

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
Vienna

Final Independent Project Evaluation of

**“Drug law enforcement systems for
criminal intelligence collection, analysis
and exchange”**

RER/F23
Central Asia

May 2018



UNITED NATIONS
New York, 2018

This independent evaluation report was prepared by an evaluation team consisting of (Stephen Powell and Bunafsha Odinaeva). The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process of projects. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>

The Independent Evaluation Unit of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime can be contacted at:

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Vienna International Centre
P.O. Box 500
1400 Vienna, Austria
Telephone: (+43-1) 26060-0
Email: ieu@unodc.org
Website: www.unodc.org

Disclaimer

Independent Project Evaluations are scheduled and managed by the project managers and conducted by external independent evaluators. The role of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) in relation to independent project evaluations is one of quality assurance and support throughout the evaluation process, but IEU does not directly participate in or undertake independent project evaluations. It is, however, the responsibility of IEU to respond to the commitment of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) in professionalizing the evaluation function and promoting a culture of evaluation within UNODC for the purposes of accountability and continuous learning and improvement.

© United Nations, May 2018. All rights reserved worldwide.

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

This publication has not been formally edited.

CONTENTS

Executive summary.....	viii
Summary matrix of findings, evidence and recommendations	xiii
I.Introduction	1
Background and context	1
Logical framework	3
Purpose and scope of the evaluation	4
The composition of the evaluation team	6
Evaluation methodology	6
Limitations to the evaluation	9
II.Evaluation findings	10
Relevance	10
Efficiency	13
Partnerships and cooperation	17
Effectiveness	19
Impact.....	26
Sustainability.....	28
Human Rights & Gender Equality	31
III.Conclusions	34
IV.Recommendations	36
V.Lessons learned and best practices	40
ANNEX I. Terms of Reference of the Evaluation	41
ANNEX II. Evaluation tools: questionnaires & interview guides	72
ANNEX III. Evaluation matrix	76
ANNEX IV. Desk review list	87
UNODC documents	87
Other external documents	88
ANNEX V. List of persons contacted during the evaluation	89
ANNEX VI. Sampling strategy.....	91
ANNEX VII. Current logframe	92

ANNEX VIII. Comments on Logical framework	94
ANNEX IX. More details on the recommendation on monitoring and evaluation	99
ANNEX X. More details on recommendation on benchmarking and training standards	
100	
ANNEX XI. Expenditure breakdown.....	102

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Abbreviation	Full name
CARICC	The Central Asian Regional Information & Coordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances & their Precursors
CLP	Core Learning Partner
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (US State Department)
IT	Information Technology
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
ROCA	Regional Office for Central Asia
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UN	United Nations

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

<i>Recommendation</i>	<i>Management Response (accepted/partially accepted/rejected)</i>
The main features of the F23 project approach (in particular: software provision, appropriate training, support for networking, longer-term partnership) should be integrated into future similar projects in the region and the new Programme for Central Asia. (Project Management, ROCA, and Regional Section for West and Central Asia). Recommendation is directed to the UNODC Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia and staff responsible for the implementation of the successor activities to F23 ¹ .	Accepted
In follow-on activities as part of the new Programme, increase the use of 1) pairings between regional or international experts and analysts, 2) trainer-training, and 3) training courses held on the premises of beneficiary agencies.	Accepted
Identify relevant analyst skills and equipment specifications specified as minimum requirements. Link training and equipment provision to these identified standards, with better target-setting, evaluation and scoring for training, with the option to link to national training curricula and academies. Support individual countries to implement their own training to these standards, and also define mid-level and advanced areas of work where outside help is needed.	Accepted
Develop a concise and realistic logical framework for future follow-on activities which interfaces with the minimum standards, above, and satisfies usual standards of evaluability and logical consistency, formulated in a SMART way and used for real-time project monitoring.	Partially accepted
Strengthen procedures for identifying and addressing emerging threats in real time, for example by facilitating more rapid input of expertise from outside the region and more rapid transfer within it.	Partially accepted
Highlight potential human rights implications of the use of software and techniques, and help agencies work together on possible solutions.	Rejected

¹ All the recommendations are directed to this same recipient

Ensure the inclusion of gender equality and collect gender-disaggregated data for training and expert meetings. Model an inclusive approach in project implementation with key individuals / champions who could act as change agents.

Partially accepted

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

The annual increase in the flow of drugs, mainly opiates from Afghanistan, has become a significant external threat for the Central Asian region. Since a key issue in the fight against illicit drug trafficking is the collection, analysis and exchange of information carried out by analytical units in the law enforcement agencies of the region, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) project RER/F23 (F23), entitled “Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and exchange”, was designed to fill this gap. The project originally began in 2002 and ended on 12 November 2017. The objective of the project was set as “a coherent and comprehensive system for intelligence, and information collection, analysis and exchange is established”. The project installed modern intelligence systems and i2 analysis software (“iBase” and “Analyst’s Notebook”) in 18 counter narcotic agencies in the project area. It was funded by Austria, Italy, Canada, France, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States of America through their respective agencies and by UNDP, with a total overall budget of USD 8,016,445 and implemented by UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA).

The outcomes of the project are specified somewhat differently in the original project document and revisions², but taking all documentation together, the project aimed *at a minimum*, within at least one agency within each participating country, with respect to trafficking of narcotics, to increase/enhance 1) information gathering and 2) analysis, and 3) this was to be increasingly intelligence-led; and in addition it also intended to achieve: 1) progress on these dimensions in *more than one* agency in each country; 2) application a) in particular to *transnational* narcotics trafficking and b) more generally to *other organized crimes*; 3) increased exchange of intelligence between agencies *within one country*; and 4) increased exchange of intelligence *between countries*.

The evaluation followed the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD – DAC) criteria assessing relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, human rights and gender equality, and the implementation of recommendations from the mid-term Independent Project Evaluation in 2012, deriving lessons learned, best practices and recommendations for future project interventions. Relevant lessons and recommendations for the new UNODC Regional Programme for Central Asian States 2015-2019 were also sought. The evaluation was undertaken by means of a mixed-methods approach with a gender-responsive evaluation methodology in line with United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) and UNODC Norms and Standards.

The evaluation time scope was 1 January 2012 to 2 December 2017 (end of the evaluation field mission) and the geographical coverage was Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,

² It proved difficult to isolate from the project documentation precisely what were the intended outcomes, so for the purposes of the evaluation, „essential“ and „additional“ success dimensions were defined. The former three are considered to be essential minimum outcomes, and the latter four are „nice to have“.

the locations within which the project was actually implemented. The evaluation was carried out by a team of two external independent evaluators, one lead evaluator with experience in evaluating technical assistance projects in over 30 countries over the last 20 years, and one team member, expert in the area of law enforcement in Central Asia. The evaluation methodology considered primary and secondary data sources ensuring triangulation of findings, further promoting the participation of stakeholders throughout the evaluation process, including a desk review and field mission with semi-structured interviews and site visits including site observation to beneficiary agencies, from 20 November to 2 December 2017.

Main findings

Relevance

The project was highly relevant to beneficiary needs and priorities. Improving the effectiveness of drug law enforcement is a priority and an urgent and continuing need. The Outcomes were highly relevant to the project aims and the Outputs were appropriate to achieve the Outcomes. The long-term approach and partnership was an appropriate way to provide this kind of support in this region; the duration was however unusually long considering that essentially the same project model was used throughout.

Efficiency

Achievement of outputs approximately followed the project plans, although already in 2012 the geographical scope of the project had to be restricted to just the four evaluated countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, due mainly to lack of funding. Project activities were cost-effective ways of achieving outcomes.

Effectiveness

The project reached the essential standards of progress implied in the logical framework and also showed additional successes on a number of other areas, in particular having effects within multiple agencies within individual countries and facilitating networking between them and with foreign agencies – as evidenced by inspection of project documentation and interviews with internal and external respondents.

The F23 training approach reached a certain level of maturity and delivered good results in all three outcome areas, especially the first two (1. Specialized law enforcement personnel use enhanced management of information-gathering and exchange systems; 2. Law enforcement personnel use enhanced analytical capacity in operational work). As evident from interviews, analysts were more in a position to use the skills and capabilities they had acquired through the project in their daily work. The approach propagated by F23 became a central part of law enforcement operations in some if not all agencies. “Rotation” of trained staff into other positions did happen to a considerable extent but was not only a disadvantage because trained staff could use their new skills in new areas, and the agencies as a whole could benefit from wider understanding of the ways of working introduced and strengthened by F23.

The project sponsored bilateral links indirectly but not directly: it was indirectly conducive to cooperation between relevant agencies in individual countries, and its support for The Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC) contributed to very important regional

networking. Regional level assistance was carried out as planned. In-house training was restricted to specific needs on particular occasions, in particular when software was installed, though it was highly valued.

The project management succeeded in a demanding task with relatively sparse resources; however, the project monitoring system was not really fit for purpose. The logframe items, indicators, baselines and targets often did not match up with one another and many were not SMART³.

Impact

The project made plausible contributions to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and target 16.A (“Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime”) in particular. There was no evidence of a substantial impact on gender-specific SDGs.

The project contributed to a larger number of more evidence-based prosecutions, which was a significant achievement, and there were some positive results in neighboring thematic areas which were not directly intended – for example, F23 support to CARRIC contributed indirectly to the staff of that organisation holding training courses outside the region; and F23 contributed to the Afghanistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan “Initiative AKT”⁴.

Sustainability

It is highly likely that most agencies would continue with the use of i2 and intelligence-led policing within each country even in the absence of similar support; however, regional cooperation, mutual support in training etc, would be less likely to sustain. The training model is on the verge of becoming sustainable.

Human Rights and Gender Equality

Neither gender equality issues nor human rights issues were explicitly included in the project design, training materials, or in the way the F23 approach was to be implemented. In interview, all three groups of respondents said that the project most likely had a very positive impact on human rights by increasing the role, availability and value of evidence in the anti-narcotics process, supporting the rule of law. The evaluation showed that the human rights implications (data protection etc) need to be made clearer in the training courses in order to increase respect for human rights in the operations of F23-related activities. Around 10% of trainees were women, a ratio which is typical for law enforcement in Central Asia, though there was some notable improvement in 2017.

The evaluation also addressed gender issues, looking in particular at the gender ratio amongst analysts and on training courses. Inspection of project records shows that the gender balance

³ SMART is a much-used acronym which originally meant “Specific – target a specific area for improvement; Measurable – quantify or at least suggest an indicator of progress; Assignable – specify who will do it; Realistic – state what results can realistically be achieved, given available resources; Time-related – specify when the result(s) can be achieved.” as attributed to Doran, G. T. (1981). “There's a S.M.A.R.T. way to write management's goals and objectives”. *Management Review. AMA FORUM*. 70 (11): 35–36.

⁴ “The Afghanistan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan (AKT) Initiative is aimed at strengthening cross-border cooperation in law enforcement and legal matters between these countries at the starting point of the Northern Route for trafficking narcotics from Afghanistan.” Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/rpanc/RP_Success_Stories_distribution.pdf

amongst analysts is still quite poor. Gender-specific records were not held for the training courses, but closer inspection of records shows that there was a relatively low percentage of women trained, roughly corresponding to the low percentage amongst analysts in general.

Main conclusions

The project continued to be highly relevant to the changing situation on narcotics trafficking in Central Asia, from the perspective of both national governments and the international community. F23 fulfilled a need for outside expertise, respecting the individual situation and needs of each beneficiary agency.

