concept of incentives is one which prison administrations throughout the world have used for many years for all prisoners, including for violent extremists. Enabling violent extremist prisoners to earn benefits in exchange for responsible behaviour encourages them to participate in disengagement interventions and ensures a more disciplined and controlled environment that is safer for staff and prisoners. Other potentially positive outcomes include a reduced risk of self-harm and improved staff-prisoner relationships.

Restrictions and disciplinary sanctions: From time to time, however, it is inevitable that some violent extremist prisoners will break the rules and regulations of the prison, threaten the good order of the institution or, on occasion, may use the disorder as a distraction to facilitate an escape attempt. The disciplinary system is one of the methods of maintaining order in prisons, and will encompass informal resolution mechanisms, internal disciplinary measures or—in case of serious alleged criminal acts committed in prison—criminal prosecution.

If found guilty of a disciplinary offence, prisoners may be subject to a range of restrictions and sanctions. These should always be just and proportionate to the offence in question, and should be the consequence and culmination of a disciplinary process imposed after an allegation against a prisoner is established. In no circumstances may restrictions or disciplinary sanctions amount to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In this regard, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners explicitly prohibit a number of practices altogether, including:

- Solitary confinement, defined as the confinement of prisoners for 22 hours or more a day without meaningful human contact, for an indefinite term
- Prolonged solitary confinement, defined as solitary confinement for a time period in excess of 15 consecutive days
- Solitary confinement in the case of juveniles; pregnant women; women with infants; breastfeeding mothers; and prisoners with mental or physical disabilities (the latter category as far as their conditions would be exacerbated by such measures)
- Placement of a prisoner in a dark or constantly lit cell

³⁵ IJ Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization, Recommendation 2 (Maintain a safe and humane environment where violent extremist radicalization can be identified early-on and terrorist recruiters have less opportunity to target vulnerable individuals).

- Corporal punishment, including the reduction of diet or drinking water
- Collective punishment³⁶

Use of force: The use of force by prison staff should remain a measure of last resort, and be strictly governed by the principles of necessity and proportionality. It should be limited to cases of attempted escapes, of active or passive physical resistance against a lawful order, or when personal security is threatened. There are particular principles that apply in relation to firearms, which must be followed. As a general rule, however, and except in special circumstances, prison staff performing duties which bring them into direct contact with prisoners should not be armed. Finally, it is never permissible in a well-managed prison to employ or otherwise rely on prisoners to control other prisoners.³⁷

Request or complaints: All prison systems should have a clearly defined set of procedures that allow a violent extremist prisoner, or their legal advisor, to make a request or complaint, or to air a grievance, without fear of reprisal.³⁸ The utility of healthy communication in any human institution cannot be overemphasized. Prisoners should be encouraged to communicate with the prison administration about any difficulties they have, and be assured that their complaints will be treated seriously. Complaints procedures should contain a description of how a prisoner can go about making a request about his or her treatment and should also describe the avenues of complaint available to prisoners, beginning at the local level, going on to the most senior level in the prison, and, if need be, proceed to external bodies and organizations (such as the prison administration headquarters, inspectorate, ombudsman, or courts).

✦ For further detail on operating safe and orderly prisons, see chapter 6 of the UNODC Handbook on the Management of High-Risk Prisoners (2016)

³⁶Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules, Rules 43-45; also see the Bangkok Rules, Rules 22-23.

³⁷Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 40(1), 82; Code Of Conduct For Law Enforcement Officials, Article 2; Basic Principles On The Use Of Force And Firearms By Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 15-16.

³⁸Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 56 and 57.


3.

Managing prison staff and other people who work with violent extremist prisoners

3.1 Introduction

Staff are the most important element of any prison system. Prison administrations should recognize this and devote significant time and resources to the recruitment, selection and training of personnel who work in prison. Ensuring that prisons holding violent extremist prisoners have a sufficient number of good quality and well-trained staff should be a priority for all prison systems.

In jurisdictions where violent extremist prisoners are held in separate facilities, prison staff will find themselves only working with violent extremists. In other countries where violent extremists are integrated into all prisons, or dispersed among a few high-security prisons, prison staff may work with violent extremists on a less frequent basis. In both scenarios, the way in which prison officials deal with violent extremist prisoners (who sometimes refuse to conform to legitimate expectations) can be one of the greatest challenges to the professionalism of prison staff. Prison managers and staff have to balance security and control with delivering disengagement and reintegration interventions when working with violent extremist prisoners. Whereas general staff-related elements are covered in other UNODC publications, the intention here is to highlight issues related specifically to working with violent extremist prisoners.

 For further detail, see chapter 3 of the UNODC Handbook on the Management of High-Risk Prisoners (2015), including guidance on: qualities of prison staff; recruitment and selection of staff; training and development; conditions of service; staffing levels; prison management; professional standards and ethics; the importance of interpersonal skills; exercise of discretion; and the risk of staff manipulation and conditioning

3.2 Qualities of prison staff

Staff working with violent extremist prisoners require a good combination of personal qualities and technical skills. They need personal qualities that enable them to deal with all prisoners, including the difficult, dangerous and manipulative, in an even-handed, humane and just manner.

As society in general has become more diverse, complex and interconnected, prison society has come to reflect this. This changes the requirements for staff skills and competences, especially with regard to radicalisation and extremism, in which identity often plays a key role. Sensitivity and understanding of other cultural and religious norms, values and expressions has become increasingly important for the building of good staff-offender relationships. Prejudices and fear of staff members, leading to over-reporting and negative interactions with detainees, can undermine de-radicalisation/disengagement efforts. Staff dealing directly with convicted terrorists need specific skill sets and not all staff members will be suitable. It is a challenge to select and train staff to deal with radicalisation and violent extremism.

Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016) Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, RAN Prisons and Probation—practitioners working paper, p3.

It should be remembered that people joining the prison administration do so with a range of existing skills, knowledge and abilities. It is important that prison administrations see staff as a valuable asset, build on these existing attributes, and make good use of any existing but not yet developed talents.

3.3 Recruitment and selection of staff

The importance of careful recruitment and selection of prison staff is highlighted in a number of international instruments.³⁹ Most jurisdictions appoint only experienced staff to work with violent extremist prisoners, as it requires more specialized skills and a high level of personal integrity to work effectively with those prisoners. This means, first of all, that men and women who are to work in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners need to be carefully selected to make sure that they have the necessary additional qualities, knowledge, and experience.

A few jurisdictions have taken the policy decision to also use new staff in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, in order to ensure that new perspectives are available, to break down more entrenched views displayed by longer serving staff, and to overcome problems of corruption among some current staff. These new staff will require comprehensive and in-depth training and support, as they will be new to working in the prison environment.

Safeguards should be put in place to ensure that staff selected to work with violent extremist prisoners are not members of violent extremist groups, criminal gangs or associated with organized crime, and are not being used to infiltrate the prison. In post-conflict situations, in particular, it is important to provide effective vetting of people who will be working with violent extremist prisoners—both existing staff and new staff—to ensure that there are no pre-existing loyalties or any hostility between staff and violent extremist prisoners.

Gender-sensitive techniques should be adopted in recruitment, retention and promotion of women in prison administrations to correct any gender imbalance. Women staff should be recruited and trained to work with women violent extremist prisoners and to design and deliver gender-appropriate interventions.

 *For further detail on the special needs of women violent extremist prisoners, see chapter 4.7*

³⁹ See the Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 74-75; Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, Article 18; Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, Principle XX; Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa, 6; European Prison Rules, Rules 77 and 82.

Every effort should be made to recruit staff from ethnic, religious and racial minorities and indigenous peoples represented among the violent extremist prisoner population. This will help to ensure a better understanding among staff about different cultures, establish a non-discriminatory attitude towards prisoners from minority groups and indigenous peoples, and help foster trust between prisoners and staff. Recruiting minority staff also assists in addressing challenges related to language and interpretation, which often makes it difficult for staff to understand conversations or the exact translation of certain words and statements, leading to misinterpretations, intelligence errors, and challenges when delivering interventions (where effective communications are crucial).⁴⁰

As much as possible, prison and probation services shall select and recruit staff with relevant linguistic abilities and cultural sensitivity. Intercultural and multifaith awareness training for staff shall form an integral part of education and training in order to promote understanding of and tolerance to diversity of beliefs and traditions.

Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 13.

Prison administrations should be aware, however, that in some cases staff from the same ethnic, religious or cultural background as violent extremist prisoners may be seen as traitors by those prisoners, which might, in itself, generate conflict. Furthermore, if a member of the prison staff shares the views and beliefs of a particular violent extremist group, he or she should not be allocated to work with prisoners from that group.

Particular attention needs to be paid to the recruitment of specialist staff. These are likely to be individuals who are already trained in a specific profession. They will include faith leaders, teachers, instructors and health-care staff. Adequate numbers of specialist staff, such as psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers, should also be appointed to prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, given the requirement to address the complex needs of this group of prisoners. It should not be assumed that people who have had professional training will automatically be suitable to work in a prison environment. They also need to be selected carefully and there needs to be clarity about the role they are expected to carry out in the prison administration.

3.4 Training and development of staff

Training, which is crucial to any environment, is especially important for people working with violent extremist prisoners. International standards indicate that prison staff should receive training before beginning work in prison (pre-service “orientation” training) and throughout their career in the prison administration (in-service “refresher” training).⁴¹

⁴⁰ See Sydney Memorandum, Internal Challenge 5.

⁴¹ See the Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules, Rules 75-76; Bangkok Rules, Rules 29 and 33.

CANADA: Training for staff working with violent extremist prisoners

The Correctional Service of Canada's (CSC) facilities are secure environments, where offender behaviour is routinely observed, monitored, supervised and reported. Frontline correctional, security and parole staff are provided training on Security Threat Group identification and management, which includes training on the identifiers and behaviours of individuals and groups who pose a security risk to CSC operations.

Radicalized offenders have been identified at some CSC facilities across the country, and security staff at these locations receive support and guidance from external criminal justice partners (i.e. the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Counter-Terrorism Information Officer Program). CSC recognizes the need to build organizational resilience to radicalization and violent extremism through staff awareness and educational training. Intervention is heavily dependent on the strength of identification practices, as early detection would allow CSC to intervene in addressing the contributing and criminogenic factors that motivate individuals to support and engage in violent extremism-related activities.

Contribution submitted by the Correctional Service of Canada in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Good practice is to give additional training to staff before they begin working in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners. Introductory-level modules such as on “Managing violent extremists in prison” or on “Identifying radicalization to violence within prison” can be delivered to new staff as part of their primary orientation training. In addition, it is important to offer courses that educate and sensitize staff to linguistic, cultural and religious diversity. For example, in 2016, the Nigerian Prisons Service introduced a two-week training course on the Management and De-Radicalisation of Violent Extremist Prisoners. The course is part of the curriculum for the training of all new recruits.

More advanced training should be provided for staff working with violent extremist prisoners on a daily basis and should include topics such as: understanding violent extremism; recognizing signs of radicalization to violence; assessment of violent extremist prisoners; implementing a positive regime for violent extremist prisoners; assessment of intelligence and other information about violent extremist prisoners; anti-conditioning and manipulation training; dealing with individual or group violence in a way that protects staff while using minimal force; adhering to ethical and professional standards; interpersonal skills; intelligence gathering; stress management; religious diversity and freedom of religion or belief; and sensitization and awareness courses focussing on language, behaviour, cultural and religious issues related to specific groups.

In lower-resource and post-conflict countries, providing formal training courses for staff may not always be possible. In such circumstances, regular briefing sessions on relevant topics should be provided by more experienced staff before the beginning of shifts.

All first-line prison and probation staff should be trained to recognise signs of radicalisation. It is not necessary for all staff members to be experts on specific ideologies or religions. It is however necessary that correctional officers have some background knowledge of the religious and cultural backgrounds of the people they are working with. This is essential to understanding the difference between normal cultural and religious-based expressions, and extremist expressions.

Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016) Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, RAN Prisons and Probation—practitioners working paper, p. 4.

It is critical that staff working in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners are properly equipped to recognize signs of radicalization to violence.⁴² This is especially true for those who are in direct contact with individuals at risk of radicalization to violence. Although these professionals are not all prison staff, their training and awareness of the needs of individuals at risk means that they are often the best placed to recognize those individuals in the process of being radicalized to violence. But frontline workers do not always have a good understanding of the process of radicalization to violence or know how to respond to it. Training is therefore needed to help them recognize and interpret signs of radicalization to violence, and to help them judge whether an intervention is appropriate or not.⁴³ In some jurisdictions, experienced members of staff are appointed as “reference points” for less experienced staff to whom they can raise concerns and ask for advice on whether a specific behaviour is an indication of radicalization to violence.

● *For further detail on the prevention radicalization to violence in prisons, see chapter 7*

ITALY: Training course for staff working with violent extremist prisoners

The Office of Training of the Penitentiary Department of the Italian Ministry of Justice identified, in 2010, the need to introduce a training course for existing staff on how to manage Muslim violent extremist prisoners. The course had two objectives: to help staff avoid behaving in a way that might offend the religious sensitivity of Muslim prisoners; and give staff sufficient knowledge about Islam to ensure that prisoners did not exploit the lack of knowledge. The three-day training course consisted of sessions on: cultural and religious aspects of Islam; Islamic religious practice; international terrorism, ideological background and its diffusion; proselytization and radicalization; penitentiary management of international terrorists; and operational techniques.

A six-month follow-up evaluation found that 80 per cent of staff who completed the course noticed a significant improvement in the quality of their daily duties in the prison; felt more aware of aspects related to the culture and religious practice of Muslim prisoners; and were therefore better able to establish constructive relationships with those prisoners.

Office of Training, Penitentiary Department, Ministry of Justice, Italy.

Where prisons are delivering disengagement interventions, as described in chapter 5, everybody involved in the disengagement process (including scholars, faith leaders, uniformed, non-uniformed and frontline staff) require training to sensitize them to the intervention, its goals and objectives, the kind of violent extremist prisoners they are dealing with, how to manage crises when they arise, and how to distinguish between signs of radicalization to violence and legitimate expressions of faith or ideology.⁴⁴

It is particularly important that frontline prison staff understand and are carefully attuned to the disengagement and reintegration process, even if they are not directly responsible for its delivery. Staff should avoid actions that undermine the disengagement and reintegration

⁴² IJ Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization, Recommendation 5 (Commit to developing professional staff, with a particular focus on the elements that will help officials identify and address violent extremist radicalization in prisons).

⁴³ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: Strengthening the EU's response (2014), para 2.4.

⁴⁴ Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 5; also see the ICCTR Paper on the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, Subsection II (Staff training).

process. It would be helpful for prison staff to have a thorough understanding of and appreciate the important role they play to support the process.⁴⁵

It is further useful to look for ways and opportunities to cross-train with other law enforcement agencies in order to share operational information and good practices. Training involving representatives of a variety of government departments and agencies can also serve to increase awareness of the challenges and capabilities of partner organizations and strengthen inter-agency coordination and information exchange.⁴⁶

BELGIUM: The CoPPRa staff training module

CoPPRa is a training project which was initially designed for police officers in Belgium, but which has since been used to train prison staff and other criminal justice professionals. The programme aims to improve the capacity of frontline criminal justice staff to prevent radicalization to violence. It rests on the assumption that while frontline staff have a key role in prevention, they do not always have a good understanding of radicalization to violence, how to recognize the warning signs, or understand what to do in response. This project has aimed to help to remedy this through the spread of relevant knowledge and training.

In order to achieve this, CoPPRa has developed a pocket guide for first line staff, a CoPPRa Train the Trainer manual, CoPPRa e-learning on its website, and a CD-ROM with PowerPoint slides of different training modules. This material is free and is available for interested criminal justice organizations. The material is also free to be adapted to local needs and situations. The material takes approximately eight hours to cover in total.

In 2015, the CoPPRa module was adapted so that it could now be included in the basic training received by all prison staff in Belgium, with a particular focus on helping staff to detect signs of radicalization to violence among prisoners. The aim of the training is to raise levels of awareness among staff, but also reduce false alarms and unnecessary concern.

Available at: <http://www.coppra.eu/resources.php>.

Although it can be very helpful to discuss good training practice from different regions, it is important that courses are tailored to the local environment and that participants are challenged to consider how international strategies and practices can function in their country. Furthermore, the training should be tailored to the challenges, responsibilities and capabilities of the different stakeholders to ensure that they achieve maximum impact.

Prison directors holding violent extremist prisoners in their prisons also require training in “political intelligence”. That is, they need to be able to manage prisoners who have a high profile with politicians, media and the public. This brings greater scrutiny and sensitivity to any operational decision made in relation to those prisoners. It is important, therefore, that prison directors understand the broader landscape and are able to navigate through additional pressures.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Good Practice, No. 9.

⁴⁶ Global Center on Cooperative Security (2015): *Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa: an Action Agenda*, Action 3.

3.5 Conditions of service

As the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) make clear, prison staff should be given appropriate status, levels of pay and conditions of employment.⁴⁷ The conditions of service for staff working with violent extremist prisoners should reflect the challenges and importance of their role. The issue of pay requires careful consideration. If staff do not receive salary levels appropriate to the economic situation in their country, they may be open to corruption of a direct or indirect nature.

Prison staff, in a number of jurisdictions, have been attacked and killed by violent extremist groups as a consequence of working in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners. The prison administration should therefore take appropriate steps to ensure the personal safety of staff working in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, both while they are on duty in the prison and while outside of the prison. There have been cases where threats have been made directly to staff and their family members, and, in some cases, the “target killing” of officials and their family members, particularly if they do not collaborate with violent extremist prisoners’ demands.

Depending on the level of risk at any particular time, additional measures may involve providing secure housing for staff and their families, equipment to search their vehicles, and personal alarms. There are also examples, such as in Turkey, where staff working with violent extremist prisoners are provided with public housing and special vehicles. Prison managers who oversee prisons holding violent extremist prisoners sometimes express concern that the unique challenges of these facilities can create a great deal of stress for the staff who work in those prisons. Prison administrations should attempt to mitigate the impact of this environment in a variety of ways.

Finally, prison administrators should ensure that each prison has an appropriate number of staff on duty at all times to enable the prison to comply with international standards and national laws and regulations.⁴⁸ The appropriate staffing level for each prison holding violent extremist prisoners should depend on the number of staff required to be on duty at any one time to ensure security, safety and order. It is also important that sufficient staff are appointed to enable violent extremist prisoners to participate in a range of constructive regime activities, including disengagement interventions, and to do so without having a negative impact on the security, safety and stability of the prison.

➤ *For further detail on staffing levels, see chapter 2.3 of the UNODC Handbook on the Management of High-Risk Prisoners (2016)*

3.6 Professional standards and ethics

Violent extremist prisoners may attempt to undermine the professionalism of staff and seek to exploit staff to obtain illicit goods, to assist with an escape attempt or to act as a conduit to criminal groups outside of the prison. Prison staff need, therefore, to meet high standards of professional and personal conduct at all times.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Nelson Mandela Rules, Rule 74.

⁴⁸See, for example, Principles and Best Practices on The Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, Principle XX.

⁴⁹Nelson Mandela Rules, Rule 77; United Nations Code Of Conduct For Law Enforcement Officials, Article 7.

Behaviour that amounts to unprofessional conduct includes: discrimination; harassment; victimization or bullying; dealings with prisoners, former prisoners and their friends and relations; provoking, using unnecessary or unlawful force or assaulting a prisoner; using offensive language to a prisoner; having any sexual involvement with a prisoner; or giving prisoners or ex-prisoners personal or other information about staff, prisoners or their friends and relatives which is held in confidence.

Not only is the apparent further radicalisation of terrorist convicts in prison an issue, but the potential radicalisation of the inmate population and the prison officers is a problem as well. In 2005, ... a warden at the Keborokan Prison in Bali helped smuggle a laptop into prison for the Bali bomber, Imam Samudra, who was then on death row. It was subsequently revealed that the laptop was used by Samudra to chat with other militants and help plan the second Bali bombing.

Ungerer C.: "Jihadists in Jail: Radicalisation and the Indonesian prison experience", Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2011/40, p. 12.

Prison officials should be accountable for ensuring that their prisons have internal standards and methods in place and implemented to affectively prevent and counter corruption.⁵⁰ Some examples of methods include vetting staff at the point of recruitment and selection for working with violent extremist prisoners, conducting unannounced staff searches, changing shifts regularly, developing an internal affairs or professional standards unit to investigate reports of corruption, and prosecuting and publicizing examples of corrupt staff. Ways in which violent extremist prisoners may attempt to undermine the professionalism of staff and seek to exploit staff include the following:

- *Manipulation:* A feature of prison life is that prisoners may endeavour to manipulate staff. This can be even more prevalent in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, as some violent extremist prisoners can be very adept at communication and manipulation. They may do this for malicious reasons or as a strategy to obtain psychological prominence. Whatever the motivation, the consequences are always serious. In manipulating staff, prisoners seek to take control from them and this threatens safe custody, leaving staff anxious and uncertain. In order to prevent manipulation, staff should demonstrate professionalism, be transparent, impartial and consistent. Managers should ensure that staff receive training on manipulation and are constantly vigilant to attempts to manipulate them.
- *Conditioning:* Some violent extremist prisoners are particularly good at conditioning prison staff. Conditioning can be defined as the manipulation of the balance of power towards the advantage of the manipulator. Within the prison context, it is how prisoners impose their will upon staff and how some staff impose their will on other members of staff. Violent extremist prisoners can adopt a number of methods to identify potential staff targets for conditioning and exploitation.

Violent extremist groups and individuals have been most successful in their prison operations when they have corrupted sympathetic staff or intimidated or manipulated

⁵⁰ IJJ Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization, Recommendation 11 (Take preventative measures to combat corruption to reduce opportunities for radicalization and ensure that where corruption exists, its perpetrators are appropriately punished).

understaffed and undereducated guard forces.⁵¹ Manuals produced by violent extremist groups, which have been seized by security services, indicate that violent extremist groups provide instruction on how to manipulate and corrupt prison staff.⁵² They encourage prisoners to: speak with individual members of prison staff, not groups; convince staff that the prisoner is not as bad as they were told; and offer moral guidance to staff. The manuals also provide guidelines to violent extremist prisoners about what to discuss with staff, to claim abuse, and protest about their treatment.

Prison administrations should take steps to ensure that staff do not succumb to conditioning and exploitation. Staff should receive training on: the importance of adhering to policy and procedures; reporting conditioning immediately; avoiding over-familiarity with prisoners (friendly, not friends); dynamic security; establishing boundaries (e.g. not sharing personal information); and acting in a professional, reliable and consistent manner.

- *Intimidation and extortion:* Violent extremist prisoners can also resort to intimidation and extortion of staff to achieve their goals of escape; creating disorder; or committing criminal activities while in prison. In such circumstances, there is a danger that some prison staff will respond by retreating into a passive role, in which they do little to enforce rules or correct prisoners' behaviour.

3.7 Contribution of specialist staff and other people

Faith professionals⁵³

Member States should consider integrating appropriate faith professionals into the disengagement process, as they can play an important role in the process. In the case of ideological and faith-inspired violent extremist activity, a number of incarcerated violent extremists who cite religion for their actions may have a shallow knowledge of the religion by which they were supposedly inspired. Properly trained faith professionals should be encouraged to engage in extensive dialogue with violent extremist prisoners and potentially raise doubts about their views on the acceptability of the use of violence.

Not every faith professional will be well suited for a therapeutic function. Faith professionals who are incredibly knowledgeable and experienced in their pastoral work may find it difficult to operate in the prison environment, as the rehabilitation of violent extremists requires a different set of skills and aptitudes. Assessing the faith professional's willingness and ability to work in the therapeutic environment should therefore be a key factor in the selection process.

⁵¹ Central Intelligence Agency (2002) *Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars*, p. 3. Available at: www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/ctc082002.pdf

⁵² See for example, "al-Qaeda training manual – Lesson 18: Prisons and Detention centres", quoted above.

⁵³ The term faith professional is used in this context to refer to religious scholars, faith advisors, and spiritual care givers from all faiths and religious traditions who have an extensive knowledge of their particular faith.

Guidance on the role of religious scholars and other ideological experts

Governments should provide religious scholars with specialized training related to their functions before they begin this work. They will need training both in how to operate in the prison setting and in dealing with inmates, and in making the transition from the traditional pastoral role to include a more advocacy position in the therapeutic community. Basic training in psychology would also be an important component of the training for the religious scholars, as their work will involve a large psychological dimension.

Governments should take steps to vet religious scholars before they are allowed to work in the rehabilitation setting to ensure that their substantive knowledge and views are acceptable, in line with the therapeutic objectives and are not likely to result in counterproductive activities.

Governments should also vet material that is used by religious scholars and that is brought into the prison setting, to ensure that it is supportive of the rehabilitation goals and does not condone or support extremist ideology.

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute / Government of Spain (2013): Building on the GCTF's Rome Memorandum – Additional Guidance on the Role of Religious Scholars and other Ideological Experts in Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes.

A faith professional who comes from the same tribal, ethnic or linguistic groups as the violent extremist prisoner can, in some circumstances, be more effective than one who comes from a different segment of the community. However, since these scholars might become targets for violent extremists, Member States should consider taking steps to ensure their safety throughout this process.⁵⁴

✚ For further detail on faith-based interventions, see chapter 5.7

Careful attention should be given to the selection and training of faith professionals who will be leading interventions when it comes to different sects and teachings. Some disengagement programmes have faced challenges where faith professionals cannot agree on the kind of sectarian doctrine to be used in countering violent extremist ideology. In such circumstances, emphasis should be placed on the central role of religious doctrines that promote peace and tolerance. The training for faith leaders should transcend their sectarian affiliations and be committed to issues of peace and security common to all in countering violent extremism.

Psychologists


Psychologists can play a key role in the disengagement process and should be fully integrated into those disengagement interventions.⁵⁵ They can help identify factors in the social context and psychological make-up that made the individual vulnerable to violent extremism and the motivational factors that contributed to his or her decision to engage in violent extremist activity. This information helps to inform the risk and needs process and to design an

⁵⁴Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 10.

⁵⁵See Hedayah and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (2013): Building on the GCTF's Rome Memorandum: Additional Guidance on the Role of Psychologists/Psychology in Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs.

individualized plan for each violent extremist prisoner. In addition to “disengagement”-related activity, psychologists are important for more general areas, including where there are mental health concerns that have little or nothing to do with ideology. Addressing these more general matters can indirectly effect change or disengagement.


Psychologists should be specially trained to do this type of work.⁵⁶ They should have at least a baseline understanding of violent extremism and terrorism and, where possible, a basic understanding of the foundational elements of disengagement and reintegration interventions in a prison setting. However, psychologists should also recognize that working with other offender populations is also valuable experience for dealing with violent extremists, and should not regard this particular segment of offenders as too challenging or different to work with.

 *For further detail on psychological and cognitive interventions, see chapter 5.8*

It should be noted that in many jurisdictions, particularly in lower-resourced countries, there may be few, if any, psychologists operating in prisons. Where this is the case, this should not be seen as a reason to delay work on disengagement interventions. Other staff can have a key role to play in developing disengagement assessment methods and interventions. These staff groups include: general prison staff, teachers, vocational training instructors, sports and exercise instructors, pastoral care providers, faith scholars and social workers.

Victims and victims' advocates

Victims and victims' advocates can be powerful voices and Member States could consider including them in disengagement interventions, where appropriate. If approached correctly, there may be the potential for victim-perpetrator contact to contribute to the physical and psychological well-being of the victims. It also might be beneficial for the perpetrators. Hearing first-hand how their violence tragically impacts ordinary citizens might evoke a mind-shift in violent extremist prisoners.⁵⁷ Moreover, dialogue between violent extremist prisoners and victims or their advocates may reduce psychological tension and may contribute to the violent extremist's disengagement and successful reintegration. It is important to carefully consider when, how, and which victims are introduced, so that prisoners are most receptive to their messages and perhaps more importantly so that potential negative side-effects for the victims are minimized—since revictimization is a possibility.

 *For further detail on victims in the context of violent extremist prisoners' social reintegration, see chapter 8.6*

Former violent extremists

Former violent extremists can be influential with those prisoners going through the disengagement process and could be included where possible and appropriate. Former violent extremists, particularly those who have been through the disengagement process themselves, may be influential with violent extremist prisoners participating in these interventions. The testimonials of

⁵⁶ Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 8.

⁵⁷ Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 12.

former violent extremist prisoners can be dramatic evidence of the benefits of change.⁵⁸ Their testimony on subjects including: the process of indoctrination; extricating themselves from violence; and the harsh realities of life as a violent extremist can have a big impact on current violent extremists. This being said, these former violent extremists must be carefully vetted and selected. Since these former violent extremists may themselves become targets for violent retaliation, Member States should consider taking steps to ensure their safety throughout this process.⁵⁹

INDONESIA: Using former terrorists in disengagement activity

The Indonesian police's approach to "de-radicalising" terrorist convicts is focused heavily on the former JI leadership group. In addition to offering financial incentives to some individuals, they have included elements of a counter-ideology program to convince militants that violence is not part of religion. Accordingly, the police have spearheaded an initiative using former militants who have revised their stances on violence to engage other militants in prisons. This is based on the assumption that former hardliners have a more lasting impact on supporters of violent jihad than appeals from moderate religious figures.

Ungerer C. 'Jihadists in Jail: Radicalisation and the Indonesian prison experience'. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2011; 40: 1-20.

Family members and significant others

Consideration should also be given to the integration of family members and significant others into disengagement interventions. Families can play an integral role in the success of disengagement interventions and are particularly instrumental after release in reintegrating the individual and keeping him or her from returning to a life of violent extremism. Disengagement interventions should therefore actively involve family members of prisoners.⁶⁰ This will also help the family understand and be sympathetic to what the prisoner is going through and be more readily able to provide a supportive environment for the prisoner once he or she is released. Any meaningful role for families will only be possible if family members feel safe and are not subject to intimidation. Their relationship with the State may initially be one of suspicion and fear, and therefore, their experiences may demand additional assurances.

There are cases, however, where family members have contributed to the violent orientation of the prisoner, and prison administrations should carefully assess the family members' involvement in these situations based on a risk assessment.⁶¹

⁵⁸ See for example: Speckhard, A., Shaikh, M., and Stern, J. (2014). *Undercover Jihadi: Inside the Toronto 18, Al Qaeda Inspired, Homegrown, Terrorism in the West*, Advances Press; Husain, E. (2007) *The Islamist: why I joined radical Islam in Britain, what I saw inside and why I left*, London: Penguin Books, pp. 48-66; Jacobson, M. (2010). "Terrorism Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left", *Policy Focus*: 101, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Choudhury, T. (2009) Stepping out: supporting exit strategies from violence and extremism. Project: European network of former extremists, feasibility assessment, Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

⁵⁹ Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 13.

⁶⁰ Disley, E. et al (2011) Individual disengagement from Al Qa'ida-influenced terrorist groups: A Rapid Evidence Assessment to inform policy and practice in preventing terrorism, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, United Kingdom Home Office, pviiv.

⁶¹ Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 14. See also: Chernov Hwang (2016) Jihadist Disengagement from Violence: Understanding Contributing Factors, RSIS Commentary No. 139 – 9 June 2016.

SINGAPORE: Support for families of violent extremist prisoners

An Interagency After-Care Group (ACG) was established in Singapore to sustain and/or facilitate family stability during the period that the violent extremist was in prison. The main driver for ACG was to support the families of prisoners in order to prevent extremist groups stepping in to do so after the detention of the prisoner. The Group overcame suspicions of prisoners' spouses in very practical ways—for example, by providing financial assistance, as the prisoners were often the sole breadwinners. They also helped the spouses find work, taught them to read and ensured that the education of prisoners' children continued uninterrupted, through various means such as enrolling them in tuition programmes, securing school fee waivers and providing pocket money.

Contribution submitted by the Singapore Prison Service in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Members of the community

Members of the community, including celebrities and other influential personalities, can also help inspire change among violent extremist prisoners, and could be included in disengagement interventions. The motivational themes and public service messages they deliver can be quite captivating and effective.

Community involvement is vital for effective design and implementation of successful CVE and de-radicalisation programs. Participants thus called for more community involvement in such policies and the need to identify credible and genuine community group partners for the design and development of socialisation process. Community involvement provides assurance and transparency on the true situation of inmates, how they are treated and looked after, thus countering one of the main narratives of VEs. It also improves relations between the state and its communities, and fosters trust and collaboration.

Global Counterterrorism Forum: Sydney Memorandum on Challenges and Strategies on the Management of Violent Extremist Detainees (2012), Solution Strategy 6.

Consideration should also be given to involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community sector organizations and the private sector. These bodies are often not seen as being part of the system or State and therefore may find it easier to establish relationships with violent extremist prisoners. Engaging these groups brings the added benefit of continuity of care for the reintegration of violent extremist prisoners upon release.

GERMANY: Violence Prevention Network

Since 2001, the NGO "Violence Prevention Network" has been working successfully in reducing ideologically motivated and religious-motivated, serious crime and extreme acts of violence committed by youth. In the method of *Verantwortungspädagogik*® (Education of Responsibility), the Violence Prevention Network has identified a way to address people who have affiliated themselves with anti-democratic structures without humiliating them, thus facilitating their reversion to the democratic community.

The vision is that ideologically vulnerable people and violent offenders motivated by extremism change their behaviour through deradicalization efforts, lead independent lives and become part of the democratic community, in order to prevent extremism of any kind. The Violence Prevention Network works to ensure that people have the tools and resources available to reflect on and overcome their previous behaviour patterns. The goal is to enable them to live a life in which they do not harm themselves or others.

Violent extremist prisoners are more likely to talk to facilitators who are not perceived as “part of the system”. It is easier to gain access and it is much easier to engage on eye-level, since there are no power relations or hierarchy as is the case when dealing with prison staff. The trainers should be people that the violent extremist prisoner can relate to, and prison staff/public servants are less likely to have a personality with which he or she could identify. NGO practitioners can continue to work with him or her upon release, i.e. the former violent extremist prisoner can turn to the trainer he or she already knows and trusts instead of having to deal with a stranger.

Contribution submitted by the Violence Prevention Network in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

The prison authorities should carefully assess external bodies before they are permitted to engage with violent extremist prisoners. Consideration should also be given to entering into a written agreement with the body concerned and for that agreement to specify what the organization should and should not do.

4.

Assessing and managing the risks posed by violent extremist prisoners

4.1 Introduction

The proper risk assessment of prisoners is one of the fundamental components of good prison management policies. It enables the efficient use of resources, individualization of sentences, protection of the public and upholding the human rights of prisoners. Investment made in developing and implementing effective, evidence-based systems of risk assessment can also enable Member States to improve the prospects of getting violent extremist prisoners to disengage from violence.

The management of prisoners cannot be successfully undertaken without assessments of the risks they pose. A careful appraisal, sometimes known as “screening”, should be made by the prison administration, therefore, of all prisoners when they are first admitted to prison and a more detailed risk assessment repeated at regular intervals thereafter. The range of risks assessed during the initial screening should include:

- Harm to self, to other prisoners or to people working in or visiting the prison (*harm-related risk*)
- Threat to good order in the prison and radicalizing other prisoners to violence (*order-related risk*)
- The likelihood of escape (*security-related risk*)
- Committing another serious offence on prison leave or release (*recidivism-related risk*)
- Instigating the commission of offences in the community in cooperation with associates in the outside world (*crime-related risk*)
- Establishing who is a violent extremist, including where the alleged or actual offence is not directly related to violent extremism

The type of risk a violent extremist prisoner poses should have a significant impact on the risk management strategy, as it should in the case of all prisoners. For example, the risk management of prisoners who are assessed to be a serious escape risk will need to emphasize security routines and measures, while that of prisoners who are assessed to represent a risk to order may not need to emphasize security so much as efforts to change attitudes and behaviour. In the case of prisoners convicted of terrorism-related offences, specific risks that need to be covered include: their role within their organization or group (i.e. high or low level); their recruiting or radicalizing other prisoners to violence (i.e. degree of charismatic

leadership or appeal); maintaining or creating operational command structures in prison; and plotting violent and criminal activities from prison, in communication with outside contacts.

It is very important to understand that violent extremist prisoners do not comprise a homogenous group. The motivations, circumstances and reasons why individuals commit violent extremist offences are often varied and complex.⁶² The risk assessment of such prisoners needs to be informed by a sophisticated understanding of the characteristics of any organization to which they belong, and their motivations. It should also not be assumed that all prisoners convicted of terrorism-related offences are committed to bringing about political or social change or to fight for a moral or religious cause. Practice has shown that some become engaged in such activity because of more conventional criminal motives (e.g. for financial gain, for the excitement or simply for the gratification of committing violence) while others get involved to fulfil more intrinsic or existential needs and desires (e.g. the need for status, belonging or meaning). In some cases, on the other hand, prisoners are convicted of an offence unrelated to violent extremism but their intention was related to violence extremism. The application of a thorough and reliable risk assessment will identify those prisoners whose true motivation was related to violent extremism.

It is critical, therefore, to assess each individual, including the personal and contextual circumstances contributing to their violent extremist views that are likely to contribute to such offending in the future.

➊ For further detail, see chapter 4 of the *UNODC Handbook on the Management of High-Risk Prisoners (2015)*, including specific guidance on: assessments, classification, categorization and allocation and sentence planning.....

4.2 Admission, classification and categorization

The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) require that prisoners always need to be separated according to their legal status (pretrial from sentenced), gender (men from women) and age (children from adults). Furthermore, an assessment of all prisoners should be undertaken upon admission in order to determine the risk they may pose to themselves and/or others as well as their needs. Such individual assessments are crucial in order to ensure that the necessary measures are put in place to minimize these risks and to respond to prisoners' needs in a manner that will enable their eventual social reintegration. On the basis of his or her risk and needs assessment, each prisoner should be classified according to criminal record, character and treatment needs, including the assignment of a security category that corresponds to the findings of the risk assessment.⁶³

Prisoners' classification and categorization are essential to decide their allocation to a suitable prison or unit within a prison and, together with the findings of their risk and needs assessment, provide the basis for the development of individualized sentence plans. These basic rules apply to the management of all prisoners. In fact, they are particularly important in the case of violent extremist prisoners, where any shortcomings in their assessment,

⁶² See, for example: Stys, Y. & Michel, S. (2014). *Examining the Needs and Motivations of Canada's Federally Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders* (Research Report R-344). Ottawa, ON: Correctional Service of Canada.

⁶³ Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 11, 89(1)-(2) and Rule 93.

classification, categorization and allocation can have far-reaching and severe consequences both for the prisoner and the public.

An important first step can be developing an effective intake, assessment and classification system for new inmates. The important first steps in correctional management begin when a new inmate enters the prison facility. Target populations of rehabilitation programs could thus be narrowly and unambiguously defined according to set criteria. Knowing as much as possible about the inmate's personal background, criminal history, personality traits, ideology and behavior in prison is important for making sound classification decisions and in designing effective individual rehabilitation programs.

Rome Memorandum: Good Practice 3.

Special attention shall be paid to admission procedures of all prisoners as the good carrying out of such procedures allows feelings of trust and safety to be established in prisoners, enabling proper assessment of their health condition at entry, and contributing to good risk and needs assessment, sentence planning, classification, allocation and accommodation.

Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 19.

Knowing as much as possible about the violent extremist's co-defendants, personal background, criminal history, significant contacts, and ideology allows for more accurate registration and appropriate categorization and allocation. In Somalia, for example, prison staff have been trained to use a simple and basic assessment tool which involves asking prisoners a set of 45 questions. This assessment was used on over 800 alleged and sentenced violent extremist prisoners, and identified that only 148 were ideologically or religiously motivated; the others were motivated by financial inducements provided by the violent extremist group. These prisoners were driven to join the violent extremist group by poverty rather than ideology or religion.

In addition to information collected by interviewing the violent extremist prisoner, information should be gathered from a variety of other sources. Access to quality information from law enforcement agencies and courts familiar with the cases is important, as it promotes better informed registration and classification processes by the prison administration. Court records and assessments made by social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists can also provide a valuable source of information, as can contact with the violent extremist's family and friends.

Assessments should be based on multiple sources of information to increase reliability. The sources should consist of:

- *Actuarial data:* about the individual and the offence.
- *Dynamic factors:* such as employment, housing, mental health, family support, etc. Changes in these factors in particular may form triggers to increase risk, or mitigating circumstances that reduce risk.
- *Clinical factors:* professional judgement and experience, using the personal and professional experience to assess the information collected through interviews and file reading.

- *Information from partners in a multi-agency framework:* information coming from social workers, the police, intelligence services, etc. about an individual's case.

Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016) Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, RAN Prisons and Probation—practitioners working paper, p5.

It is also important to develop an effective prisoner file management system and database to record information and account for all violent extremist prisoners from the time that they first enter the prison to the end of their sentence. The importance and major elements of a prisoner file management system are equally outlined in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).⁶⁴

⊕ *For further detail, see the UNODC Handbook on Prisoner File Management (2008)*

Assessments should be conducted by appropriately trained, and where appropriate, certified staff. As the assessment needs to cover a variety of risks and issues, staff with different specializations should be involved in the assessment.

- *Separation:* As described earlier, prisoners need to be separated according to their legal status, gender and age. For most prisoners, these factors are static and change only in very few circumstances, for example, when a child becomes an adult. This separation is an overriding factor when it comes to the allocation to a prison or a part of a prison⁶⁵ and is not dependent on any risk assessment.
- *Classification:* Classification further differentiates the separation of prisoners, and facilitates their placement to the most appropriate prison (section) that will (a) adequately address the issues of health, safety and security; and (b) contribute to the timely preparation of their eventual release. The classification process is based on the information gained through the individual risk and needs assessment of each prisoner, and may be further informed by potential health issues assessed in the course of the medical examination upon admission.

1. The purposes of classification shall be:

(a) To separate from others those prisoners who, by reason of their criminal records or characters, are likely to exercise a bad influence;

(b) To divide the prisoners into classes in order to facilitate their treatment with a view to their social rehabilitation.

2. So far as possible, separate prisons or separate sections of a prison shall be used for the treatment of the different classes of prisoners.

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for The Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 93; also see United Nations Rules for The Treatment Of Women Prisoners And Non-Custodial Measures For Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules), Rules 40 and 41.

⁶⁴Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 6-10.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, Rule 11.

- *Categorization:* As with all prisoners, violent extremists should also be categorized according to the security risk (escape) and control risk (likelihood of participating in activity that would disrupt the prison or radicalize other prisoners to violence) that corresponds to the findings of their risk assessment. Security categorization refers to assigning a security category to prisoners, which should be the lowest category consistent with managing the prisoner's assessed security-related risks, and to subsequently allocating him or her to a prison regime suitable for the management of his or her individual security level and other risks and needs.⁶⁶

In most jurisdictions, prisons are described according to their security category, which may be high, medium or low. The security category of the prison is based on the level of security that exists in the prison. A high-security prison would have significant physical, procedural and dynamic security arrangements in place so that it would be impossible for a prisoner to escape. In contrast, a low-security prison may have no locks on cell doors and a low perimeter fence. In deciding on the allocation of prisoners, the principle that all prisoners are held in the least restrictive setting necessary for their safe and secure custody should be respected, based on their individual risk assessments and without discrimination.

Violent extremist prisoners who are assessed and categorized as high-risk would usually be allocated to a high-security prison or a high-security unit within a prison of a lower security category (e.g. a medium-security prison). The small number of violent extremist prisoners who are considered to be particularly dangerous may need to be held in special maximum security facilities, which may be special prisons or separate units within another prison (e.g. within a high-security prison where other high-risk prisoners are held).

In countries with low resources, and especially in post-conflict contexts, individualized risk assessments are rarely carried out. The classification and categorization of prisoners is usually undertaken on the basis of gender, age and sometimes also pretrial status, though even this kind of separation is not always in place. Those prisoners convicted of violent extremist offences may automatically be held in extremely restricted high-security conditions, not based on an individualized risk assessment, but purely on the length and nature of their sentences or charges. Chronic overcrowding exacerbates the challenges presented by the lack of a proper assessment and classification system. In these circumstances, ensuring safety and security in prisons where violent extremist prisoners are held is particularly challenging. It is of fundamental importance that efforts are made, even in countries with scarce resources, to put in place measures to develop a system of individualized assessments, at least to separate those who are genuinely high risk from others, and to ensure that those who are in need of protection are protected.

The screening assessment of a prisoner on admission is only the beginning of the process of risk assessment. A full assessment should take place to identify their violent extremism related risk and needs, with further assessments undertaken at regular intervals during the period that the violent extremist prisoner is in custody.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Rule 89(2); also see the Bangkok Rules, Rules 4, 40-41; European Prison Rules, Rule 51(4) and 53(5).

UNITED STATES: Security Threat Group Validation and Management

In the 1980s, the number of prison violent extremist groups, also referred to as security threat groups (STG) in United States prisons began to grow dramatically. Prison officials across the country faced the challenge of managing the violence and criminal activity associated with these prisoners while, at the same time, ensuring that their civil and due process rights were not infringed.

One of the most valuable tools developed in the United States is the process called STG validation. Validation involves assessing an inmate's possible membership in a STG, based on an objective review of predetermined factors such as the nature of the current criminal offence, criminal history, self-admission, tattoos, association with known STG members, possession of STG symbolism and/or documents, photographs, etc. Each factor is assigned a numerical value. If an inmate reaches a certain threshold he/she may be validated based on their level of involvement and activity with the group. Due to differences in statutes and regulations, as well as cultural differences across the country, the factors and the weights assigned to them may differ from state to state, but the process is essentially the same. In most U.S. states, the inmate may appeal a determination that he/she is associated with an STG, since that determination can affect decisions about custody classification, housing, programmes and other aspects of his/her incarceration.

It is important to remember that STG validation is not the same thing as classification. All inmates still undergo an objective classification process to determine their risks and needs. The STG validation process serves to inform classification decisions. It also helps to avoid "labelling" of inmates as STG members by ensuring that the same transparent, objective, documented process is followed in all cases. Another important factor is that STG validation and classification is an ongoing process. As an inmate's situation and behaviour changes, the STG validation and classification may be revisited.

The STG validation process is a key component in the effective management of STG members in United States prisons and jails. It has also led to the sharing of information among STG units throughout the country and the formation of state and regional gang investigator networks, essential to effectively monitoring the activity of these groups, which often cross jurisdictional lines.

Contribution submitted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, United States of America, in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

4.3 Allocation and accommodation

All prison administrations need to decide how to house violent extremist prisoners within their prison system.⁶⁷ This decision revolves around a number of questions, including whether violent extremist prisoners should be separated from the general prison population (separation) and, if so, whether they should be isolated from each other (isolation), held in one place (concentration), or whether they should be dispersed across a small number of prisons (dispersal). The alternative is to integrate violent extremist prisoners with the general population (integration). A mix of these approaches can be seen among Member States and, in reality, a hybrid approach is often adopted. The security category of each violent extremist prisoner, as discussed in the previous section, will also have implications for allocation decisions.

⁶⁷Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 4.

Regardless of whether prisoners sentenced for terrorist-related crimes are kept in separate prisons or wings or are dispersed across the prison system, the risk they may pose, including the risk of radicalising other prisoners, shall be evaluated individually before their allocation is defined and shall be reviewed at regular intervals.

Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 20.

There is no one right answer and prison administrations will need to determine the best approach to accommodation, based on specific factors within the country.⁶⁸ These factors include:

- The size of the violent extremist prison population to be segregated or dispersed
- The state of the prison infrastructure and the administration's ability to ensure secure custody if violent extremists were dispersed to a number of prisons
- The capacity, size and skills level of staff
- The financial resources available to manage the violent extremist prisoner population
- The legislative framework and responsible authorities
- The cultural, political and social context
- The risk that an individual presents for being further radicalized, or for radicalizing others to violence
- The modus operandi and organizational structure of the violent extremist group

FRANCE: Accommodation of violent extremist prisoners

The creation of dedicated prison wings for violent extremist prisoners (VEPs) in France is one of the principle measures adopted by the prison administration in the context of the fight against terrorism. The selection of prisons where these measures are implemented is made according to the architecture, the location and the capacity of the sites. Staff assigned to work in these prison wings follow a three-week training course. Of the five prison wings, two are dedicated to the assessment of radicalized prisoners or prisoners on the path of radicalization to violence, whereas the three other prison wings are dedicated to the management of violent extremist prisoners.

Only adult male prisoners are allocated to dedicated prisons wings for VEPs. The selection of prisoners is made during a meeting involving prison directors, as well as the directors of social reintegration services, and the probation service. Allocation decisions are based on the prisoner's profile/background and receptiveness.

As a general rule, allocation in dedicated prison wings for VEPs is in individual cells, most notably in order to respect the principle of separation between pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners. The treatment of prisoners in the dedicated wings is in line with the regular prison regime as far as rights and obligations of prisoners are concerned, including the right to maintain contact with family, access to constructive activities, etc. The management of prisoners in the dedicated prison wings for VEPs varies according to the prison wings. For example:

⁶⁸ IIIJ Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization, Recommendation 6 (Consider appropriate factors when determining whether to segregate or disperse inmates with special attention given to terrorist ideologues and leaders and those susceptible to their violent extremist messages).

- In some prison wings, programmes are compulsory, meaning that prisoners have to participate in general training activities (courses delivered by teachers from the Ministry of National Education), discussion groups and all other necessary activities that address identified risks.
- In other prison wings, the management of detainees will be individual, i.e. professionals from different disciplines will provide services / conduct interviews on an individual basis.

The management of VEPs comprises three phases: (a) gaining the prisoner's trust; (b) work on ideologies and beliefs; and (c) self-appraisal and projection into the future. The work performed in the dedicated prison wings is multidisciplinary. At a first level, there are prison guards, prison staff in charge of social reintegration, probation officers as well as psychologists and teachers. At a second level, there are other relevant partners working with prisoners, such as from the national education system, health-care units, etc.

Case study submitted by the Directorate of the Prison Administration, France, in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

- *Separation*: Separating violent extremist prisoners from the general population could make them easier to manage and reduces the risk of them radicalizing others to violence.⁶⁹ In addition, necessary resources including extra security measures and training for prison officers and specialist personnel may only be needed in a limited number of locations. However, there are also negative aspects to separation. Keeping violent extremist prisoners separate from the general prison population can generate risks. Separation may elevate their status in the eyes of other prisoners or groups in the community. Grouping together violent extremist prisoners who exhibit widely disparate levels of radicalization to violence risks the less-radicalized prisoners being influenced by more radical prisoners.⁷⁰ Incarcerating violent extremist prisoners in separate prison wings may also enhance rejection or stigmatization of these prisoners, which could make it difficult for them to integrate into the mainstream prisoner population when they are transferred to a regular prison regime (for instance, in pursuit of a disengagement or reintegration agenda). In addition, separation often bestows unwanted levels of status/feelings of importance to the separated group.

⁶⁹For examples of separation see: *Netherlands*–Veldhuis, T.M. & Lindenberg, S. (2012a) “Limits of Tolerance under pressure: A case study of Dutch terrorist detention policy”. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 5, 425–443); *Kenya* – Kenya to tackle radicalisation with new prison for “extremists”, 16 February 2016, Available at: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-kenya-prison-idUKKCN0VQ0S4>; *Saudi Arabia*–Boucek, C., (2008) “Jailing Jihadis: Saudi Arabia’s special terrorist prisons”. *Terrorism Monitor*, 6, 4–6; *Philippines*–Morales, R. (2012) “Integration versus segregation: A preliminary assessment of de-radicalisation in two Philippine correctional facilities”. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Journal*, 35, 211–228; *Australia* – Brown, D. (2008) The effect of terrorism and terrorist trials on Australian prison regimes, in C.Cunneen & M. Salter (Eds.), *Proceedings of the Second Australia and New Zealand Critical Criminology Conference*, Sydney, Australia, 19–20 June. (pp. 61–76). Sydney: University of New South Wales.)

⁷⁰See for example, Adeline Hazan (French Prison Controller): “When I visited the prison in Fresnes, I noticed that they had placed a young man who left for Syria on a whim [in a cell] with a completely radicalized leader.”, quoted in: Jublin, M. (2015) “France’s Prison Controller Thinks Grouping Radical Inmates Together Is a Terrible Idea”, *Vice News*, June 30, 2015.

INDONESIA: Terrorist Allocation Policy

Given the overall size of the Indonesian prison population, the number of terrorist prisoners is quite small, and amounted to 274 prisoners in November 2014. These prisoners are relatively dispersed in the system and are held in approximately 26 different prisons, with some of the more hard-line prisoners being held at a variety of prisons on Nusakambangan island. The biggest concentration of terrorist prisoners is probably at Jakarta's Cipinang Prison, which held 54 in 2013.

The Indonesian authorities initially tried to concentrate terrorist prisoners. For example, during the conflict with GAM [Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (or Free Aceh Movement)], efforts were made to concentrate the GAM prisoners. This changed, however, to a more dispersed policy, especially for prisoners who had received sentences in excess of three years. The change in approach was more a response to accommodation issues rather than a conscious government policy on dispersal. A similar issue has occurred with later terrorists prisoners. While these prisoners are often held in maximum security prisons, they are not isolated from other prisoners and enjoy the same privileges in terms of visiting rights. Indeed, their ability to move around prison and access visiting areas is superior to most other prisoners, as some staff are intimidated by the terrorist prisoners.

Serious concerns have been raised about the freedom that these prisoners have to mix with other terrorist prisoners, including leaders and ideologues, as well as their ability to mingle freely among other types of prisoners, and the relatively relaxed regime that allows terrorist prisoners large numbers of visitors. One terrorist leader was recorded as having 900 separate visitors over the course of a year. Within the prison visiting areas, the terrorist prisoners are free to move around and congregate.

Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).

- *Isolation:* Violent extremist prisoners are held in isolation in some countries, where each prisoner is held in a single cell, totally isolated from the outside world and from other prisoners. Their contact with staff is also kept to an absolute minimum and their one hour of exercise a day does not usually involve any contact with prisoners or staff. Such practices amount to prolonged solitary confinement. In other countries, some violent extremist prisoners may be permanently segregated from others in a single person cell with very restricted or no access to regime activities, which can also be described as prolonged solitary confinement. It is important to note in this regard that the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners unambiguously identify prolonged (in excess of 15 days) or indefinite solitary confinement as one of the practices that should be prohibited. Permanent and total isolation may further violate Member States' obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment.⁷¹
- *Concentration:* Violent extremist prisoners in one or two prisons enables the prison administration to focus all its resources including extra security measures and training for prison officers and specialist personnel in limited locations. With a single

⁷¹Nelson Mandela Rules, Rule 43(a), (b); Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, on Art. 7 of the ICCPR (1992); Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the combined third to fifth periodic reports of the United States of America (United Nations Ref. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5), 19 December 2014, para. 20; also see the Istanbul Protocol on the use and effects of solitary confinement (A/63/175, Annex); Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture to the United Nations General Assembly, 5 August 2011 (A/66/268), in particular paras. 75, 76, 80, 81 and 84.

institution, it is also possible to try and create a more therapeutic environment in which the impact of interventions can be fostered. However, concentrating violent extremist prisoners in one or two prisons can have some disadvantages. First, it can make that prison the focus for external attacks mounted to free the prisoners. Second, the control of prisoners may present management challenges if violent extremist prisoners are located in a single institution, for example, if the prisoners decide to cause a disturbance. Housing all violent extremist prisoners together could increase the risk of prison violence and the chances of illegal activities being carried out. Where tightly structured violent extremist organizations are involved, they may attempt to recreate their operational command structures, put pressure on disengagement efforts, and present the prison authorities with a united front. Staff manipulation or threats against staff may also represent a higher risk.

ALGERIA: Classification and separation

Detainees charged with terrorism-related offences are strictly separated from the rest of the prison population and divided into three categories according to their personality and the gravity of the alleged offence:

Violent extremists: Those individuals whose behaviour is characterized by the resort to armed violence, disobedience and an absence of respect for laws and prison regulations, coupled with a strong will to dominate and manipulate other prisoners.

Ideological extremists: Those who, while not being violent and respecting the laws and regulations, discretely glorify terrorism within prison facilities.

Others: Those who are charged with the failure to report terrorist attacks, e.g. for fear of retaliation. This category of prisoners represents the least dangerous, and is generally disciplined, follows prison regulations and sometimes even cooperates with national authorities.

Separation of these categories is key to avoiding radicalization to violence and/or recruitment of other prisoners. The objectives of classification and separation are to allocate violent extremist prisoners into suitable groups—ranging from isolation of the most dangerous individuals to small groups for the less dangerous ones—and to separate them from the rest of the prison population. In Algeria, the Administration of Penitentiary Establishments and Reintegration considers it important not to concentrate a high number of prisoners charged with terrorism-related offences in one single prison facility.

Case study submitted by the Administration of Penitentiary Establishments and Reintegration of Algeria, in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Finally, there are also particular concerns from the perspective of treatment with humanity and dignity. There is a higher likelihood of the balance between control and care being undermined, in favour of more control in prisons holding a concentration of violent extremist prisoners. As there can be only a limited number of such institutions in one prison system, there is an increased likelihood that prisoners will be placed far from their homes, which will hinder or limit family contact. Housing violent extremist prisoners together may therefore actually contribute to, rather than eliminate, potentially conducive conditions to radicalization to violence. Concentration models are sometimes accompanied by restrictive prison regimes for violent extremist prisoners, which may arouse feelings of discrimination and unfair

treatment among the respective prisoners and their support network and thereby fuel the frustration and anger that lies at the root of extremist violence.⁷²

In summary, housing violent extremist prisoners together with like-minded peers might create opportunities for them to form close-knit groups and collectively plot violent extremist activities, and harsh confinement conditions may arouse anger and frustration and spur intensification of ideological commitment. Moreover, it is feasible that prisoners in specialized prisons for violent extremists might become heroes in the eyes of their followers, thereby creating a stronger support base for violent extremist activities. Alternatively, they may also be labelled and rejected as a consequence by the general public, which may cause reintegration problems after release and increase the risk of recidivism. Previous experiences with concentration strategies for violent extremist prisoners demonstrated that such policies can generate a range of undesired side effects such as intense resistance among prisoners, further mobilization of support for the prisoners' political objectives, and increased violence among their support community. Likewise, the imprisonment and confinement conditions of incarcerated members are central in the narratives of many violent extremist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Irish Republican Army and, more recently, the Islamic State, and appear to have been driving factors in the establishment of a support base for these movements.⁷³

Detaining violent extremist prisoners with like-minded peers also increases the probability for a charismatic leader to emerge, and that prisoners come together into a cohesive subgroup, polarize even further and adopt even more violent extremist attitudes. Although a cohesive group with an identified leader does provide a useful structure for a prison service to work through, if such processes do occur, the ultimate result may be that concentration models run the risk of reinforcing, rather than curbing, the probability of violent radicalization, which could lead to an enhanced (or at least sustained) extremist threat.⁷⁴

- *Dispersal*: In some jurisdictions, violent extremist prisoners are dispersed among the high-security prisons within the prison estate. Where high-security prisons do not exist, or are insufficient, violent extremist prisoners may be allocated to regular prisons, to be held either in a separate high-security unit or placed in cells that are furnished and equipped to provide a high level of security. Such cells will usually be located in parts of the prison that offer the most protection from the outside world.

ENGLAND AND WALES: Dispersal of violent extremist prisoners

The "high-security prison estate" in England consists of eight prisons, which house the "Category A" inmates deemed to pose the greatest potential risk. There are currently a total of around 120 terrorist prisoners, just over 20 of whom are on remand [and] held in prisons in England, most of whom are dispersed among the eight high-security prisons. Ninety are identified as Al Qaeda influenced, with the remaining 30 including animal rights, separatist and other domestic terrorists.

⁷²Williams, R. "Why some prisons produce terrorists", *The Globe and Mail*, 4 February 2015.

⁷³McCoy, T. (2014) "How the Islamic State evolved in American Prison". *The Washington Post*. 4 November 2014.

⁷⁴Veldhuis, T. (2015), Captivated by fear. An evaluation of terrorism detention policy, PhD thesis, University of Groningen; Ungerer C. (2011), Jihadists in Jail: Radicalisation and the Indonesian prison experience. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 40: p. 12.

Following the conclusion of a government-ordered review into prison-based radicalisation to violence, however, the Ministry of Justice announced an important policy shift in August 2016, namely that the most dangerous Islamist extremists will be removed from the general prison population and held in “specialist units” in the high-security estate. The review had concluded that some charismatic prisoners were exerting a “radicalising influence” over fellow Muslims. It further claimed that some had encouraged aggressive conversions to Islam and/or had been involved in the intimidation of prison imams.

Pickering, R.: “Terrorism, extremism, radicalisation and the offender management system in England and Wales”, in: A. Silke (2014): Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism, p. 162; Ministry of Justice (2016): Government sets out new measure to tackle extremism in prisons, Press release, 22 August.

However, some prison administrations believe that the policy of dispersing violent extremist prisoners over several high-security prisons can be problematic, creating logistical, security and operations difficulties.⁷⁵

MOROCCO: Concentration and Dispersal of Terrorist Prisoners

In 2015, approximately 600 prisoners in Morocco’s prison system were described as political extremists. These prisoners are typically motivated by a radical interpretation of Islam, and often have links to groups such as AQIM [Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb] and IS [Islamic State]. The prison authorities initially decided to concentrate extremist prisoners in a small number of prisons and to separate them from the mainstream prison population. The two populations were kept apart, partly due to fears that the extremist prisoners would radicalize other prisoners. However, this separation policy was judged to have failed. Concentrating the terrorist prisoners was found to lead to an increasing radicalization among these prisoners and to undermine other efforts to encourage deradicalization. Prisoners’ commitment to the cause hardened in the context of incarceration with prisoners from similar backgrounds. In order to address this, a new policy of dispersal has been introduced. This has seen the 600 extremist prisoners dispersed to approximately 40 different prisons.

Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).

- *Integration:* In some countries, integrating violent extremist prisoners among other categories of prisoners has proved to be the best approach, as it prevents the formation of tight groups and confronts violent extremists with alternative perspectives and ideas that might contribute to their disengagement from violent extremism.⁷⁶ However, integrated or dispersed imprisonment of violent extremist prisoners conveys the risks of radicalization to violence and recruitment of other prisoners.

⁷⁵ See Sydney Memorandum, Internal Challenge 2. In England and Wales, for example,

⁷⁶ Jones, C. and Morales, S. (2012) concluded that the integration of terrorist inmates with prison gangs may temporarily encourage disengagement and set the foundations for deradicalization. However, without a specifically designed intervention strategy, the terrorist inmates may revert to militancy once they have returned to their original social settings—Integration versus Segregation: A Preliminary Examination of Philippine Correctional Facilities for De-Radicalisation, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 35:3, 211-228.

CANADA: Integration-Separation Accommodation Model

The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) does not accommodate its terrorist-convicted offenders in dedicated prisons, instead utilizing an Integration-Separation accommodation model. This approach focuses predominantly on the integration of radicalized offenders in an open general population environment; however, it permits for the physical/geographical separation of these offenders where security information suggests that the direct association of two or more radicalized offenders poses a threat to the offender, institution, or staff. Separation may be achieved through placement of a radicalized offender within a different living unit at the same correctional facility, or via placement at a different institution or correctional setting. Managing terrorist-convicted offenders consistently with other types of offenders that pose a security threat avoids providing unwarranted status onto the radicalized offender and defuses any potential “recruitment/radicalization” power base.

Case study submitted by the Correctional Service of Canada in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

In a number of Member States, violent extremist prisoners are frequently moved to different institutions to deal with structural overcrowding or, in the case of leaders, on security grounds. Frequent transfers can disrupt disengagement and rehabilitation efforts.⁷⁷ Thus, transfers should be limited and effectively managed to minimize their impact on the disengagement and reintegration process.

Some Member States adopt a mixed approach based on the role of the violent extremist prisoner in their organization or type of violent extremist organization. For example, violent extremist ideologues and charismatic leaders are assessed as more likely to radicalize others than mere followers and foot soldiers, and to act as an intensifying influence on (already violent extremist) fellow prisoners. Therefore, the ideologues and leaders are separated from the general population, while followers and foot soldiers are integrated with the general population.

SPAIN: Different strategies for dealing with specific terrorist groups

The Spanish terrorist prisoner allocation policy represents a distinctive case, as the country has adopted different strategies for dealing with specific terrorist groups. Historically the main terrorist threat in Spain since the 1970s has come from the Basque separatist group, ETA [Euskadi Ta Askatasuna]. Initially, the Spanish authorities operated a concentration policy for ETA prisoners, holding them in a small number of facilities. In the late 1980s, this policy was changed to a dispersal policy to spread ETA prisoners throughout the prison system. In contrast, as violent Islamic terrorists emerged as a significant threat in the 2000s, Spanish policy was to keep these prisoners concentrated and to avoid dispersing them throughout the system. Thus, the Spanish prison service operates two distinctive allocation policies simultaneously.

The decision to disperse ETA prisoners was based on an analysis of the group. ETA is a relatively large terrorist group which has a highly structured organization and has adopted a military-style hierarchy. Prior to 1986, ETA prisoners were concentrated. The authorities noted that this allowed the group to retain close control over its members and kept the prisoners very cohesive and organized. In order to undermine this, after 1986 the Spanish authorities started to distribute the

⁷⁷ See Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 22.

ETA prisoners more widely throughout the Spanish prison system. Initially, this involved sending the prisoners to 54 different jails where the number of ETA prisoners varied from anywhere between 1 to 41. Some prisoners were sent more than 4,000 km away from the Basque region to a prison in the Canary Islands. A further motivation for the dispersal strategy is that it provided the Government with a bargaining issue for negotiations with ETA. The ETA prisoners would prefer to be located in prisons closer to their home region, and the dispersal strategy allowed the Government an issue to potentially make concessions in return for other concessions from ETA or the prisoners.

Violent Islamic terrorists, however, represented a quite different challenge as judged by the prison authorities. In contrast to ETA, the 75 violent Islamist terrorist prisoners did not belong to a single cohesive organization, and do not possess a clear hierarchy or chain of command. Thus, the training and organization seen with ETA prisoners is not a feature of the violent Islamist prisoners. Further, there were significant concerns that the violent Islamist prisoners might be more likely to attempt to radicalize other prisoners, compared with ETA. As a result, the Spanish authorities have not implemented the dispersal strategy used for ETA with the violent Islamist prisoners. While most of the violent Islamist prisoners have been held in isolation wings, some have been allowed to mix with other prisoners and this has been linked to instances of radicalization.

Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).

4.4 Assessing different types of risk: tools and approaches

There has been some progress in violence risk assessment during the last decade. Much of this progress has been seen in the improved capacity to accurately identify individuals at high risk for future violent behaviour, in populations including adults with severe mental illness, correctional populations, mentally disordered offenders and sexual offenders.⁷⁸

In developing objective risk assessment tools and protocols, it is vitally important that officials identify and clearly define the types of risks they seek to assess. For example, prison staff should determine if they want to evaluate whether a violent extremist prisoner will pose a risk within the prison or if they seek to review the risk the prisoner poses to the outside community, or both. They should likewise assess what are the likely risks to the prisoner, including being vulnerable to radical influence and hence a potential for being radicalized to violence. In all cases, these risk assessment tools should be evidence-based and culturally appropriate, rather than based on personal biases, speculative considerations or something adopted without contextualization from other jurisdictions.

In assessing security-related risks, the overriding consideration in risk assessment is the protection of the public. A number of criteria have been identified for assessing these risks, which are equally applicable to violent extremist prisoners:

- The threat the prisoner might present to the community if he or she were to escape
- The likelihood that the prisoner will try to escape either on his or her own or with external assistance

⁷⁸ For a summary of developments see: Heilbrun, K. (2003) "Violence Risk: From Prediction to Management", in *Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts*, Second Edition, edited by D. Carson and R. Bull. John Wiley & Sons.

- Any previous history of attempting to escape and access to external help
- The nature of the crime for which the prisoner was convicted
- The number and types of any previous offences
- The potential for threat to other prisoners and staff
- The potential risk to the public via contacts with the outside world
- Previous behaviour in prison
- The likelihood that the prisoner will seek to radicalize others to violence

It is also critical to assess the personal and contextual circumstances which contribute to a violent extremist prisoner's offending and are likely to contribute to reoffending—namely, assessing the risk of committing future violent extremist-related offences. Within the prison context, and for this type of offender, it is generally agreed that the most effective approach is to use structured professional judgement in making the assessments.⁷⁹

Structured professional judgement is the most common approach to risk assessment. It is important to note that the term “professional” is used to allow for the reality that there are non-clinical professionals (for example, prison staff and religious leaders, etc.) who conduct violence risk assessments. The evaluator must conduct the assessment according to guidelines that reflect current theoretical, professional and empirical knowledge about violence. Such guidelines provide the minimum set of risk factors that should be considered in every case. The guidelines will also typically include recommendations for information gathering (e.g. the use of multiple sources and multiple methods) and communicating opinions. Structured professional judgement is centred on individuals, not groups of violent extremist prisoners. Information is gathered, weighted and combined according to the assessor's judgement, often assisted by a specialist risk assessment tool. The approach is therefore empirically guided and improves consistency, as each assessor is encouraged to consider the same set of risk assessment factors for each person they assess. It supports consistency but it is not intended to produce identical assessments. Rather, assessments are reproducible (follows the guidelines for completion, grounded in empirical knowledge) and transparent (it should be clear why risk factors have been identified as relevant, i.e. they should be based on evidence gathered about the violent extremist prisoner; it should also be clear how these risk factors link to needs).