The 2012-17 phase of the project was able to build on and expand the groundwork done in the first phase. It did not merely maintain a minimum level of capacity in each agency but on the contrary began to reap the benefits in terms of actual use of that capacity to facilitate evidence-based prosecutions.

With respect to the minimum achievement criteria implied in the logical framework the project was effective, and also added value, such as including several agencies within each country and helping to improve interaction between them. To a lesser extent it managed to contribute to cross-border exchange of intelligence but there would still be a lot of work to be done in that regard, some of which is beyond the remit of F23.

Training components reached a certain level of maturity and national agencies were beginning to take over responsibility for them, with some material being included in basic material for Police Academy trainings.

While some of the recommendations from the mid-term evaluation in 2012 were taken into account, more could have been done to revisit them. In particular, in-house training, train-the-trainer and peer-to-peer training were efficient, effective and valued by partners but due to funding restrictions were not used as much as recommended by the previous evaluation.

The project monitoring system and logical framework as formulated in the project document and revisions were perhaps its weakest point. They were logically inconsistent and lacked SMART formulation. There was no systematic monitoring of e.g. staff scores on a standardised skills test; prosecutions brought, etc.

Key recommendation

Revisiting recommendations from Mid-Term Evaluation Report

In follow-on activities as part of the new Programme, increase the use of 1) pairings between regional or international experts and analysts, 2) trainer-training, and 3) training courses held on the premises of beneficiary agencies.

Sustainability of expertise; benchmarking

Identify relevant analyst skills and equipment specifications specified as minimum requirements.

Link training and equipment provision to these identified standards, with better target-setting, evaluation and scoring for training, with the option to link to national training curricula and academies. Support individual countries to implement their own training to these standards, and also define mid-level and advanced areas of work where outside help is needed.

Logical Framework and Monitoring

Develop a concise and realistic logical framework for future follow-on activities which interfaces with the minimum standards, above, and satisfies usual standards of evaluability and logical consistency, formulated in a SMART way and used for real-time project monitoring.

Emerging challenges

Strengthen procedures for identifying and addressing emerging threats in real time, for example by facilitating more rapid input of expertise from outside the region and more rapid transfer within it.

Human rights & gender

Highlight potential human rights implications of the use of software and techniques, and help agencies work together on possible solutions.

Collect gender-disaggregated data for training and expert meetings.

Model an inclusive approach in project implementation with key individuals / champions who could act as change agents.

Lessons learned and best practices

One best practice was the exemplary long-term and individualized approach which accompanied national partners in a difficult context over more than one and a half decades. Patient and persistent help with applying the project model led to a major shift in the sense that agencies now see the benefits themselves and are motivated to continue the approach.

The support to expert meetings, alongside training and equipment, helped sponsor a core of key personnel with advanced level of expertise within the region, mainly but not only based at CARICC.

SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings	Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)	Recommendations
<p>Achievement of outputs continued to approximately follow the project plans. Project activities were cost-effective ways of achieving outcomes.</p> <p>The project certainly reached the essential standards of progress implied in the logical framework and also showed additional successes on a number of other areas.</p>	<p>Deskwork (project reports, project plans), on-site inspection, interview, inspection of financial records, collation and analysis of training records.</p>	<p>The main features of the F23 project approach (in particular: software provision, appropriate training, support for networking, longer-term partnership) should be integrated into future similar projects in the region and the 2015-19 Programme for Central Asia.</p> <p>Recommendation is directed to the UNODC Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia and staff responsible for the implementation of the successor activities to F23⁵.</p>
<p>Much progress was made with respect to the recommendations from the mid-term evaluation (awareness-raising for key staff, on-the-job and peer-to-peer training). However some still need continued work and are still valid.</p>	<p>Project records for expert/analyst training etc, interview with agency representatives and project staff.</p>	<p>In follow-on activities as part of the new Programme, increase the use of 1) pairings between regional or international experts and analysts, 2) trainer-training, and 3) training courses held on the premises of beneficiary agencies.</p>
<p>There was a lack of concrete evidence of training effectiveness apart from satisfaction surveys, and no systematic way to formulate, assess or certify required skills and knowledge within</p>	<p>Project record systems, interview with agency representatives and project staff.</p>	<p>Identify relevant analyst skills and equipment specifications specified as minimum requirements.</p> <p>Link training and equipment provision to these identified</p>

⁵ All the recommendations are directed to this same recipient


or between agencies or countries. There was a continued need to anchor expertise within the region.		standards, with better target-setting, evaluation and scoring for training, with the option to link to national training curricula and academies. Support individual countries to implement their own training to these standards, and also define mid-level and advanced areas of work where outside help is needed.
The project logical framework was weak, logically inconsistent and lacked SMART formulation. There was no systematic monitoring of e.g. staff scores on a standardised skills test; prosecutions brought, etc.	Project document and revisions, interviews with relevant project staff.	Develop a concise and realistic logical framework for future follow-on activities which interfaces with the minimum standards, above, and satisfies usual standards of evaluability and logical consistency, formulated in a SMART way and used for real-time project monitoring.
There are many important emerging threats such as the use of encrypted messaging by criminal groups which seriously challenged the ability of agencies to respond to them; the project's procedures for dealing with these threats were not as fast as agencies desired.	Interview with all actors and especially government agencies; government documents.	Strengthen procedures for identifying and addressing emerging threats in real time, for example by facilitating more rapid input of expertise from outside the region and more rapid transfer within it.
Use of software and techniques provided and supported by F23 had some potential human rights implications (data protection etc) which were not dealt with thoroughly enough in the training courses.	Interview with agency representatives, project staff and deskwork.	Highlight potential human rights implications of the use of software and techniques, and help agencies work together on possible solutions.
Gender equality was not specifically addressed in project design or training materials	Manual collation and analysis of training records using trainee names. Inspection of project records	Ensure the inclusion of gender equality and collect gender-disaggregated data for training and expert meetings. Model an inclusive approach in project

	and materials. Observation during evaluation visits.	implementation with key individuals / champions who could act as change agents.
--	--	---

I. INTRODUCTION

Background and context

Map 1. Map of the project countries*



Key to map: yellow background = all countries in UNODC Strategic Region; thick, dark border = countries included in project 2012-17 and visited for evaluation; thin, pale border = other countries in project 2002-11.

*Source: Google Maps

Afghanistan continues to dominate the world production of opiates, see Table 1. In the 1990s, the search for new drug markets led to a new drug transit route through the countries of Central Asia to the Russian Federation, called the "Northern Route". The Central Asian countries bordering Afghanistan are geographically located in a difficult mountainous area, especially Tajikistan. The

annual increase in the flow of drugs has become a significant external threat for the Central Asian region.

Table 1. The cultivation of opium poppy and opium production in Afghanistan 2009-2017*

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Hectares	154000	209000	224000	183000	201000	328000
Opium production (in metric tons)	3700	5500	6400	3300	4800	9000 (estimate)

*Data from <http://drugsmonitoring.unodc-roca.org>⁶.

Countries in the region, including Afghanistan and the Russian Federation, agreed on the need to cooperate in the fight against drug trafficking. A special role in this is played by international organizations designed to assist the law enforcement agencies of the Central Asian countries. Since a key issue in the fight against illicit drug trafficking is the collection, analysis and exchange of information carried out by analytical units in the law enforcement agencies of the region, the UNODC F23 Project works on achieving these goals.

Overall concept and design of the F23 project

The UNODC project RER/F23, informally known as “F23”, had the title “Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and exchange”. The project originally began in 2002, since when there have been seven project revisions⁷, (the most recent, June 2012 and July 2014, were in the period covered by this evaluation). The objective of project F23 in the most recent project revision was “a coherent and comprehensive system for intelligence, and information collection, analysis and exchange is established”⁸. The project originally began in 2002 and ended on 12 November 2017. It was funded by Austria, Italy, Canada, France, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States of America through their respective agencies and by UNDP, with a total overall budget of USD 8,016,445 and implemented by UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA).

The project area of responsibility at project end included the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. However, Turkmenistan was not actively involved in the project, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan were included up until 2012 and were intended to be included also for the phase 2012-17. Armenia and Georgia were also intended to be included 2012-17. See Table 2 During the period of 2012-2017, direct support was provided just to the first four of these countries, mainly due to lack of funding.

⁶ See also https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2017/November/afghan-opium-production-jumps-to-record-level--up-87-per-cent_-survey.html

⁷ See Terms of Reference, p. 44

⁸ Changes to the project logical framework, including to the Objectives, are outlined on p. 96.

The project installed modern intelligence systems and i2 analysis software (“iBase” and “Analyst’s Notebook”) in 18 counter narcotic agencies in the project area. Approximately 400 officers have been trained in crime analysis techniques at various levels. The F23 “project philosophy” was to teach, across different agencies and countries, *similar* working methodologies and using the *same* analysis software and database structures. This approach was intended to stimulate national and regional cooperation between agencies and encourage the sharing of information and analytical products between intelligence analysts from participating countries.

Logical framework

The three **Outcomes** of the projects (as further elaborated in Annex VIII) are as follows (slightly abbreviated). The evaluation team have added *italics* to words which are presumably intended to express the intended *changes*, the *difference made* by the project.

Specialized law enforcement personnel use *enhanced* management of information-gathering and exchange systems.

Law enforcement personnel use *enhanced* analytical capacity in operational work.

Law enforcement personnel *increased* use of intelligence-led policing in operational work.

The formulations of these and their indicators, and the formulations of the Objective, are however inconsistent and in general do not define (with sufficient clarity) the baselines, or how progress is to be measured, or the desired extent / scale of the project. In particular, it is not clear whether the targets refer to one beneficiary agency, or all of them, or to individual countries; which kind of crime is to be targeted; what kind of *data exchange* between agencies is intended – within or between countries?

To explicate more precisely what the project was actually aiming to do in order to be able to evaluate its actual achievement against those aims, the evaluation team condensed the logical framework into *essential* and *additional* success dimensions:

Essential success dimensions: Within at least one agency within each participating country, with respect to trafficking of narcotics, the project **must** increase/enhance the three Outcomes: 1) information gathering and 2) analysis, and 3) this is to be increasingly intelligence-led⁹.


There are also additional aims which are implied at various points in the project documentation but not so consistently that they can be judged to be binding:

Additional success dimensions: 1) progress on the essential dimensions in *more than one agency* in each country; 2) application a) in particular to *transnational* narcotics trafficking and b) more generally to *other* organised crimes; 3) increased exchange of intelligence between agencies *within* one country; 4) increased exchange of intelligence *between* countries

⁹ This means above all that the work of agencies is not only responding to crimes but using intelligence to understand and anticipate crime in a pro-active way, also impacting resource allocation.

Since targets are not consistently given, *any* substantial difference made to these dimensions will be judged as success. Finally, although a wider geographical scope was indicated initially, the “the participating countries” is considered to be limited to the four countries covered in the ToR for the evaluation.

Figure 1. A graphical representation of the project logical framework from the latest Revision (7), with adjustments



*All Outputs potentially contribute to each Outcome; dotted lines to and around Objective show it is *defined* in terms of the Outcomes rather than *caused* by them

Purpose and scope of the evaluation

A final Independent Project Evaluation is mandatory and has to take place prior to the financial closure of the project as per UNODC Evaluation Policy.

The evaluation followed the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD – DAC) criteria as well as some additional criteria (see methodology section on p. 6), deriving lessons learned, best practices and recommendations for future project interventions. As many aspects of the project are to be integrated with other projects under the umbrella of the UNODC Programme for Central Asian States 2015-2019 signed in May 2015 by the government representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, relevant lessons and recommendations for the new UNODC

Regional Programme for Central Asian States 2015-2019 were also sought. The evaluation was undertaken by means of a mixed-methods approach with a gender-responsive evaluation methodology in line with United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) and UNODC Norms and Standards. The evaluation process is fully independent and is conducted under the guidance and quality assurance of the UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU)¹⁰.

The evaluation criteria as specified in the ToR (and slightly refined in the inception report) form the sub-headings of the Findings sections, pp. 10 ff.

The purpose of the evaluation is to ensure ownership, result-based orientation, cost-effectiveness and quality of the UNODC services.

The results of this summative final evaluation are intended for use by the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia, project team, beneficiary agencies and donor countries.

The evaluation *time* scope is 1 January 2012 to 2 December 2017. Furthermore, the project coverage is nine countries, however since 2012 F23, funds were only available (from INL USA) for the Central Asia states. Out of five Central Asia states Turkmenistan did not sign the project extension. As a result since 2012 the project was implemented only in these four countries. So the evaluation *geographical* scope is as shown in the shaded column:

Table 2. The project countries

	UNODC Strategic Region	Included in F23 2002-11	Intended to be included in phase 2012-17	Actually included in phase 2012-17: Geographical scope of evaluation	Visited in evaluation	Included in new Programme for Central Asia
Uzbekistan	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kazakhstan	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kyrgyzstan	X	X	X	X	X	X
Tajikistan	X	X	X	X	X	X
Turkmenistan	X	X	X			X
Afghanistan	X	X	X			
Azerbaijan	X	X	X			

¹⁰ <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/index.html>

Armenia	X		X			
Georgia	X		X			

The composition of the evaluation team

The final Independent Project Evaluation was carried out between October 2017 and January 2018 by a team of two external independent evaluators:

- International independent external evaluator (lead evaluator), with experience of evaluating technical assistance projects, having conducted evaluations in over 30 countries over the last 20 years, with a PhD in research psychology from the University of Middlesex.
- National independent evaluator (team member), expert in the area of law enforcement, with in-depth knowledge on the drugs situation in Central Asia as Deputy Director of the Drug Control Agency in the Republic of Tajikistan¹¹.

Logistical support was provided by Project staff.

Evaluation methodology

The evaluation followed the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD – DAC) criteria, assessing relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, as well partnerships and cooperation, human rights and gender equality mainstreaming, **and the implementation of recommendations from the mid-term Independent Project Evaluation in 2012**. A set of evaluation questions was agreed in the inception phase, organised according to the evaluation criteria. These were taken from the ToR and further modified as indicated on pp. 72 ff. Then an “evaluation matrix” was constructed with evaluation questions, collection methods and data sources.

For each evaluation question, a corresponding subsection of the report was written. This subsection was written as a triangulation of the different results for each of the methods used for that particular question, to strengthen accuracy, robustness and reliability of evaluation results.

In order to ensure the evaluation offered diverse perspectives a variety of different groups of stakeholders was included, as detailed below. The list of stakeholders includes seven Core Learning Partners (CLPs); these were a limited number of those deemed as particularly relevant to be involved throughout the evaluation process, i.e. tasks such as reviewing and commenting on the TOR and the evaluation questions. An initial group of stakeholders, and potential interviewees, including CLPs, was defined in the evaluation Terms of Reference and included in the first version

¹¹ The team member was not directly involved in the F23 project and did not take part in any F23 training: as she was working as head of a DCA she could not be direct recipient of F23. But she was involved in managing the analytical units also during the cooperation with F23.

of the evaluation matrix. On inspection of the matrix it was then decided, in the inception phase, to also add interviews with two civil society organisations in order to increase the variety of respondent types and to broaden the possibilities for triangulation – see p. 9.

The evaluation followed a gender-responsive approach. Women are very much in a minority in law enforcement in the region, so in mixed groups, female respondents were addressed specifically and supportively. The evaluators maintained their questioning even if questions relating to gender were given lower priority by male respondents. The evaluation team consisted of one woman and one man. On occasion, the female evaluator was able additionally to engage female respondents individually on issues like workplace environment, during site visits.

The evaluation made use of a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods to gather and analyse data. The methods used included a desk review of documentation, semi-structured interviews and to a lesser extent observation. A limited amount of quantitative data was available in the form of data on beneficiary agency personnel participating in project events and also in the form of their feedback on those events.

Interviews were of various types, mainly differentiated according to stakeholder group, as follows:

- Interviews with UN staff, including UNODC. These took place on UN premises (and in one case by telephone) with either one or two respondents.
- Interviews with beneficiary agencies. These took the form of 1-3 hour visits to the premises of the Agency in question. The format varied but always involved at least a central interview with 1-5 key respondents. In some agencies it was possible also to talk to individual agents, in an individual interview.
- Interviews with donors and others, with either one or two respondents. These included the main donor (INL), Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and civil society organisations.

Different groups of questions from the overall set of evaluation questions were highlighted as particularly relevant for each group of stakeholders and operationalised for that group as indicated in the evaluation matrix. Interviewees were asked for their consent to the interview before it began and were informed about confidentiality.

Observation was only conducted at beneficiary agencies. For security reasons it was not possible to view agents working with live data. However it was possible to view the working environment, the equipment which had been provided alongside equipment from other sources, and to ask agents questions about their use of the software and procedures.

Detailed list of evaluation activities

A desk review of relevant documents (Annex III), followed by preparation of an Inception Report (containing preliminary findings of the desk review, refined evaluation questions, data collection instruments, sampling strategy, limitations to the evaluation, and timetable).

Field mission from 20 November to 2 December 2017 in Central Asia. This included the following activities.


- Visit to UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) in Tashkent consisting of:
 - Briefing and individual semi-structured interviews of UNODC staff.
 - Visits to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan consisting of:
 - Individual semi-structured interview with and briefings by UNODC staff members.
 - Briefing by UNODC staff in the UNODC Programme-Offices in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia, Uzbekistan;
 - Individual semi-structured interviews with project beneficiary agencies and other national counterparts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan;
 - Individual semi-structured interviews with donor representatives;
 - Site visits and observations to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and other sites for physical inspection and discussions both with beneficiary agencies and other people directly or indirectly affected by the project;
 - Site visit and observation to CARICC in Almaty
 - Phone/Skype individual semi-structured interviews with staff at UNODC HQ, Vienna, Austria.
- Analysis of all available information ensuring triangulation of sources, methods, data and theories.
- Preparation of the draft evaluation report.
- Preparation of the final evaluation report and presentation of evaluation findings.

Sampling

With reference to Table 2 it can be seen that at country level, the sample is a so-called census, i.e. all are covered. But within countries, it was not possible for logistics reasons to visit all the agencies; in fact, in the selection made by project management, four agencies were left out (covering 8 out of 12). This selection had already been discussed and agreed with the partners concerned as part of the evaluation ToR and thus was difficult for the evaluation team to change.

Figure 1 gives an overview of the interviewees. In total, 53 stakeholders were interviewed, of whom 10 were female. Beneficiary agencies were best represented, followed by project management. The gender balance was most equal in project management. Women made up about 1/5 of the sample, which is much better than the ratio in the agencies overall.

Figure 2. Individual respondents interviewed for this independent evaluation



Limitations to the evaluation

There was a very limited number of fieldwork days to cover many sites and a long list of evaluation questions. This was partially mitigated by submitting some questions in writing to the project management.

It was difficult to assess the main outcomes without clear definition of outcomes / indicators or comprehensive baseline or endline. This was partially mitigated by obtaining full project monitoring data from management in addition to the annual reports.

Some of the topics were sensitive (e.g. organized crime) which may compromise / bias some sources & the freedom for Law Enforcement Agency staff to discuss high level or sensitive matters. This was partially mitigated by adding interviews with CSOs. Circular questioning was also used (e.g. *what do you think other countries ... / other agencies ... would answer to this question: ...*)

It was difficult to investigate some kinds of possible negative impact. e.g. whether i2 software was being used in ways not consistent with human rights, for example to track opposition groups; project management had no record of such cases. Partial mitigation was to ask civil society groups about this possibility; however, they were reluctant to discuss this kind of question at all, so no conclusions could be drawn.

II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Relevance

Evaluation question:

To what extent is / was the project relevant to the respective beneficiaries' agencies and governments' needs and priorities?

To what extent is / was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the donors and UN?

To what extent do the objectives, outcomes and outputs respond to present circumstances and stakeholder expectations¹²?

Relevance to stakeholders

Improving drug law enforcement is a kind of activity which one could expect to find within UNODC's contribution to the respective **UNDAF frameworks**. In fact, it is specifically mentioned in the UNDAF for Kazakhstan 2010-15; Output 3.4. However, the topic is not specifically covered in the UNDAF plans for Kyrgyzstan 2012-16, Tajikistan 2016-20 or Uzbekistan 2016-20.

On the whole, the project was highly relevant to the appropriate **national strategic plans**, see p. 76 and p. 102. The strategic plan for Kyrgyzstan¹³ in particular mentions „carrying out systematic combat against corruption, organized crime and drug trafficking. Establishing incentives for legalization of informal (shadow) economy; ... Promptly and decisively respond to challenges and threats: international terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking“. However it is the relevance of the project to Kazakhstan's priorities is less clear, as the national development plan for that country only mentions anti-narcotics in terms of reducing addiction and increasing penalties. The other three countries' plans specifically mention installation of databases and other appropriate technology.

In interview, representatives of the beneficiary agencies emphatically agreed that the project addressed important national priorities. Narcotics trafficking is the centre of a nexus of problems which present real and growing threats to national development, such as money-laundering and terrorism, yet it is estimated¹⁴ that only a small proportion of narcotics passing the national borders is actually seized¹⁵.

¹² In this and subsequent sections of this Findings chapter, some additional questions, mainly arising out of the mid-term evaluation, are also subsumed under the main headings and can be found in Annex I

¹³ National Sustainable Development Strategy for The Kyrgyz Republic 2013-2017

¹⁴ Source: UNODC, 2008: Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia

¹⁵ In 2010 UNODC estimated that only between 1% and 10% of opium and heroin transiting Tajikistan were seized: 75-80 tons of heroin and 18-20 tons of opium trafficked versus 985 kg of heroin and 744 kg of

F23 strategy and activities are also in line with the strategy of the main donor, (*Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs*; INL) and with that of the US State Department, as part of a broader strategy to strengthen criminal intelligence within law enforcement agencies in Central Asia.

Relevance of objectives, outcomes & outputs

Interview sources and document review concur that some form of international information sharing is absolutely essential for transnational crime prevention. The main project outcomes - analysts gathering, using and exchanging intelligence not only reactively but also proactively - are highly relevant to achieving the project aims (while the Objective is best understood as a synthesis of the Outcomes, see p. 3, the Expected Accomplishment¹⁶ is a useful alternative expression of general project aims). While gathering, analysing and exchanging intelligence have always been recognised as important, the 3rd Outcome on intelligence-led policing in particular is something which became clearer as a key contribution partly through the involvement with the F23 project, and in particular through witnessing the capabilities of the i2 software.