Specialized risk assessment tools provide a guide and set the minimum set of risk factors that should be considered. In some instances, some of these factors may not be relevant; in others, additional risk factors may need to be added. Each assessment should consider all risk factors, even if some are later rejected as not relevant to that particular case. Many of the risk assessment tools and protocols currently available, however, have questionable relevance to violent extremists because the factors used to assess risk do not necessarily relate to the background and motivations of this group of violent offenders. In order to establish individual disengagement interventions for violent extremist prisoners, assessment tools specifically tailored to identify risks of radicalization to violence, and risk of undertaking future violent extremist related activities, will therefore need to be used, if available.

A limited number of specific tools, discussed below, have so far been developed to assess violent extremist prisoners. These tools have, to date, only been used with limited numbers

⁷⁹See Monahan, J. (2012) “The individual risk assessment of terrorism”, *Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series*, 34; Borum, R. (2015) “Assessing Risk for Terrorist Involvement”, *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, 2, 2, 63-87.

of prisoners, and in specific jurisdictions and contexts, so their validity may be limited.⁸⁰ Both tools potentially provide useful guidance in the area of extremist violence, but care should be taken in using the assessments in all jurisdictions. It should also be noted that it may not be realistic to deploy tools as comprehensive as these in jurisdictions with limited resources, in post-conflict situations, or when there are many hundreds of violent extremist prisoners that require assessing. More basic and simple assessment tools have been developed in some jurisdictions.⁸¹

The *Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA-2)*⁸² was designed to be used with people who are suspected of being radicalized to violence, who are in the process of being radicalized to violence, who have a history of extremist violence, or who have been convicted of such offences. It is applicable to people interested in furthering any of a spectrum of violent extremism ideologies including political, social, religious or other ideologies or causes. VERA-2 contributes to a multi-modal risk assessment process that is reliant on information initially obtained, analysed and validated by intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies. Following conviction, decisions are made for the security classification and initial placement of the offender within the correctional system. The needs and risks identified pertinent to radicalization to violence and violent extremism, as well as any criminogenic risk and needs that are identified, become the focus of programme interventions during the period of incarceration. VERA-2 focuses on a number of factors: attitudes-beliefs-ideology risk factors; social context and intention risk factors; history and capability risk factors; motivational and commitment elements; and protective indicators. An augmented version, the VERA-2R, includes additional indicators related to mental health background and status and motivation.⁸³

Another tool, the *Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG22+)*,⁸⁴ was developed to help assess each individual, and the personal and contextual circumstances which contributed to their violent extremist offending and/or are likely to contribute to such offending in the future. These guidelines adopt a case formulation approach: a method of analysing the specific individual and contextual circumstances in a person's life that appear to have a functional link to their offending. It is particularly appropriate for idiosyncratic offending, where there is less certainty about its cause or functions. Structured professional judgement is employed (described earlier in this chapter) and a framework is provided to help make these judgements systematic, considered and transparent. Assessors consider three dimensions: (1) engagement, (2) intent, and (3) capability. Twenty-two factors have been identified that seem to contribute to extremist offending and these typically map on to the three dimensions. Assessors are asked to consider these to ensure that they do not neglect specific circumstances which may contribute significantly to offending. This assessment is dynamic, in that it can measure the impact of changes in people's lives on their level of engagement, intent or capability (including the impact of intervention on these areas).

⁸⁰Cook, A. (2014) Risk Assessment and Management of Group-Based Violence, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Canada, p. 4.

⁸¹See, for example, the tool developed by the Nigerian Prisons Service – Barkindo, A. and Bryans, S. (2016) “De-radicalising Prisoners in Nigeria: developing a basic prison based de-radicalisation programme”, *Journal for Deradicalisation*, Nr.7, Summer 2016.

⁸²Pressman, D. and Flockton, J. (2014) “Violent extremist risk assessment; issues and applications of the VERA-2 in a high-security correctional setting”, chapter 9 in Silke, A. (ed.) *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremist – Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*.

⁸³Pressman E., Duits, N., Rinne, T and Flockton, J. (2016) VERA-2R Violence Extremism Risk Assessment – version 2 Revised: A structured professional judgement approach, Nederlands Instituut voor Forensische Psychiatrie en Psychologie.

⁸⁴Lloyd, M. and Dean, C. (2015) “The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders”, *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, 2015, Vol. 2, No. 1, 40–52.

Whatever tools are employed, it should be remembered that risk assessment is not an exact science and that it will not provide a definitive answer as to whether a violent extremist prisoner is likely to reoffend after release. Such tools are indicators of underlying reasons for someone being a violent extremist and can provide some insight into whether the risk of reoffending is reducing as a result of interventions. Assessments should be validated using other sources of information such as staff observations and security intelligence. The key point is that an assessment informs decisions about how risk can best be managed and mitigated in the future.

It is important that information received from violent extremist prisoners is also validated against other available sources and with other staff members. If the information provided by violent extremist prisoners conflicts with that obtained from reports and records, the staff member must explore these discrepancies. When completing the assessment tool, the staff member must draw conclusions about the reliability of the sources from all the available evidence before completing the relevant sections of the documentation. If it is difficult to distinguish which source is more reliable, the staff member doing the interview should use professional judgement and record reasons. This is essential so that when the case conference takes place, other staff members can understand how decisions relating to the assessment were made.

At the end of the assessment, each staff member may reach a slightly different conclusion based on their interviews with the violent extremist prisoners. The staff member should share their assessment based on their individual judgement and seek to reach a consensus on the overall risks and needs for each violent extremist prisoner, as part of a case conference.

Conducting assessments is by no means an easy task. Many practitioners might feel anxiety, pressure and insecurity to do the assessment “right”. This might lead to biases and risk aversion. To avoid this, staff members should be supported in managing their anxiety and being confident about their decisions, both those based on the results from the assessment tool and on their professional insights. A support structure for verification can be put in place.⁸⁵ Anxiety can also be addressed by having staff trained and certified in the application of the specialized tools. Assessments should not be administered by those who have not been trained and certified on their correct application.

4.5 Understanding the reasons for prisoners’ violent extremist behaviour

Not all those who become engaged by a group, cause or ideology go on to develop an intention to cause harm, so “intent” as an additional dimension is an important consideration. Intent factors describe the mind-set that is associated with a readiness to use violence and address what the individual would do and to what end. Again, not all those who have intent to cause harm on behalf of a group, cause or ideology are capable of doing so, and plots to cause violence take a high level of personal or group capability, resources and networking to be successfully carried out. What the individual is capable of is therefore a key consideration when assessing risk of violence. Factors can include: individual knowledge, skills and competencies; access to networks, funding or equipment; and criminal background and capability.

⁸⁵Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016) Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, RAN Prisons and Probation–practitioners working paper, p. 5.

Undertaking the detailed risk assessment will enable the prison administration to identify which of the wide variety of motivations and factors have “pulled” and “pushed” individuals towards violent extremism. Understanding why individual prisoners have gone down the path of violent extremism is critical for a number of reasons: (a) to design appropriate interventions; (b) to monitor progress and impact of those interventions; (c) to determine the risk of future violent acts; (d) to help identify protective factors; (e) to assist with identifying other management strategies; (f) and to prevent assumptions about groups directing strategies for individuals (which may be counter-productive).

In the past decade and a half, research has been conducted on the drivers of violent extremism. However, there is no authoritative statistical data on the pathways towards individual radicalization. While there are some recognizable trends and patterns, there are only a few areas of consensus that exist among researchers. Qualitative research, based mainly on interviews, suggests that two main categories of drivers can be distinguished: “push factors”, or the conditions conducive to violent extremism and the structural context from which it emerges; and “pull factors”, or the individual motivations and processes, which play a key role in transforming ideas and grievances into violent extremist action ...

Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism—Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674 (2015), para. 23.

It is important not to assume that there is a typology of violent extremists against which any individual can be matched. As was made clear earlier, each violent extremist prisoner is unique and factors that motivated them to commit violent acts vary from person to person. That said, a number of underpinning generic reasons can be identified for violent extremist behaviour. More specifically, there appear to be certain recurrent drivers, which are common among a wide variety of countries and regions and which lead, sometimes in isolation and sometimes in combination with other factors, to violent extremism:

- *Lack of socio-economic opportunities:* Countries that fail to generate high and sustainable levels of growth, to create decent jobs for their youth, to reduce poverty and unemployment, to improve equality, to control corruption and to manage relationships among different communities in line with their human rights obligations, are more prone to violent extremism and tend to witness a greater number of incidents linked to violent extremism. Citizens may consider weak development outcomes as confirmation of the lack of a government’s legitimacy, making State institutions less effective in responding to violent extremism when it arises. The absence of alternative employment opportunities can make violent extremist organizations an attractive source of income.

Working with reason and justice, we can rebuild a fundamental sense of loyalty and belonging throughout our societies. Discrimination should be fought, and equality promoted in schools, work-places, courtrooms, police-stations, prisons, neighbourhoods and communities. Equal access for all to economic, social and cultural rights will contribute to immunizing individuals and societies from violent extremism. It is particularly vital that we promote the resilience of affected communities. This requires genuine efforts and action to eradicate real or perceived exclusion and marginalization.

Statement by Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, at the Geneva Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism, 8 April 2016.

- *Marginalization and discrimination:* No country is completely homogeneous and diversity in and of itself does not lead to or increase a country's vulnerability to violent extremism. However, when a country experiences insecurities such as scarce resources, and when one group, whatever its demographic weight, acts monopolistically in political and economic sectors at the expense of other groups, the potential for inter-communal tensions, gender inequality, marginalization, alienation and discrimination increases, as expressed through restricted access to public services and job opportunities and obstructions to regional development and freedom of religion. This, in turn, may incite those who feel disenfranchised to embrace violent extremism as a vehicle for advancing their goals.
- *Collective grievances and victimization:* Historical legacies of, or collective grievances stemming from, domination, oppression, subjugation or foreign intervention can enable narratives of victimization to take hold. These narratives can provoke simple and powerful emotional reactions which may then be exploited by violent extremists: the memory of past or present actual or perceived oppressions is upheld so as to fuel the thirst for revenge against oppressors. Violent extremism does not occur in a vacuum. Violent extremist campaigns are strongly influenced by the wider political and socio-economic contexts in which they occur. This environment can either support and encourage violence, or inhibit and undermine it.
- *Poor governance, violations of human rights and a lack of the rule of law:* Violent extremism tends to thrive in an environment characterized by poor governance, democracy deficits, corruption and a culture of impunity for unlawful behaviour engaged in by the State or its agents. When poor governance is combined with repressive policies and practices which violate human rights, the potency of the lure of violent extremism tends to be heightened. Violent extremists also actively seek to exploit State repression and other grievances in their fight against the State.
- *Prolonged and unresolved conflicts:* Prolonged and unresolved political, cultural or international conflicts tend to provide fertile ground for violent extremism, not only because of the suffering and lack of governance resulting from the conflict itself but also because such conflicts allow violent extremist groups to exploit deep-rooted grievances in order to garner support, seize territory and resources and control populations. Although the conditions conducive to violent extremism affect entire populations, only a small number of people are actually radicalized and turn to violence. Both complex individual motivations and human agency play a key role in exploiting these conditions and transforming ideas and grievances into violent action.

As its definitions indicate, radicalisation is a process of change, a transformation from one condition to another. Hence, it is not sudden and people do not snap and become radical, although a certain incident (e.g. experienced act of discrimination, perceived attack on Islam such as the 2003 war on Iraq, or moral crisis such as the death of a beloved person) can accelerate the process. Most female suicide bombers in Iraq were said to have had family members (father, brother, son, etc.) killed by the multinational forces or state forces in the country.

Al-Lami M. (2008) Studies of radicalization: State of the field report. London: University of London, p.2.

- *Individual backgrounds and motivations:* Negative personal experience that resonates with the narrative of violent extremist ideologies can heighten the chances that an individual will embrace violent extremism. Individual motivations vary: researchers

have reported precipitating events as diverse as experiencing or witnessing torture, the death of a relative or friend at the hands of the security forces or a foreign power, unfair trials, the loss of property or the humiliation of a parent. While some highly educated people have played consequential roles in violent extremist organizations, many members are poorly educated, often not having completed secondary education. A large number have only rudimentary literacy levels and almost no religious knowledge or education, making them vulnerable to indoctrination.

- *Distortion and misuse of beliefs, political ideologies and ethnic and cultural differences:* Violent extremist groups cynically distort and exploit religious beliefs, ethnic differences and political ideologies to legitimize their actions, establish their claim on territory and recruit followers. Ideology can play a significant role in facilitating extremist violence, although it may not be the most important factor. Recruits to violent extremist movements often have a simplistic understanding of the ideology that the movement's leadership endorses. Indeed, for some, a deeper ideological understanding only comes after time spent in prison with other members, which allows them time for detailed debate and discussion. In assessing risk, key issues to consider are whether the individual's behaviour or attitudes endorse a movement's ideological values. To properly do this, the assessor needs to have an understanding of the ideological framework of that particular movement. Violence committed "in the name of religion" (on the basis of, or claimed without justification from, religious tenets of the perpetrator) and "on the grounds of religion or belief" (on the basis of the religious affiliation of the victim), is a complex phenomenon in different parts of the world. For many people, religion is a very emotional issue, deeply connected to feelings of identity, devotion and group attachment. Religious convictions can drive people to push their boundaries and perform acts of solidarity, compassion and charity. However, this enormous potential can also turn into a destructive force, feeding violent extremism.
- *Leadership and social networks:* While contextual factors, personal experiences and collective grievances can all contribute to the emergence of violent extremism, there is also a social context that provides some form of organization and direction for these elements. This is often established through the intervention of a charismatic leader or political entrepreneur, and through informal family and social networks. Research highlights that social factors are probably the single most important element in the radicalization to violence process. Proponents of the social network and social movement theories contend that radicalization to violence is transmitted and intensified through social affiliations, bonds of friendship, kinship, discipleship and other social networks.
- *Other motivations:* It should also be remembered that some people just get "sucked into" violent extremist groups and may be exploited and conditioned, threatened and coerced into fighting. Others may simply be using violent extremist activity as a cover for more criminal intentions, such as people smuggling, weapons or drug trafficking. Some people join violent extremist groups to maintain, or finance, a drug addiction. Some commit offences that have been supportive of the violent extremist group, but may not have committed them with that intention. There have also been cases of violent extremist groups providing financial loans to potential recruits to enable them to set up small business.

In summary, academics as well as policymakers have traditionally focused on finding the causes of radicalization to violence in externalities such as political and economic conditions. However, the radicalizing effects of individual factors should not be overestimated. External factors shape and constrain the individual's environment but do not have a direct effect on

his or her behaviour. Radicalization to violence is an individual condition that is prominently caused by a combination of social and individual causal factors.⁸⁶ In other words, dynamics in which the individual is directly involved prominently cause radicalization to violence, which implies that in addition to personal characteristics, the individual's (perceived) position in relation to relevant others affect his or her behaviour.⁸⁷

4.6 Need for regular reassessment of risk

While risk assessment protocols can be administered at the outset—and can be used to shape the initial classification, categorization, allocation and intervention decisions regarding individual violent extremist prisoners—it is particularly important that assessing risk is undertaken on an ongoing and regular basis. In fact, the assessments performed later in the process may be more accurate, as prison staff will have had more time to interact with and observe the violent extremist prisoner. It is also important to recognize that an assessment is dynamic, and that prison staff need to accommodate change and protective factors and circumstances emerging. Unlike most other types of offending, changes to an individual's relationship with a group, cause or ideology may be particularly important to assess with this particular group.

Behaviour in custody is an important factor for every prisoner in terms of risk assessments. Violent extremist prisoners who engage in violence against staff and other prisoners, participate in political protests (e.g. hunger strikes) or actively attempt to compromise the operation or security of the prison (e.g. escape attempts) may be showing strong commitment to the cause and a willingness to engage in serious violence on its behalf. In contrast, prisoners with a good behavioural record have shown an ability to comply with the regime, which may indicate a genuine desire for reform. For example, how prisoners relate to prison faith leaders may provide considerable insight into their general outlook and attitude. Another important issue to consider is whether the prisoner has shown a willingness to complete prison-based interventions designed specifically for violent extremist prisoners. If they have engaged with such interventions, the outcome of such involvement is clearly significant to a risk assessment.

Readministering risk assessment protocols at regular intervals is important, therefore, to inform risk assessment and management decisions, including placement and security categorization. Good practice suggests reassessments at least every six months or in response to specific incidents. Furthermore, an oversight mechanism for risk assessments should be put in place, where results and outcomes are challenged and analysed.

The results of these periodic assessments will also assist prison officials in estimating the impact of the intervention strategies, detecting changes in prisoner attitudes, and deciding whether particular intervention strategies need to be modified.⁸⁸ Different categories of prisoners will require different intervention strategies according to the risk indicators identified

⁸⁶For a recent summary of studies on the causes of radicalisation see: Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016) *The Root Causes of Violent Extremism*, RAN Issue Paper.

⁸⁷*Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law* (2008) Causal factors of radicalisation. Some jurisdictions have conducted detailed research in order to better understand the drivers for violent extremism. For example, in Nigeria, the Office of the National Security Adviser undertook studies in 2015 as part of development of their Countering Violent Extremism programme, including understanding the complex causes and processes of radicalisation.

⁸⁸Assessment can also inform management strategies more broadly, such as surveillance, supervision, detention and intervention strategies, as set out in the UNODC *Handbook on Managing High Risk Prisoners* (2016).

in the course of their assessment, and these may change as the violent extremist prisoner goes through various interventions.

In the case of violent extremist prisoners who are eligible to be considered for early or conditional release, arrangements must be made to conduct a risk assessment to inform the decision of conditional release authorities (for example, release decision made by a parole board). Prior to the final release of a violent extremist prisoner, a formal multi-agency meeting which includes the police and, where they exist, a probation violent extremism lead, should take place to review a final risk assessment and to inform decisions after release.

A final prison-based risk assessment of the likelihood that the violent extremist prisoner will commit further violent extremist offences is critical to ensuring public safety. In some jurisdictions, where the risk of the individual committing further violent extremist offences is considered to be very high, preventative detention is permissible under the law. In all other jurisdictions, violent extremist prisoners must be released at the end of their prison sentence, even if they continue to pose a risk to society. Where the risk is assessed as high, suitable arrangements should be put in place to closely monitor the released prisoner.

4.7 Violent extremist prisoners with specific needs

Women violent extremist prisoners: When women violent extremists are held in prisons, it is imperative to ensure compliance with the relevant international standards, particularly the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules).

Women's participation in violent extremism has evolved from auxiliary roles supporting their male counterparts, to gathering intelligence, providing health care, and maintaining safe houses, to direct engagement in violent acts, including suicide bombings.⁸⁹ Between 1985 and 2010, female bombers committed over 257 suicide attacks (representing about a quarter of the total) on behalf of many different violent extremist organizations, according to one report.⁹⁰ Another report suggests that girls and women now make up 30 to 40 per cent of the combatants in numerous violent extremist groups.⁹¹

Violent extremist groups across the political and ideological spectrum have utilized female forces for a range of activities including: logistics; recruitment and awareness-raising; operations, suicide bombing and combat; fundraising; and investigation and interrogation in conflict zones.⁹² Women in violent extremist movements can assist in preparing and committing crimes, provide ideological support, and strengthen the social cohesion within the movement. But they can also be coerced into becoming part of violent extremist movements and can be both victims as well as perpetrators.

⁸⁹Hearne, E. (2009). Participants, Enablers, and Preventers: The Roles of Women in Terrorism. December 2009. research paper presented at the British International Studies Association annual conference, Leicester, United Kingdom, December 2009.

⁹⁰Bloom, M. (2011). "Bombshells: Women and Terror", *Gender Issues* Vol. 28, Numbers 1-2, 1-21.

⁹¹Ness, C. (2007) "The rise in female violence", *Daedulus*, Winter 2007, Vol. 136, No. 1, Pages 84-93.

⁹²See for example: Institute for Strategic Dialogue: "Till Martyrdom Do Us Part" Gender and the ISIS phenomenon (2015); Algeria female "imams" battle Islamist extremism (2015); Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on violations and abuses committed by Boko Haram and the impact on human rights in the affected countries (2015); Penal Reform International (2015)–International Experts Roundtable on Preventing Radicalisation in Prisons: Developing a Coordinated and Effective Approach.

Many conditions conducive to terrorism impact both on the potential violent radicalization of men and women. It is however critical to understand how these factors may be experienced differently along gender lines. Gender-based discrimination may indeed possibly overlap with and exacerbate discrimination and violations of rights on other grounds, such as race, ethnicity or belief. Moreover, specific conditions conducive to the terrorist radicalization of women may include gender-based inequality and discrimination, violence against women, lack of educational and economic opportunities and lack of opportunities for women to exercise their civil and political rights and engage in the political process with lawful and non-violent means.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2013) Women and Terrorist Radicalization—Final Report, paragraph 6.

Women are not only victims, but have long been involved with groups engaged in violent extremism. Their roles vary according to each group and can include conducting suicide bombings, participating in women's wings or all-female brigades within armed organizations and gathering intelligence. Women can also be sympathizers and mobilizers through providing health care, food and safe houses to violent extremists and terrorists. For example, while mothers can be an entry point for prevention efforts, they can also be a source of radicalization.

Countering Violent Extremism While Respecting the Rights And Autonomy Of Women And Their Communities, Chapter 9 in: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing The Peace—A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, (2015), p225.

Although the role of women as violent extremists remains relatively unexplored, studies suggest that most of the factors that prompt men to become terrorists motivate women in the same way.⁹³ A variety of additional motives for women becoming involved in violent extremism have also been suggested.⁹⁴ Women can be more vulnerable than men to being drugged, raped, physically coerced, and emotionally and socially blackmailed, especially in traditionally patriarchal societies where they have little recourse to alternative mechanisms of empowerment or independence. Like some of their male counterparts, women can also be influenced or coerced to participate in violent extremism by family members, to avenge a sense of personal or familial dishonour, or to transform their status from victims of sexual violence into ideological icons. Although men can do the same, it is often more difficult or unusual for women to do so in societies where they are not encouraged to take on public or combat roles.

Among the estimated 5,000 individuals within the EU who have left for Syria and Iraq to join ISIL, there are at least 550 women. The underlying motivations for women in the West to leave their countries to join ISIL in Syria and Iraq are multi-varied and complex. Often it involves a combination of religious, ideological, political and personal reasons.

Radicalisation Awareness Network (2015) The Role of Gender in Violent Extremism, p. 3.

⁹³ Chowdhury Fink, N., Barakat, R. and Shetret, L., (2013), "The Roles of Women in Terrorism, Conflict and Violent Extremism: Lessons for the United National and International Actors", Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, and for a description of these motivations and an extensive list of studies on the roles of women in terrorism, see Maj. Marne L. Suttan, "The Rising Importance of Women in Terrorism and the Need to Reform Counterterrorism Strategy," United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009.

⁹⁴ See for example: Carter, B. (2013) "Women and violent extremism", GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services; *Penal Reform International* (2015) International Experts Roundtable on Preventing Radicalisation in Prisons: Developing a Coordinated and Effective Approach; Suttan, M., (2009), The Rising Importance of Women in Terrorism and the Need to Reform Counterterrorism Strategy, United States Army, Monograph; Cunningham, K., (2003), "Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26:171–195, 2003; Alison, M., (2003), "Cogs in the Wheel? Women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam", *Civil Wars*, 6(4), 37–54; Jacques, K., Taylor, P., (2013), "Myths and Realities of Female-Perpetrated Terrorism", *Law and Human Behaviour*, 37(1), 35–44.

In other circumstances, violent extremist groups may provide safe havens for women or provide self-esteem and a sense of accomplishment by taking on roles that are challenging societal gender norms. Involvement may result from a shortage of men within the organization, due to personnel being captured, killed or unwilling to participate. Women who are victims of violence and discrimination may feel that they had no non-violent option. Prolonged displacement can also affect their decision to join violent extremist groups. All of these experiences shape women's political identities, often creating highly committed female violent extremists.

Those staff undertaking risk assessments in prison should ensure that they fully explore the role that the women prisoner played in the violent extremist activity. Given the complexity of women's involvement in violent extremism, it is important that consideration is given to designing effective gender-sensitive disengagement activities.⁹⁵ Gender issues can be of key importance for the methodology of interventions. To be effective, disengagement, reintegration and after-care interventions should be gender-sensitive and address these varying experiences, as well as the specific obstacles and challenges that women may face.

Develop gender-sensitive disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs that address the specific needs of women and girls on a path to terrorist radicalization or involved in violent extremism.

Global Counterterrorism Forum (2015) Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 10.

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has pointed out that “it is important to appreciate that women have a role in the design and implementation of counter-terrorism measures, as well as to recognize their contributions in combating terrorism.”⁹⁶ It is therefore necessary to ensure that women are able to participate and be represented in policy development discussions and that gender expertise is included at the very outset of designing interventions for women violent extremists. There is currently no specific risk assessment tool for women violent extremist prisoners.

As pointed out in chapter 3, gender-sensitive techniques should also be adopted to correct the gender imbalance through the recruitment, retention, and promotion of women in prison administrations. Women staff should be recruited and trained to work with women violent extremist prisoners and to deliver gender-appropriate interventions. Women religious leaders, teachers and community elders could also be used to provide counselling, education and training for women violent extremist prisoners and to assist in facilitating their reintegration into mainstream society, especially following their release.

For those women who were compelled to travel to marry, or who were forced to marry after being abducted, it is very important to understand that they are victims of sexual violence

⁹⁵United Nations Security Council resolution 2242 (2015) calls for greater integration of gender throughout activities to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Resolution 2242 (2015) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7533rd meeting, on 13 October 2015, S/RES/2242 (2015), paragraph 13.

⁹⁶United Nations General Assembly, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism: Note by the Secretary-General, A/64/211, 17 March 2010 (Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism).

who are in need of psychological treatment, otherwise the damage they feel may lead to increased violent extremism. They are often young and it can be harder to deal with them as violent extremists unless there are gender-sensitive interventions.⁹⁷

It is not just in relation to prison-based interventions that women have special needs. If a woman has been convicted of a violent extremist offence, it can be very challenging to reintegrate her, owing to the stigma she is likely to face from her family and community and the risk of revenge. Additional interventions, tailored towards the gender dimension, may be necessary. Women violent extremist prisoners may have troubled family relationships and histories (experience with domestic violence, sexual abuse and honour-related violence). A risk assessment should be undertaken to establish whether it is safe—on both a psychological and physical level—to return home. Upon return, issues need to be addressed (including those relating to honour/shame). Additionally, trauma therapy by a psychotherapist is often necessary. Although women and girls may not have entered into combat, they are quite often traumatized by their experiences.⁹⁸

✦ For general guidance on the treatment of women prisoners, see the UNODC Handbook on Women and Imprisonment (2nd edition, 2014)

Foreign terrorist fighters: The term “foreign terrorist fighters” has been defined by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 as “... nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.”⁹⁹

According to some sources, there are nearly 30,000 foreign terrorist fighters currently deployed.¹⁰⁰ The number of criminal cases involving foreign terrorist fighters has grown in recent years. This is not only due to the increasing number of foreign fighters and returnees, but also due to the broadening of the scope of national legal regimes—and especially criminal codes—which are being adapted to more effectively address the foreign fighter phenomenon, and violent extremism in general. For instance, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2011) indicates that Member States should criminalize in their domestic legislation the (attempt to) travel for terrorism-related acts, the financing, organization or other facilitation of such acts. It is likely, therefore, that the number of violent extremist-related prisoners entering the criminal justice system, including prisons, will probably rise.

Returning foreign terrorist fighters who are held in prisons, whether pretrial or sentenced, require individual assessments in which their motives for travel can be better understood.

⁹⁷ Saltman, E. and Smith, M. (2015) “Till Martyrdom Do Us Part” Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon, Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

⁹⁸ Radicalisation Awareness Network (2015) The Role of Gender in Violent Extremism, p. 5.

⁹⁹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2178 (2014): Adopted by the Security Council at its 7272nd meeting, on 24 September 2014, S/RES/2178 (2014). For an alternative definition see: de Guttery, A., Capone, F. and Paulussen, C. (eds.) (2016), *Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond*, T.M.C. Asser Press.

¹⁰⁰ United States Congress Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel. Washington, D.C., September 2015, pp. 11 – 12; E. Schmitt and S. Sengupta, “Thousands Enter Syria to Join ISIS Despite Global Efforts”, *New York Times*, 26 September 2015; United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Action Against Threat of Foreign Terrorist Fighters Must Be Ramped Up, Security Council Urges in High-Level Meeting, 29 May 2015; Schmid, A. (2015) “Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates: Conceptual and Data Issues”, *ICCT Policy Brief*, October 2015.

Risk assessment frameworks, as they relate to foreign terrorist fighters, should be shared between partner States, where appropriate, to help ensure a comprehensive approach that reflects good practices.¹⁰¹

Driving factors that may lead to a decision to travel to a conflict zone may include: the sense of outrage at what is alleged to be happening in the country where the conflict is taking place and empathy with the people being affected; adherence to the ideology of the group an individual wishes to join; and a search for identity and belonging. Other drivers may be: foreign policy grievances; national policy; intergenerational conflict; and peer pressure.¹⁰² While many may seek specifically to join a violent extremist group, others may have believed that they were protecting civilians from oppression. Others may simply have been motivated by adventure or monetary gain, while some may have travelled to provide humanitarian assistance before becoming engaged in violent extremism. Some have allegiances, which may be cultural, ethnic, and/or economic, that transcend contemporary political borders and so they do not perceive themselves as foreign fighters.

The challenge for the prison administration is identifying the most appropriate interventions for foreign terrorist fighters given their varied motivations and, in many cases, their decision to voluntarily disengage from the violent extremist cause.¹⁰³ The situation may be made even more complex if the returning foreign terrorist fighter is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, trauma, behavioural unpredictability, emotional instability, or mental health issues brought on as a result of participating in violent extremist activity.

Develop comprehensive reintegration programs for returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). Comprehensive reintegration programs – including in prisons – are a critical component to respond to the potential threat posed by returnees ... Key principles for consideration to guide engagement and the development of such programs include: (1) the need to articulate the goal of activities to reduce the risk of returnees committing terrorist acts; (2) the importance of developing targeted and tailored engagement strategies based on the specific motivational factors; and (3) the need to involve multi-disciplinary actors in law enforcement, communities, and faith-based organizations.

Global Counterterrorism Forum (2014) "Foreign Terrorist Fighters" (FTF) Initiative. The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon, Good Practice 19.

¹⁰¹ Global Counterterrorism Forum "Foreign Terrorist Fighters" (FTF) Initiative (2014): The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon, Good Practice, No. 16.

¹⁰² Frenett, R. and Silverman, T. (2016) "Foreign Fighters: Motivations for travelling to foreign conflicts", in de Guttery, A., Capone, F. and Paulussen, C. (eds.) (2016), *Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond*, T.M.C. Asser Press, chapter 5, pp64-75.

¹⁰³ Entenmann, E. et al. (2015) Rehabilitation for Foreign Fighters? Relevance, Challenges and Opportunities for the Criminal Justice Sector, ICCT Policy Brief, December 2015; European Commission–Radicalisation Awareness Network (2013) "Declaration of Good Practices for Engagement with Foreign Fighters for Prevention, Outreach, Rehabilitation and Reintegration"; Global Center on Cooperative Security (2015): Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa: an Action Agenda, Action 9; Jones, C. (2014). "When foreign fighters return: managing terrorists behind bars". *The Conversation*. <https://theconversation.com/when-foreign-fighters-return-managing-terrorists-behind-bars-31054>.

“Lone wolf” violent extremist prisoners: The frequency of attacks by domestic “lone wolf” violent extremists¹⁰⁴ continues to increase. Even though such attacks remain less common and precipitate fewer casualties than violent extremist acts by organizations and groups, there are certain trends among “lone wolf” violent extremists that can be identified:¹⁰⁵ increased targeting of law enforcement and military personnel; increased radicalization to violence via the Internet and extremist media; and proclamation of an individual ideology instead of claiming affinity to specific, organized violent extremist groups. In particular, the expansion of the Internet and social media offers individuals the ability to become radicalized to violence without physically interacting with others and to research various attack methodologies undetected. “Lone wolf” violent extremist prisoners may have specific needs and require specific interventions that should be identified following a thorough risk assessment.

Pretrial violent extremist prisoners: In many countries, individuals suspected of terrorism-related offences may spend many years in detention awaiting trial, while in other countries individuals may spend substantial time in military or immigration detention facilities. Pretrial populations are more transient and less stable than sentenced prisoner populations. Planning meaningful support is also more difficult in the absence of a fixed horizon (for example, the prisoner’s sense of an exit from prison and the prison authorities’ inability to determine the duration of a prisoner’s detention). Furthermore, due to legal or policy restraints, pretrial prison populations in certain countries are not always able to avail themselves of the same prison services and programmes as sentenced prisoners. In addition, detainees are at their most vulnerable in the period immediately following their arrest, and therefore their susceptibility to the efforts of violent extremist recruiters may be higher during this pretrial period. It is important that these risks and challenges are reflected in the assessment and management of pretrial violent extremist prisoners. However, prison administrations must also be aware that any intervention including pretrial violent extremist prisoners may have an impact on their respective court cases—a factor which may discourage participation.

¹⁰⁴ A “Lone Wolf” violent extremist can be defined as: a single actor who uses violence linked to a formulated ideology, whether his own or that of a larger organization, and who does not receive orders, direction, or material support from outside sources.

¹⁰⁵ National Security Critical Issues Task Force (2015) *Lone Wolf Terrorism*, Georgetown University. See also: Hamm, M. and Spaaij, R. (2015) *Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways to Forge Prevention Strategies*, Indiana State University; Marlatt, G. (2016) *Lone Wolf Terrorism – A Brief Bibliography*, Homeland Security Digital Library, Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security.

5.

Prison-based disengagement interventions

5.1 Introduction

"I take complete responsibility for my actions. I acted purely in the name of my religion ... I can assure you that one day, should I be set free, I would do the same, exactly the same ..."

Mohammed Bouyeri, the killer of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gough quoted in: Al-Lami M. (2008) Studies of radicalization: State of the field report. London: University of London.

Interviewer: "If you had met me at that point, would you have tried to kill me?" Former al Qaeda member: "Of course. I would have killed you. But now I see you and I can live together in peace"

Interview with a former al Qaeda member at a rehabilitation centre in Saudi Arabia. CBS News, This Morning (November 18, 2014).