Equally, the project activities and outputs were seen both by beneficiary agencies and by external respondents on the whole as relevant ways to achieve these objectives. The i2 software was very well suited to the task; there are some alternatives but there were no compelling arguments to make what would be a very expensive and time consuming shift to a different system. There are also relevant potential applications for the software which the agencies are exploring and for which the agencies are looking for assistance.

Telephony meta data, i.e. who called whom, where and when was the most significant component of i2 applications in most agencies. There were some questions as to whether the rise of messaging and VoIP applications like WhatsApp, which are much harder to trace in the same way, might threaten the whole project approach. However, i2 is in principle agnostic as to the type of data being used, and most of the agencies were already integrating other types of data such as financial transactions; Indeed, some of the best results were achieved where different types of data were combined. In parallel, the accompanying hardware and training support provided by the F23 project was necessary to make use of the software adequately. The project approach was flexible with the right balance between software, hardware and training.

The project was viewed by beneficiary agencies and by external respondents as the right kind of partner to offer this package of support.

The project took an unusually long voyage, from 2002 to 2017. This kind of long-term relationship was explicitly welcomed by the respondents, even when there were very few staff in place who had actually experienced more than a few years of it. It was taken as indicating a long-term commitment to supporting the agencies and a sign of patience and the understanding that it can take a long time to achieve sustainable change. It also made it easier for the project to identify partners and target those who were best placed to be effective.

opium seized. Source: Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Threat Assessment. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012)

¹⁶ General Assembly resolution 64/179

The evaluation showed that achieving progress was more difficult in the earlier years of the project. It took some years until a “critical mass” was achieved; even after the software had been installed and approved, it took varying amounts of time until concrete benefits could be seen. This point was reached at different times in different agencies.

The fact that the project was in the end limited to just four of the original cooperating countries somewhat simplified the task of project management, as much of the work involved agencies and even individuals who were old rather than new contacts. Nevertheless, beneficiary staff rotation was high (see Section “Progress against Outcomes”).

Benchmarking and needs analysis

The evaluation questions on benchmarking and needs analysis (see pp. 76 ff.) follow up on recommendations from the 2012 mid-term evaluation.

Benchmarking is a structured process best known from the business arena in which workflows, approaches and performance are compared, numerically and qualitatively, between similar firms working in similar markets. It can be a useful way for firms to learn from one another. At the 6-monthly expert working group meetings hosted at CARICC, regional development was discussed, but a benchmarking approach as such was not applied. One factor which mitigated against the development of benchmarking was that project management was concerned to understand and adapt to the individual needs of each country. Furthermore, national agencies had their own standards, situations and regulatory frameworks.

Nevertheless these are no longer completely persuasive arguments. Now that beneficiary agencies are more intrinsically motivated and persuaded of the benefits of the project model, there is perhaps a better environment for relaunching the idea of regional standards and a benchmarking exercise.

Needs analysis: Alternative and additional software needs were discussed at the six-monthly experts meetings and suggestions were reviewed by CARICC, such as add-on packages and ways of bridging to other software. Project support was mainly centred around suggesting additional free software such as Google Earth. ARC GIS proved to be a useful complement to i2. Choice of software was also affected by the relatively limited funding available. The project was able to make some adaptations to the software solutions offered but did not have the technical capacity or funding to consider or indeed implement more fundamental changes to the approach. Since 2014 there was no dedicated IT expert within the project, but as the relevant expertise could be found within CARICC and the programme offices, this was not judged by beneficiary or other respondents to be an important drawback.

Some agencies requested licenses for additional software e.g. for analysing social networks but these were turned down on the grounds of cost. Project management were further sometimes offered particular, paid-for software packages. Management however preferred to focus on well-established and free solutions.

Summary of findings on Relevance

The project was highly relevant to beneficiary needs and priorities. Improving the effectiveness of drug law enforcement is a priority and can be judged objectively to be an urgent and continuing need. The Outcomes were highly relevant to the project aims and the Outputs are an appropriate

way to achieve the Outcomes. In particular the role of intelligence-led policing (Outcome 3) became clearer to the relevant authorities through participation in the project. While beneficiary agencies do affirm the relevance of the project, it is unlikely that they would have implemented similar mechanisms without outside help. The long-term approach and partnership was an appropriate way to provide this kind of support in this region; the duration was unusually long considering that essentially the same project model was used throughout. The project was mainly concerned to adapt its approach to individual country and agency needs and benchmarking was not conducted systematically as part of ongoing regional development. A formal needs analysis in the strict sense was not carried out after 2012; however, informal, ongoing needs analysis was conducted through regular contacts with the beneficiary agencies and at the expert meetings. The ability of the project to purchase new software was seen as limited but agencies were encouraged to adopt some free software packages.

Efficiency

Evaluation questions:

To what extent is the project implemented in the most efficient and cost-effective way compared to alternatives?

Are the activities the most cost-effective way of achieving the outputs / outcomes / objective?


Are there any good practices regarding efficiency, e.g. are certain aspects or arrangements of the project particularly efficient?

Breakdown of costs; staffing history

The total overall budget according to the last revision in 2014 was \$8,016,445. The overall approved budget at the end of 2011 was \$5,087,315, i.e. the overall budget for the evaluation period was \$2,929,130 as per the costed workplan. Looking at costs in the costed workplan for the years 2014-17, these were split approximately 50/50 between overheads – mainly staff costs – and direct project costs. The main items are shown in Figure 3¹⁷. The two main headings are international staff and IT equipment. Approximately half of the costs were directly related to specific project activities, i.e. IT equipment, expert meetings etc.

¹⁷ This is based on the budget breakdown 2014-17 as reported in last revision. The actual expenditure (according to generic headings and not the costed workplan headings) is shown in the Annex XI.

Figure 3. F23 Budget breakdown in costed workplan for 2014-17



The donors throughout the duration of the project were Austria, Italy, Canada, France, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States of America via their respective agencies, and UNDP. The main donor(s) for the phase 2012-17 was INL.

It is important also to mention the national Ministries themselves as the main supporters of project implementation, as they did provide staff, administrative support, premises, running costs etc, without which it would not be possible to implement the F23 project.

The staffing situation at the project end was as follows: The overall coordination of the project was in the hands of the Head of UNODC Programme Office in Tajikistan/International project Coordinator, supported by the Project Manager who was mainly concerned with project implementation. National staff was employed as part of the cost-share scheme: Project Manager - 40%, Project Assistant - 100% plus a share of (security guards, IT expert, cleaner etc.) There were some small adjustments to national staff arrangements during the evaluation period, and from 2013 to 2015 the project was managed by an Interim Project Coordinator/Project Manager due to lack of funding.

Achievement of outputs

Data on achievement of outputs was analysed on the basis of output-level information provided by project management – essentially, lists of people attending training. As the training courses were so central to the project, data for them is listed and analysed here. The evaluation team worked with the training records provided by project management, tagging the activities according to type, country etc. and then collating and analysing the records as displayed below.

Table 3. Numbers of F23 training courses held per year, by host country

Country	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Grand Total
Kazakhstan			2	1	1	1	5
Kyrgyzstan			1	1	4	2	8
Tajikistan				3	3	2	8
(Outside evaluated countries)	4						4
Grand Total	4	0	3	5	8	5	25

A total of 25 training courses were carried out, approximately 4 per year, in all three countries except Uzbekistan. Most were held in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in response to agency requests. Additional training courses were provided in cooperation with other UNODC projects¹⁸.

Table 4. Numbers of participants*

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Grand Total
Total	81	0	64	59	398	42	644

*Note this total excludes over 700 additional participants from one single awareness-raising / information mission in Kyrgyzstan Northern Regions in 2017, as this was not a training course, and the involvement of these participants was more limited and not comparable to the other courses.

Table 5. Number of training courses of different types conducted per year*

Data	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Grand Total
Multi-country	2	0	2	1	2	0	7
Multi-agency	2	0	3	4	7	3	19
Includes different regions within same country	0	0	1	1	4	4	10
Peer to peer	0	0	1	1	3	4	9
On-the-job	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
Train-the-trainer	0	0	0	1	1	0	2

*Note that a “2” in the first cell means that 2 training courses were held in 2012 which were of a multi-country, etc.

“Multi-country” means that beneficiary agencies from more than one country participated. One 2017 training in Kazakhstan with the participation of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan experts seconded to CARICC is not coded as “multi-country”. Note that one training course can appear in more than one row, e.g. a multi-agency train-the-trainer course.

¹⁸ For example, an i2 Intelligence analysis training for LE officers/analysts from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was conducted at CARICC in Almaty, June 3-8, 2013. The training was organized by the SP1 and K22 project with on-spot consultative and advisory support from the F23 project. This course is not included in the tables above.

The training courses covered a wide range of different needs. The number of on-the-job and train-the-trainer courses was not so high. On-the-job training was mostly provided if special support was required on a specific case and the agency permitted it (once confidential information was added to the database, subsequent support was usually provided remotely).

Table 6. Trainings with participants from each country

Data	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Grand Total
Kazakhstan	2	0	2	2	2	1	9
Kyrgyzstan	2	0	3	2	5	2	14
Tajikistan	2	0	2	3	5	2	14
Uzbekistan	2	0	0	1	2	0	5

Seven of the training courses included participants from more than one country (see previous table); over half the courses (14 out of 25) included participants from Tajikistan, and the same is true for Kyrgyzstan. However, only five courses included participants from Uzbekistan.

Cost-effectiveness

Respondents from partner governments and external respondents agreed that the project was managed efficiently and cost-effectively. Interactions between agency staff and project management were mostly smooth and timely. There were delays, however these were nearly always due to issues beyond the control of project management such as approval of equipment supplies.

Procurement procedures can be very time-consuming, mainly due to centralised procurement and the new, UN-Secretariat-wide financial and administrative system Umoja. This centralised procedure is important for streamlining processes globally and to combat corruption but it does mean that procedures can be bureaucratic. Even once equipment was delivered, another layer of approval may be required before it can be used; this is a routine part of established procedure, with equipment remaining in boxes for several months, as in one case which the evaluation team took note of.

Probably the biggest delays were due to all official communications between project management and the agencies needing to pass through the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs. This is complicated by the fact that there are many related projects in the Central Asia region which the partner governments have to interact with.

The project adapted its approach according to the needs of individual agencies, adding hardware and software licenses as and when appropriate. Hardware provision also included servers and networking where necessary. For example, the Analytical Unit of the Drug Control Agency in Tajikistan recently asked for a secure local area network to communicate with their Ministry of the Interior, which they received promptly.

International interchange of data (additional success dimension 4, see p. 3) was partly reliant on CARICC, which itself had to function within the challenging context of a multi-national, inter-agency centre. These challenges were no fault of F23.

There were some examples of cost savings. National and international external partners reported that UNODC projects had worked together in an efficient way, and inspection of project records highlighted a number of partnerships¹⁹. Training courses were further coordinated with other UNODC programme/projects to avoid overlap²⁰.

The version of i2 in use, mostly version 9, was relatively up-to-date compared to global practice in law enforcement agencies. Most of the agencies expressed satisfaction with the hardware; using computers which are not powerful enough for the software can itself be an inefficiency.