The question facing prison administrators is whether it is possible to convince violent extremist prisoners to disengage from violence, and, if it is possible, what interventions should be put in place to achieve the desired disengagement.

Disengagement from violent extremism has been a neglected area, not only in counter-terrorism policies but also in research on violent extremism. However, some recent studies are beginning to provide valuable insights.¹⁰⁶ This is despite the fact that disengagement remains potentially as complex a process as initial recruitment and radicalization to violence. There have, however, been a number of attempts to develop case studies of disengagement from violent extremist groups and to formulate policies and interventions directed at facilitating individual disengagement from such groups. Any effort to understand the factors that drive or facilitate disengagement for each individual will necessarily be based in, or derived from, a particular context.

¹⁰⁶For recent research on the subject see: Altier, M., Thoroughgood, C., & Horgan, J. (2014). "Turning away from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology". *Journal Of Peace Research*, 51(5), 647-661; Braddock, Kurt and Horgan, J. (2015). "Towards A Guide For Constructing And Disseminating Counternarratives To Reduce Support For Terrorism". *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 39 (5), 381-404; Williams, M.J., Horgan, J., & Evans, W.P. (2015). "The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking". *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* (October). 45-65; Horgan, J., Altier, M. B., Shortland, N., & Taylor, M. (2016). "Walking Away: The Disengagement and Deradicalization of a Violent Right-Wing Extremist". *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* (March), 1-15.

However, although the political and ideological context may be very different, the social and psychological processes involved may well be similar, or at least comparable.

Current research suggests that violent extremism is not caused by a distinct personality trait, disorder or profile. However, understanding how various mental illnesses may facilitate extremist violence continues to evolve. Treating mental illness or supporting people with emotional or psychological disturbance may be an appropriate strategy for some.¹⁰⁷ Any such assessment and treatment should only be undertaken by qualified health-care professionals, and be linked to psychosocial interventions.

Radicalization to violence is a process of belief and attitude change towards an extremist orientation that justifies the use of violence to achieve its goals. In some cases, the process may take many years; with other people, it may take only a few months. Driving their violent extremism orientation is a collection of experiences, memories, feelings, emotions, thoughts and beliefs. Radicalization to violence is best viewed, therefore, as a process of change, a personal and political transformation from one condition to another. Scholars argue that becoming radicalized to violence is, for most people, a gradual process that requires a progression through distinct stages and happens neither quickly nor easily. A person does not become a violent extremist overnight, although the influence of an incident which may act as a “catalyst event”, such as an experienced act of discrimination, perceived attack on a religion, or a “moral crisis” with the death of a loved one, may accelerate the process.

Underpinning the approach of disengagement interventions is the concept that if an individual can adopt radical beliefs and attitudes that lead to violent extremism, then that individual can also abandon the use of violence through changing those beliefs and attitudes that justify its use.

The pathway to disengagement may not necessarily be the same for everyone, nor are the qualities of that disengagement process as experienced by the individual the same for each person ... the reality of individual accounts is such that physical, psychological, voluntary and involuntary issues and experiences can combine even within one individual case to characterize the true complexity of one person's disengagement experiences. The reasons for disengagement can be numerous, conflicting, competing and exceptionally complex even within a single case. Indeed it is the case for many individuals engaged in terrorism that disengagement is as complex as the process that characterized how they become involved in terrorism in the first place.

Bjorgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009) Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, London: Routledge, p. 27.

It is clear from research that no single model of disengagement is universally applicable. Disengagement interventions cannot simply be transplanted from one country to another, even within the same region.¹⁰⁸ To be effective, efforts must be highly tailored to the country and culture involved, the nature of violent extremist group, the individual prisoners participating and the environment into which the former violent extremist detainee is ultimately released.

¹⁰⁷ Post, J. (2007) *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda*. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan. See also Post, J. (2009) Foreword in Horgan, J. *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements*. London: Routledge, p xii.

¹⁰⁸ Porges, M. (2011): “Reform School for Radicals: Deradicalization programs are justified by their indirect effects”. *The American Interest*. Vol. 6, No. 6.

That is not to say that good practices cannot be identified. Interventions should focus on the social and psychological process whereby an individual's commitment to, and involvement in, violent extremism is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity. Interventions achieve this aim by addressing the reasons why people are motivated to engage and offend, as well as those attitudes, beliefs and perceptions that enable them to offend. They should also provide opportunities to learn new skills and coping mechanisms.

5.2 Defining intervention goals and outcomes

In developing interventions, it is important to clearly define goals and objectives, as well as indicators of success and failure.¹⁰⁹

Perhaps most important is defining from the outset whether the goal of the intervention is to change the views, values and attitudes (deradicalization) or the behaviour of the violent extremist prisoner (disengagement from violence). Interventions that aim for the latter are likely to be more successful in achieving their goals. They do not attempt to change a prisoner's radical or extremist beliefs and views but instead seek to get a prisoner renounce the use of violence to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, the United Nations Human Rights Committee held that a domestic "ideology conversion system", which was applied in a discriminatory fashion with a view to altering the political opinion of an inmate by offering inducements of preferential treatment within prison and improved possibilities of parole, had violated the freedom of expression and of the manifestation of belief on the discriminatory basis of political opinion.¹¹⁰ Consequently, this handbook focuses on disengagement rather than deradicalization.

A second question that Member States will need to consider is whether interventions should focus on lower and mid-level violent extremists or those in leadership positions. In the case of those in leadership positions, the goal may be collective disengagement or for them to motivate their supporters to follow them in the disengagement process. Focusing on the leadership group may have a more significant impact in the longer term, but may be far more difficult to achieve.

5.3 Understanding the reasons for, and the process of disengagement

Former violent extremists who have reintegrated most successfully and who report feeling the most connected in mainstream society are those who have made significant changes in six domains: "social relations"; "coping"; "identity"; "ideology"; "action orientation"; and "disillusionment".¹¹¹ In many cases, development within these domains occurs over a period of years.

¹⁰⁹ Rome Memorandum, Good practice, No. 1.

¹¹⁰ *Yong-jo Kang v. Republic of Korea*, Views of the Human Rights Committee of 15 July 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999, para. 7.2.

¹¹¹ Five domains were set out in: Barrella, K. (2015) "Pro-integration: disengagement from and life after extremism", *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, Volume 7, Issue 2, 2015, pages 129-142. The sixth domain is identified as a common theme in other research (see below).

Social relations: A range of supportive and meaningful relationships. Relationships are one of the primary vehicles for disengagement from violent extremism and, further, appear to be what most optimally enables subsequent engagement of a former violent extremist elsewhere in society. Research suggests that ties to family or friends can act to pull people away from the involvement in violent extremism.¹¹² The importance of social ties in drawing people out of violent groups has been highlighted in a number of jurisdictions.¹¹³ These ties can also be an anchor for those who have disengaged. For this reason, maintaining, or re-establishing, family and community links will be essential to assist people wishing to leave violent extremism.

➊ *For further detail on families in the context of violent extremist prisoners' social reintegration, see chapter 8.5*

Coping: An ability to address personal health issues, both psychological and physical. A person who has left a violent extremist group may well need professional support for physical or emotional issues. It is common for a person to be distressed by the loss of purpose, friendships, belonging and identity. Some people feel paranoid that the group will be looking to punish them; others feel, sometimes correctly, that the community they intend to move back into after release will reject them. Depending on the individual's history, problems with depression, anxiety, trauma, trust and relationship issues may be present. Coping skills and self-care are necessary for anyone facing personal challenges. Therefore, psychological and health services need to be incorporated into any disengagement activity in prison.

Identity: Disengagement is a transformative identity process during which a person disconnects from a violent extremist group and reconnects elsewhere, re-establishing their own sense of self as they do so. The stability and cohesiveness of a former violent extremist's personal and social identity underpins his or her ability to connect with others outside the group. The emergence and/or development of personal identity is a critical factor in well-being generally, and is a particular challenge for many former violent extremists, especially if they have been in the violent extremist group for a long time. Most of them need to develop multiple new threads of identity to determine where they belong.

Ideology: Change in ideology such that the individual no longer believes that violent methods are justified; tolerating or accepting that other people hold different beliefs and belong to different identity groups; a coherent set of ideas and beliefs that enable peaceful cohabitation. Former violent extremists indicate that guidance about foundational/seminal knowledge in their faith or ideology tradition from a respected source was critical in their change of views. An ability to challenge ideas and beliefs that support violence in a respectful way is tremendously valuable to support the disengagement process.

Action orientation: Non-violent action orientation such that the individual can participate in their own life, or wider community life on release, to the full extent that they desire.

¹¹² See, for example: Noricks, D. (2009) "Disengagement and Deradicalization: Processes and Programs". In *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*, Davis, P. K. and Cragin, K. (eds), pp 299-321. Santa Monica, SA: RAND Corporation; Horgan, J. (2009a) "Individual Disengagement: A psychological analysis". In *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, Bjørge, T. and Horgan, J. (eds), pp 17-29. London: Routledge; Jacobson, M. (2008): "Why Terrorists Quit: Gaining From Al Qa'ida's Losses", *CTC Sentinel*, 1(8), pp. 1-4; Fink, N. C. and Hearne, E. (2008): *Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism*, New York International Peace Institute; Demant, F., Slooman, M., Buijs, F. and Tillie, J. (2008): *Decline and Disengagement – An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation* Amsterdam: IMES Amsterdam.

¹¹³ See, for example, programme review of deradicalization interventions for Pakistani militants in Beg, S. and Bokhari, L.: "Pakistan: In search of a disengagement strategy", in: Bjørge, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, pp. 224-242. London: Rutledge.

Depending on their socialization prior to entering a violent extremist group, some individuals leaving these groups need additional support in finding constructive and law abiding ways to pursue their cause, or live their life. Active participation in family, work, community or prosocial activities each exemplify different manifestations of a non-violent action orientation. Providing violent extremist prisoners with employment skills to assist them in getting a job can make a significant contribution in this area.

Disillusionment: The factor most commonly cited in literature as being associated with disengagement from all types of violent extremism.¹¹⁴ People can be disillusioned with the way that the group operates, the ideology of the group, the behaviour of the leader or the rules of the group. New recruits report a discrepancy between their vision of mobilization to the “cause” and their “on the ground” experience. Some members of violent extremist groups report that this was a factor in their decision to disengage from violence. Others become increasingly disillusioned with the effectiveness of the tactical use of violence to achieve their objectives, which can act as a powerful catalyst for re-assessing the use of violence and their involvement in the violent extremist group.

In light of the above, disengagement from violent extremism can be brought about through a complex set of interacting processes that support change in all six domains.

Some factors that can influence a violent extremist prisoner to disengage from violence occur outside of the control of the prison administration, such as ageing (people are less likely to remain actively involved in violent extremism the older they get) and experiencing a turning-point event (such as the death of a close friend or family member). Changing personal priorities, such as the desire to begin leading a quieter life, begin a family or take up employment, and spending time away from the violent extremist group are also associated with violent extremists disengaging from violence.¹¹⁵ Moreover, disengagement does not happen in a vacuum and the actions of the State towards the prisoner’s family and community will directly influence what is possible in the prison setting. Other factors, such as social grievances, are also outside of the scope of what prison interventions can address.

Having completed a thorough risk assessment of the reasons why a prisoner committed, or supported, violent extremist activities, it is possible to identify the “needs” associated with those risks. “Needs” in this context can be understood as issues that must be addressed by “interventions” that will lead to disengagement from violence. This approach is known as the “risk-needs-responsivity framework”.¹¹⁶ Member States are encouraged to develop appropriate interventions to assist violent extremist prisoners to disengage from violence.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴Horgan, J.: “Individual Disengagement: A psychological analysis” and Barrett, R. and Bokhari, L.: “Deradicalization and rehabilitation programmes targeting religious terrorists and extremists in the Muslim world”, both in: Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, pp. 17-29. London: Routledge; Jacobson, M. (2008): “Why Terrorists Quit: Gaining From Al Qa’ida’s Losses “ *CTC Sentinel*, 1(8), pp. 1-4; Fink, N. C. and Hearne, E. (2008): *Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism*. New York International Peace Institute.

¹¹⁵Abuza, Z.: “The Rehabilitation of Jamaah Islamiya detainees in South East Asia” and Horgan, J.: “Individual Disengagement: A psychological analysis”, both in: Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, pp. 193-211. London: Routledge; Demant, F., Sloopman, M., Buijs, F. and Tillie, J. (2008) *Decline and Disengagement An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation* Amsterdam: IMES Amsterdam.

¹¹⁶See: Andrews, D. A., Bonta, J., & Hoge, R. D. (1990). Classification for effective rehabilitation: Rediscovering psychology. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 17, 19-52; Andrews, D. A., & Bonta, J. (2006). *The psychology of criminal conduct* (4th ed.). Newark, NJ: LexisNexis; UNODC *Introductory Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of Offenders* (2012), p. 37.

¹¹⁷See for example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) para. 4 on “developing and implementing prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for Foreign Terrorist Fighters”.

More important ... is training prison administrators to look at terrorist prisoners as individuals and tailor prison programs to their needs ... there is no single intervention that can produce a rejection of violence among a disparate group of people who have joined radical movements for many different reasons.

International Crisis Group (2007) "Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons" Asia Report N°142. International Crisis Group, p. 16.

In addition to responding to those specific needs, it is important (in accordance with desistance theory), to help prisoners “look at their lives through some new lenses”¹¹⁸ by attempting to build personal maturity, renegotiate relationships, and constructing or reconstructing personal narratives.

5.4 Impact and types of interventions

Interventions in this context are defined as “the planned and structured processes designed to assist violent extremist prisoners to abandon engagement in violent extremist acts or, for those considered to be at serious risk of becoming radicalized to violence, to avoid committing such offences in future”. It should be noted at the outset that interventions for violent extremists will, in many respects, overlap with what should be provided to rehabilitate other prisoners (such as education, vocational training, psychological and behavioural therapy, and after-care), in particular where the assessed needs of the violent extremist prisoners are similar to those of other prisoners. They differ primarily in their emphasis on religious or ideological motivated interventions. Interventions should always be targeted to address the specific needs of each individual.¹¹⁹

To these ends, all appropriate means shall be used, including religious care in the countries where this is possible, education, vocational guidance and training, social casework, employment counselling, physical development and strengthening of moral character, in accordance with the individual needs of each prisoner, taking account of his or her social and criminal history, physical and mental capacities and aptitudes, personal temperament, the length of his or her sentence and prospects after release.

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rules 92.

Interventions can take various forms ranging from the general, providing a supportive and transformative institutional environment, to the highly specific, delivering structured, high-level interventions to address deep-seated ideological convictions that predispose to acts of violent

¹¹⁸ Porporino, F.: “Bringing sense and sensitivity to corrections: from programmes to “fix” offenders to services to support desistance”, in: J. Brayford, F. Cowe and J. Deering (2010): *What Else Works? Creative Work with Offenders*, Cullompton: Willan.

¹¹⁹ See: Stys, Y., Gobeil, R., Harris, A. J. R., & Michel, S. (2014). Violent extremists in federal institutions: Estimating radicalization and susceptibility to radicalization in the federal offender population, Research Report R-313. Ottawa, ON: Correctional Service of Canada; and Stys, Y. & Michel, S. (2014). Examining the Needs and Motivations of Canada’s Federally Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders, Research Report R-344. Ottawa, ON: Correctional Service of Canada.

extremism. Disengagement related interventions normally consist of a variety of activities including: psychological counselling and support; cognitive-behavioural programmes; social work interventions; faith-based debate and dialogue; education; vocational training; creative therapies; physical therapies (e.g. yoga, sport, exercise); family activity; and social, cultural and recreation.

MALAYSIA: Deradicalization programme, Kamunting Prison

The Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), in cooperation with the Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM), developed a deradicalization programme which could be used with the Internal Security Act detainees being held at Kamunting Prison. Most of these detainees were believed to be connected with violent Islamist-inspired groups. These prisoners were held in separate wings from other “ordinary” prisoners but were allowed to mix among themselves.

The deradicalization programme involves a variety of different elements, ranging from religious counselling to vocational training and psychological support for prisoners. It employed psychologists as well as religious experts from JAKIM, police officers and the prisoner’s family members. The objectives of the programme is to: (1) tackle the radical ideology which motivated the prisoner’s past offending and demonstrate how this contrasted with other teachings of Islam; (2) instil appropriate civic values in the prisoner; (3) provide psychological support to improve the prisoner’s self-esteem; and (4) provide vocational training to prepare the prisoner for life after release.

Prison staff provide most of the training, but external staff also play an important role. Religious scholars from JAKIM provide religious instruction to the prisoners, with religious classes taking place every day and lasting on average 90 minutes. This is also supplemented by guest talks from university professors, who are particularly respected by the prisoners, as they are seen as independent from the Government. Most classes take place in a group format. Psychologists provide counselling support for the prisoners, both at a group level and on a one-to-one basis as needed. Hard-line prisoners who are judged to be obstructing the process for other prisoners, are moved away and held at a different location.

Overall, the programme draws on a variety of elements which have been associated with successful intervention programmes elsewhere. These factors include: tackling violent ideological justifications; improving prisoner self-esteem and psychological health; involving the prisoner’s family in the deradicalization process; removing hard-line prisoners from those who are willing to engage with the programme; and, providing practical support for life after prison.

Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).

As discussed earlier, it is imperative to tailor interventions to local conditions, cultures and legal traditions of the countries concerned, as well as to context-specific root causes of prisoners’ engagement in violent extremism.¹²⁰ Research also suggests that broader contextual circumstances can be as important as specific targeted interventions in achieving disengagement from violence. These contextual circumstances include: a supportive prison environment; healthy relationships; feeling safe; and opportunities to walk away from groups or causes.

¹²⁰ See RAND Corporation (2010): “Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists”; Hinds, R. (2013): *Islamic Radicalisation in North and West Africa: Drivers and approaches to tackle radicalisation*. GSDRC, University of Birmingham; Morris, M., Eberhard, F., Rivera, J. and Watsula, M. (2010, May). *Deradicalization: A Review of the Literature with Comparison to Findings in the Literatures on Degangging and Deprogramming*. Institute for Homeland Security Solutions.

Disengagement interventions should seek to address those attitudes, beliefs and perceptions that enable violent extremist prisoners to support or participate in violent acts. Interventions therefore need to focus on the following key issues:¹²¹

- *Fulfilling needs legitimately*: Helping people identify opportunities to develop alternative commitments to meet their needs; questioning how adequately their involvement really meets their needs; encouraging prisoners to feel that they no longer “fit in” with other members of the violent extremist group; and exploring any dissatisfaction or disillusionment with their involvement.
- *Developing supportive attitudes, beliefs and thinking*: Exposing inconsistencies or inaccuracies in their current beliefs that support violence; reducing identification with a group or cause (which can begin to weaken the bonds of ideology); making it more difficult for them to see other groups in simplistic ways through diluting “us and them” stereotypes; and recognizing the complexity of other people’s values and commitments and commonalities between groups.
- *Increasing emotional tolerance and acceptance*: Making individuals more aware of how their emotions are associated with their values and beliefs; helping them to tolerate emotions more effectively and “let go” of these; making changes in their lives to make circumstances that impact on the things they identify with feel less personal.
- *Increasing personal agency*: Educating individuals about how and why people can adopt the values and beliefs of others without question; reconnecting them with their personal identity rather than just being defined by the extremist group, cause or ideology; supporting them in taking steps to form new commitments to reflect who they want to be in order to meet their needs; and helping them to manage intimidation and pressure from others to prevent them from disengaging.
- *Expressing values and pursuing goals legitimately*: Challenging people about their sense of entitlement to use violence for a specific cause (or on behalf of a group of people); exploring whether such behaviour is counter-productive to their cause; examining the consequences of such behaviour on other people; increase their understanding that the wider political and social environment has changed and that political violence is no longer necessary, leading to a reappraisal for the need or justification for continued violent extremism; and encouraging them to express disillusionment with the violent extremist group’s policies, leadership, objectives (e.g. unwillingness to negotiate) or with specific operational tactics (e.g. the targeting of civilian areas).
- *Developing delayed deterrence*: Encouraging violent extremist prisoners to think about the risk of future incarceration; the anxieties connected with a violent extremist lifestyle; and the serious personal costs they face if they continue to commit violent acts, while at the same time questioning their ability to cope with these costs.
- *Aspiring to a “normal” life*: Assisting the individual to evaluate past decisions and reassess life goals, provoking a re-evaluation of their involvement in violent extremism; encouraging them to focus on wanting a “normal” life (marriage and showing more respect and concern for their own children); and helping prisoners to learn skills so that they can gain employment on release.

¹²¹ Based on: Dean, C.: The healthy identity intervention: The UK’s development of a psychologically informed intervention to address extremist offending, in Silke, A. (2014): *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues In Management, Radicalisation and Reform*, p. 99-100.

Most of these cognitive changes require a holistic approach across a number of disciplines and specializations and a range of interventions. Developing interventions that assist violent extremist prisoners in defining the issues that pushed them towards violent extremist behaviours in the first place is a challenging task. It is an even more challenging task to help them in formulating objectives and identifying and implementing solutions. Each type of intervention can be used to focus on a specific issue. For example:

- Religious interventions to challenge justifications for violence based on an interpretation of a religious document
- Education intervention to counter nationalist ideology and develop critical thinking
- Psychological interventions that foster the resocialization of violent extremists
- Social work intervention to establish a clear vision of a better future
- Vocational training to gain the skills needed to secure a job on release
- Sports and exercise to develop team work, trust and self-fulfilment without the need for violence
- Arts therapy, such as theatre, as an opportunity to express emotions

Different types of intervention tend to build on each other and the overall impact is cumulative, sometimes taking a long time to have an impact. It should also be remembered that violent extremist prisoners may feel remorse and sorrow for victims as part of the disengagement process. The prison administration should ensure that appropriate support mechanisms and interventions are put in place.

Violent extremists experiencing remorse and guilt

A common theme amongst terrorists is the issue over remorse/guilt. Many mentioned their feelings of sorrow at what they had done and thought they would never be totally free, even when released. It was difficult for them to express any real empathy with their victims without betraying their family/community/group. The sorrow came from knowing they had done something wrong. Where remorse is concerned, there is a stronger hope of moving on. However, when that remorse turns to guilt, then there can be feelings of suicide and rejection. If we take these issues seriously, then we need staff and other people in the prisons who can cope with these mental health problems relating to remorse/guilt/suicide, so that prisoners may be reintegrated into their communities safely with a better chance of rehabilitation.

Contribution submitted by the International Commission of Catholic Prison Pastoral Care in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Specific mentoring programmes are also often used to support violent extremist prisoners who are participating in disengagement activities, as well as for individuals deemed vulnerable to radicalization. A mentor can provide one-to-one, individually tailored support to meet the specific needs of the prisoner. Mentors can be a valuable supplement to the interventions taking place in prisons, as well being a stand-alone intervention. Mentors are usually recruited from civil society, which means that they are able support the prisoner while in prison, upon release, and during the crucial transition phase. In order for a mentor programme to be effective, mentors should be carefully vetted, trained and offered professional supervision. Similarly, individual mentor plans should be formulated and coordinated with the prisoner's

action plan and the requests of the prisoner. Structured follow-ups and adjustments should be established. In comparison to other interventions, mentoring programmes are relatively low-cost, and can be adjusted to meet different structural and cultural settings.

DENMARK: A Mentoring Training Programme

The overriding objective of the mentor training programme "Deradicalization–Back on Track" is to offer targeted mentoring to people with extremist tendencies who are convicted of or charged with criminal offences, and thereby give them the help and support they need to get back on track and break out of radicalized groups—both while in prison and in connection with their subsequent re-entry into society.

The training programme for mentors consisted of three two-day seminars and two follow-up seminars, also lasting two days each. In addition to this, the Danish Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service provided a tailored, supplementary two-day course on extremism and radicalization. Network days were also held for the mentors. Effective mentoring is a complex task. The key to its success is to establish a relationship of trust and to have properly trained mentors with a wide range of competencies—mentors who can draw on their own experiences but also draw inspiration from others; mentors who can reflect on their own practice in order to be able to adapt their approach for the benefit of the mentee.

Danish Department of Prisons and Probation and the Danish Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs (2014) Deradicalization – Back On Track: Concept for mentor training programme with a focus on extremism and radicalization.

Each of the main types of intervention is discussed in more detail in the following sections.

5.5 Education

1. Provision shall be made for the further education of all prisoners capable of profiting thereby, including religious instruction in the countries where this is possible. The education of illiterate prisoners and of young prisoners shall be compulsory and special attention shall be paid to it by the prison administration.
2. So far as practicable, the education of prisoners shall be integrated with the educational system of the country so that after their release they may continue their education without difficulty.

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rules 104.

Education can be a direct antidote to violent extremist messages.¹²² Disengagement interventions should therefore include a range of educational activities. Basic education, including literacy courses, maths, history and civics, can open a world of understanding for violent extremist prisoners and end their reliance upon other people who tell them what to think. Improving the prisoners' educational abilities will also increase their self-esteem, self-confidence, opportunities, and status within their communities.

¹²²Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 16.

The education levels of VEOs [violent extremist offenders] vary greatly. Many come from marginalized backgrounds. It is important to offer a wide range of educational programs and learning activities for all levels, from basic primary education to advanced concentrations such as university level degrees and legal courses. Courses can include literacy, math, history and civics, but it is important that both the type and the content of courses are based in local culture and practices. They should be tailored to the needs and capabilities of the inmates. Education can be delivered by a range of actors, including government educators and civil society groups. Educators should be carefully recruited, vetted, and monitored to ensure suitable people deliver the courses and appropriate content is discussed. The education gained by VEOs will better prepare detainees for continued schooling and job opportunities. Inmates with an aptitude for learning can become teachers or teacher's aids and may help their fellow inmates with their education. Learning from peers was also seen as a way to help inmates develop their social skills.

Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (2015) Detention and Reintegration Working Group Workshop on Education, Life Skill Courses and Vocational Training for Incarcerated Violent Extremist Offenders.

The risk assessment process should identify violent extremist prisoners who have little or no basic education, particularly in numeracy and literacy, and should assess how such deficits may have contributed to their openness to extremist views justifying violent behaviour. If time spent in custody is to be positive, providing someone who is illiterate and innumerate with opportunities to learn and to achieve nationally recognized qualifications will result in significant personal and social benefits, including: acquisition of knowledge; improvement of social skills based on ability to read, write and make everyday calculations; qualifications; greater self-esteem; and increased opportunities for employment.

Prison changed everything. When I went to prison, it was there when I really started to study. The first year I was there, I began to study philosophy. For a whole half year, I just read and read ... I learned for the first time in prison that it is possible to look at the world in many ways, many different ways. There doesn't have to be a right or wrong answer. There's a lot of different ways.

Norwegian right-wing violent extremist convicted for his role in bombing a mosque. Quoted in: Horgan, J. (2009) Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements, London: Routledge, p46.

Education does not come to an end with the attainment of basic skills. Many violent extremist prisoners will be able to read and write before entering the institution, and some will have higher education qualifications. It is important that those violent extremist prisoners who are literate and numerate, or who have completed basic education courses while in the institution, should have opportunities to progress further. There is ample evidence to show that the provision of a broad educational curriculum in prisons that also includes higher education can improve prospects of employment in higher paid and responsible jobs after release. Holding down a responsible and rewarding job inevitably leads to a higher degree of engagement in the community and greater likelihood of maintaining pro-social attitudes and lifestyles.

International experience has shown that many violent extremist prisoners, and particularly the leaders, are well educated and from financially comfortable backgrounds. Risk factors will not be linked to ignorance or poverty but may arise from a search for identity in a world

in which they may feel disengaged from the institutions of the State, articulating their sense of alienation in cultural, religious or ethnic terms. Further education in a supportive, collaborative and rational environment can help them to review and revise their beliefs and convictions.

Education should also focus on developing life skills, communication skills and foster participation, civic values and the decision-making abilities of each person. Education can improve individual self-confidence, self-esteem and feelings of self-worth. It can help develop self-awareness, assisting an individual to reflect on beliefs and behaviour, and create a positive self-identity as an achiever. It can instil critical reasoning, helping to shape a new mindset in which formerly held feelings of perceived injustice, anger and revenge are questioned, leading to new interpretations of the world and how and why things are.

THE PHILIPPINES: Alternative Learning System

The Alternative Learning System is offered as an intervention programme to all inmates including those charged with terrorism-related cases. This is an educational programme composed of secondary, elementary and basic elementary classes. The jail officers serve as their teachers, and with permission from the inmates, during class session, they are videotaped. The recordings of each class session are then put on a CD-ROM and given to the wives, and for their children to be used. The package is like an extended ALS Class that does not only cater the inmate-students, but also their families and more importantly their children.

Contribution submitted by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, The Philippines, in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Space should be provided within the wider education curriculum for learning about citizenship, reinforcing the values, rights, duties and responsibilities of individuals towards each other and in relation to the State. Learning about law, justice, fairness, human rights and ethics in public life, democracy, the role of government, critical thinking and constructive debate is essential in countering subjective interpretations of the world propagated by violent extremists. Civic responsibility and citizenship may also build a shared sense of culture within a society that consists of a diverse mix of ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds. However, it should be noted that in some countries and regions, implementing or even justifying the need for civic duty education in curricula could be challenging.¹²³

By engaging in discussions on citizenship, violent extremist prisoners are able to explore contesting narratives critically and objectively and to develop their own views on what it takes to be a good citizen. In this way, education becomes re-education. Education can help to challenge distorted beliefs about the injustices of historical events and the modern State propagated by violent extremist groups and often included in the curriculum in extremist-controlled educational institutions. In cases where there may be grounds for beliefs about historical and continuing injustice and oppression, education can provide alternative strategies for legitimate challenge through established State institutions and without a need to resort to violence. Counter-narratives or dialogues, particularly those that discredit false assertions, identify hypocrisies and misrepresentations, are particularly important in achieving

¹²³ Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and Hedayah (2013): The Role of Education in Countering Violent Extremism, Meeting Note, December 2013.

disengagement from violence.¹²⁴ Education interventions focused on discrediting and delegitimizing the ideology that drives violent extremism should therefore be part of any disengagement activity.

5.6 Vocational training

1. So far as possible the work provided shall be such as will maintain or increase the prisoners' ability to earn an honest living after release.
2. Vocational training in useful trades shall be provided for prisoners able to profit thereby and especially for young prisoners.

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 98.

To successfully reintegrate into society, it is critically important that a former violent extremist prisoner is employable and able to support his or her family. Employment can also reduce the need for, and the appeal of, rejoining a violent extremist group. Vocational skills training and employment is therefore an important component of disengagement activity. Opportunities for vocational training and institutional work experience are also useful ways of keeping violent extremist prisoners occupied, helping to relieve boredom and inactivity that can adversely affect physical and mental wellbeing potentially leading to disruptive behaviour.

I therefore recommend that Member States:

Encourage individuals to leave violent extremist groups by developing programmes that place an emphasis on providing them with educational and economic opportunities.

Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism—Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674 (2015), para. 49(c).

Prison should provide inmates with a range of opportunities to gain experience working in occupations such as metal working, farming, painting, tailoring, upholstery, hand crafts, and performing arts. In some prisons, goods produced by inmates in fields such as carpentry, iron welding/construction, jewellery and pottery, are sold to the government or local communities. In the short term, learning vocational skills provides VEOs with a structured environment and sense of purpose. The long-term benefit is a skill set that allows released individuals to secure employment, earn a living, provide for their family and contribute to society in a positive way.

Global Counterterrorism Forum (2015) Detention and Reintegration Working Group Workshop on Education, Life Skill Courses and Vocational Training for Incarcerated Violent Extremist Offenders.

¹²⁴ See for example: Green, S. N. (2015) “Changing the Narrative: Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda”. Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Jacobson, M. (2010) “Terrorism Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left”. *Policy Focus*: 101. Washington – District of Columbia, United States of America: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

The risk assessment process should identify those violent extremist prisoners who were unable to find regular work prior to their detention and will determine whether this is likely to be a risk factor associated with their attraction to a violent extremist group or cause. The frustrations arising out of the inability to find or maintain a job can lead to feelings of disillusionment, anger against the State and attraction to a group or cause that promises a better future in the form of improved self-worth, a sense of belonging and even financial well-being.

As far as possible, the skills to be acquired in vocational training courses should be matched to an individual's talents, potential and preference, as this will make it more likely that the violent extremist prisoner will achieve the necessary qualifications, along with the self-esteem and rewards that drive and accompany progress. It is also important that there is a match between skills required and opportunities available in the outside community.¹²⁵

TURKEY: Prison vocational training, workshops and education

Teachers in prisons hold an "interview" with prisoners who are received into prison in order to identify their educational needs. At the end of the interview, an education plan is prepared covering educational activities that will take place with the prisoner until his or her release. A range of educational provision at different levels is made available within the prison including: basic literacy; elementary school; high school and an education faculty. Use is made of distance education and examinations take place within the prison.

The workshop system in prisons in Turkey was established in 1997 in order to help unemployed prisoners to gain a profession and to improve their current professions. In 2015, approximately 47,000 prisoners gained a vocational profession while working in 262 prisons across Turkey. Prisoners are able to earn an income and also have insurance. There are three separate systems in workshops to provide prisoners with an occupation. In the first system, prisoners may work in workshops that are in prisons; in the second system, prisoners in open prisons may work in public institutions such as municipalities and courthouses; in the third system, prisoners may work in workshops that are established by the private sector within the open and closed prisons.

Contribution submitted by the Directorate General for Prisons and Detention Houses, Turkey, in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Some vocational skills will be in broad demand throughout the country. Others will need to be tailored to the work opportunities available in the area or community in which the former violent extremist prisoner eventually intends to settle. For this reason, it is important to undertake a work and training needs analysis of work available in the community and the associated skills required. This should inform decisions on what work and training should be made available to violent extremist (and other) prisoners. In post-conflict countries, for example, a number of skills are of particular importance, such as construction and welding skills, and these skills could be taught in prisons.

¹²⁵Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 17.

Examples of vocational skills training in prisons

Carpentry	Metal fabrications	Paint making
Tailoring	Farming and husbandry	Furniture making
Printing	Bread making	Soap making
Building trades	Electronics	Shoe-making
Hairdressing	Painting	Industrial cleaning
Car mechanics	Jewellery	Pottery

The institution should liaise with employment agencies and potential employers in order to keep up-to-date with work skills required and opportunities available, so that vocational courses can be kept relevant and violent extremist prisoners advised in preparation for their release. Good liaison will also support them in making decisions about where to apply for work and how to apply (job searching, completing application forms, curriculum vitae and interviewing skills). It could also provide a service in planning for release by introducing violent extremist prisoners to potential employers.

Prison administrations will need to take the appropriate security precautions, which may mean that some violent extremist prisoners have to be excluded from certain types of work, based on their risk assessment. Some courses and work experience may be inappropriate, particularly if the assessment process raises concerns that an individual could employ skills gained to further their own and others' ambitions to commit violent extremist acts or to undermine the security of the institution or even national security. Staff should never underestimate the ingenuity that can stem from deprivation of liberty and commitment to a cause and how seemingly innocuous courses and course materials could provide the skills and raw materials that could lead to the manufacture of weapons, poisons, even explosives, or to serious abuse of the internet.

5.7 Faith-based interventions

Prison-based faith interventions have a long record of contributing to prisoner rehabilitation.¹²⁶ However, care should be taken in terms of the content of those interventions. The Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief has emphasized that it is not government's role to look for the "true voices of Islam" or of any other religion or belief. Since religions or communities of belief are not homogenous entities, it is advisable to acknowledge and take into account the diversity of voices. The Special Rapporteur has reiterated that the contents of a religion or belief should be defined by the worshippers themselves, while manifestations may be limited according to article 18, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example to prevent worshippers from violating the rights of others.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ See: Schaefer, L., Sams, T., and Lux, J. (2016): "Saved, Salvaged, or Sunk: A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Faith-Based Interventions on Inmate Adjustment", *The Prison Journal*, June 10, 2016; Johnson, B. (2004): "Religious Programs and Recidivism Among Former Inmates: A Long-Term Follow-Up Study", *Justice Quarterly* 21, pp. 329-354; Johnson, B. Larson, D. and Pitts, T. (1997) "Religious Programming, Institutional Adjustment and Recidivism Among Former Inmates in Prison Fellowship Programs," *Justice Quarterly* 14, pp. 145-166.

¹²⁷ See the remarks by the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief in A/HRC/7/10/Add.3, para. 76.

Many violent extremists use their faith as a justification for their violent activity. In reality, their knowledge of their faith, and its interpretation, may be limited and has often been shaped by faith leaders who seek to promote a particular interpretation that advocates the use of violence.

Religious sources and normative codes of conduct always accommodate different readings that are actively undertaken by human beings. Thus, human agency is inevitably involved in interpreting religious traditions, dogmas, laws or identities. Open-minded interpretations that encourage tolerance, empathy and solidarity across boundaries may exist alongside narrow-minded interpretations of the same religion, which lead to polarized world views and a militant rejection of people holding other persuasions.¹²⁸ Whenever violence is justified by the invocation of religion or arrogated to religious tenets (i.e. religious ideas, concepts, images or anxieties), it should be remembered that human beings ultimately bear responsibility for the practical consequences that they draw from the interpretation of their faith.

The significance of faith-based interventions is based on the role that a particular interpretation of religious ideology can play in justifying violent extremism. As such, any intervention requires understanding the religious ideologies (or the interpretation of them) that justify violent acts, and countering them with alternative scholarly arguments.

Religious professionals should be fully integrated as members of intervention teams in the prison environment. While their work may be different, in some respects, from other experts involved in these programmes—such as psychologists, psychiatrist, social workers and educators—they should nonetheless work closely with all members of the team. Each has his or her own special contribution to make. Other members of the intervention team should have a clear understanding of the role of religious faith leaders in this process, to ensure that their efforts are complementary, mutually supportive and well-articulated.

Beyond a clear condemnation of violence committed in the name of religion, communities and their leaders should positively promote empathy, tolerance and an appreciation of diversity. They should challenge the religious extremists' authenticity claims by exposing the ignorance of their views of the charitable core messages contained in religious traditions. Religious communities and scholars may also play an important role in rehabilitation and reintegration programs for violent extremist offenders and foreign fighters who returned to their country of origin, also with a view to neutralize possible future radicalization efforts. (...)

Religious communities and their leaders should promote empathy, respect, non-discrimination and an appreciation of diversity. They should challenge the authenticity claims of religious extremists by exposing their views as being ignorant of the charitable core messages contained in religious traditions. Additionally, they should share with others their beliefs in the importance of respecting the rights of others, thereby contributing to a sense that the rights of all will be respected.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of religion or belief, Human Rights Council, 29 December 2014, A/HRC/28/66, paras. 65 and 105.

¹²⁸For a summary of religious scholars challenging justifications for violence see: Glenn, C., Nada G. and Nozell, M. (2015): "Muslims Condemning Violent Extremism? Count the Ways"; available at: www.usip.org.

Countering the narratives of violent extremists requires a thorough understanding of their academic and intellectual sources. This reality underlies the important role of religious professionals in tackling religious extremism. The narratives applied for countering violent extremist ideologies should not be dictated by the views of any particular sect but rather be directed by the central message of those religious ideologies with regards to tolerance, balance, and the spirit of co-existence that guide good relationships with others and bring peace and security in society. In addition to countering the narratives of violence, the opportunity should be used to offer alternatives that send positive and non-violent messages.

NIGERIA: Religious interventions

Nigeria's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme recognizes that behavioural change is central to deradicalization. Since the current specie of terrorism in Nigeria is based largely on religious colouration, one major component of treatment for VEPs in custody is intervention by religious leaders or scholars. A key component of their work is the offer of alternative interpretation of text and the promotion of Islamic principles that proffer non-violence and peaceful coexistence. VEPs explained that the only interpretation they were exposed to was that of insurgency leaders and they were not aware of alternative meanings of texts. They are also not aware of the sources of such interpretations. Many cannot read or write Arabic and are generally illiterate and with no vocation. Through a careful and humane approach, religious leaders in Nigerian prisons have been able to thaw rigidly held views. Once this barrier was broken, VEPs became amenable to participate in other interventions designed towards deradicalization. The success recorded by religious leaders for the management of VEPs in custody in Nigeria is significant and is being studied by other jurisdictions .

Contribution submitted by the Network of African National Human Rights Institutions West Africa, in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Positive dialogue with members of extreme groups, whether violent or non-violent, in order to clarify issues, removes doubt or clear misconception is recommended for those who have knowledge. Scholars are well positioned to engage extremists in positive dialogue with a view to calling them to the truth, establishing proof, refuting dubiety, rejecting unsound opinion, differentiating between truth and falsehood, showing the strongest arguments in controversial issues, or narrowing the gap of disagreement.

Mr. Ahmad Bello Dogarawa (2015), Role of Scholars in Countering Terrorism in Nigeria.

Some of the violence in Nigeria is committed by Christian groups against Muslims. Countering extremist and violent ideologies in Christianity requires three approaches. These approaches must be taught, followed and constantly evaluated with utmost commitment and loyalty, particularly for those engaged in the deradicalization and rehabilitation of violent extremists. It is important to emphasize that Christianity is centred on love, peace and justice. Another level of countering violent extremism and radical views in Christianity is demonstrating the meeting point between Christianity and Islam. This is to emphasize what unites Christians and Muslims rather than what divides them. Over the years, there have been efforts coordinated by religious scholars, churches and Christian organizations aimed at fostering inter-religious dialogue and peaceful co-existence between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. This is intended to tame the tide of extremism and cultivate the spirit of tolerance and accommodation.

Fr. Atta Barkindo, African Conflict and Security Analysis Network, ACSAN, and the Kukah Center for Faith, Policy and Leadership Research, Abuja, Nigeria.

Care should be exercised, however, as the broad majority of faith-based violent extremists may not possess even a basic level of critical understanding of religious texts and doctrine sufficient

to be convinced by a rational critique of those texts or ideologies, at least at the outset of any intervention.¹²⁹ Religious professionals may need to adjust their approach based on background, knowledge level of the prisoner and their position in the organization. Religious professionals may be able to use more complex, in-depth arguments with more knowledgeable members, while simplifying their narrative and counter-narratives with other followers.¹³⁰

Religious professionals must have credibility with the prisoners, as well as with government officials and organizations. There are a number of different criteria involved in the establishment of the necessary credibility and trust. Religious professionals should have the appropriate professional background and experience, education and credentials in this area. They will also need to demonstrate to the violent extremist prisoners that they have some measure of independence from the State and from prison authorities. Prisoners who have strong, negative views of the State and with State institutions such as prisons, may make it more difficult for the religious faith leaders to establish the necessary relationship, based on trust, with the prisoner. Before beginning in-depth discussions on religious subjects, the religious faith leader should first come to know the prisoners personally, and keep the discussions focused on family, welfare and other similar topics.

I know that some prisoners will always view me negatively, because I am a government imam. With the person who was ready to blow himself up, I can't be sure I have changed him. But I can say I have shown him another way, and that their theology is wrong ... I don't have a thought detector, so I don't know what's happening in a prisoner's mind. I just have the hope that through honesty and prayer, I can lead them towards self-improvement.

Prison Imam quoted in: Rose, D. (2012) Inside Britain's terror cells: A chilling insight into how gangs of convicted terrorists recruit prisoners for Al Qaeda—and the courageous men and women sent in to "turn" them.

The point in the disengagement process where an intervention by religious faith leaders would be most effective will differ from person to person, with the intervention team making the decision regarding the most appropriate timing to expose violent extremist prisoners to religious faith leaders. For some prisoners, the period immediately following sentencing will be ill-timed, as they are still adjusting to life in the prison environment, while for others, this type of intervention might give them immediate hope for their post-prison life. Determining when to intervene should be made on a case-by-case basis.

5.8 Psychological and cognitive interventions

Psychological programmes have been available in prisons for many years, and thousands of prisoners have passed through them, with good research evidence that “cognitive-behavioural” courses can reduce reoffending, as well as make prison life calmer.¹³¹ Psychological

¹²⁹ See, for example, Sageman, M. (2008). *Leaderless Jihad: Terror networks in the twenty first century*, Philadelphia, United States of America: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 14.

¹³⁰ United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (2013): Additional Guidance on the Role of Religious Scholars and other Ideological Experts in Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes.

¹³¹ Andrews, D. and Bonta, J. (2010): *The Psychology of Criminal Conduct* (5th Edition), (New Providence, NJ: LexisNexis).

interventions should not, however, be seen in too “pure” a psychological sense (such as psychotherapy) when actually they may be fundamental to facilitating change, disengagement and desistance. Psychosocial interventions, based on established principles for effective interventions to address other forms of offending, can be specifically designed to promote disengagement and desistance by integrating unique features and approaches to address violent extremism specifically.

States could consider developing cognitive programs that assist offenders in defining the issues that pushed them towards violent extremist behaviors in the first place and subsequently in formulating objectives and identifying and implementing solutions

Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, Number 15.

Psychologists should understand that treating violent extremist prisoners can often be different from treating other violent offenders. Some violent extremist prisoners may have little outward psychopathology, but research shows that many are emotionally vulnerable and have identity and status issues.¹³² Intervention plans should be designed accordingly.

Some professionals have argued that the most effective types of treatment for prisoners are based on cognitive-behavioural and social learning approaches, in particular when they take into account the offender’s personal characteristics such as interpersonal sensitivity, interpersonal anxiety and verbal intelligence.¹³³ Prisoners also need a set of skills, for example, communicative, emotional and reflective capabilities, that can be developed through cognitive-behavioural interventions and that will assist them to engage in other types of interventions. Some have also argued that established, evidence-based principles and approaches to prevent other forms of offending are also likely to have utility in preventing violent extremism.¹³⁴

PAKISTAN: Therapy for violent extremist prisoners

Pakistan's most populous province, Punjab, has decided to train prison staff in criminal psychology in a bid to curb terrorism. About 300 to 350 hardened criminals are currently detained in 36 jails of the province for terrorist activities, sectarian killings and other crimes of a heinous nature who will be given specialized psychological therapy. The training of prison staff in the first phase covers different topics and is meant to enhance their skills for assessing the psychology of criminals. The trained staff could then make assessments of the prisoners, citing certain symptoms in the prisoners' behaviour, which they have been trained to identify. In the second phase, the prison officers prepare a list of inmates they recommend for therapy and submit the list to psychologists. This training aims to reduce the crime rate in society and terrorism from the country.

Farooq Nazir, Inspector General of Punjab Prisons, Pakistan, available at: www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/04/09/Pakistan-fights-terrorism-with-therapy-for-violent-prisoners/71423538815150/.

¹³²Hedayah and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (2013): Building On The GCTF’s Rome Memorandum: Additional Guidance on the Role of Psychologists/Psychology in Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs.

¹³³See, for example: Andrews, D., Bonta J., and Hoge, R. (1990): “Classification for effective rehabilitation: rediscovering psychology”, *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 19-52.

¹³⁴Mullins, S. (2010): “Rehabilitation of Extremist Terrorists: Learning from Criminology”, *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, pp. 162-193.

Research on the extent to which effective approaches to preventing other types of offending also apply to preventing violent extremism is still limited. Identifying what unique approaches may be required for violent extremist prisoners is still at an early stage, as facilitating disengagement is not a process focussed on to prevent most other types of offending.

GERMANY: Taking Responsibility—A Programme on Breaking away from Hate and Violence

The “Taking Responsibility—Breaking away from Hate and Violence” programme was initially developed in 2001, focused on right-wing extremism. The aim of the project was to help deradicalize young people who had been arrested for ideologically motivated acts of violence. The programme has since been expanded for use with militant Islamists, and more recently has also been adopted for ethno-nationalist conflict.

The programme seeks to distinguish between the offence and the offender. A recurring theme is to question the ideology used to justify violence and to identify and critique past strategies used to justify offences. The programme seeks to achieve its different objectives through a variety of approaches, including training courses, role-play, presentations, coaching sessions, deradicalization training and other education courses. The programme is a voluntary one, and an important element is a positive relationship between the trainers and trainees based on mutual trust.

The programme is divided into 20 weekly sessions that cover a series of modules. Each training group is composed of two trainers and between six to nine prisoners. For brief periods, one-to-one work may take place if a prisoner finds the group environment too intense. The trainers come from a variety of backgrounds, but cannot be staff at the prison or detention facility in which the prisoner is being detained. That the trainers come from outside the prison system is believed to be an important element in building effective relationships with the prisoners.

Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).

Psychosocial interventions

- Facilitating behavioural change
- Enhancing coping skills
- Promoting decision-making
- Improving relationships
- Building self-esteem
- Facilitating client potentials, development and growth
- Improvement of self-knowledge and understanding
- Reconstruction of experience and character for adjusted living
- Healing of emotional pain and resolution of confusion
- Improvement of critical thinking and problem solving skills
- Facilitation of acquisition of effective coping mechanisms

Psychosocial interventions can play an important role in facilitating desistance, for example, addressing identity issues, supporting coping, addressing beliefs and ways of thinking that

support violence and supporting action orientation. These interventions can provide the platform upon which violent extremist prisoners can appreciate why other forms of intervention may be important in their lives, for example, strengthening social networks, educational and vocational activities, etc. Crucially, psychosocial interventions can help provoke and support individuals through the process of disengagement.

Where possible, administrations should try to ensure continuity in the psychological counselling for violent extremist prisoners, and have the same psychologist(s) remain with the prisoner throughout. A lack of continuity can make it far more difficult to build trust and rapport.

5.9 Creative, cultural and recreational activities

Recreational and cultural activities shall be provided in all prisons for the benefit of the mental and physical health of prisoners.

Every prisoner who is not employed in outdoor work shall have at least one hour of suitable exercise in the open air daily if the weather permits.

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rules 105 and Rule 23(1)

It is generally acknowledged that participation in arts- and sports-based interventions is unlikely to lead to desistance from criminal activity by itself, but it can make a significant contribution to desistance in indirect forms.¹³⁵ Sports, arts and culture can provide compelling alternative narratives.¹³⁶ They offer a valuable means of talking about differences and diversity, and of underscoring common histories, experiences and hopes for many people. Drama and the arts can provoke critical thinking and discourse on shared histories and experiences that may cross political boundaries. Sports can also be a powerful uniting force. Sports, arts and culture can also help develop alternative, positive means of understanding and addressing grievances and tensions that can contribute to a support for violent extremism.

Arts-based interventions have been shown to: (a) increase the capabilities of prisoners to express themselves; (b) contribute to developing their personal and social strengths; (c) create an opportunity for prisoners to explore their own identity; (d) assist them to locate hope and motivation in a personal discourse which makes sense to them and which they own; and (e) provide judgement-free spaces for prisoners to recognize their interconnectedness with others without external pressure to comply.¹³⁷

¹³⁵Hughes, J., Miles, A. and McLewin, A. (2005): *Doing the Arts Justice: A Review of Research Literature: Practice and Theory*, Unit for Arts and Offenders.

¹³⁶Hedayah and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (2015): *Thinking Outside the Box—Exploring the Critical Roles of Sports, Arts, and Culture in Preventing Violent Extremism*, Policy Brief, February 2015.

¹³⁷See for example: McCourt, E. (2005): “Art of the possible: the place of art therapy in work with high risk offenders”, *Irish Probation Journal*, 2 (1), pp. 35-41; Albertson, K. (2015): *Creativity, Self-exploration and Change: Creative Arts-based Activities’ contribution to Desistance Narratives*, *Howard Journal*, vol. 54, No 3, pp. 277-291; Bolton, G. (1999): *The Therapeutic Potential of Creative Writing: Writing Myself*, London: Jessica Kingsley; Anderson, K. (2015): “Documenting Arts Practitioners’ Practice in prisons: What do you do in there?”, *Howard Journal*, vol. 54, No 4, pp. 371-83; Nugent, B. and Loucks, N. (2011): “The arts and prisoners: experience of creative rehabilitation”, *Howard Journal*, 50(4), pp. 356-70; O’Keeffe, C. and Albertson, K. (2012): “The Good days are Amazing; An Evaluation of the Writers in Prison Network”, Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam University; Parkes, R. and Bilby, C. (2010): “The courage to create: the role of artistic and spiritual activities in prisons”, *Howard Journal*, 49, pp. 97-110.

"I find it difficult to express emotion, but here, it felt safe to do that, a place of safety. A place where we can be open about how we feel to be men, honestly and openly. We all progressed through the sessions together and expressed freely. It was very empowering to discuss things so openly. (Offender focus group, SC11)"... Creative arts-based programmes offer a genuine strengths-based approach to character development from which subjective changes and transformational identities may spring in desire and commitment, which are both realistically grounded and can be imagined and actualised by offenders ... Opportunities for offenders to observe and practise reflective subjective-linked functions, express emotions and engage in moral conversations in a safe and non-judgemental place within prison are, sadly, rare.

Albertson, K. (2015) Creativity, Self-exploration and Change: Creative Arts-based Activities' contribution to Desistance Narratives, Howard Journal, vol. 54, No 3, p. 287.

During participation in arts-based interventions, violent extremist prisoners are, at the very least, engaging in "conversation" about an object (be it a novel, song, speech or play) and thereby practising critical thinking and communications skills. It is only with good communications skills—vocal, verbal, textual, visual imagery or performance-based—that a person can begin to engage in the analysis of their own self and life. Communications about lives, histories and feelings is an essential starting point from which new meanings can emerge and from which they may transform their life journey. Practising critical thinking and communication skills can also result in developing positive messages that help violent extremist prisoners to disengage from violence.

Engagement in arts-based interventions can also provide opportunities for violent extremist prisoners to take on more pro-social self-concepts and identities. Introducing violent extremist prisoners to reflectivity through arts ensures that they can engage in opportunities to try to make sense of their lives in terms of attaining some kind of coherence that is both sensible and meaningful to them.

It is important to have a diversity of activities on offer; activities which may illicit different modes of engagement. A range of creative pursuits can be encouraged and adapted as interventions. Such activities may include indigenous arts such as music, drumming, dance, calligraphy, group performances and traditional handicrafts. But staff will need to be aware of activities that promote the development of a positive national identity and that can be effective in alleviating trauma, as well as alert to activities that serve to reinforce belonging to a violent extremist group or cause.

Sports, arts, and culture play a major role in prison life: they provide inmates with (physical) ways of expressing themselves, increase their confidence, and help them create positive relationship with others (including prison staff). They help develop a greater understanding of different cultures and practices. These types of activities assist in the assessment of the needs, feelings and attitudes of VEOs for the purpose of rehabilitation programming and targeted interventions.

Global Counterterrorism Forum (2015) Detention and Reintegration Working Group Workshop on Education, Life Skill Courses and Vocational Training for Incarcerated Violent Extremist Offenders.

One intervention that has proved to be popular and effective in addressing behavioural and attitudinal change in custodial institutions is art therapy. Art is creative and thereby edifying,

providing a sense of fulfilment for those who prefer to express their talents through this particular medium. The creative process also enables the communication of feelings and emotions associated with significant life events and can help in coming to terms with trauma, depression and mental health issues. The skill and sensitivity of the art therapist in nurturing a communicative relationship with the artist is paramount.

SRI LANKA: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Rehabilitation Programme

In designing the LTTE rehabilitation programme, the Sri Lankan government faced a variety of challenges not the least of which was the large number of prisoners who needed to be dealt with. In order to try to rehabilitate these prisoners a multi-pronged programme was introduced. Key elements included:

(1) Hard core members of the LTTE who remained highly committed to the cause were separated from the rest of the prisoner population, so that they were not able to actively try to undermine the rehabilitation programme

(2) The authorities did not refer to the LTTE members as “prisoners” or “detainees”. Instead, they were referred to as “beneficiaries”. It was believed that this language had more positive connotations and would help foster better relations with staff, and creates a different and more positive self-image for the “beneficiaries” themselves.

(3) Prisoners were encouraged to take part in a variety of activities designed to encourage individual development. This included taking part in yoga to develop spiritual insight, and artistic activities to facilitate individual expression. The emphasis on individual development in these programmes, was designed to counter-act the heavy collectivistic and group focus which dominated the prisoners’ time in the LTTE.

(4) Prisoners also took part in vocational programmes, which were designed to develop skills that would help the prisoners to successfully reintegrate into society after their release. These programmes included courses on construction, electronics and carpentry, as well as courses on cosmetics and the clothes industry specifically for female prisoners.

The evaluation of the programme showed a significant drop in support for continued political violence among prisoners who experienced the rehabilitation programme compared to those who did not. Similarly, prisoners in the programme showed a significant increase in positive attitudes towards the staff running the centres. Overall, the evaluation showed a positive impact of the rehabilitation programme even among more hard core individuals among the LTTE prisoners.

Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).

It is important to clarify the distinction between the general understanding of “art as being therapeutic”, focusing on the creative process as therapy, and the more specific development of a form of psychotherapy practised through the medium of art by qualified registered therapists and known as “art therapy”. What is important is the symbolic expression of deep-seated feelings and attitudes that can be analysed and interpreted by therapist and artist in a therapeutic relationship. There is an opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of violent extremists and counter their narratives by drawing on local cultural and artistic traditions that in many instances reflect a more tolerant society.

Art work and art therapy provided a medium for expression and assessment. The beneficiaries engaged in artwork to give expression to issues close to their hearts. They expressed their desires for family life, freedom, peace, and unity. Creative writing exercises included poetry, short stories, and booklets related to the themes of freedom, loss, appreciation of rehabilitation, new thinking, future plans, and development ... Creative therapy rehabilitation provided effective ways for participants to express their inner thoughts and feelings through indirect means. Creative therapies can have a healing effect on large groups of people. Examples of creative therapy conducted in the centers included theatre, drama, and music programs designed to help beneficiaries communicate and transform.

Hettiarachchi, M. (2013) Sri Lanka's Rehabilitation Program: A New Frontier in Counter terrorism and Counter Insurgency, Prism: Vol. 4, Issue 2, (2013), p.105-122, Macquarie University, Australia, Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism.

Sport, particularly football, basketball and athletics, is popular in many prisons. It is well represented in some custodial institutions with staff who are dedicated specialists, some of whom have achieved national and international recognition.

People in every nation love sport. Its values are universal. It is a global language, capable of bridging social, cultural and religious divides. It can be a powerful tool for fostering understanding, tolerance and peace ... I believe sport contributes to personal development and growth. It teaches us teamwork and fair play. It builds self-esteem and opens doors to new opportunities. This, in turn, can contribute to the well-being of whole communities and countries.

Speech by the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, 1995-2006, on "The Impact of Sport in the World", Davos, Switzerland, 2006.

Sport is an important positive intervention as it fosters teamwork, social and leadership skills, and promotes goal-setting and instils a sense of identity and belonging. Sport also creates opportunities to address other factors that may lead to violent extremism, such as health and safety, gender inequalities, and conflict resolution in a setting where learning is interactive and viewed as "fun".¹³⁸ It is important for those leading sports interventions to set positive examples for participants and help foster positive attitudes, good sportsmanship, and teamwork. Through different sports-related interventions, violent extremist prisoners can realize their potential and not be confined to a single identity, such as their religion or ethnic background, for example.

NIGERIA: The role of sport in prison-based disengagement programmes

Violent extremist prisoners in the custody of Nigeria Prisons Service were, at inception, unruly, rude and uncooperative. Most of the VEPs held the view that sport is the pastime of oppressors and the very elements they wage war against. Very few VEPs were amenable to participating in sport. The Local Treatment Team (LTT), comprising sports therapists from the Nigerian Prison Service, persisted. Basic sporting facilities were then brought into the prison and installed: a better

¹³⁸ Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and Hedayah (2013): The Role of Education in Countering Violent Extremism, Meeting Note, December 2013.

football pitch, volleyball, basketball and table tennis. Apart from the appeal of this variety of sports, those who volunteered to participate had longer time out in the open. They were provided with basic individual kits like tracksuits, trainers, jerseys and spare inner shirts. Following this, more VEPs volunteered to participate. The period of sporting activities assisted in anger management and reduction of resistance to treatment. The more each person participated in sport, the more they become amenable to other interventions. Some began to express the possibility of becoming sports professionals upon release. They began to compete among themselves with a view to excelling. With sport as a preoccupation, the possibility of further radicalization, at least, was reduced. Indeed, sport has been a major intervention in treatment and deradicalization of VEPs in Nigeria and the VEPs have competed in football matches against the general prison population and prison staff teams.

Contribution submitted by the Network of African National Human Rights Institutions West Africa, in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Sport will often be the first point of entry into the prison regime—an initial engagement in an activity which is likely to be regarded as providing fun and escape from everyday routine and less likely to be a public statement of conformity. Sport promotes personal development and growth—sporting activities are character-building, promoting self-confidence, self-control and self-esteem as well as relief from stress, a sense of physical wellbeing and a means of preventing depression. Sport encourages pro-social thinking and behaviour—these include the positive values of teamwork, fair play, mutual respect, adherence to rules, civility and respect for others, competition without conflict, respect for boundaries and managing anger. As such, they instil in the individual agreed values, being essential preparation for more targeted psychological interventions.

Sporting activities also provide a neutral context for regime engagement, set apart from the daily routines of the institution, and are an opportunity where prisoners and staff can temporarily suspend their differences, interacting as participants, players and sports men or women. An effective programme of sporting interventions will require adequate sports facilities, a range of sporting opportunities and a well-trained and professional staff who are fully aware of the benefits of sports and games in addressing risk-related needs.

5.10 Reporting, monitoring and evaluating interventions

Reporting on disengagement activity is necessary for ensuring accountability; to facilitate monitoring; to enable the adaptation of interventions; for budgeting purposes; as a foundation for evaluation; and for the professional and personal protection of all involved. It can be an enabling process if it is designed and implemented accordingly.

In order to facilitate reporting, it is important that the work with individual violent extremists is well-documented and that comprehensive and accurate records are maintained. All staff expected to complete reports should be trained on the format and content of those reports. Documentation is the core material for recording progress of interventions with individuals, for reporting and ultimately monitoring. Managers should guide, support and verify the documentation prepared, collated and filed by the team responsible for delivering interventions and submit it to prison administration headquarters in accordance with laid down protocols.

Reporting of outcomes is the documented recording of the impact and effectiveness or otherwise of the interventions. It also records any changes or incidents linked to the purposes of the interventions, for example behavioural change of the violent extremist prisoner or other issues that have a direct effect on outcomes. Outcomes must be reported over a time period, such as monthly. This allows the intervention team to build up a bank of information that illustrates patterns and changes over time. The core sources of information will be individual risk assessment and case conference files and a record of the total violent extremist prisoner population over that time period. It is also necessary to establish clear, quantifiable indicators of effectiveness (that are measurable) in order to inform outcomes.

Indicators of the impact of interventions could include: changes in the prisoners' behaviour; level of engagement with the interventions; number of institutional incidents; reduced security level for prisoners; and number of interventions completed. It should also be remembered that even if the intervention is not showing any impact on a prisoner's behaviour, risk assessments and interventions enable the prison administration to find out more about prisoners and the risks they pose.

Both activities and outcomes need to be monitored closely. Monitoring should also be undertaken through observation and recording of those observations. The headquarters supervisory team should regularly visit prisons where interventions are taking place to observe all relevant matters pertaining to the effective implementation of interventions. The supervisory team should prepare and submit information in a way that allows decision- and policymakers at prison administration headquarters (and higher authorities) to make informed and well-reasoned decisions concerning interventions. Prison administration headquarters has the responsibility for analysing the level of progress or otherwise and should maintain a database of intervention activities and their impact.

In general terms, evaluating an intervention involves determining whether the objectives were appropriate, whether the activities were effectively implemented and the extent to which the objectives were met. Evaluation helps to understand why and to what extent the intended results were achieved by a particular intervention. It also provides information about the broader impact of those interventions on stakeholders and institutions. In addition to supporting accountability mechanisms, a proper evaluation is an important source of evidence about the results achieved and, as such, is a lesson-learning tool that contributes to building knowledge about how best to achieve certain intervention objectives.

CANADA: Applied research programme on offenders radicalized to violence

The Correctional Service of Canada's (CSC)'s Research Branch has been conducting focused research on radicalized offenders since 2012. Its programme of research in this area has examined the profile of CSC's radicalized offender population and how it compares to non-radicalized offenders, explored the characteristics of those who may be susceptible to a radicalizing influence, and gathered international best practices and lessons learned on the effective management of radicalized offenders—all in an effort to inform effective and evidence-based correctional policy and practice. The success of this work hinges on the collaborative partnership that has been forged with CSC's Security Branch. Embedding an operational subject-matter expert in the research team has been identified as an organizational best practice, resulting in a more reciprocal and open internal information-sharing relationship, more relevant and targeted research questions, and a more immediate transformation of research results to operational practice.

Contribution study submitted by the Correctional Service of Canada in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Evaluating the success of interventions which seek to ensure that violent extremist prisoners disengage from violence is a universal challenge faced by almost all prison authorities, academics, practitioners and observers. Despite the massive investment of resources in this field, few Member States and multilateral organizations have elaborated robust and succinct methodologies to evaluate the success, or otherwise, of these interventions. Likewise, academic literature on the effectiveness of interventions generally remains in its infancy and interventions that have been evaluated often do not meet scientific standards.¹³⁹ A review of 135 studies found that they were mostly anecdotal, and that no explicit reference to theory and no empirical quantitative or qualitative data was reported.¹⁴⁰

The challenge is further complicated by the fact that goals and objectives of such programmes vary from one place to another, as well as States' capabilities and resources devoted to implementation. However, Member States should seek to develop simple mechanisms and metrics that would allow them to measure the effectiveness of their interventions.¹⁴¹ Governments should further release such research in view of the global learning and academic interest this would provide. Evidence-based interventions cannot be developed without the evidence being made public. When making evaluations public, governments should specify whether these were completed by independent research bodies.

Sufficient resources should be allocated to carry out scientific research and evaluation of existing programmes tackling radicalisation. Any such programmes shall be knowledge-based and shall be regularly reviewed.

Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 40.

At a simple level, desistance from violence is the desired outcome of disengagement and reintegration interventions and it is usually measured by an indicator such as reoffending, reconviction or reimprisonment for a terrorism-related offence. But recidivism rates can be misleading. They are often inaccurate, reflecting only what is known to security services and the criminal justice system, which can be limited. Measuring the impact of interventions also suffers from the "dilemma of attribution", that is, relating improved indicators, such as reduced incidences of violent extremism and recidivism rates, to the interventions themselves. There are several other factors (local, national and international in nature) that can affect operations and the success or failure of interventions.¹⁴²

Since recidivism cannot be identified until well after a violent extremist prisoner's release, it is important to consider whether it is possible to gauge the prisoner's progress while they

¹³⁹ See for example: Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (2010): "Rehabilitating the terrorists? Challenges in assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalisation programs", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22, pp. 267-291; Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010): "Violent Radicalization in Europe: What we know and what we do not know", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 33, 797-814; Carline, A. (2011): Report to the home secretary of independent oversight of Prevent review and Strategy. London: HM Government; Christmann, K. (2012): Preventing religious radicalisation and violent extremism: A systematic review of the research evidence. United Kingdom: Youth Justice Board; Lindekilde, L. (2012): "Introduction: Assessing the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation policies in northwestern Europe". *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 5, pp. 335-344.

¹⁴⁰ Feddes, A. and Gallucci, M. (2015): "A Literature Review on Methodology used in Evaluating Effects of Preventive and De-radicalisation Interventions", *Journal for Deradicalization*, winter 15/16, No. 5.

¹⁴¹ See Sydney Memorandum, Internal Challenge 9.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, Internal Challenge 6.

are still in custody. A regular risk assessment, as discussed earlier in this chapter, can provide evidence of reduced risk. This requires significant resources and individualized attention, a particularly difficult proposition when working with large numbers of violent extremist prisoners and few staff. But although refining such assessment tools is crucial (as they are indicative of behavioural change), they will never provide a perfect real-time measurement of an intervention's success and an absolute guarantee that the violent extremist prisoner will not continue his or her engagement in violent extremism after release.¹⁴³

 *For further detail on post-release and monitoring, see chapter 8*

Furthermore, the flow of information should not be one way. An effective feedback loop should be established so that information is passed back to intervention team members on the findings from monitoring and evaluation. This will enable them to refine and amend interventions in the light of evidence of “what worked”.

A key element for ensuring intervention development, learning and advocacy is independent research of the highest quality. Member States are encouraged to commission research or consider research proposals. Any research will have to have an enabling and a practical benefit, e.g. it directly informs future interventions in the jurisdiction or elsewhere. In addition, all research activities must be fully compliant with ethical and security parameters.

¹⁴³ Stern, J. and Porges, M. (2010, 1 May): Getting Deradicalization Right, Council on Foreign Relations.

Managing the implementation of disengagement interventions

6.1 Introduction

Facilitating violent extremist prisoners to disengage from violence is a challenging task. The disengagement activity will need to be organized and managed. Each violent extremist prisoner will require a range of different interventions, as described in chapter 5, to meet their multiple needs that relate to the risk that they pose. A timetable will need to be developed, facilities created in which to run the interventions, materials and resources acquired, and prisoners engaged effectively.