The evaluation found that although the details of the project workplan were clear, a clearer overall project plan in the sense of the discussion in Annex VIII (inconsistencies between different statements of the project aims, no indicators or lack of indicators with SMART formulation, lack of baselines and monitoring data, etc) would have made it easier to gain a shared vision of exactly what the project was trying to do and what constitutes progress towards the vision. Although the agencies had access to the new Programme for Central Asia, it is regarded a large and complex Programme, where the different parts and their functions and inter-relationships were not clear to everyone.

Summary of findings on Efficiency

Achievement of outputs in most cases were in accordance with the project plans. Project activities were cost-effective ways of achieving outcomes, with the activities carried out during the evaluated timeframe building on initial steps taken from 2002 to 2012. There were some problems with delays but these were mostly not due to project management.

Partnerships and cooperation

Evaluation questions:

What is the nature of the relationship between the UNODC project and beneficiary agencies and BCs? (e.g. could you describe it as „donor-driven“, „bottom-up“ etc)?

Whose project is it? To what extent were stakeholders properly engaged and informed?

¹⁹ F23 collaborated with the following UNODC projects: RER/H22 “Establishment of a Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC)”; XAC/K22 “Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossings points (BCPs) and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices (BLOs)”; KGZ/K50 “Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic”; TAJ/H03 “Tajikistan Drug Control Agency (DCA) – Phase II”; KGZ/T90 “Criminal Justice Programme in the Kyrgyz Republic”

²⁰ In September 2014, a training course on “Intelligence analysis training for the law enforcement analysts of DCA and MOI” was held together with KGR/K50 and TAJ/H03. In the same year, three other training courses were held in collaboration with CARICC, INL and/or the Coordination and Evaluation Unit of UNODC ROCA

How was the project conducive to the development of agency partnerships at the bilateral and multilateral level? This includes a) between agencies within same country and b) internationally and c) with other national and international partners.

Was assistance continued at regional level in the current model, using joint activities, in house training and expert meetings? To what extent has UNODC F-23 sought / established partnerships with national and international partners, including agencies, UNODC-internally, public oversight bodies and civil society, etc.?

The agencies, according to most respondents, identified quite strongly with the project aims and approach but, with the some exceptions, regarded primarily as a vehicle for delivering technical support. So on the one hand it was mostly seen as mostly fulfilling genuine agency needs, and there was a good sense of *partnership* between the agencies and UNODC. On the other hand, there was less of a sense of *ownership*; F23 was seen as belonging to UNODC rather than to the agencies.

On the issue of technical expertise, UNODC and the F23 project in particular were seen as major players with a technically sound portfolio. However the F23 project was seen as being relatively limited in resources.

The project had to cover up to 18 agencies across several countries, which sometimes made it more difficult to adapt to individual needs and requests as well as the changing context (cyber-crime etc, dark net). The project followed correct procedures in engaging and informing partners, but a closer and more frequent contact would have been welcomed by most of the agencies; some compared F23 with some other UNODC projects which are supported by a National Officer in each country who assists with maintaining and facilitating in-country relationships and indicated that this arrangement would have been more desirable.

Agency partnerships and regional assistance

The project did not directly sponsor bilateral links; for example the individual agencies did not visit each other's offices in the framework of F23. The project did provide indirect support to bilateral linkages and multilateral cooperation; the most substantial example of a channel for international cooperation supported by F23 was CARICC. F23 strongly promoted and supported cooperation via this centre. Regional assistance was continued in all three areas via the regional meetings and in-house training, though there was only a small number of the latter. In-house or on-the-job training was mainly restricted to occasions when software was installed, which did not happen in the evaluated timeframe after 2012.

Cooperation with other UNODC projects was mostly seamless, for example with TD/RER/H22 "Establishment of CARICC" and XAC/K22 "Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossings points (BCPs) and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices (BLOs)". There was however little cooperation with public oversight bodies or civil society.

Summary of findings on Partnerships

This can be considered a relatively top-down project which however meets with the increasingly enthusiastic participation of the beneficiary agencies. Stakeholders were properly engaged and informed, but it was not always easy to maintain close contacts with so many agencies across four

countries. The project sponsored bilateral links indirectly but not directly. It was indirectly conducive to cooperation between relevant agencies in individual countries, and its support for CARICC contributed to very important regional networking. Regional level assistance was continued as planned. In-house training was restricted to specific needs on particular occasions though it was highly valued.

Effectiveness

Evaluation questions:

To what degree did the project achieve its outcomes and objectives?

What other major factors (apart from the project) helped or hindered?

How good are beneficiary staff skills relevant to the 3 Outcomes? How much do the 3 outcomes actually happen in live operations (proportion of time?)

To what extent was the project management (i.e. UNODC management & within stakeholders) effective and allowed implementing the set objectives under the project?

To what extent did the project contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals? Was there any contribution to gender-specific SDGs in particular?

Project effectiveness can be judged in terms of the essential and additional success dimensions as noted on p. 3²¹ and which are derived from the project plans. Performance data from narrative reports and triangulated by interviews was compared against these dimensions in the following paragraphs. As argued on p. 3, to be judged as effective, within at least one participating agency within each country, with respect to trafficking of narcotics, the project would have to increase/enhance 1) information gathering and 2) analysis, and 3) this would have to be increasingly intelligence-led. Additional dimensions cover features which were suggested, but not formally required in the logical framework are: 1) achievement of the Outcomes in more than one agency in each country; 2) application: a) in particular to transnational narcotics trafficking and b) more generally to other organised crimes; and 3) increased exchange of intelligence between agencies within one country and increased exchange of intelligence between countries.

The narrative within the mid-term evaluation report is a very useful description of the situation at project mid-term, for comparison with the current final situation encountered by this evaluation, in order to assess the contribution made by the project²². Overall it is very clear that substantial progress was made.

Progress against Outcomes

As noted already, review of the project document and revisions of it shows that the project was lacking clear definitions of indicator scores and in particular a systematic monitoring framework, or databases of such indicators (e.g. staff scores on a standardised skills test; prosecutions brought, etc) recorded at regular intervals over the life of the project. So there was no direct way to systematically assess key outcomes like staff skills, work done using i2 or other F23 outputs, or prosecutions brought as a consequence of F23 inputs, e.g. in which key evidence had been

²¹ Since the indicators and targets given in the logical framework are not judged to be adequate without additional work, see p. 2

²² Bearing in mind that some things might have changed even without the project

constructed with i2 – see recommendations on p. 37. No measures of staff skills – whether a test, or self-assessment supervisor or instructor assessment were applied, either as part of a regular assessment or even before and after the training courses.

Ideally, the single most important set of data would be on how much the F23-trained skills and knowledge were actually used in participating agencies, were it available. Though there was some data on this in the project reports and some additional data was offered by agencies in interview, there was in fact no systematic monitoring database. The evaluation team discussed extensively with project management the possibility of systematically contacting the agencies to provide this data retrospectively for the evaluation, but this option was ultimately rejected as very unlikely to be successful in the evaluation timeframe.

Outcomes 1 and 2: information gathering and analysis

F23 contributed to information gathering and analysis skills within the agencies and these skills were put to use in nearly all the agencies visited at least once a week and often more frequently. This was only questionable for one agency visited and is not certain for the other agencies not covered by the evaluation (see Sample, p. 8).

According to interviews and with reference to documentation provided, intelligence databases were in place and in regular use in nearly all the agencies. Link charts were created as a matter of course in many agencies. Telephone meta-data was the main content, but other types of data such as financial flows were also used.

The project was able to make a difference on these key staff skills and behaviour in spite of the fact that there was a considerable amount of “rotation” amongst key staff, i.e. when staff moved to other positions. This problem is not unique to this region or this sector, F23 adapted to this problem and continued to accompany the agencies, attempting to provide advanced training for those who could benefit from it, and basic training for new staff.

Several agencies said that on-the-job training was the most effective for them, although others also pointed out the importance of having a mix of training inputs, especially including basic training. As the F23 approach was able to offer a range of training inputs in negotiation with agencies, it was able to accommodate different needs of this nature, which was seen as very positive.

It is remarkable that the majority of training courses were custom-designed to fit specific needs, for the individual needs of each agency, a country or the region, in order to maximise effectiveness.

Selection of trainees was a key issue. Managers were tasked with identifying the right trainees for each course and were also involved in dialog with the F23 project management on their specific needs. However it was a recurring problem that agencies did not always nominate trainees who would most benefit from specific training courses or whose expertise could be put to the best use. It occasionally happened that attendance at a training course was approved as a kind of reward for specific staff – something that was seen by F23 project management as beyond their control. The absence of a specific F23 national officer in each country made it harder to monitor and optimise the process of nominating trainees.

The F23 training approach reached a certain level of maturity. Nearly all agencies were familiar with the approach and the benefits it brought and assessed the courses as relevant, efficient and effective. Many respondents readily admitted that the time has come for individual countries and/or

agencies to take responsibility at least for basic i2 training, and some have begun to do that. (On the other hand, several agencies were still quite dependent on the F23-trained analysts.) There were many calls made by respondents for assistance to standardise at least the basic training approach, while underlining that each country and each agency has its own context, regulations, training academies etc. Respondents reported that there is some scope to integrate some of the content into existing training modules – for instance in law enforcement academies.

Outcome 3

Intelligence-driven operations and collaboration on live cases were lagging behind intelligence-gathering and analysis. The use of i2, and other F23 training inputs, certainly assisted in making agencies become more proactive. In comparison with the evaluation results of the mid-term evaluation, it is clear that progress was made. Interviewed staff were familiar with the concept of intelligence-led policing and could provide examples of where it was used, in particular in the sense of identifying possible new cases on the basis of existing data rather than reacting to crimes committed. There was less evidence that the project contributed to risk analysis or resource allocation being conducted on the basis of the tools provided.

Summary of findings on progress against Outcomes

With respect to the essential success dimensions identified on p. 3, the project certainly made *at least some difference* on all the three Outcomes in *at least one agency in each country*, with the biggest effects in relation to Outcomes 1 and 2. The situation on the “Additional dimensions of effectiveness” (see p. 3) was a little more mixed but overall very positive.

- achievement of the Outcomes in *more than one agency in each country*

As noted in the mid-term evaluation report, throughout the project, certain countries and Law Enforcement Agencies were more cooperative and more interested in adopting new practices than others; and the UNODC project staff made great efforts to include all beneficiary agencies at all times, individualising the approach in each case.

It was very difficult to get a systematic assessment of the spread of engagement and progress across the beneficiary agencies, in the absence of systematic historical or current data relevant to this point. Discussions with project staff suggest that there was a good spread of involvement and progress at least across the four project countries (12 agencies), exceeding the implied minimum target of at least one agency per country; this was validated by the overall impression of the co-evaluator, who had some extensive knowledge of the project during part of the implementation period although she was not directly involved in it. However, it was not possible to corroborate this information further.

- application a) in particular to *transnational narcotics trafficking* and b) more generally to *other organised crimes*

Most of the narcotics cases relevant to F23 and dealt with by the agencies were in fact transnational, and representatives from two of the agencies reported that they were actively using the software for

non-narcotics cases²³. So project influence was broader than the minimum area of operations implied in the project documentation.

- increased exchange of intelligence between agencies *within* one country and *between* countries

There are several well-known and understandable disincentives to sharing information. Probably the best single route for promotion for personnel is to solve an important case, so even individuals within the same agency may not want to share intelligence if they think they can finish it on their own. Similarly, one agency within a country may sometimes prefer to try to complete a case on its own than share intelligence with another agency. Also, agencies within one country obviously have different profiles; there is a certain amount of rivalry and one agency may not see that another has the right competences to add value to solving a case. Finally, sharing information is not always desirable or appropriate and may have negative consequences – in particular, it increases the chance of a leak, either because information channels are technically compromised or because personnel are not trustworthy. For example, an anticorruption agency might be well advised not to share its information as they might involve future targets within the same government. This fear is particularly strong with respect to exchanging intelligence between countries.

The F23 project worked to facilitate information exchange on several levels. In Uzbekistan, F23 had a particularly positive impact on cooperation between the agencies, linking also with the UNODC K22 project on border control. Secure communication was possible using the Intellect software provided by F23. Within Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, some of the agencies were part of a country-specific internal network with the support of F23, and Kazakhstan was also hoping to install such a network.

Exchange of live intelligence between countries remains an area with considerable potential but also the most work still to do. CARICC is seen as the channel through which this exchange should take place. However, this is still a slow process. The main reasons for restricted performance are connected to national and international regulations and agreements; individual member states are held back by the challenge of differing national legislation; they take the risks of intelligence exchange very seriously. Member States do see the need for and benefits from regional cooperation.

On average, CARICC facilitates intra-country information exchanges about once a week through the liaison officers²⁴, as physical letters delivered in a diplomatic bag. Using formal channels, it can take up to two months for the requested data to return. CARICC has developed a proposal for an extension of the i2 software which would enable limited sharing of specific pieces of information between partners but it would cost several hundred thousand dollars and would still be subject to a multilateral information exchange framework agreement being signed by all parties. There is a multilateral agreement which has been drafted that still has not been signed, even though it is only a framework agreement which does not tie the partners to actually sharing any information. An alternative is to use the Interpol system i.e. de-classifying information before sharing.

Apart from facilitating exchange of intelligence, CARICC also provides many useful strategic analyses although these are still not comprehensive, for example Uzbekistan is not properly included.

²³ This claim, though quite plausible, is difficult to verify.


²⁴ The liaison officers are situated in CARICC and the salaries are paid by UNODC

Gender

The gender balance amongst analysts is still quite poor, and a few respondents expressed the opinion that law enforcement is a generally a more challenging environment for women mainly due to night work and travel requirements; however, these challenges apply less to the specific role of analyst which was therefore seen as being a role which it is easier for a woman to conduct in the four evaluated countries.

Gender-specific records were not held for the training courses. However, a retrospective calculation was made by the evaluation team for the courses and expert meetings for 2012-2017, using the names of the trainees to determine gender, which suggests that about 10-11% of participants were women, with some improvement in 2017.

Figure 4. Percentage of women on F23 training courses, by year



It was difficult for F23 to influence selection of participants - the invitations to attend the project events were sent through the MFAs to the agencies. They were verbally encouraged by F23 to involve more women, an encouragement which is recommended to also be made in writing.

Awareness programmes and expert pairings

Were comprehensive awareness programmes conducted amongst operational staff to ensure full understanding of intelligence-led law enforcement, its requirements and its benefits; - did they help?

Was an international expert 'team'/pairing established to mentor and provide skills transfer in situ with beneficiaries and on a rolling basis amongst them?

These evaluation questions follow up a corresponding recommendation from the 2012 mid-term evaluation.

The answer to the question on awareness raising is *yes*, according to both internal records and interviews. Awareness-raising on modern intelligence work was seen as key not only for staff but also for management. It contributed to the mainstreaming of “the F23 approach” which occurred across many of the agencies.

Both peer-to-peer and on-the-job training from experts from the region was held (see Table 5) in limited numbers and this was judged by agency respondents as having been very useful. Expert/team pairs were established in Tajikistan (DCA), Kyrgyzstan (MOI) and Uzbekistan (National Center), as well as at CARICC.

Most F23 on-the-job (or “on spot”) trainings were provided at the initial time of software installation and creation of the data base, which was mostly in 2007 -2010. The on-the-job trainings were provided mostly if special support was required on a specific case and the agency permitted outside experts to view the data. As soon as the agencies started working with the data base and it contained confidential information, they mostly received support remotely.

Project management

The project management had to carry out a demanding task with relatively sparse resources (both the international Project Coordinator and the regional Project Manager also had roles in other projects). The project management was judged as above average in efficiency, meeting deadlines effectively. Most difficulties were attributed to the new UN-wide Umoja system, see p. 14. There was no project officer position in each country, and this was mentioned as a weakness by some respondents. Stronger project staff presence in the participating countries could have helped with speeding up exchange of information and could also have helped to identify specific training and support needs more rapidly, and could have assisted in selecting trainees.

There is scope to further reduce the amount of travel using webinars and other online possibilities. However internet access is problematic in some agencies, and most respondents would not want to reduce the amount of personal contact much further, as face-to-face contacts were seen as being particularly important in the region.

As previously mentioned, there was no systematic monitoring framework; the monitoring system, such as it was, was not really fit for purpose. The project annual reports did report to the indicators provided in the logframe. Baselines were provided except at Objective level. However as mentioned on pp. 3 ff., some of the indicators were problematic and many were not SMART. Although there were some detailed narrative reports, there was no monitoring framework or database to track the key indicators over time. Post-training questionnaires were used after training courses (and these show a very good level of satisfaction with the courses) but pre-tests were not used to compare pre-test and post-test performance. Results were recorded in individual files. There seems to have been little expert input to ensure logical consistency and quality of the logical framework and associated documentation; only the Strategic Planning and Inter-Agency Affairs Unit (SPIA) at HQ is involved in quality assurance.

Sustainable Development Goals

Envisaged UNODC contributions to the SDGs were outlined in the relevant corporate document²⁵. Narcotics interdiction should plausibly contribute to SDG 3.5 “strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse”. (Further discussion of the effectiveness of an enforcement / interdiction approach as opposed to contrasting approaches like harm reduction is beyond the scope of this evaluation.) The project also plausibly²⁶ contributed to SDG 10, as drug-related profiteering is a significant cause of inequality in Central Asia. More effective and more evidence-based prosecutions also means progress on SDG 16, „promote peaceful and inclusive societies ... Access to justice for all“, and specifically, TARGET 16.A – “Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime”. F23 was part of UNODC support to Member States to reach the Targets under SDG 16 by improving criminal intelligence analysis and information management capacities, and further develop mechanisms for collection, evaluation, exchange and dissemination of information between drug control agencies in the Central Asian region.

The findings in the Relevance and Effectiveness sections above provide support for the plausibility of these contributions to the SDGs.

Summary of findings on Effectiveness

It was a challenge for this evaluation to try to quantify progress on the three Outcomes. What can be ascertained is that the F23 training approach reached a certain level of maturity and was delivering good results in all three outcome areas, especially the first two. Analysts were more in a position to use the skills and capabilities they acquired through the project in their daily work. The approach propagated by F23 became a central part of law enforcement operations in some if not all agencies. “Rotation” of trained staff into other positions did happen to a considerable extent but with advantages for agencies as well as disadvantages. Summarising the progress on Outcomes, the project certainly reached the essential standards of progress implied in the logical framework (see p. 3) and also showed some additional successes. Turning to gender-specific effectiveness, the gender balance amongst analysts was quite poor. Gender-specific records were not held for the training courses. About 10% of participants were women, something which it was difficult for F23 to influence; there was some improvement in 2017, when the percentage increased to about 16%. Following recommendations of the mid-term evaluation, awareness-raising was conducted for staff and also for management and was successful in helping to mainstream the F23 approach in many agencies. Expert mentoring was also carried out, but only to a limited extent; it was well received but relatively expensive.

The project management succeeded in a demanding task with relatively sparse resources. However, the project monitoring system, such as it was, was not really fit for purpose. The logframe items, indicators, baselines and targets often did not match up with one another and many were not SMART.

Finally, the project made plausible contributions to the SDGs and target 16.A in particular. There was no evidence of a substantial contribution to gender-specific SDGs.

²⁵ https://www.unodc.org/documents/SDGs/UNODC-SDG_brochure_LORES.pdf

²⁶ There is no hard evidence for or against any of the points in this section. Complex research designs would be required to gather such evidence. The evaluation team only points out which connections are *plausible*.

Impact

Evaluation questions:

To what extent has the anticipated impact been reached by the project?

Have there been any positive or negative unintended results?

Any consequences on women and men differently? Any consequences for human rights?

The project documentation did not use the word “impact” when setting out the project vision. However the “Expected Accomplishment” could be construed as impact: “1 (b) Member States are equipped to take effective action against transnational organized crime, including: drug trafficking; money-laundering; trafficking in persons; smuggling of migrants; illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms; and emerging policy issues as mentioned in General Assembly resolution 64/179”.

It is difficult to formally establish impact on drug trafficking per se. Possible indicators include number of seizures, street and wholesale prices of narcotics and so on. However all of these are problematic in their own way, quite apart from the fact that assessing the contribution of a small project like F23 to changes at this level is almost impossible.

However it is possible to affirm that the project plausibly contributed to improved, evidence-based prosecutions: one national agency said they have disrupted the work of four transnational groups at least partially with the help of F23 and the i2 software, with 41 cases of groups of individuals brought to trial; another said that i2 had helped provide evidence in several hundred cases since 2012. So the responsible officers in two relevant agencies in two of the four evaluated countries reported a substantial impact. In comparison with the narrative from the mid-term evaluation report, it seems likely that more narcotics prosecutions were being brought with the help of F23, using a better standard of evidence.

There is also evidence for additional positive impact in several thematic areas close to the project which were not specifically anticipated. For example, F23 contributed to the Afghanistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan “Initiative AKT²⁷”.

F23 support to CARICC leveraged the reach of that organisation, such as a substantial number of relevant publications (more than a thousand info bulletins in the last ten years), 39 bilateral or multilateral operations in the last ten years, as well as CARICC staff conducting trainings in the region and beyond.

The tendency towards more sustainable training models included moving some of the training expertise in-house through train-the-trainer initiatives. Teaching and training a subject was also a useful exercise for staff because it also helped them improve their own expertise.

Before being included in a training course or other F23 initiative, candidates were subject to vetting via the US State Department. This was important for at least two reasons – first, analysts could become involved who were passively connected to criminal networks and for this reason did not

²⁷ “The Afghanistan-KyrgyzstanTajikistan (AKT) Initiative is aimed at strengthening cross-border cooperation in law enforcement and legal matters between these countries at the starting point of the Northern Route for trafficking narcotics from Afghanistan.” Source:
https://www.unodc.org/documents/rpanc/RP_Success_Stories_distribution.pdf

pursue some targets, reducing project effectiveness. Second, analysts could be actively involved in criminal activity and could use insider knowledge of intelligence procedures to criminal ends.

More fundamentally, the kind of approach and the hardware and software provided by F23 was in principle suited to controlling and suppressing not only criminal activity but also legal and illegal opposition groups – this technical possibility was confirmed in principle by interviewees; there is no evidence that this might be happening, but also no way to be sure that it is not. See p. 31.

Support for CARICC ; integration of Customs Administrations

These evaluation topics follow up on specific recommendations from the 2012 mid-term evaluation.