It is very unlikely for one person, or an individual specialism, to successfully convince a violent extremist prisoner to renounce violence. A team approach, making good use of a range of individuals and specialisms, has the greatest likelihood of helping prisoners to change. Adopting an approach in which many individuals are working together to address a violent extremist's risks and needs will be a new development in some jurisdictions. It is important, therefore, that a teamwork methodology is adopted and that the team operates in an integrated way. To support this integrated teamwork, shared procedures, tools and ethical standards are required.

6.2 Integrated case management and the disengagement process

Integrated case management can be described as a prisoner-centred, multidisciplinary approach to working with prisoners with provision for initial assessment, needs identification, goal setting, a programme of interventions and periodic review to measure progress. An emphasis is made on prisoners taking greater personal responsibility for their own development through active engagement with both specialist and non-specialist services in the prison. Integrated case management uses a common framework, approach, tools and language to assess, identify needs, monitor progress and update the outcomes during violent extremist prisoners' detention, transition to release, and community supervision. Adopting an integrated case management approach can make a significant contribution to successful disengagement from violence as it ensures a structured approach to: implementing interventions; identifying roles and responsibilities; working effectively as part of a team; and recording information and ensuring that it is treated, appropriately.

A key element of integrated case management is to ensure that a coherent and comprehensive risk management strategy is implemented throughout a violent extremist prisoner's sentence and following release, with the involvement and participation of all relevant agencies, to improve effectiveness and prospects of successful resettlement. Integrated case management is particularly pertinent to the management of violent extremist prisoners, who present challenging and complex risk and need profiles requiring the input of services with different specializations to address them in the most effective manner.

The four stages in the disengagement process can be summarized in the following way:

- *Engagement:* The first stage involves staff getting to know the violent extremist prisoner, establishing a positive professional relationship, developing trust and entering into a constructive dialogue. Part of the engagement process will be to ensure that violent extremist prisoners have reasonable conditions such as accommodation, food, water, clothing, bedding, exercise areas, etc.
- *Risk:* All new prisoners arriving in institutions should receive an initial general admission screening and those who are identified as violent extremist prisoners should be referred for a detailed risk and needs assessment. The risk assessment should focus on a number of key components, as outlined in chapter 4.
- *Needs:* Having identified the underpinning reasons for the violent extremist prisoner's involvement in violent extremism, staff should identify risk-related needs. That is, the activity that will help to reduce the risk that the violent extremist prisoner will engage in, or advocate, future violent extremist activity.
- *Response:* Once the risk-related needs have been identified, the interventions team should agree on what interventions are necessary to meet those needs and when they should be delivered. On first arrival at the prison, many prisoners will not be ready to open-up about issues and more time may be required before they are prepared to engage with the interventions. The interventions team should also agree on who will deliver the intervention and when the intervention will take place. This may involve having to prioritize which interventions will be delivered first. New or additional interventions may be necessary, as the risk and needs change.

6.3 Creating a supportive working environment for interventions

An effective custodial setting will provide a supportive operational context for the delivery of structured interventions. All practitioners, including security and custodial personnel, ancillary, supervisory and administrative staff members, who do not have a direct role to play in delivering structured interventions, contribute to maintaining the conditions conducive to intervention delivery and to supporting progress in disengagement.

The prison provides much more than a background—it also facilitates a context. As a complex organization designed to help violent extremists to abandon their violent orientation, it exerts a powerful overriding impact on the daily lives and attitudes of its residents. Located in an institutional context, the violent extremist prisoner's thoughts and behaviour are routinely observed and challenged in all areas where those prisoners and staff interact on a daily basis. But challenge should not be unduly direct and provocative, for this can easily reinforce embedded attitudes. Rather, it implies encouragement to re-examine beliefs and values so

that desired gains in the form of personal needs and goals with regard to meaning, status, belonging and justice can be achieved in different ways. Contributing to helping prisoners to disengage from violence becomes the responsibility of all staff in the prison.

In order to help achieve a supportive environment, all prisons operating disengagement interventions should hold general sensitizing, understanding and awareness-raising sessions for staff. Everyone working in the prison should contribute to disengagement activity by behaving in a pro-social manner. This will contribute to tackling violent extremist prisoners' anti-social attitudes, thinking and behaviour, and help to reinforce positive change. This is applicable to interaction and engagement between staff and violent extremist prisoners in the accommodation areas and yards, as well as in more structured settings.

Simple staff behaviours can increase the quality of interaction between staff and violent extremist prisoners. These include: taking time to listen; treating violent extremist prisoners fairly and with respect; demonstrating pro-social attitudes and professional standards of behaviour (acting as a positive role model and encouraging and rewarding pro-social statements and actions); giving strong positive messages about the potential for desistance from violent extremism; avoiding labelling; giving focus to practical and social problems as well as attitudes, thinking and behaviour; and expressing and encouraging motivation and hope. It is also important that the relationship between the custodial and security staff and treatment team are positive, constructive and supportive if the prison and interventions are to function effectively.

6.4 Methods and approach to delivering interventions

The approach taken to implementing interventions needs to reflect the scale of the problem faced by Member States. What can be realistically delivered to a handful of violent extremists held in prisons in some countries will be very different from what can be delivered to many hundreds and, in some cases thousands, of violent extremist prisoners detained in other jurisdictions. Optimum use should be made of available support. The scale, type and methodology of delivery of interventions should be tailored to the specific number of violent extremist prisoners held in each Member State.

Some interventions, such as vocational training, will need to be delivered in a workshop or classroom in a traditional manner. Other interventions, particularly cognitive-behavioural and faith-based interventions should take into account cultural norms. In some countries, interventions are likely to be more successful when delivered orally rather than through written means. Oral-based delivery, through the use of individual and group discussions, plays, poetry, arts and crafts, will be more effective in some cultures, where reading is not dominant.

Where sufficient staff are available, interventions can be delivered on a one-to-one basis (or two facilitators to one participant). The individual format has a number of obvious benefits over a group format, the most important of which is helping the violent extremist prisoner participants to get in touch with their own personal values and beliefs rather than being overly influenced by those of their associates. The relationship between the facilitator/s and the participants is viewed as crucial to facilitating change and disengagement from violence. However, one-to-one interaction may not be realistic where there are few members of staff and hundreds of violent extremist prisoners. In such cases, group-based interventions should be used, including narrative-based activity.

6.5 Roles, responsibilities and teamwork when implementing interventions

In jurisdictions where staff numbers are low, there may not be the capacity to create separate teams to deliver interventions. In such circumstances, existing staff may be expected to undertake disengagement activities in addition to their normal duties and become the intervention team. Good use should be made, in these circumstances, of staff members' existing skills, knowledge and experience in shaping the type of interventions available. For example, general prison staff may be: trained carpenters or mechanics who could be used to deliver vocational training interventions; artists or sports referees who could run related interventions; or university-educated psychologists who could be deployed to run anger management interventions.

Where supplementary resources are available, separate intervention delivery teams could be set up to focus on the implementation of interventions. The team should include a multidisciplinary group of individuals. The complexity of violent extremism means that, in most cases, interventions require a multidisciplinary network of professionals, including psychologists, psychiatrists, religious faith leaders, sports instructors, art therapists, social workers, vocational guidance officers, teachers and medical staff. Working together and in partnerships, they bring different skills, methodologies and perspectives to the work and are thereby able to deliver successful results.

Training should be provided for intervention team members on relevant tools, techniques and related administration. Given the challenging task of supporting prisoners in the disengagement process, it is good practice for all relevant staff to be professionally trained and educated to deal with the complexities of disengagement and reintegration efforts. Prison staff and professionals involved in rehabilitation programmes could be trained to distinguish signs of radicalization to violence, communicate in a way that is constructive and avoids conflict, and respond appropriately to a potential radicalization to violence. The subject of staff recruitment and training is explored in chapter 3.

The specific duties of the interventions team should include: undertaking initial assessment of violent extremist prisoners; identifying risks, needs and appropriate interventions; completing and updating case file records; delivering interventions; participating in case conferences; completing reassessments; and using the materials, tools, and equipment provided for disengagement interventions.

Intervention team members can be appointed on either a full- or part-time basis. This will depend on the resources available, the number of violent extremists participating in interventions and the level and frequency of intervention required. The performance of duties, as members of the interventions team, should be reflected in annual performance appraisals. Where there is a large number of violent extremist prisoners held within an institution, it will be necessary to have sufficient intervention team members in order to ensure that assessments and interventions take place at the required frequency. This may require there to be more than one intervention team in the institution, if resources are available.

In order that interventions team members can effectively engage with violent extremist prisoners, it is important that each team has one or more members who speak the language of the violent extremist prisoners. In some cases, violent extremist prisoners may not speak the official State language, particularly if they come from a particular tribe or group, or are foreign nationals. Violent extremist prisoners may also refuse to participate in activities during which the official State language is used. The team membership may also need to account for gender and ethnicity.

Intervention team members should be well supported while they are working on disengagement interventions. This support should take the form of individual supervision, group support and having a coach and/or mentor to whom they can go when faced with challenging situations.

The director of each prison that operates interventions remains accountable for ensuring suitable arrangements for the effective delivery of those interventions within his/her command. The director is usually also the chief security officer of a prison, and has ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of personnel and prisoners. The intervention team should work closely with the director to ensure that he/she is fully aware of intervention requirements and activities and that those requirements and activities are appropriate to the security arrangements within that prison.

At headquarters level, there should be a supervisory management team that holds the overall responsibility for establishing, overseeing the development, implementation and evaluation of interventions, as well as providing mentoring and support for the prison-based intervention team. The supervisory team should include representation from all the main specialisms and professions who are involved in delivering interventions. The supervisory team or, in some jurisdictions, a more senior management team, should set policy, ensure that necessary arrangements are in place for delivering interventions and coordinate with other government agencies for implementation.

Integrated case management is based on the recognition that successful disengagement will require the involvement and support of a range of individuals. Teamwork needs to be developed at each level and in various roles. The multidisciplinary approach reinforces the distinct benefits arising from staff working in parallel, i.e. working on the different aspects of disengagement from violence from different perspectives at the same time. Being part of a team requires not only the sharing of information, including the case plan as it is developed and as it changes over time, but also developing shared strategies and an understanding of how to collaborate as members of a team. Lack of collaboration, synergy and mutual trust are major constraints that impact on the effectiveness of successful interventions.

6.6 Intervention case conferences, record keeping and confidentiality of information

Intervention team leaders should arrange regular team meetings to discuss day to day business, administration, resources, staff management, reporting, and challenges faced. The purpose of team meetings needs to be identified, with clear agendas, a nominated chair and minute taker for each meeting. An audit of case files should be conducted bi-monthly to ensure that all documentation is in order and signed off by relevant supervisory members. Brief case reviews could also be conducted at team meetings. Team meetings are different from case conferences and must be held separately.

Ongoing case reviews are necessary to review progress of interventions. Case reviews also: allow for an opportunity to share what worked well and lessons learned; develop creative and effective strategies for working with complex issues; are a safe process to build on existing skills and knowledge; explore different perspectives and solutions to challenges; and confirm whether there is a need to proceed with a formal case conference.

An intervention case conference should be held at set intervals and the first case conference should be held no later than six weeks after a violent extremist prisoner's arrival at an institution. The case conference can have the following aims: to examine, utilize and compare risk assessments made by all intervention team members; to affirm the prisoner's level of needs across a number of key areas relating to their risk; to explain the above to the prisoner and seek his/her views on ways of reducing or managing the assessed risks, particularly by meeting the assessed needs through appropriate interventions; and to involve the prisoner in developing an action plan for the next reporting period, including referrals for appropriately sequenced interventions. Case conferences are held to share interventions, successes, and also to ask for assistance or new ideas. Some prison systems bring together staff from external agencies and, as appropriate, the family of the violent extremist prisoner, in case conference.

A single dynamic intervention-related case file should be developed soon after a violent extremist prisoner's admission to the prison, which should then be updated and modified as he/she progresses through the institution. The intervention case file should contain: an admissions board report; a summary of the violent extremist prisoner's key biographical information; the history of assessments; the names of members of the intervention team; the initial assessment records (from individuals); an agreed initial risk and needs assessment (from the case conference); an action/treatment plan (from the case conference); case review notes; additional actions required (from the case conference); reassessments (next case conferences or individual assessment); and other comments and recommendations. Intervention team members should keep up-to-date clear case notes of every contact with each violent extremist prisoner. These records should cover: progress of intervention; number of sessions and themes; changes made/outcomes; significant incidents (life events and/or therapeutic events); strengths; assessments; and intervention team member/prisoner relationship dynamics.

It is important that prisoners are informed about the rules on confidentiality and that the principle of "informed consent" is applied. Prisoners should have the limitations of confidentiality explained to them clearly before engaging in assessment and/or interventions. Consequences of disclosure need to be carefully understood and assessed, for example for those prisoners awaiting trial or sentence and where personal information may lead to insecurity for their family members. Violent extremist prisoners' information is generally held under legal and ethical obligations of confidentiality. Disclosure may be authorized, however, by the violent extremist prisoner, government or institution regulations or the law, keeping in mind that public safety must remain the paramount consideration. Information obtained from a violent extremist prisoner should be disclosed to other members of the interventions team in so far as it has an impact on the risk and needs assessment. Disclosure of information outside of the interventions team should only take place where there is a threat to the safety of the violent extremist prisoner; the safety of other prisoners or staff; or the security or good order of the prison or national security.

6.7 Codes of ethics, standards of practice and supporting intervention team members

There are four ethical principles, based on good practice, within which intervention team members should operate: respect, competence, responsibility and integrity. In their work with violent extremist prisoners, intervention team members must act in line with the principle of "do no harm" through their intervention. They should develop a constructive and

therapeutic culture that promotes psychological growth for the prisoner while offering the opportunity for healthy relationships between staff and prisoner to develop, in which relevant information can be disclosed by the prisoner to enable appropriate interventions.

Relationships among intervention team members should be conducted in a spirit of mutual respect. Intervention team members should endeavour to maintain good working relationships and systems of communication that enhance their work. Intervention team members should treat all colleagues fairly and foster equality of opportunity. They should not allow their professional relationships with colleagues to be prejudiced in any way. It is unacceptable and unethical to discriminate against colleagues on any irrelevant personal or professional grounds. The challenge of working ethically means that intervention team members will inevitably encounter situations where there are competing obligations. In such situations, the intervention team members should discuss the emerging issues with the intervention team leader, who will, when necessary, bring it to the attention of the supervisory or management team.

There is a degree of physical, psychological and programmatic risk inherent when working with violent extremist prisoners. As intervention team members work with violent extremist prisoners, they may develop symptoms that are very similar to post-traumatic stress response as a result of hearing about the prisoners' negative experiences or from hearing what they inflicted on their victims. Support and supervision should be provided for those working intensively with violent extremist prisoners. It is essential that both the intervention team leader and supervisory team monitors any symptoms of vicarious traumatization and put strategies in place to reduce the potential adverse impact of this work.

6.8 Timetabling interventions and maximizing use of facilities

Any institution implementing interventions will require at least a minimum range of facilities if interventions are to operate effectively. At a minimum, institutions providing interventions should provide the following facilities: meeting rooms (for one-to-one interviews and counselling); classrooms (for group work, presentations and lectures); worship facilities; vocational training and other workshops; sports and exercise facilities; and facilities for creative and arts therapy.

In order to make optimum use of the facilities, there should be a clear weekly timetable of activities. A timetable is a powerful administrative tool and can provide an appropriate structural dimension to the activities required for effective interventions. A timetable also contributes to an increase in sense of order for violent extremist prisoners. The timetable performs the important task of allocating a large proportion of the institution's resources. The work of the intervention team, prisoners' time and facilities availability should be controlled directly by the timetable. The material resources of equipment and supplies, which are largely related to interventions, are also indirectly controlled through effective timetabling.

6.9 Engaging and motivating prisoners to participate in interventions

Some violent extremist prisoners will, at least initially, resist or reject participation in interventions. They may be suspicious of the efforts of officials and their motivation for running

interventions, and refuse to engage with the prison authorities.¹⁴⁴ The challenge for the prison administration, therefore, is to overcome the resistance and to get violent extremist prisoners engage with interventions. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to delay engaging with violent extremist prisoners until after they have spent some time in prison, to give them time to come to terms with their imprisonment and the consequences of their involvement with violent extremist activity, and to also give time for any potential “natural” disengagement to occur.

One way that staff members can build a relationship with violent extremist prisoners is by seeking to arrange for their basic needs to be met by the institution’s administration. Basic needs include overall accommodation conditions, contacts with the outside, in particular family, and health care. While these are not risk-related needs, meeting them creates the best chance of interventions succeeding, as relationships are then nested in a safe, secure, adequately resourced and well-operated custodial setting where the human rights of prisoners are respected.¹⁴⁵

Prisoners’ feelings of safety and trust in the legitimacy of staff’s actions are likely to induce positive change and facilitate their rehabilitation and resettlement. Every effort shall therefore be made to preserve and build on such relations of trust in order to help offenders start crime-free life.

Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 12.

It is important that violent extremist prisoners are informed about the purpose of the interventions and the way that they operate. Staff members should explain to violent extremist prisoners that participation in the programme is voluntary and that they can withdraw their consent to participate and drop out any time. Violent extremist prisoners should be further informed of: intervention objectives; the role of intervention team members; the operation of the interventions; timetabling; confidentiality; and limits of the interventions. A written, signed consent form is used in some jurisdictions. If that is not feasible, the team member should note in writing that the prisoner was informed of all these matters and consented to participation.

In no circumstances should provision of all basic conditions outlined in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) be withdrawn from violent extremist prisoners as a means to coerce them into participating in disengagement activity. States could, however, consider the use of incentives to encourage violent extremist prisoners to participate in interventions. Incentives are used in many prison systems for all prisoners to encourage good behaviour and participation in programmes. There are a range of incentives that States could offer to violent extremist prisoners when they participate cooperatively in interventions, including: enhanced visits with family members; increased recreational activities; opportunities to receive payment for work; additional items allowed in possession; and other privileges or benefits while incarcerated. States should consider revoking these incentives and privileges in the case of violations of prison rules and codes of conduct or evidence of involvement in criminal activity during incarceration, while

¹⁴⁴ See Sydney Memorandum, Internal Challenge 7.

¹⁴⁵ See Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 2.

adhering to applicable human rights obligations.¹⁴⁶ Care should also be taken to ensure that incentives do not apply to violent extremist prisoners only or else they will be regarded by other prisoners as a “special group” which may result in hostility or other prisoners aspiring to be violent extremists.

Member States should encourage their prison authorities to consider identifying ways to recognize the achievement of violent extremist prisoners who successfully complete interventions. Official recognition of achievement in a variety of interventions (including education, vocational training, sports, faith-based activities and cognitive behavioural interventions), encourages self-confidence, a sense of self-worth, engagement in institutional programmes and improves future prospects after release. Ways to show recognition include graduation ceremonies, awarding certificates and medals and inviting family and senior representatives of the community and community agencies to attend. Moreover, at different stages during the disengagement process, prisoners could be required to certify that they have met certain educational, vocational, assessment and experience requirements as a prerequisite to obtaining more freedom or privileges.¹⁴⁷

6.10 Promoting interventions to the outside community

In order to ensure public reassurance and understanding, regular work with the media (newspapers, television) should take place to explain the positive disengagement activity taking place in prison, the types and purpose of interventions being delivered and the evidence and results that they can have on violent extremist prisoners.¹⁴⁸ This should be done sensitively and take into account current political and public opinion.

The growing popularity of social media offers many opportunities for publicizing disengagement activity and success stories to the public. Social media is a means of communication that creates value by using a variety of web-based technologies to promote dialogue and the exchange of user-generated content. Typically, the content includes text, audio or video that is published on the Internet and shared in an environment that allows users to interact with each other. An increasing number of prison administrations are using a variety of social media tools to increase the visibility of their programmes and build support for their initiatives. Websites, Twitter feeds, Facebook pages, blogs websites and YouTube videos have all been used to publicize positive activity taking place in prison.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ See Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 19; Sydney Memorandum, Solution Strategy 5.

¹⁴⁷ See Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 18.

¹⁴⁸ Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 41.

¹⁴⁹ Rakis, J. (2012): Using social media to publicize reentry success.

THE PHILIPPINES: Promoting intervention programmes

The benefits of using the media to promote intervention programmes for violent extremist prisoners are imperative if prison managers want good results. Every time there is an upcoming significant event, the agency issues press releases to the media three days prior to the day of the event. Mostly, if the media thinks the event is worthy of publication, they publish articles and stories about the intervention programmes. To convey gratitude for the support they extended, prominent personalities such as the Mayor or Chief Executive and other sponsors are invited to grace the event. We do this to our ordinary jails, and hopefully to our facilities holding violent extremist prisoners.

Contribution submitted by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Philippines in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Care should be taken, however, when it comes to media contact. Intervention team members should only speak to the media about the interventions with advance authorization from prison administration headquarters. Where approval has been given, consideration should be given as to whether the member of staff should be identified by name in the article or television programme. There is a risk that public identification may put the member of staff, or their family, at risk.

7.

Preventing radicalization to violent extremism in prison

7.1 Introduction

Prisons are often attributed prominent roles in the emergence and expansion of violent extremist movements, and it has been claimed that several violent extremist ideologies originated behind bars.¹⁵⁰ There is a concern that if left unchecked, prisons may serve as locations in which violent extremism can thrive and where prisoners can be radicalized to violence or where violent extremist prisoners who are co-located can form closer relationships, more cohesive networks and mutual reinforcement of violent extremist beliefs. However, recent research suggests that such risks are overstated and that there is limited evidence for suggesting that significant numbers of prisoners are being radicalized to violence and proceed with committing violent extremist acts upon release.

... Safeguards need to be put in place to prevent the spread of extremist ideologies to other prisoners while upholding the protection afforded under international law to persons deprived of their liberty, including with respect to international standards and norms relating to solitary confinement.

Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism—Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674 (2015), para. 31.

The above notwithstanding, violent extremist prisoners may network in prisons, gain access to a large pool of potential recruits, and coordinate violent extremist crime outside prison. Activities may include, among other things: producing and distributing ideological literature and/or propaganda within and beyond the prison population; using prison visits to communicate with followers in the outside world; providing reinforcement and support to fellow prisoners who were punished for subversive activities in prisons; engaging in active resistance to the prison authorities through refusing to cooperate in the prison's regime; intimidating prison staff and management; and instigating violent clashes with prison staff.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ See: Central Intelligence Agency (2002) Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars, p1. Available at: www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/ctc082002.pdf; International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (2009): "Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and Deradicalisation in 15 countries", p. 7; Cilluffo, F. and Saathoff, G. (2006). Out of the shadows: Getting ahead of prisoner radicalization. Report by George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute, and University of Virginia, Critical Incident Analysis Group; HM Government (2013) Tackling extremism in the UK—Report from the Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism.

¹⁵¹ See RAND Corporation Europe (2008): Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalised prisoners, pp. 27-36.

Such scenarios not only undermine prison security and safety, but also compromise one of the core objectives of imprisonment, the protection of society from crime. Furthermore, they undermine the disengagement objective described in earlier chapters.

SOMALIA: Radicalization to violence in prison

Imprisoned al-Shabaab elements make up the vast majority of prisoners at Mogadishu central prison in Somalia. Among them are al-Shabaab leaders who use their dominance and expertise to remobilize imprisoned young al-Shabaab members and to recruit other inmates who are in a vulnerable and emotional situation to follow their terrorist path. Through organized teams in the prison, they focus on the encouragement and reactivation of their young imprisoned followers and ensure that they keep to their terror cause. They also target young inmates who are weak within the harsh environment of the prison or are under chronic stress, which makes them vulnerable to radicalization propaganda. They threaten and harass any who do not follow their course while they give others incentives to soften them for the purpose. An external extremist network works on the infiltration of the prison system in order to provide and feed them with propaganda material for the radicalization inside the prison. These elements apply all kind of tactics to achieve their goal. This is manifested in Mogadishu central prison through the recovery of cell phones containing propaganda lectures. The inmates listen to these propaganda voice recordings in small groups at certain times.

Contribution submitted by the Prison Administration of Somalia in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Countries around the world have responded to the potential threat of prisoner radicalization to violence and have implemented a range of measures to contain the spread of violent extremist ideology. However, this “security first” approach is geared toward achieving instant control, and care must be taken to ensure that this is not achieved at the expense of prisoner rights or longer-term considerations, such as social reintegration.

Recent research has begun to challenge the notion that violent extremist ideologies are a virus that can infect entire prisoner populations by spreading from one prisoner to the other. Specifically, they have questioned the assumptions that: (a) all violent extremist prisoners convey an increased risk of recruiting fellow prisoners; (b) fellow prisoners are vulnerable to such influence; and that (c) openness to violent extremist belief systems is intensified by the deprivations of individual freedoms, which are inherent to the prison experience.¹⁵²

Several authors have nuanced the risk of prisoner radicalization to violence and have argued that claims of radicalization to violence among prisoners are false, or at least overstated, and driven by fears more than by empirical evidence.¹⁵³ Indeed, there are only a few incidences in which violent extremism has been linked to (former) prisoners, and in many instances these cases are poorly documented or based on ambiguous information. Some commentators

¹⁵²Veldhuis, T. (2015), *Captivated by fear. An evaluation of terrorism detention policy*, PhD thesis, University of Groningen.

¹⁵³See for example: Jones, C.R. (2014). “Are prisons really schools for terrorism? Challenging rhetoric on prisoner radicalization”. *Punishment & Society*, 16, 74-103; Klein, G.C. (2007). “An investigation: Have Islamic fundamentalist made contact with white supremacists in the United States?” *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations*, 7, pp. 85-101; Useem, B. (2012). “U.S. prisons and the myth of Islamic Terrorism”. *Contexts*, 11, pp. 34-39; Marsden, S. (2015) Little evidence to show that prisons have become ‘universities of terror’. Available at: <https://theconversation.com>; Ilardi, J. (2010). Prison radicalisation: The devil is in the detail. Paper presented at the ARC Linkage Project on Radicalisation – Conference, Understanding Terrorism from an Australian Perspective: Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation and Counter Radicalisation, Monash University, Australia.

appear to have succumbed to the temptation to link prisoners' conversion to a specific faith with violent extremist activities, as if there is some inevitable path from prison conversion to violent extremism. Others assume that a prison experience on the part of a suspected or convicted violent extremist played a role in the development of that person's violent extremist beliefs and behaviour, even where there may be no compelling evidence to indicate that they even converted whilst in prison.

A number of studies that assert widespread radicalization to violence in prison rely upon very limited information, and therefore equally questionable analysis, about what the individual did in prison, who they interacted with, the nature and development of their beliefs, spiritual or otherwise and do not consider the impact of post-release experience. It should also be remembered that it is not prisons (or prison conditions) in themselves that cause prisoners to be radicalized to violence: if that were true, radicalization to violence would be the rule rather than the exception. Rather, prison conditions can activate social and psychological mechanisms that may, under certain circumstances and for certain individuals, induce a shift toward violent extremist attitudes and behaviour that is then interpreted as radicalization to violence.

The above notwithstanding, prison radicalization to violence is an issue of considerable importance and recruitment attempts, successful or otherwise, do occur. Whether violent extremist prisoners are separated, dispersed, or concentrated, there remains a risk that some violent extremist prisoners, particularly leaders, may seek to radicalize other prisoners to violence and to further radicalize those prisoners who are in prison for a violent extremist offence. Studies have suggested that violent extremist recruitment methods are not always expected to yield a high number of recruits. Violent extremist messages may be delivered to many prisoners with the understanding that most will resist radicalization to violence.¹⁵⁴ However, a single prisoner radicalized to violence can be a significant threat to public safety.

7.2 Radicalization to violence cycle

There are several theories regarding the process of radicalization to violence. One prominent theory suggests that the radicalization to violence cycle is composed of four steps: (a) pre-radicalization to violence; (b) identification; (c) indoctrination; and (d) action.¹⁵⁵ Each stage is distinct, and a violent extremist may never reach the final step. Radicalizing an individual to violence is a fluid process that does not have a timetable and does not necessarily lead to action. Individuals may enter, exit or even re-enter the radicalization to violence process at any stage. It is important to note that these stages are not chronological and individuals can skip stages, reaching violent actions more quickly. It also means that individuals may stop the process and may not be fully radicalized to violence; conversely, even if they are fully radicalized to violence they will not necessarily carry out a violent action.

¹⁵⁴Gerwehr, S. and Daly, S. (2006): "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment" in , McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, p. 84.

¹⁵⁵The four step cycle is the dominant theory but other theories have been developed. For further details of the four-step cycle see: Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division. The radicalization process: From conversion to Jihad. See also: Silber M, Bhatt A. Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat. New York. New York City Police Department; 2009; Al-Lami M. (2009), Studies of radicalization: State of the field report. London, United Kingdom.

(a) *Pre-radicalization to violence*: Imprisonment can be the environment that provides the motivation, stimulus and opportunity for embracing violent extremism. It can be driven by either intrinsic or extrinsic motivations. Intrinsic motivation could be the result of a personal crisis/trauma, experiences of discrimination and/or alienation, or individuals may feel frustration and dissatisfaction with their current religious faith, leading them to change their belief system. On the other hand, extrinsic motivations could be any external factor (for example, economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious or social deprivation) that may negatively affect an individual's attitude and belief towards those implicated.

(b) *Identification*: Imprisonment can increase the isolation of an individual from his/her former life, encourage him/her to adopt and accept a new social identity, provide religious instruction that is based on violence, and open up opportunities for training in violent extremist activities.¹⁵⁶ At this stage, an individual prisoner identifies him/herself with a particular violent extremist cause and essentially changes his/her religious beliefs or behaviours. These individuals may begin to construct a new character based on religion and support for violent extremist ideologies. Guidance from supervisors reinforces their new sense of identity and commitment. Overall, the individual prisoner's needs and wants are increasingly removed and replaced by those of the collective.

(c) *Indoctrination*: Imprisonment enables the new recruit to be immersed in a “group-think” environment, thereby strengthening social identity, allowing the individual to be vetted, monitored and tested by other violent extremists. The individual prisoner is so indoctrinated that he/she is convinced that action is required to support the violent extremist cause. Part of this stage is becoming an active participant. This involves small-group and individual participation that allows the recruit to know and recognize his/her potential as a violent extremist. What is critical in this stage is the knowledge, skills and leadership of senior prisoner figures. This is a highly volatile and emotional stage for recruits. Confidence increases over time and the prisoner's mind becomes saturated with violent extremist ideologies. The only solution to their problems is to stand up for what they believe in through violent action.

(d) *Action*: The individual prisoner knowingly engages in violent extremist activity. While in prison, he or she may undertake a variety of operational activities, including: recruitment of other prisoners; facilitation of violent extremist activity in the prison or outside; financing violent extremist activity; and preparing, planning and executing violent extremist activity.

7.3 Enablers and precursors of radicalization to violence in prison

A number of researchers have sought to identify factors in the prison context that may render prisoners more susceptible to being radicalized to violent extremism. These have included identification of several “push” and “pull” factors. The main factors that can drive, or create opportunities for radicalization to violence in prison, are described as follows:

- *Ideology*: Exposure to an ideology that seems to sanction, legitimize or require violence, often by providing a compelling but fabricated narrative of contemporary politics and recent history.

¹⁵⁶ However, this is seen as positive/protective when the individual comes in with violent extremist ideologies—they are isolated from their influential group in the community.

- *Grievance*: A range of perceived grievances, some real and some imagined, to which there may seem to be no credible and effective non-violent response. One of the factors that may increase a prisoner's susceptibility to violent extremist ideologies is the experience of unfair or unjust treatment, actual or perceived. Violent extremist prisoners may seek to attribute their imprisonment or the way they are treated in prison to discriminatory policies and may interpret their situation as yet another signal that the government seeks to humiliate members of their group. Imprisonment and confinement conditions have indeed been central in the narratives of some violent extremist movements.¹⁵⁷ Embracing a violent extremist group may thus be a way for prisoners to deal with perceived unfair or unjust treatment that comes above and beyond the deprivations caused by imprisonment, and to pursue the satisfaction of social and epistemic needs in the face of adversity.
- *Charismatic leaders*: Exposure to people or groups who can directly and persuasively articulate that ideology and then relate it to aspects of a person's own background and life history. The literature on prisoner radicalization to violence repeatedly emphasizes the importance of charismatic individuals in recruiting other prisoners for violent extremist purposes.¹⁵⁸ Whether this happens is likely to depend on an array of situational factors such as characteristics of the violent extremist prisoner, the other prisoners, and the prison context. Charismatic leaders are able to exploit emotional triggers such as hatred, revenge and frustration. They can perform an essential function in channelling perceived or experienced humiliation into an ideological narrative and guiding the formation of a group identity that revolves around shared humiliation and ideological commitment.¹⁵⁹

Charismatic leaders targeted the most vulnerable—inmates who had spent or will spend much of their lives incarcerated under maximum security and who no longer had contact with family. Angry and embittered by their circumstances, these inmates often adopted anti-authoritarian attitudes and were easily pressed into a gang, where they met an inmate leader who promised hope. Indeed, I discovered that charismatic leadership was more important than other commonly cited factors associated with prisoner radicalization.

Hamm, M.S. (2008). *Prisoner radicalization: Assessing the threat in U.S. correctional institutions*. *NIJ Journal*, 261: 17-18.

¹⁵⁷ See for example: Gormally, B., McEvoy, K. & Wall, D. (1993): "Criminal justice in a divided society: Northern Ireland Prisons". *Crime and Justice*, 17, pp. 51-135, and Kepel, G. (2002): *Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

¹⁵⁸ See for example: Brandon, J. (2009b). *Unlocking al-Qaeda: Islamist extremism in British prisons*. London: Quilliam Foundation; Warnes, R. and Hannah, G. (2008): "Meeting the challenge of extremist and radicalised prisoners: The experiences of the United Kingdom and Spain". *Policing*, 4, pp. 402-411; Hamm, M.S. (2012). "Prisoner radicalization in the United States", *Prison Service Journal*, 203, 4-8; Hamm, M.S. (2013). *The spectacular few: Prisoner radicalization and terrorism in the post-9/11 era*. New York: New York University Press; Hofmann, D.C. & Dawson, L. (2014). "The neglected role of charismatic authority in the study of terrorist groups and radicalization". *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37, pp. 348-368.

¹⁵⁹ Emrich, C. G., Brower, H. H., Feldman, J. M., & Garland, H. (2001). "Images in words: Presidential rhetoric, charisma, and greatness". *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 46, pp. 527-557, Klein, K. & House, R.J. (1995). "On fire: Charismatic leadership and levels of analysis". *Leadership Quarterly*, 6, pp. 183-198.

“We had one [terrorist] prisoner who was a top-end proselytiser. He was brilliant at it. He’d get someone vulnerable, not an experienced prisoner, and offer him protection and support through religion. He’d build a rapport over a long period: it’s what he lived for. And then from that, influence his idea of what it means to be a Muslim ... What he was actually doing was preaching, not on a weekly but a daily basis, recruiting in the yard. He had been urging people to join the fight in Afghanistan on the outside—and he just carried on doing it here.”