Project documentation and interviews show that F23 had continued support of CARICC, specifically through activity 3.2.1, which envisaged regular expert meetings together with CARICC, working on a collective strategy and implementation for sustainable information exchange channels in the region, mostly via CARICC itself; and also more generally through its operational assistance for national law enforcement in the region. Interview with beneficiary agencies and CARICC staff confirm that F23 was seen as being a key partner by CARICC, with considerable influence but a fairly modest budget line. However, the longer-range effectiveness of this support depends on the effectiveness of CARICC itself which is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

Respondents suggest that the sustainability of CARICC is likely to continue to be dependent on international support. There is a costed work plan for the activities of CARICC, and the F23 project was supposed to work towards its sustainability, but only Kazakhstan contributed a small amount as a voluntary contribution. A vision for CARICC, with a clear business model, outcomes and progress indicators, for both the coordination and intelligence-sharing functions, is a challenge which can be at least partly addressed by the new Programme for Central Asia.

Greater interaction with customs services (and also with border services) was a logical step for F23. However, these services have very different needs and ways of working and already have their own databases which are less focused on criminal intelligence. Most seizures are not made at official border crossing points where customs agencies are situated, so interaction with state border services is important too. F23 recognised that a “one-size-fits-all” approach of simply promoting the i2 software did not work. To at least some extent, F23 in collaboration with other agencies managed to promote a tailored approach which was most successful in Uzbekistan and to a lesser extent in Tajikistan. Through the K22 BLO project, F23 was able to work together with Boarder Liaison Officers who provided an interface between customs and State Border Services.

Summary of findings on Impact

The project plausibly contributed to a larger number of more evidence-based prosecutions, which was a significant achievement. There were some positive results in neighbouring thematic areas which were not directly intended. It is not possible to exclude some negative effects on human rights. F23 continued its valued support for CARICC, which continues to play an important role. There was some gradual progress in including Customs Administrations more formally but this still differs from country to country

Sustainability

Evaluation questions:

What measures are in place to ensure future maintenance and repair of the facilities and equipment provided?

To what extent are project interventions and impact sustainable in the longer term, say 3-10 years?

Were there continued efforts to secure high level and donor support by UNODC, partners and beneficiary agencies.

How much donor visibility was there?

Were efforts made by beneficiaries for self-funding? Was there direct outreach to potential donors?

Computer hardware was a key part of the F23 approach, so its sustainability is crucial to the sustainability of project outcomes in relation to future similar projects in the region. An additional question arising from the mid-term evaluation (see Annex on p. 76) was whether necessary IT updates were fulfilled by use of replaced UNODC equipment and renewed donor funding.

Stakeholders expressed puzzlement at the question on IT updates, because surplus UNODC hardware was not judged to be more advanced than agency hardware over the hardware lifecycle of the project. F23 provided hardware updates when necessary, involving all of the project countries in the last 12-24 months. Hardware updates were also provided from different sources including other UNODC projects. Interviews revealed that there was no specific systematic approach to future maintenance and repair on the part of the agencies, as each agency received tailored support in varying timeframes and hardware would become outdated at different times. This is probably the most cost-effective approach. It is difficult to be sure what would happen in the absence of further support from F23 or similar projects when hardware needs replacing.

As far as sustainability of staff skills is concerned, many agencies said in interview that they follow a sustainability procedure according to which when staff leave a unit, their replacement is trained in equivalent skills (this means in particular, skills relevant to the F23 project). This training is conducted either by the person leaving or by other analysts; this would contribute significantly to sustainability of skills.

Within all the project countries F23 helped improve institutional memory; people within the agencies left, but the long-term partnership with F23 helped reduce the risk that working practices introduced with the support of the F23 project might be forgotten. The project countries' motivation to institutionalise elements of the F23 approach is, according to respondents, probably increasing as the benefits of the approach become more apparent. Individual staff were on the whole motivated to learn the skills which F23 brought and there were rewards for proficiency – not only promotion but in some cases medals and awards. Most respondents said that internal motivation was increasing throughout the life of the project.

It should however not be forgotten that, as mentioned above, the national Ministries were really substantial supporters of project implementation, as they do already provide staff, administrative support, premises, running costs etc.

Study visits, even to peer countries, can provide motivation by illustrating potential successes and the benefits of successful operations. The regional meetings can also be helpful in building this kind of shared vision as well as being a useful forum for keeping up with new developments.

The sustainability of the F23 approach really depends on national ministries being convinced that it benefits them.

Sustainability of training model

An additional question arising from the mid-term evaluation was whether staff recruitment, rotation and retention issues were addressed with beneficiary agencies. Many respondents spontaneously expressed the opinion that the training model was successful and was ripe to transition to a more sustainable model with much greater ownership nationally and regionally. External respondents agreed with the suggestion that there is room for more systematic work on training curricula and support on how to integrate them into existing national and agency-level training, even though the details would certainly look different from agency to agency. At least one agency already developed their own manual for the software with approval from the Ministry of the Interior and nominated their own trainers, with the aim to integrate the material within the IT program at the police academy.

Thanks to F23 and the Train the Trainer component, there is now a significant pool of higher-level trainers who can form the core of training sustainability, perhaps moderated by CARICC. Trainers from the region are valuable, as they know situation on the ground. However there will still be a need for technical input, via similar inputs to those provided by F23, on more advanced issues, newer developments, etc.; to some extent CARICC can and does fulfil this function but the UNODC Programme for Central Asia could also help coordinate the provision of these inputs.

F23 management did not get involved directly with HR issues such as recruitment and rotation at the agencies because their understanding was that there was very little that could be done, due to agency policies, and outside the remit of F23. The beneficiary agencies themselves were aware of these issues. Interviewees pointed out that the solution may not be to try to stop rotation, as it does have the benefit of spreading awareness and expertise throughout each agency, (staff trained in the i2 software and ways of working may go on to make net contributions to other projects). In fact it would be difficult to track individuals within organisations as they might see this as threatening and a problem of role confusion. However this does mean that it was more difficult for F23 management to keep a track of key project outcomes.

Funding

The funding situation overall in the region is problematic, with an overall decrease in donor support for this type of intervention in the last few years in spite the continuing need. The range of potential donors is very limited.

Kazakhstan is now rated as an upper middle income economy and an emerging donor²⁸, but the other project countries are all lower-income²⁹ so are more dependent on continued support from international agencies.

²⁸

http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html#Upper_middle_income

²⁹

There have been efforts on the part of UNODC to secure donor support in-country for continued support for the F23 model and also to engage donors for CARICC, which is extremely aware of the need for sustainability and the threat of gradually decreasing funding. The beneficiary agencies felt less responsibility for funding of the project itself, but were active in securing related and complementary inputs such as equipment from other sources in the context of other projects. They did approach UNODC with ideas and requests for sensible additions and extensions such as installing VPNs to interconnect their internal regions and agencies.

There was little donor visibility. INL was sometimes visible at some meetings and events. However there was some considerable visibility for UNODC in the sense that all stakeholders (including CSOs) were aware of UNODC and F23.

Future developments

Government agencies expressed in interview that they are very concerned about new and emerging threats and issues, not only in terms of the linkages to narcotics trafficking but also as criminal developments in their own right, and elements of this concern also appear in National Strategic Plans. Key issues named by them and through literature review include:

- New encrypted communication applications e.g. WhatsApp.
- Dark Net
- New psychoactive substances
- Money laundering, offshore
- Online purchasing of illegal drugs
- Support for terrorism
- Cybercrime
- E-wallets, Bitcoin and similar currencies, Blockchain

Some of these issues are already addressed by UNODC regionally and globally but agencies were specific in wanting to see them linked more closely to the F23 approach and the i2 software. Probably the most significant development is the first one. Some of the work of the agencies is based on telephone analysis but many criminal groups have moved to applications like WhatsApp with encrypted messaging. This transition is not complete yet – so ordinary telephone analysis is still very useful – but the trend is clear. This shift does not in any way invalidate the overall approach, as i2 software and ways of working applies just as much to other flows such as financial. The shift to encrypted communication increases the importance of physically seizing telephones from which communications can then be accessed.

Heroin addiction amongst national populations is seen as a declining problem; existing and new users are moving to marijuana and other drugs as it is difficult to find opiates. Young people are reported to be increasingly interested in religion and sport as well as turning to other drugs, but on the other hand they may underestimate the risk of these other drugs. There is low but increasing use of synthetic drugs; a particular danger is the easy availability of Ephedra which grows wild across the whole region³⁰.

http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html#Low_income

³⁰ „Trends in drug trafficking in Central Asia and Southern Caucasus, Nov 17, UNODC

https://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Illicit%20Drug%20Trends_Central%20Asia-

Summary of findings on Sustainability

It is highly likely that most agencies would continue with the use of i2 and intelligence-led policing within each country even in the absence of similar support; however, regional cooperation, mutual support in training etc, would be less likely to sustain. The training model was on the verge of becoming sustainable. The funding situation was problematic, even though UNODC made strong efforts to secure further funding. The agencies were able to secure indirect support from other donors, e.g. sharing equipment provided by other projects. UNODC, but not to the same extent the main donor (INL), had quite high visibility amongst the beneficiaries. Hardware updates were partially provided from F23 and other sources but not from replaced UNODC equipment as this was not judged a satisfactory solution. Recruitment, rotation and retention were taken seriously by the agencies, but were largely outside the remit of F23. Rotation was seen by the agencies not only as a threat but also an opportunity and a way of increasing project impact in new areas. All actors and especially government agencies were very aware of the rapid developments taking place and repeatedly asked for support with them.

Human Rights & Gender Equality

Evaluation questions:

To what extent are human rights considerations included in the project development and implementation?

To what extent are gender considerations included in the project development and implementation?

Is gender-disaggregated data available?

To what extent did the project intervention contribute to fulfilment of the National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security?

To what extent did the project intervention contribute to introduction and implementation of measures aimed at increasing women and minority representation in the police?

Human Rights

Human rights issues were not explicitly included in project design, training materials, or in the way the F23 approach was to be implemented; this is also evidenced by the fact that beneficiary agencies never mentioned human rights or gender issues in interview without prompting. Yet there are human rights issues which could well be addressed. For example, one agency said that there was no problem that their database is accredited with respect to personal data protection because it is “only used on suspects”. The possibility of threats to human rights is underlined reading the Kazakhstan National Development Plan, which explicitly discusses the possibility of reintroducing capital punishment for narcotics trafficking³¹. So there are issues on which approaches like F23 could be adapted to provide more input on human rights.

final.pdf

³¹ “Combating narcomania and narcobusiness. We have to toughen penalties for import and spread of drugs, we should launch a discussion in the society - whether it is expedient to introduce capital punishment for that offence as is common in a number of countries including Malaysia and Singapore. Drugs are an altogether particular and destructive threat and it is quite a problem to what extent principles of humanism may be applicable here. In fact, on one scale we have the life of the man who imports and spreads drugs while on the other we see several lives ruined through the fault of that man.”

On the other hand, and more substantially, the F23 project was having a positive impact on this same human rights context, by increasing the extent to which prosecutions were based on evidence rather than, for example, confessions made under duress – see p. 26.

The F23 project aimed to follow UN best practices on conflicts of interest and abuse of power. Staff undertook mandatory training to heighten their awareness. Procurement was done centrally through the Uzbekistan office, translators were taken from the UNDP roster and there were thresholds for suppliers. To mitigate actual corruption, all participants for training were vetted by the US government via INL.