Prison staff quoted in: Rose, D. (2012) “Inside Britain’s terror cells: A chilling insight into how gangs of convicted terrorists recruit prisoners for Al Qaeda—and the courageous men and women sent in to ‘turn’ them”. Available at: www.dailymail.co.uk.

- *Need to satisfy basic physical and general needs:* When life in prison is a struggle to survive, prisoners may be motivated (or forced) to join a violent extremist group to obtain food, somewhere to sleep, and protection, regardless of whether they identify with and intrinsically adhere to the group’s violent extremist ideology or not. Such prisoners may seemingly have radicalized and adopted violent extremist attitudes and beliefs, but such manifestations of extremism may reflect an underlying struggle to survive in prison rather than sincere ideological commitment. Poor living conditions and prison overcrowding can generate resentment and provide the ground for violent extremist narratives to take root.¹⁶⁰

LEBANON: Risk of radicalization to violence in prison

Inadequate conditions of imprisonment, prison overcrowding and poor security measures represent the main challenges of the Lebanese prison system, which in itself enhance the risk of prison-based radicalization to violence.

Contribution submitted by the Prison Administration of Lebanon in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Furthermore, radicalization to violence in prison may also be seen as a by-product of attempts by prisoners to satisfy their general needs. Imprisonment itself can be a threat to individual needs, as prisoners are likely to experience deprivations in several domains of their lives. Early research described how the “pains of imprisonment”, such as deprivation of liberty, goods and services, heterosexual relationships, autonomy and security, can be a source of frustration and deviancy among prisoner populations.¹⁶¹ Such deprivations can cause threats to, or deficits in, a variety of fundamental individual needs and vulnerable prisoners may turn to violent extremist groups to fill the void.

- *Religion:* The experience of a criminal conviction and spending time in prison can lead some people to take a closer interest in religion than they had before. Religion can help them change their lives for the better. It is not uncommon, therefore, for

¹⁶⁰ See Global Center on Cooperative Security (2015): Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa: an Action Agenda, Action 8; Useem, B. and Clayton, O., “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” *Criminology & Public Policy*, vol. 8, no. 3(August 2009), pp. 586-587.

¹⁶¹ Sykes, G.M. (1958) *The society of captives*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

prisoners to experience religious or spiritual conversion during imprisonment.¹⁶² However, as people who convert may initially be less well-informed about their faith, they may be vulnerable to overtures from radicalizers who seek to impress a distorted version of theology upon them. For example, research has shown that prisoners (including recent converts) were ignorant and confused about the Islamic faith and those with violent extremist views could fill this gap with misinformation and misinterpretation.¹⁶³ Conversion, however, rarely leads to violent outcomes.¹⁶⁴ Prison staff should be aware that there have been cases of violent extremist prisoners aggressively forcing or coercing other prisoners to convert to swell their ranks and strengthen their hold on crime rackets. Some prisoners have spoken of strict religious law being enforced in some prisons by violent extremist prisoners, with prisoners being banned from eating pork, pictures of women torn down and music systems destroyed.¹⁶⁵

7.4 Vulnerability and models of recruitment in prison

Prisons provide a constantly regenerating pool of potential candidates for recruitment into violent extremist groups.¹⁶⁶ This section considers how recruiters are able to spot, assess and encourage potential vulnerable recruits to join a violent extremist cause.

Recent research has found that, while radicalisation is a live and important issue to both prisoners and staff, it is rarely witnessed. Radicalisers use a variety of means to persuade and influence, including coercion and intimidation. This is true in prisons as in other environments. In prisons, it is not always clear where observable behaviours are indicative of radicalisation or other prisoner behaviours, such as the formation of alliances as coping mechanisms, bullying or criminal association.

United Kingdom—Prevent Strategy (June 2011) para. 10.157.

The majority of studies have focused on demographic variables (such as age, gender, ethnicity, race) to look at the vulnerability of individuals to recruitment to violent extremist causes, mainly because they are much easier to access than other variables.¹⁶⁷ However, many empirical studies show that psychographic variables, such as attitudes, emotions, preconceptions and motivations, seem to matter most regarding the success rate.¹⁶⁸ In some cases, it is the

¹⁶² Clear, T. and Sumter, M. (2002). "Prisoners, prison, and religion: religion and adjustment to prison". *Journal of Offender Rehabilitation*, 35, 127-159. Clear, T.R., Hardyman, P.L., Stout, B., Lucken, K. & Dammer, H.R. (2000). "The value of religion in prison: an inmate perspective". *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 16, pp. 53-74.

¹⁶³ Liebling, A., Arnold, H., & Straub, C. (2012). Staff-prisoner relationships at HMP Whitemoor: 12 years on. London: National Offender Management Service.

¹⁶⁴ Hamm, M.S. (2009). "Prison Islam in the age of sacred terror". *British Journal of Criminology*, 49, 667-685. Hamm, M.S. (2011b). Locking up terrorists: Three models for controlling prisoner radicalization: Hamm, M. (2013) *The Spectacular Few*, New York University Press.

¹⁶⁵ Porter, T. (2013) "Muslims 'Force UK Prison Inmates to Convert' With Bullying and Intimidation", *International Business Times*, October 20, 2013.

¹⁶⁶ Mulcahy, E., Merrington, S. Bell, P. "The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: Exploring Recruitment, Religion and Prisoner Vulnerability", *Journal of Human Security* (2013), Volume 9, Issue 1, pp 4-14.

¹⁶⁷ Gerwehr S. and Daley S., (2006): "Al-Qaida: Terrorist selection and recruitment" (chapter 5 in *The Homeland Security Handbook*, New York, United States; McGraw-Hill; p. 73-89).

¹⁶⁸ Ash S. (1985): "Cult-induced psychopathology, part one: Clinical picture", *Cultic Studies Journal*. Vol. 2(1), pp. 31-90.

expertise of the potential recruit that the violent extremists are seeking, for example, engineers or information technology and communications specialists.

Recruitment plays a significant role in any violent extremist organization.¹⁶⁹ Individuals can use their expertise to spot, assess and encourage potential recruits to follow the same path.¹⁷⁰ The process of recruitment can be viewed as one of “rational prospecting”, meaning that recruiters follow a strategy for seeking out individual prospects that demonstrate the greatest “participation potential”.¹⁷¹ In the first stage, the recruiter seeks information regarding the target individual (such as past activities the individual has been involved in). Also, the recruiter assesses whether the individual has characteristics, such as political interests or concerns about politics, that might predispose them to take part in their violent extremist activities. In the second stage, the recruiter needs to get a positive result (i.e. the individual recruit accepts and becomes an active member). In order to successfully achieve this, the recruiter may entice the recruit with various gratifications or incentives, such as food, clothing and protection.¹⁷²

7.5 Preventing and detecting radicalization to violence in prisons

In some jurisdictions, prisons administrator are under a legal duty to prevent radicalization to violence.¹⁷³ Even if there is no explicit legal duty to prevent radicalization to violence in prison, professional prison directors will seek to prevent and detect radicalization to violence in their prison.

As highlighted in chapter 3, the importance of staff training should not be underestimated in this regard. Prison staff should: understand the nature of the threat; be aware of the use of various narratives; appreciate that there is no typical violent extremist or recruit; get to know their prisoners; and raise concerns if members of staff do have concerns about behavioural patterns. Prison managers must adopt a range of activities to prevent, detect and disrupt radicalization to violence in prison.

One area where radicalization to violence can occur is during religious gatherings. The importance of vetting religious leaders before permitting them to lead religious services in prison was highlighted in chapter 2. One national study found that only half of religious services were physically supervised by prison staff, and just over half used any sort of audio or video monitoring capabilities. The same study found that prisoners were allowed themselves to act

¹⁶⁹ Stys, Y., Gobeil, R., Harris, A. J. R., & Michel, S. (2014). *Violent extremists in federal institutions: Estimating radicalization and susceptibility to radicalization in the federal offender population* (Research Report R-313). Ottawa, ON: Correctional Service of Canada

¹⁷⁰ Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division. *The radicalization process: From conversion to Jihad*.

¹⁷¹ Brady H., Schlozman K., Verba S. “Prospecting for participants: Rational expectations and the recruitment of political activities”, *American Political Science Review*. 1999; 93, pp. 53-168.

¹⁷² Gerwehr S. and Daley S. (2006): “Al-Qaida: Terrorist selection and recruitment” (chapter 5 in *The Homeland Security Handbook*, New York, United States; McGraw-Hill; p. 73-89).

¹⁷³ See for example: United Kingdom: Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (article 26): “The governor of a prison... must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.”

as spiritual leaders in half the institutions.¹⁷⁴ Even when internal or external religious leaders are available, some may be intimidated by violent extremist prisoners who consequently assume the role of religious service providers for themselves. In the absence of qualified religious services providers, prisoners can become attracted to violent extremist views and the politico-religious messages coming from other prisoners who assume informal positions of religious leadership. Monitoring procedures should be put in place to ensure religious services are being conducted appropriately.

In prison radicalisation may be facilitated by the fact that prayer rooms are a popular place to convey messages, and that they are among the few areas in which inmate groups can meet, often without guard supervision. Even if supervision is provided, language barriers and a lack of cultural awareness might prevent prison staff from identifying suspicious behaviour.

Handbook on Violent Radicalisation: Recognition of and Responses to the Phenomenon by Professional Groups Concerned (2008) Austria–France – Germany.

Appropriate information and intelligence sharing should take place, including with external law enforcement partners, to understand whether violent extremism is an issue in the prison and to identify and manage any behaviours of concern. At national prison administration level, there is a need to create an intelligence group to monitor, share, analyse and collate any information regarding prisoner radicalization to violence from all prisons within the jurisdiction. This group should also work closely with external law-enforcement agencies.

UNITED STATES: Correctional Intelligence Program (CIP)

The United States Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have jointly developed the Correctional Intelligence Program (CIP). CIP is a nationwide special project designed to facilitate coordination on terrorism matters between all Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and all correctional agencies nationwide. BOP assigned employees to the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) to coordinate the exchange of intelligence related to corrections and manage CIP.

The project's main focus is to prevent prison radicalization in particular, and to encourage the effective exchange of intelligence regarding terrorism matters in general. BOP plays a major leadership role, and all state/local correctional agencies are actively encouraged to partner. The Correctional Intelligence Program focuses on: improving intelligence collection; detecting, deterring, and disrupting efforts by terrorist, extremist or radical groups to radicalize or recruit in federal, state, local, territorial, tribal or privatized prisons; and providing training and support materials that can be used by field offices and JTTFs for training and outreach at state and local correctional institutions.

All of these elements have helped identify numerous factors responsible for the spread of radicalization and recruitment in prisons. A recent comprehensive assessment based on a survey of nearly 3,000 state and local correctional facilities identified "best practices" for correctional institutions to follow to combat the spread of radicalization and recruitment. Some of these are: establish system-wide vetting protocols for all contractor and volunteer applicants; the FBI provides assistance by conducting criminal history checks against all FBI indices for contract,

¹⁷⁴ A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers, Department of Justice, Office of The Inspector General April 2004, p. 17.

volunteer, and staff personnel entering correctional facilities. Relevant information is passed on to correctional officials for appropriate action; create system-wide databases of contractors and volunteers providing direct inmate services; improve monitoring capabilities; coordinate inmate transfers; and share information among all levels of law enforcement and correctional personnel. FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces can facilitate this process.

Contribution submitted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, United States of America, in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

Staff in everyday contact with prisoners should be empowered to take decisions in order to be able to react swiftly and adequately to signs of radicalization to violence and deal with interpersonal conflicts. In particular, staff should be given tools to report concerns regarding signs of radicalization to violence, and appropriate procedures should be applied to assess such risks promptly and professionally.¹⁷⁵ Consideration should further be given to creating a dedicated core group of dependable, trained and motivated individuals to investigate suspected cases of radicalization to violence in each prison and to provide advice to staff who have concerns about particular prisoners.

➔ *For further detail on prison intelligence, see the UNODC Handbook on Dynamic Security and Prison Intelligence (2015)*.....

Prison staff should also be aware that prisoners undertaking recruitment efforts or leading violent extremist groups in prison do not necessarily have a high profile and often conform, superficially at least, to the prison regime. Leaders are able to avoid detection by using surrogates to conduct business so that their real identity remains unknown to the prison authorities.¹⁷⁶

A number of indicators, as outlined below, may suggest vulnerability to violent extremism, and may therefore be useful in detecting attempts to radicalize a prisoner to violent extremism. It should not be assumed that the characteristics and experiences set out below necessarily indicate that a person is committed to becoming a violent extremist:

- *Expressed opinions:* These may include support for violence and terrorism, the leadership of terrorist organizations and uncompromising rejection of the principle of the rule of law and of the authority of any elected government of a country; clearly identifying another group as threatening what they stand for and blaming that group for all social or political ills; using insulting or derogatory names or labels for another group; speaking about the imminence of harm from the other group and the importance of action now; expressing attitudes that justify violence on behalf of the group, cause or ideology; condoning or supporting violence or harm towards others; or plotting or conspiring with others.

¹⁷⁵Useem, B. and Clayton, O.,(2009): "Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners," *Criminology & Public Policy*, vol. 8, no. 3 (August 2009), pp. 586-587.

¹⁷⁶Liebling, A., Arnold, H., & Straub, C. (2012). Staff-prisoner relationships at HMP Whitemoor: 12 years on. London: National Offender Management Service. Central Intelligence Agency (2002) Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars, p. 4, available at: www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/ctc082002.pdf

- *Material*: Possession of violent extremist literature, symbols and imagery in hard copy or digital form; attempts to access, become a member of or contribute to violent extremist websites and associated password-protected chat rooms (where Internet access is permitted in prison); possession of material regarding weapons and/or explosives; possession of literature regarding military training, skills and techniques.
- *Behaviour and behavioural changes*: Loss of interest in and withdrawal from contact with family, peers, friends; hostility towards former associates in prison; association with existing violent extremists in prison and individuals who hold extremist views that stop short of advocating violence; changing their style of dress or personal appearance to accord with the group; their day-to-day behaviour becoming increasingly centred around a violent extremist ideology, group or cause; attempts to recruit others to the group/cause/ideology.

The examples above are not exhaustive and vulnerability may manifest itself in other ways. There is no single route to violent extremism nor is there a simple profile of those who become involved. For this reason, any attempt to derive a “profile” can be misleading. It must not be assumed that these characteristics and experiences will necessarily lead to individuals becoming violent extremists, or that these indicators are the only source of information required to make an appropriate assessment about vulnerability.

Prison staff will need to take into consideration how reliable or significant signs are and whether there are other factors or issues that could indicate vulnerability. Prison staff should closely observe any changes in the behaviour of prisoners and, in particular in the event of changes in several areas, speak to the prisoner about them.

When developing indicators evidencing radicalization to violence, staff should be cautioned that such indicators should not be considered in isolation but in the context of personal features and specific circumstances of a given case in order to avoid erroneous conclusions.¹⁷⁷ For example, just because a prisoner adopts a particular faith, or follows its practices in a more devout manner, does not mean that the prisoner is on the path to violent extremism. Some countries have developed easily accessible documents for staff which remind them of key factors to look out for in spotting signs of potential radicalization to violence. In England and Wales, for example, staff are issued with a pocket size reminder card that they are able to carry at all times.¹⁷⁸

It must be emphasized to staff that these types of indicators are not in themselves evidence of violent extremism but are merely signs that may indicate that a prisoner is on the path to becoming radicalized to violence. Further probing and evidence will be required to establish the reality. A mechanistic ticking of the checklist will not, in itself, prove that a prisoner has become a violent extremist.

¹⁷⁷ Council of Europe Guidelines for the Prison and Probation Services Facing Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, Principle 25.

¹⁷⁸ National Offender Management Service (NOMS) – England and Wales, Extremism and Radicalisation–Guidance for Staff. Available at: www.lemosandcrane.co.uk. A number of jurisdictions have more detailed and up-to-date lists of indicators for staff but these lists are not available in the public domain for security reasons.

7.6 Disrupting radicalization to violence in prisons

Where there is evidence that a violent extremist prisoner has been attempting to radicalize other prisoners to violence, prompt and decisive action should be taken. In some cases, this may involve moving the individual to another prison or to a different accommodation area within the same prison. Consideration should also be given to preventing the prisoner from freely associating with vulnerable prisoners and to supervising all of his or her interactions. Management actions could also include a reduction in privilege level, disciplinary charges or segregation. Alternatively, it may be appropriate to provide theological, motivational and behavioural interventions.

Prison staff should try to challenge the violent extremist ideology and promote how diverse views can be heard, analysed and challenged in a way which values freedom of speech and freedom from harm. Their approach should allow grievances to be aired, explored and demonstrate the role of conflict resolution and active citizenship. Where a violent extremist has particularly strong views or is highly educated, staff may not always have the necessary skills to challenge the prisoner's views. In such circumstances, the assistance of more experienced, competent and knowledgeable personnel should be sought.

7.7 Supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists

If the prison administration considers that support to reduce vulnerability to violent extremism is required, they should devise an appropriate support package for the corresponding prisoner. This may take the form of an action plan or case management plan setting out who will lead on delivering such support. The action plan should highlight identified behaviours and risks that need to be addressed. This will assist in case reviews and evaluating the effectiveness of the support package.

The type of activities included in a support package will depend on risk, vulnerability and local resources. To illustrate, a diversionary activity may be sufficient for a prisoner who is in the early stages of radicalization to violence, whereas a more focused and structured one-on-one mentoring programme may be required for those prisoners who are already radicalized to violence. The following support programmes should be considered: counselling; faith guidance; civic engagement; working with support networks; involvement in the prison regime; life skills; mentoring support; cognitive/behavioural therapies; general work on attitudes and behaviours; health awareness; and assessing and addressing any physical or mental health issues. The support package could also take the form of moving the vulnerable prisoner away from a negative influence or providing them with mentoring from the relevant faith-leader or social worker.

Individual prisoners receiving support should be reassessed at least every three months to ensure that the progress being made in supporting them is having the intended impact and that the prisoner is not being further radicalized to violence.

Preparing violent extremist prisoners for their reintegration into the community

8.1 Introduction

Violent extremist prisoners will, at some point, be released back into the community unless they die in prison or are serving a whole life sentence.¹⁷⁹ The process for reintegrating violent extremist prisoners into the community should therefore be a key element in any strategy related to preventing and countering violent extremism.

The period of transition from prison to living in the community is difficult for any prisoner. Incarceration may itself have had several negative effects on a prisoner's ability to lead a violence free, law-abiding and self-supporting life. Prisoners may have lost their livelihood, their personal belongings and their accommodation; they may have lost important personal relationships and imprisonment may have damaged their social and family networks; and they may have experienced mental health difficulties. This is no different for violent extremist prisoners who are being released back into the community. However effective the disengagement interventions that take place in prison, the risk of the former violent extremist prisoner reoffending significantly increases if no reintegration preparation is put in place.

[R]eleased individuals are vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment, the latter because many inmates leave prison with very little financial, emotional, or family support. To the extent that radical groups may draw upon funding from well-financed extremist backers, they can offer significantly more social and financial support to released prisoners than other legitimate community support programs ... when inadequate formal support is provided for inmate transition, radical religious groups may fill the void by offering both financial and emotional support. By providing for prisoners in their time of greatest need, these organizations can build upon the loyalty developed during the individual's time in prison. If connections are made with a radicalized community group, the recently released inmate may remain at risk for recruitment or continued involvement in terrorist networks. Released inmates have significant potential value for terrorist networks that have recruited them.

Cilluffo, F. and Saathoff, G. (2006). Out of the shadows: Getting ahead of prisoner radicalization. Report by George Washington university, Homeland Security policy Institute, and university of Virginia, critical Incident analysis Group, p. 7.

¹⁷⁹This is without prejudice to recommendations of international bodies to the effect that Member States should establish penal policies which would (i) ensure that life sentences are only imposed on offenders who have committed the most serious crimes, and only when strictly necessary for the protection of society; (ii) guarantee that any individual sentenced to life has the right to an appeal to a court of a higher jurisdiction, and to seek commutation of sentence; (iii) not result in the imposition of life sentences on children, i.e. under the age of 18 (see, for example, United Nations (1996), *The Life Sentence*, Report of the Criminal Justice Branch of UNOV, United Nations Publication Geneva).

8.2 Progress through the system

As described in chapter 4, the prison regime and conditions in which violent extremist prisoners are held should depend on the results of their risk and needs assessment. An important feature of the risk and needs assessment is that it should be used to identify the small number of violent extremist prisoners who are likely to pose a continued serious threat to security, safety or good order in the prison and to distinguish them from the majority of violent extremist prisoners who, although they may have committed serious crimes, will not necessarily pose a threat within the prison setting and whose level of dangerousness may reduce over time, in response to various interventions in prison.

The aim should be to move violent extremist prisoners to progressively less restrictive settings, based on periodic individual risk assessments. The final stage of a sentence should ideally be spent in the lowest security prison, which will provide prison management and the violent extremist prisoner with the best environment to prepare him or her for release. When a prisoner is moved to a lower security prison, the prison administration must ensure that the purpose of each move is specified and that new targets are set for the prisoner on arrival in the new prison.

The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules) call for countries to develop and operate a wide range of post-sentencing alternatives in order to avoid institutionalization and to assist offenders in their early reintegration into society. Such measures may include furlough and halfway houses, work or educational release, various forms of early or conditional release programmes (parole) and remission.¹⁸⁰

Subject to applicable laws, it is desirable to facilitate progressive reintegration by permitting a prisoner to leave the institution—for a day or a few days—in order to prepare his or her eventual return to the community. In some jurisdictions, transition houses or pre-release centres offer supervised residential settings to help prisoners go through a planned transition from custody to community living. They allow prisoners substantial interactions with the outside world, as well as contacts with their families and (potential) employers.

UNITED STATES: Faith-based transition centre and re-entry unit, Indiana

That radicalization may be best avoided by strengthening the occupation prospects of inmates is a main motivation for the Indiana Department of corrections' efforts to assist inmates in their transition from prison to community. Indiana's efforts include a faith-based transition centre and a re-entry unit that provides inmates with free movement in an attempt to create a culture that mimics civilian society.

Useem, B. and Clayton, O., "Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners," *Criminology & Public Policy*, vol. 8, no. 3 (August 2009), pp585-6. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00574.x/pdf>.

In the case of violent extremist prisoners who are eligible to be considered for early or conditional release, arrangements must be made to conduct a risk assessment and a release plan to inform the decision of conditional release authorities (for example, a parole board). Violent extremist prisoners should be provided with information on the application and

¹⁸⁰ See the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules), Rule 9.

decision-making process and their potential eligibility under existing law. They may need assistance in preparing their submission or application for conditional release and may need the assistance of legal advisors or paralegals to put their case forward. They may also need assistance in formulating a workable release plan.

Parole and other conditional release decisions are often based on whether violent extremist prisoners have participated in interventions designed to address their risk factors and other challenges. These decisions can also be based on whether the violent extremist prisoner's risk is manageable in the community. In some jurisdictions, violent extremist prisoners are required to sign a document testifying to the renunciation of former beliefs. Family and tribal members may also have to vouch for them, such that they will be responsible for their future behaviour.¹⁸¹

Prior to the release of a violent extremist prisoner, a formal multi-agency meeting which includes the police and, where they exist, a probation violent extremism lead, should take place to assess risks and inform decisions after release—a mechanism which should also apply to periods of temporary release. This will ensure that partner agencies work together to share relevant information and put provision in place to manage the risk or any outstanding concerns. Any cooperation and exchange of information with the police or other law enforcement agencies must be based on strict and clear procedures in terms of privacy and data protection.

Confidentiality and privacy issues can hinder multi-agency cooperation. Shared responsibility may lead to no-one feeling responsible in some cases. For example, after release, contact between the police and intelligence services (who have primary responsibility in terms of security) and the prison and probation service (who are responsible for an effective reintegration) is key to avoiding different behaviour and interventions towards the former violent extremist. This requires clear rules on ownership and information-sharing.¹⁸²

8.3 Prison-based reintegration interventions

Prison-based interventions should be put in place to prepare prisoners for their release and re-entry into the community. This is particularly important for violent extremist prisoners who may have spent a considerable period in detention.

DENMARK: Back on Track (BOT) training programme

The Back on Track (BOT) programme was designed to help prisoners who have been charged or convicted of terrorism-related offences, or who have been assessed as vulnerable to radicalization. BOT uses a broad definition of extremism and is not just concerned with religiously motivated terrorism, but is also concerned with left- and right-wing violent extremism, and hate crime.

¹⁸¹ Boucek, C., Beg, S. and Horgan, J., (2009) "Opening up the jihadi debate: Yemen's Committee for Dialogue". In: T. Bjorgo and J. Horgan, ed. 2009. *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement*. Abingdon: Routledge. Ch.11.

¹⁸² Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016): Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, RAN Prisons and Probation-practitioners working paper, p. 3.

The programme is based on a mentor working closely with the prisoner to provide assistance with practical issues such as finding work and accommodation on release, to liaise and work with the prisoner's family, and to help motivate the prisoners to change their lifestyle. The main focus of BOT is to train and coach the mentors, who can then work in a one-to-one capacity with their mentees. The mentors and mentor coaches come from variety of backgrounds including police officers, prison staff, social workers, lawyers, etc. The mentors are trained to develop their skills in areas around coaching, managing conflict and dialogue techniques.

Twelve days of training are provided to the mentors. These are comprised of five two-day sessions developing the different skills needed. Added to this is one two-day course on radicalization and extremism provided by the Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service. Following the formal training, BOT also facilitates network days for the mentors which allows the mentors to meet and share experiences and insights.

This programme is a government project and was originally developed by the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration in cooperation with the Danish Prison and Probation Services. Development of the programme started in 2011, with the first launch taking place in 2012. Initially, the programme was mainly supported by funds from the European Union, but from 2014 onwards the programme has been adopted as a general Prison Service programme.

Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).

A number of activities should be delivered as part of a pre-release interventions programme to help violent extremist prisoners prepare for reintegrating into the employment market. Employment keeps people occupied, provides ties to non-criminal (and non-violent extremist) peers and influences, and provides a source of income independent of the group.¹⁸³ An income also increases the likelihood of enabling a released prisoners to play a meaningful role within their families. It is important that efforts to find suitable employment for violent extremist prisoners begin prior to their release. This should include an assessment of the prisoner's skills and the identification of possible employment opportunities. Interventions may include services helping prisoners to develop job search and presentation and interview skills, joint discussions about expectations, addressing anxiety associated with the job search process, provision of information about the job market, preparation of a curriculum vitae and applications, information and contacts with public and private employment agencies, and contacts with individuals or previous employers who may be able to offer assistance in seeking employment.

In low-resource countries, there is often little prospect of former violent extremists finding employment without significant support from appropriate government ministries, such as the Ministry of Labour or Employment, and close links with other relevant bodies, such as the Chambers of Commerce. Providing vocational training in skills required in post-conflict situations, such as construction, building and welding, may also be particularly helpful in enabling former violent extremists to find employment.

¹⁸³ Disley, E. et al (2011) Individual disengagement from Al Qa'ida-influenced terrorist groups: A Rapid Evidence Assessment to inform policy and practice in preventing terrorism, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, United Kingdom Home Office, pviii.

Self-employment can be another important post-release occupation for former violent extremist prisoners, given the challenges that they may face with obtaining paid employment. A number of jurisdictions have set up schemes to enable prisoners to set up their own small business and to be self-sufficient on release. Entrepreneurship programmes within prisons offer a realistic opportunity for reducing recidivism.¹⁸⁴

The lack of suitable housing is one of the major challenges that all ex-prisoners face at the time of re-entry, and there is some evidence that it may be related to the risk of recidivism.¹⁸⁵ Living with a family member or a friend is not always a possibility and, when it is, it may come with its own problems. Pre-release interventions for violent extremist prisoners must therefore include a plan for securing appropriate housing. Ideally, every individual should be released directly to appropriate housing. Working with community-based organizations is often the best way to gain access to the full range of housing options available.

Another aspect of social reintegration is financial security in the sense that a former violent extremist prisoner will require, in most societies, a bank account and in all cases a basic knowledge of how to manage their finances and how to assume responsibility for their finances. Prison administrations should therefore offer interventions for violent extremist prisoners on how to manage their finances, and provide opportunities to earn money or save those earnings in prison. Some violent extremists will not require such support as they may have been professionals or self-employed businessmen or women prior to imprisonment. In some circumstances, however, where a former violent extremist's assets and bank accounts have been frozen, for example, they may need support to work with authorities to unfreeze their assets, as appropriate.

It is also important to ensure that violent extremist prisoners preparing for their release have adequate identification and other civil documents. The lack of such documents at the time of their release will impede the individual's access to services, housing and employment. Prisoners should also be provided with information on how they may access various forms of service and support in the community. In some instances, planning for their release may involve applying for such services in advance of their release.

8.4 Involving community organizations

The progress made by violent extremist prisoners in prison must continue to be reinforced after their release. It is important, therefore, to plan the release of violent extremist prisoners to ensure that they will receive uninterrupted services and support upon their return to the community. Continuity of care can be achieved through close linkages and collaboration between prison staff and community-based service providers.

¹⁸⁴ See, for example: Cooney, T. (2012) Reducing Recidivism Through Entrepreneurship Programmes in Prisons. Dublin Institute of Technology.

¹⁸⁵ Metraux and Culhane (2004): "Homeless shelter use and reincarceration following prison release", *Criminology and Public Policy*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 139-160.

Services and agencies, governmental or otherwise, which assist released prisoners in re-establishing themselves in society shall ensure, so far as is possible and necessary, that released prisoners are provided with appropriate documents and identification papers, have suitable homes and work to go to, are suitably and adequately clothed having regard to the climate and season and have sufficient means to reach their destination and maintain themselves in the period immediately following their release.

The approved representatives of such agencies shall have all necessary access to the prison and to prisoners and shall be taken into consultation as to the future of a prisoner from the beginning of his or her sentence.

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 108.1.

As violent extremist prisoners are approaching release, a range of service providers from the community that can play a role in their successful resettlement (e.g. probation services, social services, housing and health-care services) should be invited to case conferences to explore risks, needs and continuity of care in the community. There must be linkages between prison and community-based interventions to ensure continuity of support.¹⁸⁶

Interventions for the prevention of reoffending should be clearly linked to the ongoing risk assessment of the individual offender. It should be planned for both the custodial and community settings, ensuring continuity between the two contexts.

Such a plan should facilitate effective communication, coordinate the actions of various agencies and support multi-agency cooperation between prison administration, probation workers, social and medical services and law-enforcement authorities.

Recommendation Cm/Rec(2014)3 of The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States Concerning Dangerous Offenders, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 February 2014 at the 1192nd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies, recommendations 34 and 36.

8.5 Establishing strong contact with families

Relationships can be a primary vehicle for disengagement from violent extremism, and further, appear to be what most optimally enables subsequent engagement of a former extremist elsewhere in society.¹⁸⁷ The impact of family and friends' visits on the psychological health of prisoners, their motivation to desist from future offending, prospects of finding accommodation and employment after release should therefore not be underestimated. It is important to help violent extremist prisoners maintain, or re-establish, contact with their family during their time in custody and particularly in the stages prior to release.

¹⁸⁶ Griffiths, C., Dandurand, Y. and Murdoch, D. (2007) *The Social Reintegration of Offenders and Crime Prevention*, The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR), p. 6.

¹⁸⁷ Barrellea, K. (2015): "Pro-integration: disengagement from and life after extremism", *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, Volume 7, Issue 2, 2015, pages 129-142; Jacobson, M. (2008) "Why Terrorists Quit—Gaining From Al-Qa'ida's Losses", *CTC Sentinel*, July 15, 2008.

As violent extremist prisoners move towards release, prison visits should be turned into structured opportunities to help them prepare for their return to the community. Family visits close to the time of release, can provide opportunities for helping the prisoner and the family make some realistic plans for the transition period.

Prison authorities should, however, be aware that reuniting a violent extremist prisoner with his or her family may also have a negative impact on the prisoner and increase the risk of reoffending. The pre-release risk assessment should take this into account. If the violent extremist prisoner's family is associated with, or supports, violent extremist groups or ideologies, care should be taken to avoid re-establishing contact or make sure that such contact is closely monitored.¹⁸⁸

In addition to facilitating contacts between violent extremist prisoners and their families, it is sometimes important to offer services and support to family members of prisoners. Family members may have experienced significant distress over the period of imprisonment. Some of them may have relocated or formed new relationships. Reuniting a prisoner with family members may therefore have a negative impact on the family. Family members should receive timely notification and information concerning the prisoner's release. Social service agencies should be mobilized to offer assistance to family members and help them cope with the emotional, financial and interpersonal issues relating to the offender's return to his or her family and community.

LEBANON: Reintegration challenges

The "image of heroes" that some close community (family, religious and political entities) maintain of the imprisoned violent extremists created particular challenges when it comes to the reintegration of violent extremist prisoners in Lebanon. Indeed, the social reintegration of these prisoners is made more difficult if the community provides all services and support needed during the detention and following release (legal counsel, transportation, costs for the visits in prison, financial support to the family, etc.).

Contribution submitted by the Prison Administration of Lebanon in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

8.6 Preparing victims and the community

Fostering a welcoming and positive community environment for prisoners post-release, including former violent extremist prisoners, is critical to long-term success. Beyond a former violent extremist prisoner's immediate family, the broader community is also important in setting them on a path towards successful reintegration. This is particularly true in countries where tribes and clans play a significant role in communities, and where working with traditional rulers and authorities is a critical element of any reintegration programme.

¹⁸⁸ See, for example, Abuza, Z.: "The Rehabilitation of Jamaah Islamiya detainees in South East Asia", in Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, pp. 193-211. London: Routledge.

With the participation and help of the community and social institution, and with due regard to the interests of victims, favourable conditions shall be created for the integration of the ex-prisoner into society under the best possible conditions.

Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, Principle 10.

Any former prisoner may be confronted with negative stigmas, which hinder the reintegration process and cause difficulties in finding housing or employment. Arguably, such stigmatization effects are at least as strong, if not stronger, for ex-inmates who have a violent extremist background. To maximize the chances of success, additional measures must be taken to address criminogenic needs in the former violent extremists' immediate environment, and to establish a safe and trusting social network to return to. It is of profound importance to actively engender the receiving environment as a protective factor against recidivism and to encourage the community to support the re-entry and reintegration process.¹⁸⁹

Reconnecting with the victims and others who have been affected by the violent extremist prisoner's behaviour is a difficult process.¹⁹⁰ In many instances, relationships and trust have been seriously damaged and cannot be repaired easily or immediately. Restorative justice processes, reconciliation and other mediated interventions, starting while violent extremist prisoners are still in prison, can help them find their place in the community. This is sometimes referred to as a "restorative reintegration process". There is a growing movement to use restorative practices to facilitate the social reintegration of prisoners returning to the community.

Interventions can be planned to notify and prepare victims and relevant community members of the violent extremist prisoner's return to the community and to provide them with protection, counselling services and support. A victim may choose not to participate in any decision concerning the violent extremist prisoner, but may nevertheless need to be kept informed of the violent extremist prisoner's release and should be notified about the timing and circumstances of the violent extremist prisoner's return to the community. Ideally, the prison releasing the former violent extremist prisoner will have a record of the victim's wish to be notified (or not). When possible, counselling and support must be made available to victims of violent crimes, as required, to prepare them for the return of the prisoner to the community.

In some jurisdictions, the role of local communities and community leaders are crucial in supporting reintegration. This is particularly the case where local neighbourhood chiefs, tribal leaders and citizens groups have a role in formal or informal community management.

8.7 Protective measures on release

A pre-release plan must also consider how the violent extremist prisoners can be expected to be received by members of their former violent extremist group and hostile members of the community.

¹⁸⁹Veldhuis, T. (2012): "Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes for Violent Extremist Offenders: A Realist Approach, International Centre for Counter Terrorism Research Paper"; Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 24.

¹⁹⁰See, for example: Miller, R. (2010): *Terror, Religion, and Liberal Thought*, Columbia University Press, on how religious violence may trigger feelings of repulsion and indignation from the community, especially in a society that encourages toleration and respect. Rejection, however, contradicts the principles of inclusion that define a democracy and its core moral values.

Consideration should be given to providing protective measures when there is credible information that a reformed violent extremist may face threats to his or her life, or the lives of family members, during or upon release from custody.¹⁹¹ Some former violent extremists may be at risk of retaliation when transitioning back into society. To assess that risk and take it into account in planning the return of the former violent extremist prisoner to the community, it is important to make the best use possible of all the information available about any history of conflict, violence or threats by or against the individual. Some jurisdictions use pre-release questionnaires to inquire whether there are threats to life issues facing the individual or family members.

Where such risks exist, Member States should consider the possibility of relocating the former violent extremist prisoner and his/her family to safer areas. The individual and family members could also be given advice on precautionary safety measures and security practices designed to reduce future risks. In some cases, this may involve providing the former violent extremist with a new identity.¹⁹² Consideration should also be given to providing emergency support, such as a 24-hour telephone hotline, that former violent extremist prisoners can access if they are under threat or at risk of re-engaging in violent extremist activity. In most jurisdictions, the implementation of protective measures is not the responsibility of the prison administration, but it should liaise closely with the police, probation, public safety and security services in order to ensure that safety issues are considered.

Whatever the potential threat against a violent extremist prisoner, keeping them in prison for their own safety after the expiry of their sentence, can never be legally justified.

Provision should also exist for former violent extremist prisoners to be able to challenge the actions of authorities on their release, if they believe that they are the subject of bullying, harassment or discrimination by the authorities due to their prior violent offending. In some jurisdictions, this can be achieved through an ombudsman.

8.8 Post-release interventions and support

The period immediately after release is most critical, and is likely to be the most difficult for the former violent extremist prisoner, his or her family and the community. Where prisoners are married, the family's routine and dynamics will probably have changed while the prisoner was in prison, with their spouses and children taking on more responsibilities than they had in the past. There will be a considerable adjustment period upon release, as the former violent extremist prisoner works his or her way back into the family structure and community.

¹⁹¹ Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 21.

¹⁹² Bjorgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement*, London: Routledge, p. 253.

The duty of society does not end with a prisoner's release. There should, therefore, be governmental or private agencies capable of lending the released prisoner efficient aftercare directed towards the lessening of prejudice against him or her and towards his or her social rehabilitation.

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 90.

Developing a robust and effective reintegration process, working in close partnerships with civil society organizations and communities, will facilitate the former violent extremist prisoner's transition back into society, demonstrating continuing good will and providing an important support structure for the former violent extremist prisoner at a potentially challenging time.¹⁹³

Some jurisdictions provide assistance to former violent extremist prisoners in the form of a guaranteed job, housing, new social networks and, in rare cases, even help to get married, including financial support to do so.¹⁹⁴ Post-release activity should include ongoing educational/vocational skills training and disengagement interventions, as deemed appropriate. In a number of countries, formal "contracts of reintegration" exist between the prison administration and other government agencies, which require those agencies to take responsibility for reintegration issues such as employment, training and housing. In the United Arab Emirates, for example, a work placement scheme has been established between prisons and local technical colleges which ensure continuity of training and support in finding employment, including financial support for two to three years in order to set up a small business. In Malaysia, a partnership has been reached between the prison administration and the transport department through which prisoners are taught to drive and receive their driving licence, which enables them to find employment upon release.

TURKEY: Prisoner post-release support

The probation system was established in Turkey in 2005. Under this system, 137 protection boards were formed. The aim of these boards is to help prisoners who are released from prison to gain a profession, and business or job placement. These boards also help prisoners who have set up small businesses and want to engage in agricultural business by providing tools and credit. These boards are made up of local officials including: the Chief Public Prosecutor, representative of the judiciary, the Prison Governor, the Director of Probation, the Director of National Education, the Director of Social Services, the Agricultural Bank and Popular Bank, and other members. Since 2006, 7,520 prisoners have benefited from support given by protection boards.

Contribution submitted by the Directorate General for Prisons and Detention Houses of Turkey in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).

¹⁹³ See Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 20, Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 37.

¹⁹⁴ Bjorgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement*, London: Routledge, p. 253.

The post-release period can be a testing time for former violent extremist prisoners as they put into practice the pro-social values of what it means to be a law abiding citizen. It is important that any risk factors that are likely to continue on release are addressed as soon as possible in the community so that they do not lead to early relapse.

SAUDI-ARABIA: Prisoner post-release support programme

Saudi Arabia has developed one of the most influential deradicalization programmes of recent decades. The Saudi approach has informed and inspired the design and implementation of similar programmes in a wide range of other countries. In terms of structure and focus, the Saudi programmes developed for terrorist prisons are multifaceted and attempt to take a holistic approach in the reform and rehabilitation of the prisoners. To date, in excess of 3,000 prisoners have gone through some elements of the available programmes.

Following release from detention facilities, the ex-prisoners continue to be monitored by the authorities and are also required to continue to engage with the deradicalization work. One aspect of the programme is to assist reintegration into Saudi society by providing financial support to the ex-prisoners. This usually involves a monthly payment which the individual receives for up to one year or until they are financially independent. Added to this, the programme also provides assistance in securing employment.

Ex-prisoners are also encouraged to continue their education, the fees for which are paid for by the authorities. In a few cases, financial assistance has also been provided to facilitate marriages for ex-prisoners. The rationale for this support has been to encourage the men to focus more on family life and commitments, and to divert attention away from radical causes. In most cases, the strong practical and financial support provided after release, combined with continued monitoring, has been associated with a permanent move away from violent extremism.

Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).

Appropriate arrangements should be put in place for continuing help in the form of mentoring and support structures so that risks of relapse can be prevented.¹⁹⁵ Care should further be taken to ensure the safety of the mentor or practitioners, as there are a multitude of potential difficulties and risks.

Some jurisdictions provide financial incentives to support released violent extremist prisoners and to encourage them to abstain from further violent activity. The provision of financial incentives and support may include supporting prisoners' families (either through stipends, education assistance or employment) and providing a direct income source other than that from their illicit connections. The "appropriate" size of financial incentives, whether they should be in the form of cash or benefits in kind such as housing, should be considered carefully. There could be a risk that providing financial incentives may lead to unsustainable results: for example, because an individual may return to violent extremism once those benefits are withdrawn. Moreover, the provision of financial incentives might be controversial—seen as "rewards" for violent extremism by local communities. Care should be taken with such an approach to ensure that the financial assistance is not seen as rewarding violent extremism.

¹⁹⁵Sydney Memorandum, Suggested Strategy 8.

INDONESIA: Disengagement from violence

The third and perhaps the most important factor in facilitating successful disengagement was the establishment of an alternative social network of friends, family members, business associates and mentors. New relationships and friendships can offer new narratives for perceiving the enemy, highlight instances where the rhetoric of seniors was at odds with their actions, challenge prior-held views, and refocus priorities from jihad and/or revenge killing toward family.

Pressure from parents or a spouse can be a key supporting factor facilitating the disengagement. This was especially true among the Tanah Runtuh jihadists in Poso. However, the converse was also true. In those cases where parents professed support for terrorism, individuals remained hard line and unrepentant.

Finally, shifts in priorities from jihad and clandestine activities toward marriage, family, and gainful employment also facilitated disengagement. Priority shifts followed. In the cases of Tanah Runtuh members who had been released from prison, the need to earn a living, to “cari makanan” for one’s family, led to prioritising finding and keeping a job over their prior jihad activities. Likewise, among members of Jl, Mujahidin KOMPAK, and the Subur cell, the most successful instances of disengagement and reintegration were those young men who had the opportunity to go for either further education or professional development training and had become teachers or businessmen in their own right.

Chernov Hwang (2016) Jihadist Disengagement from Violence: Understanding Contributing Factors, RSIS Commentary No. 139 – 9 June 2016.

Learning and skills gained during custody should be rewarded and reinforced after release, leading to the individual’s acceptance as a law-abiding member of the community with a place to live and gainful employment. This calls for multi-agency cooperation between the prison, the police and statutory organizations offering post-release support, as well as other non-statutory groups and non-governmental organizations.

SINGAPORE: Prisoner post-release support programme

Following release from detention facilities, the ex-prisoners continue to be monitored by the authorities and are also required to continue to engage with deradicalization work. RRG counsellors who worked with the prisoner while she or he was in detention, continue to work with her/him after his release. This has provided the programme with valuable continuity.

The prisoners are initially released on a Restriction Orders (ROs) scheme, which sets a variety of conditions for the individual. They face curfews and must be at their residence at specific times. The ex-prisoners must report to the Singapore Internal Security Department (ISD) at specified times and dates, and must make themselves available to take part in counselling and interviews. Before moving address or changing employment, the released prisoner needs to obtain approval from the ISD. Also, the ex-prisoner is not allowed to make public statements, media appearances, or join any organization without prior approval from the ISD.

A further element to the post-release programme is the Interagency-After Care Group (ACG). This was established particularly to work with the families of prisoners, as it was recognized that the family would play an important role in helping to keep released prisoners away from extremist activities. Thus, facilitating family stability played an important role in the programme. The ACG aimed to provide support to families including providing female counsellors to work with the wives of ex-prisoners, by providing direct financial assistance, by helping wives to find employment, and also by supporting the education of the family’s children and assisting with school fees and other expenses.

In terms of the post-release programme, particularly strong elements are the strong support for the ex-prisoner's family. Also significant is the role that staff and counsellors who worked with the prisoner while in detention continue to play after release. This provides a strong continuity of care for the ex-prisoners and increases the likelihood that any return to violent offending will be recognized by staff.

Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).

Religious professionals based in prisons can also play a significant role outside of the prison setting, in helping facilitate the former violent extremist's reintegration into the community.¹⁹⁶ Religious professionals should strive to develop relationships with the prisoners' families. Religious faith leaders working in the communities, while not formally associated with the reintegration activities, can also play a particularly useful role. They may already enjoy the trust of the community and a network of contacts who can be of great assistance to the prisoner and their family. Ideally, religious faith leaders who work in prisons settings should have developed relationships with the faith leaders who are based in the communities. Working together, they can help facilitate a smoother transfer and transition back to the communities of the former violent extremist prisoners and make full use of the social network, particularly the family.

✪ *For further detail on aftercare and re-entry assistance, see the UNODC Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of Offenders (2012), including on job market re-entry assistance, accommodation and financial assistance, access to health care and social security; and family support . . .*

8.9 Monitoring and supervision after release

It is possible to distinguish between different models of supervising former violent extremist prisoners, in particular between the risk-based and the needs-based models. Risk-based strategies operate on the premise that former violent extremist prisoners are potentially dangerous and need to be controlled and closely monitored. Needs-based supervision strategies focus more on former violent extremist prisoners' needs and support their involvement in appropriate continuing interventions.

Monitoring also can provide invaluable information and data that can be used to determine the effectiveness of disengagement interventions.

In some jurisdictions, conditions are applied to the release of violent extremist prisoners prior to the expiration of their sentence, regardless of whether they will actually be supervised following his or her release—this is often referred to as “conditional release”. Sometimes those conditions are minimal. However, most conditional release systems impose both mandatory/standard and special conditions on the former violent extremist prisoner. Mandatory conditions are usually those stipulated by law and imposed on all prisoners released before

¹⁹⁶United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (2013): Additional Guidance on the Role of Religious Scholars and other Ideological Experts in Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes.

the end of their sentence. Special conditions are added, usually on a case-by-case basis. In some cases, the authorities have considerable discretion in determining such special conditions.

MALAYSIA: Violent extremist release arrangements

Every six months, the prisoners were evaluated to assess progress by a three-person committee of senior officials. The committee would prepare a report on each prisoner and this would be reviewed by a panel from the prison and also by the Home Ministry. The committee could recommend release if they were convinced that the prisoner had deradicalized and was no longer a threat. On average, the prisoners would spend three years in detention before being released.

Prisoners were normally released under a Supervision Order which placed restrictions on their activities, including curfews and limits on their travel and personal contacts. Continued counselling and religious instruction was also provided. Practical assistance was also given to reintegrate into society and, in some cases, the authorities helped the prisoner to gain employment or provided financial support.

Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).

Standard conditions of release are most frequently defined in the legislation or regulations governing conditional release and typically include the following: initial contact with a supervisor; ongoing contact with a supervisor; notification to the supervisor of any change in living or employment circumstances; limitations on travel; wearing an “electronic tag”; and being “of good behaviour” and/or behaving lawfully at all times.

Special or additional conditions can also be imposed in case decision-makers consider them necessary to manage the risk or meet the needs of the former violent extremist prisoner in the community. Those conditions are meant to offer a more specific response to the unique risk presented by the former violent extremist prisoner or a more detailed response to his or her reintegration needs. The use of special conditions should be related to the degree of risk that is presented by the former violent extremist prisoner. For example, the conditions may include a requirement: to avoid certain buildings, geographical areas or regions; not to approach or communicate with named people or organizations; to reside at a particular location; to participate in a particular intervention; to obey a curfew; not to use the Internet; or not to travel out of the country.

In some cases, former violent extremist prisoners may require intensive supervision, at least in the first months or years following release. Intensive supervision may mean that they should be supervised very closely, with requirements for frequent face-to-face meetings with their supervisor, a set curfew, monitoring of contacts with police, and in some cases electronic monitoring. The exact nature of the intensive supervision may vary from person to person. In some jurisdictions, the role of local communities and community leaders is crucial in monitoring the former violent extremist prisoner.

Where a former violent extremist prisoner breaches the terms of their conditional release, appropriate measures should be put in place to deal with the non-compliance. In the most severe cases of non-compliance, the conditional release should be revoked and the individual

returned to prison. In the case of lower levels of non-compliance, a more strategic approach should be adopted, based on systematic attempts to enhance the likelihood of successful completion of supervision, with violations being used as opportunities to intervene with the violent extremist prisoner offenders and redirect their behaviour.¹⁹⁷ In order to do so, it is often necessary to implement intermediate sanctions for non-compliance that do not involve a return to prison, such as participation in a community-based intervention.

Post-release supervision is a critical component in determining the success of a prisoner's re-entry and community reintegration. However, supervision is more than simply monitoring the former violent extremist's compliance with the conditions attached to their release. It involves managing the risk presented by the individual, acquiring and/or arranging resources to meet the needs of the individual and developing and maintaining a relationship with the former violent extremist that engenders trust with appropriate boundaries. It includes acts of surveillance, role-modelling, guidance and support, reinforcing positive behaviour and enforcing consequences for negative behaviour. Carried out professionally, it includes at its core supporting the social reintegration of the former violent extremist while actively managing the risk that he or she may reoffend.

While care must be taken not to give a "special status" to former violent extremist prisoners, the type of offence they committed and the impact of any future offence means that they require special attention. The key element, therefore, in considering post-release arrangements for former violent extremist prisoners must be public safety and protection. Risk assessments are indicative and can only point to a lower risk of further violent extremist offending, rather than predicting with certainty that the individual will never commit or support violent extremist activity in the future.

¹⁹⁷Burke, P. Gelb, A. and Horowitz, J., (2007): "When offenders break the rules: smart responses to parole and probation violations", *Public Safety Policy Brief*, No. 3, November, (Washington, D.C., Pew Center on the States).

Summary of key principles and recommendations

Chapter 2. Managing violent extremist prisoners: fundamental issues

- Prisoner radicalization is not in itself a threat to the prison administration or society if not connected to violence. Not all radicalization is negative or a precursor to violent extremism. Only a very small number of radicals actually become violent extremists.
- Prison administrations should ensure the secure and safe custody of violent extremist prisoners; prevent radicalization to violence within prisons; seek to ensure that prisoners disengage from future violence; and prepare those being released for their reintegration into the community.
- Good prison management and necessary reforms constitute a fundamental basis for the effective management of all prisoners, including violent extremist prisoners. Stand-alone interventions for violent extremist prisoners which are implemented in isolation of the broader prison context are unlikely to yield positive results.
- The challenges posed by violent extremist prisoners must be addressed in full compliance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) and other relevant international standards and norms, including from a gender perspective.
- Any efforts in prison to address violent extremism must not lead to undermining fundamental human rights to which all persons, including violent extremist prisoners, are entitled, including the freedom of thought, religion or belief, and the absolute prohibition of torture.
- Appropriate security measures must be implemented that maintain a proper balance between physical, procedural and dynamic security elements. All prisons holding violent extremist prisoners should have in place a structured prison intelligence system consistent with national legislation and international standards.
- Prison administration should cooperate with other law enforcement and criminal justice agencies concerning the violent extremist prisoners held in their custody. Intelligence and other relevant information should be shared across agencies.
- Prison authorities have an obligation to ensure that prisons are safe places, where prisoners, staff, service providers and visitors can go about their daily business without fear for their physical well-being. Maintaining control in prison through situational and social control methods is fundamental to ensuring safety and order.

Chapter 3. Managing prison staff and other resource persons who work with violent extremist prisoners

- Prison staff have an obligation to protect, maintain and uphold the human dignity of all offenders, including violent extremist prisoners. Prison staff who are to work with this challenging category of prisoners should be carefully selected for their integrity, humanity, professional capacity, personal suitability and ability.
- Prison administrations should have a clear policy to encourage suitable individuals to apply to work in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners. The conditions of service for those staff should reflect the challenges and importance of their role.
- All staff should receive specialist training for working with violent extremist prisoners. Furthermore, prison administrations should take appropriate steps to ensure the personal safety of staff who work in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, both while on duty and while outside of the prison, including their family members.
- Prison staff should maintain high levels of professional standards and ethics at all times when working with violent extremist prisoners. Appropriate support mechanisms should be put in place to enable staff to cope with the stress of working in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners.
- The staffing level for each prison should be set at the level required to ensure the security, safety and stability of the institution. It is essential that sufficient staff are appointed to ensure security and safety, as well as to ensure the implementation of constructive regime activities, including disengagement interventions.
- Sufficient specialist staff, such as psychologists, social workers and faith leaders, should be appointed to lead disengagement interventions. Other resources, such as victims and victims' advocates, former violent extremists, family members and significant others, members of the community, and non-governmental organizations may play a significant part in the successful delivery of disengagement interventions.

Chapter 4. Assessing and managing the risks posed by violent extremist prisoners

- Upon admission of a violent extremist prisoner, a thorough, evidence-based risk and needs assessment should be undertaken by specially trained staff. As opposed to doing so only upon entry, the assessment of risks and needs of violent extremist prisoners should be carried out on an ongoing and regular basis.
- The assessment and management of pretrial detainees should take into account their specific vulnerability, which may also include a particular susceptibility to the efforts of violent extremist recruiters. However, prison administrations must also be aware that any intervention including pretrial violent extremist prisoners may have an impact on their respective court cases, which may discourage participation.
- Structured professional judgement should be used in making the assessments of violent extremist prisoners. Assessment tools specifically tailored to identify individual risks and current levels of radicalization to violence, as well as the risk of undertaking future violent extremism-related activity, including post-release, should be developed and used according to the national context and capacities. Such tools should also consider the risk of others being radicalized to violence.

- Each violent extremist prisoner’s assessment should identify the personal and contextual circumstances which contributed to his or her (alleged) offence, and are likely to contribute to such offending in the future. The findings of this risk assessment should be used to identify the prisoner’s needs and interventions that will assist the prisoner in disengaging from violence and to enable the prisoner’s social reintegration.
- All violent extremist prisoners should be (a) separated according to gender, legal status, and age; (b) classified according to the information gained through the risk and needs assessment; and (c) categorized according to the appropriate level of security they will need to be held in. Violent extremist prisoners should be held in the least restrictive setting necessary for their safe and secure custody.
- Consideration should be given as to how best to house violent extremist prisoners within each prison system. The suitability of separation, concentration, dispersal or integration approaches (or a mix thereof) will depend on specific factors within the country, including the size of the violent extremist prison population, the prison infrastructure and the capacity, the size and skills level of staff, as well as the resources and capacity to deliver disengagement programmes.

Chapter 5. Prison-based disengagement interventions

- Underpinning the approach of disengagement interventions should be the concept that if an individual can adopt radical beliefs and attitudes that lead to violent extremism, that individual can also abandon the use of violence through changing those beliefs and attitudes that justify its use.
- No single model of disengagement is universally applicable. To be effective, efforts must be highly tailored to the country and culture involved, the individual prisoners participating and the environment into which the former violent extremist prisoners is ultimately released.
- Disengagement-related interventions may consist of a variety of activities including: psychological counselling and support; cognitive-behavioural programmes; social work interventions; faith-based debate and dialogue; education; vocational training; creative therapies; physical therapies (e.g. yoga, sport, exercise); family activity; and social, cultural and recreational activities.
- To be effective, disengagement and social reintegration interventions should further be gender-sensitive and address the varying experiences, as well as the specific obstacles and challenges which women may face.
- Taking due account of the availability of resources, the delivery of disengagement and social reintegration interventions for violent extremist prisoners should not have a negative impact on, but be accompanied by, the delivery of rehabilitation programmes for the “regular” prison population in order not to provide any “special group” status, which may result in hostility or other prisoners aspiring to be violent extremists.
- The goal of all of all above prison-based interventions related to violent extremist prisoners should be to change their behaviour so that they renounce the use of violence to achieve their objectives. This reflects the fact that having a radical belief system alone is not necessarily a threat to prison (or community) safety and security.
- Reporting on disengagement activity is an important feature to ensure accountability, to facilitate the adaptation of interventions, and as a foundation for evaluation.

Monitoring and evaluating an intervention should equally occur to determine whether the goals were appropriate, the activities were efficiently implemented and the objectives were met.

- A key element for ensuring the continuous development of interventions, learning and advocacy related to the disengagement of violent extremist prisoners is independent research of the highest quality.

Chapter 6. Managing the implementation of disengagement interventions

- An integrated case management system approach should be adopted for violent extremist prisoners, which uses a common framework, tools and language to assess, identify needs and monitor progress, and which updates the outcomes during violent extremist prisoners' imprisonment, transition to release and community supervision.
- All practitioners, including security, custodial, ancillary, supervisory and administrative staff members who do not have a direct role to play in delivering structured interventions, should contribute to maintaining conditions conducive to intervention delivery and to supporting progress in disengagement.
- Where available, an intervention team should include a multidisciplinary group of specialists who implement disengagement interventions, including: psychologists, psychiatrists, faith leaders, sports instructors, art therapists, social workers, vocational guidance officers, teachers and health-care professionals.
- For interventions team members to engage effectively with violent extremist prisoners, it is important that each intervention team has one or more members who speak the language of the violent extremist prisoners held in the prison in which they work.
- The specific duties of the interventions team should include: undertaking an initial assessment of violent extremist prisoners to identify risks, needs and appropriate interventions; completing and update case file records; delivering interventions; participating in case conferences; completing reassessments at regular intervals; and using the materials, tools and equipment provided for disengagement interventions.
- The interventions team should work closely with the director of the prison in which they operate to ensure that the director is fully aware of intervention requirements and activities, and that those requirements and activities are appropriate to the security arrangements within that prison.
- At headquarters level, there should be a supervisory or management team that holds overall responsibility for establishing, overseeing the development, implementation and evaluation of interventions, as well as providing mentoring and support for the prison-based interventions teams.
- A single dynamic case file should be developed soon after a violent extremist prisoner's admission to the prison, which should be updated and modified as he/she progresses through the institution. Intervention team members should attend regular team meetings, participate in case reviews, and contribute to case conferences.
- Any institution implementing interventions will require a range of facilities including: meeting rooms (for one-to-one interviews and counselling); classrooms (for group

work, presentations and lectures); worship facilities; vocational training and other workshops; sports and exercise facilities; and facilities for creative and arts therapy.

- Violent extremist prisoners should be informed about the purpose of the interventions and the way they operate. Staff members should explain to violent extremist prisoners that participation in the programme is voluntary. Appropriate incentives should be put in place to encourage violent extremist prisoners to participate in interventions.
- Institutions should consider various ways to show recognition for participation in, and completion of, interventions including graduation ceremonies, awarding certificates and medals and inviting family and senior representatives of the community and/or community agencies to attend.
- In order to ensure public reassurance and understanding, regular work with the media should take place to explain the positive disengagement activity taking place in prison, the types and purpose of interventions being delivered and the positive impact that they can have on violent extremist prisoners.

Chapter 7. Preventing radicalization to violent extremism in prison

- While there is limited empirical evidence which would suggest a significant level of radicalization to violence in prisons, a number of factors and grievances (actual or perceived) unique to the prison context may, under certain circumstances, render prisoners more susceptible to being radicalized to violence.
- Prison administrators should implement measures to prevent prisons becoming locations in which violent extremism can thrive and where prisoners can be radicalized to violence. Addressing prison conditions and overcrowding are an essential part of efforts to avoid that prisoners join a violent extremist group for protection or for the satisfaction of basic physical needs.
- Recruiters are able to spot, assess and encourage potential vulnerable recruits to join a violent extremist cause and use a variety of approaches to recruitment. Prison administrations should be aware that they do not necessarily have a high profile, and often seem to conform to the prison regime. Charismatic leaders, on the other hand, are able to exploit emotional triggers such as hatred, revenge and frustration, and to guide the formation of a group identity around shared ideological commitment to using violence in order to achieve goals.
- Where there is evidence that a prisoner has been attempting to radicalize other prisoners to violence, prompt and decisive action should be taken (e.g. restrictions on his or her association with vulnerable prisoners, supervision of interactions, or transfers to another prison wing or prison).
- A number of indicators in the categories of (a) expressed opinions; (b) possession of relevant material; and (c) behaviour/behavioural changes may suggest vulnerability to radicalization to violence. Prison staff will need to take into consideration how reliable or significant signs are and whether there are other factors or issues that could indicate vulnerability.
- If prison administrations consider that support to reduce vulnerability to radicalization to violence is required, they should devise an appropriate support package for the prisoner being recruited.

Chapter 8. Preparing violent extremist prisoners for reintegration into the community

- In the vast majority of cases, violent extremist prisoners will at some point be released back into the community. Supporting the reintegrating of violent extremist prisoners into the community should therefore be a key element in any strategy for preventing and countering violent extremism.
- An individual release plan should be developed that identifies the violent extremist prisoner's reintegration needs and circumstances, and determines the type of interventions that the prisoner should access in order to maximize his or her chances for successful reintegration.
- Prison-based interventions should be put in place to prepare violent extremist prisoners for their release and re-entry into the community. The aim should be to move violent extremist prisoners to progressively less restrictive settings, based on periodic individual risk assessments.
- The social reintegration of violent extremist prisoners requires a holistic and multi-disciplinary approach, with strong coordination among the different stakeholders involved, including civil society organizations, public institutions, the private sector, NGOs, families and communities. If relevant, psychological and religious counselling, employment assistance and/or support to the family should continue.
- Families can be vital partners in the reintegration process, and should be involved before the release of the violent extremist prisoner. Families can also play important monitoring functions after release. However, care should be taken to account for the fact that in some cases, the family can be part of the problem and hinder the disengagement process.
- In order to create a welcoming and enabling environment and with a view to reduce stigmatization, educating society and public opinion is necessary to create social awareness and try to break barriers and prejudices around former violent extremist prisoners.
- Consideration should be given to providing protective measures when there is credible information that a reformed violent extremist may face threats to his or her life, or the lives of family members, during or upon release from custody.
- Formal or informal monitoring and supervision post-release can be an effective method to deter or interrupt recidivism. Close supervision and guidance can support and reinforce any pre-release agreements or contracts the former violent extremist prisoner has agreed to upon release.

Glossary of key terms

The definitions contained in this glossary are for the purposes of this handbook only.

Accommodation

The (prison) housing in which violent extremist prisoners are located. This varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and includes: separation from the general prison population; isolation from each other; concentration in one place; dispersal across a small number of prisons; and integration with the general prisoner population.

Assessment

The process of identifying who is a violent extremist prisoner and estimating the risks and needs of that prisoner before categorizing him/her and planning an intervention to reduce risk of future violence and/or providing advice to judicial or other competent authorities. Assessments should also identify those at risk of being radicalized to violence. Assessments should take place on arrival at the prison and at regular intervals thereafter.

Deradicalization

The process of changing the belief system, rejecting the extremist ideology, and embracing mainstream values. Deradicalization refers primarily to a cognitive rejection of certain values, attitudes and views—in other words, a change of mind. It implies a cognitive shift, i.e. a fundamental change in understanding resulting from activities intended to help individuals to renounce radical or extreme ideas, beliefs and groups.

Disengagement

Social and psychological process whereby an individual's commitment to, and involvement in, violent extremism is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity. Disengagement from using, or supporting the use of, violence does not necessarily mean a change in an individual's commitment to a radical or extremist cause. Disengagement involves a change in behaviour (renouncing the use of violence) rather than a change in fundamental beliefs.

<i>Extremists</i>	Can be characterized as people who tend to reject equality and pluralism in society. Extremists strive to create a homogeneous society based on rigid, dogmatic ideological tenets; they seek to make society conformist by suppressing all opposition and subjugating minorities.
<i>Intervention</i>	Any action taken to assist or guide violent extremist prisoners in order to divert them from committing further violent offences, to help them lead law-abiding lives and to assist with social reintegration in the community. Some interventions may take place in the prison and others post-release. It is a purposeful, planned activity, which aims to change the characteristics of the prisoner (attitudes, cognitive skills and processes, personality or mental health, and social, educational or vocational skills) that are believed to be the cause of the individual's violent behaviour, with the intention to reduce the chance that the individual will commit future violent extremist offences.
<i>Prison/Prisoner</i>	Prison refers to any place of detention where a person is deprived of their liberty against his or her will. Prisoners refer to individuals held in detention who are: sentenced; convicted but pre-sentence; pretrial; or pre-charged.
<i>Radicalization</i>	A dynamic process whereby an individual may adopt ever more extreme ideas and goals. The reasons behind the process can be ideological, political, religious, social, economic and/or personal. A radical may seek to bring about a system-transforming radical solution for government and society through violent or non-violent means (for example, democratic means using persuasion and reform).
<i>Radicalization to violence</i>	The process by which people acquire radical or extremist beliefs and attitudes that involves the use of violent measures to achieve objectives.
<i>Reintegration</i>	Reintegration occurs at the end of incarceration, sometimes under formal supervision, sometimes without any assistance. Reintegration also refers to a process through which violent extremist prisoners move from custody to living in the community.
<i>Religious conversion</i>	A noticeable change in one's religious or belief identity; a self-conscious transformation that may take the form of a change from: one formal religion to another; an atheistic belief to a theistic belief; a recommitment to an existing religion.
<i>Supervision</i>	Refers both to assistance activities conducted by or on behalf of an implementing authority or agency and to actions taken to ensure that the violent extremist prisoner fulfils any conditions or obligations imposed, including control where necessary. Violent extremist prisoners may be supervised very closely after

release, with requirements for frequent face-to-face meetings with a supervisor, a set curfew, monitoring of contacts with police, and in some cases electronic monitoring.

Violent extremist

Someone who promotes, supports, facilitates or commits acts of violence to achieve ideological, religious, political goals or social change. In some cases, a violent extremist prisoner may not be in prison for an offence (or alleged offence) related to violent extremism, but nonetheless has been assessed as being a violent extremist according to the definition set out above.

Annex. Relevant international instruments, standards and principles

The following list of international instruments, standards and principles only refers to those cited in the Handbook:

African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Banjul Charter) (Adopted 27 June 1981, entry into force on 21 October 1986)

American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica) (Adopted on 22 November 1969, entry into force on 18 July 1978)

Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 27 August to 7 September 1990)

Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 45/111 of 14 December 1990)

Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988)

Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979)

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, entry into force on 26 June 1987)

Council of Europe

- Resolution (76)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the treatment of long-term prisoners (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 February 1976)
- Recommendation No. R (82)17 of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning custody and treatment of dangerous prisoners (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 24 September 1982)

- Recommendations CM/Rec(2003)23 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the management by prison administrations of life-sentence and other long-term prisoners (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 9 October 2003)
- Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Prison Rules (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 January 2006)
- Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Code of Ethics for Prison Staff (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 April 2012)
- Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)3 of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning dangerous offenders (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 February 2014)
- Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 2 March 2016, at the 1249th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)

Global Counterterrorism Forum

- Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism (2013)
- Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector (2012)
- Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (2012).
- Sydney Memorandum on Challenges and Strategies on the Management of Violent Extremist Detainees (2012).

Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa (the Luanda Guidelines) (Adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights during its 55th Ordinary Session, 28 April to 12 May 2014)

Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas (Adopted by resolution 1/08 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 13 March 2008)

Principles and Guidelines on Human and Peoples' Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa (Adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights during its 56th Ordinary Session in Banjul, Gambia (21 April to 7 May 2015).

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force on 23 March 1976)

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force on 3 January 1976)

Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa (United Nations Economic and Social Council resolution 1997/36 of 21 July 1997, annex)

Recommendations on Life Imprisonment (United Nations Office at Vienna Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, Life Imprisonment (UN Document ST/CSDHA/24), 1994)

United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules) (Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 65/229 of 16 March 2011)

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) (Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 70/175 of 17 December 2015)

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 45/110 of 14 December 1990)

United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism—Report of the Secretary-General (2015) Seventieth session, A/70/674

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948)





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