Gender Equality

Gender equality issues were not explicitly included in project design, training materials, or in the way the F23 approach was implemented. The words “gender”, “female” and “women” were not mentioned anywhere in the annual reports or project revisions, except that the job profile for the International Project Coordinator attached to the latest revision mentions “Takes responsibility for incorporating gender perspectives and ensuring the equal participation of women and men in all areas of work.” As with human rights, respondents could not mention areas in which F23 had taken an approach which took gender into consideration. This is likely to be different with the new Programme for Central Asia, in which “Human rights and gender sensitivity will be embedded in all elements of the programme”, further in line with the general approach at UNODC with the mainstreaming of gender equality and human rights into all projects and programmes.

But, as with human rights, the evaluation confirmed the need for a gender-sensitive approach. Female employment in law enforcement is traditionally low in Central Asia³². The number of women was reported to be increasing in many of the relevant agencies but mostly in lower-level and clerical jobs, though there are also some women in the analytical posts where barriers to employment may be lower.

Gender disaggregated data was not collected as a matter of course in F23 documentation but could be reconstructed from names of attendees. The issue of the gender balance of trainees is further addressed on p. 23. There were no direct contributions to fulfilling Resolution 1325 or women and minority representation in the police. F23 did try to make sure that women are nominated for training courses.

Summary of findings on Human Rights & Gender Equality

The F23 project design did not specifically address gender or human rights considerations. However, the project most likely had a very positive impact on human rights by increasing the role, availability and value of evidence in the anti-narcotics process, supporting the rule of law. There might also be negative impacts in terms of enabling increased suppression of opposition groups but there is no evidence that this actually happens. There is some evidence that the human rights implications (data protection etc) needed to be made clearer in the training courses. Around 10% of trainees were women, a ratio which is typical for law enforcement in Central Asia. Gender

Source: The Strategy «Kazakhstan 2030», pp 21-22, undated. Published on The General prosecutor's office of the Republic of Kazakhstan (<http://prokuror.gov.kz>). URL: <http://prokuror.gov.kz/eng/printpdf/417>

³² <http://www.ocamagazine.com/kyrgyzstan-seeks-gender-balance-in-law-enforcement>;
https://www.rferl.org/a/Do_Central_Asias_Gender_Quotas_Help_Or_Hurt_Women/1977535.html.
Respondents also agreed that the ratio is, very roughly, 10%.

disaggregated data was not regularly collected. F23 made no direct contributions to fulfilling Resolution 1325 or to the percentage of women and minority representation in the police.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The project continues to be highly relevant to the changing situation on narcotics trafficking in Central Asia, from the perspective both of national governments and the international community. F23 fulfilled a need for outside expertise which on the whole the national governments could not have provided without support. The project made considerable effort to respect the individual situation and needs of each beneficiary agency.

Looking back at the mid-term evaluation report, it is clear that the 2012-17 phase of the project was able to build on and expand the groundwork done in the first phase. It did not merely maintain a minimum level of capacity in each agency but on the contrary began to reap the benefits in terms of actual use of that capacity to facilitate evidence-based prosecutions.

Achievement of outputs approximately followed the project plans, although already in 2012 the geographical scope of the project had to be restricted to just the four evaluated countries. Project activities were cost-effective ways of achieving outcomes.

With respect to the minimum achievement criteria implied in the logical framework, see p.3, the project can be judged to have been extremely effective, and also added a lot of additional value along additional success dimensions such as including several agencies within each country and helping to improve interaction between them. To a lesser extent it managed to contribute to cross-border exchange of intelligence but there is still a lot of work to be done on that issue, some of which is beyond the remit of F23.

Project support for CARICC contributed to very important regional networking.

Training components have reached a certain level of maturity and national agencies are beginning to take over responsibility for them, with some material being included in basic material for Police Academy trainings.

While some of the recommendations from the mid-term evaluation report were taken into account, more work could have been done to revisit them. In particular, in-house training, train-the-trainer and peer-to-peer training were efficient, effective and valued by partners but due mainly to funding restrictions were not used as much as suggested in the mid-term evaluation report.

The project logical framework as formulated in the project document and revisions is perhaps its weakest point. The project management did have an implicit set of aims and a model of how the activities provided might lead to them, but it requires some work and a detailed reading of the project documents to really understand these.

An explicit concern for gender and human rights considerations were missing from the project, and there were good reasons to include them even though they involve forces beyond the control of the project – firstly, the employment situation of women within the beneficiary agencies, and second, the human rights implications of collection and storage of personal data in the light of the

regulations in each country. On the other hand, the project probably had a very significant positive impact on human rights in terms of increasing the amount and quality of evidence in narcotics prosecutions.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations are largely interlinked but have been grouped under the following headings. As the F23 project has now ended, **all recommendations are directed to the UNODC Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia and staff responsible for the implementation of the successor activities to F23.**

Continue with approach implemented by the project

The approach employed by F23 can overall be judged relevant, efficient and effective. The project certainly reached the essential standards of progress implied in the logical framework and also showed additional successes on a number of other areas.

The key features (flexible provision of software, hardware and training, support for links between agencies, longer-term partnership with agencies, etc.) should be continued as part of the new Programme for Central Asia.

Revisiting recommendations from mid-term evaluation in 2012

Much progress was made with respect to the recommendations from the mid-term evaluation report – on expert/analyst training, trainer-training, in-house training, use of OSINT, databases and the holding of awareness sessions for key staff; subject to funding limitations. However they remain valid and most still need continued work.

The following recommendations are therefore made:

- Increase use of expert/analyst pairings, trainer-training, and in-house training, with sparing use of trainers from outside the region and increased use of trainers from inside the region.
- Increase use of open-source intelligence (OSINT).
- Continue to expand type of databases beyond telephone data.

While awareness-raising sessions have been held within individual agencies as recommended in the mid-term evaluation, there could still be additional benefit from organising a special meeting for high-level staff (preferably deputy heads of Agencies), at which they could see the actual benefits of the F23 approach and could discuss the way forward not only within their countries, but also within the region.

Sustainability of expertise; benchmarking

There is a lack of concrete evidence of training effectiveness apart from satisfaction surveys, and no systematic way to formulate, assess or certify required skills and knowledge within or between agencies or countries. Given the continued need to anchor expertise within the region, and the fact

that agencies, with reservations, are interested in cooperation on regional standards and are more intrinsically motivated and persuaded of the benefits of the project model, there is perhaps a better environment for relaunching the idea of regional standards and a benchmarking exercise as recommended in the mid-term evaluation report.

It is therefore recommended that a benchmarking exercise, possibly managed by CARICC, be conducted. This would start by identifying which F23-relevant analyst skills and equipment specifications could be specified as minimum requirements, and which need to be left to differ between agencies and between countries. Then training and equipment provision could be linked to these identified standards, with better target-setting, evaluation and scoring for training, and with the option to link to national training curricula and academies. Support could be provided to individual countries to implement their own training to these standards, and also mid-level and advanced areas of work could be defined where outside help is needed. Additionally, UNODC could suggest to the Member States that one leading agency within each country could be selected as a country-level "best practice" agency, with support to reach a specified minimum standard of excellence; UNODC could further support this process. More details on this recommendation are provided on p 99.

Logical Framework and Monitoring

The project logical framework as formulated in the project document and revisions is logically inconsistent and lacks SMART formulation. No systematic monitoring database of indicator scores (e.g. staff scores on a standardised skills test; prosecutions brought, etc) was kept or updated at regular intervals over the life of the project.

It is therefore recommended that a concise and realistic logical framework is developed as the elements of F23 which interfaces with the minimum standards, above, and satisfies usual standards of evaluability and logical consistency, formulated in a SMART way and used for real-time project monitoring. Key outcomes need to be defined in a way which takes into account that the environment is changing even without the influence of the project. More details on this recommendation are provided on p 98.

Emerging challenges

There are many important emerging threats such as the use of encrypted messaging by criminal groups which seriously challenge the ability of agencies to respond to them, and the project's procedures for dealing with these threats are not as fast as agencies desire. Yet the currently emerging challenges are so substantial that they cannot be considered merely optional extras. These kinds of developments are happening so quickly and changing the landscape that the project is currently struggling to support agencies fast enough.

It is therefore recommended that project / programme management find a way to identify and address such issues in real time rather than over a period of years. Very frequent support from expertise outside the region will also be necessary for this, and there is scope for learning from "intermediate" countries such as Eastern and South-Eastern European countries. Key issues include:

New encrypted communication applications e.g. WhatsApp.

Dark Net

New psychoactive substances
Money laundering, offshore
Online purchasing of illegal drugs
Support for terrorism
Cybercrime
E-wallets, Bitcoin and similar currencies, Blockchain

Human rights

Use of software and techniques provided and supported by F23 have some potential human rights implications (data protection etc) which are not dealt with thoroughly enough in the training courses; and the agencies are just beginning to come to terms with the ramifications of personal data protection, whether or not covered by corresponding national regulations and certification procedures.

It is therefore recommended that training inputs are improved to strengthen their highlighting of human rights issues and that agencies are encouraged to work together on possible solutions; this should also involve components from other parts of the new Programme for Central Asia.

Gender equality

The project needs to do better on gender issues: the gender balance amongst analysts could be improved; gender is not specifically addressed in project design or training materials. Gender-specific records were not held for the training courses.

It is therefore recommended that project/programme management should conduct an analysis of the employment environment in law enforcement – hindrances and enablers - related to gender, with special focus on the post of analyst, also considering disadvantaged regional groups within each country. Management should maintain gender-disaggregated data for training and expert meetings. Consider also modelling an inclusive approach in project implementation: identifying and working with key (female) individuals / champions who could act as change agents, at least one within each country and one at regional level. A similar approach could be used with human rights, identifying human rights change agents.

Personnel

Covering all the project countries and a growing number of beneficiary agencies is a challenge for centrally-based staff, and makes it difficult to maintain a close relationship with the agencies, for example to assist with and monitor selection of staff for training.

It is therefore recommended, under the new Programme for Central Asia, to allocate a cost-share part of a National Officer post to ensure smooth and rapid relations within each country and with each agency.

National integration

There is a lot of scope for, and interest in, deepening integration between agencies within countries, including customs and border control, and some good progress was made in Tajikistan and also

Uzbekistan. Deepening this integration could be relatively cost-effective as much expertise is already in place; support for encrypted data transfer may be an issue.

It is therefore recommended that project/programme management continues to support deepening links between agencies in the same country, especially including customs and border control and including support to secure communication channels.

V. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

1. What are the lessons learnt from the completed “Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and exchange” project?
2. What are the best practices that could be applied in the future activities and similar projects?
3. What are the necessary adjustments to the UNODC interventions in the region within the undergoing UNOD Programme for Central Asian States 2015-2019?

A notable best practice in the F23 project is was the exemplary long-term and individualised approach which accompanied national partners in a difficult context over more than one and a half decades. Patient and persistent help with applying the project model led to a major shift in the sense that agencies now see the benefits themselves and are motivated to continue the approach.

Applying a similar approach on software and skills across agencies helped support vital coherence within agencies as well as within and between countries. This approach should be continued within the new Programme for Central Asia.

The integration of the project approach into a broader program at this stage provides many potential benefits. For example joint steering committees, planned within the Programme, are not only about doing more with less, but should continue to deepen the existing links with other projects.

Good integration between different projects within UNODC led to learning taking place between projects, e.g. on how to organise training courses.

Recent simulated international cooperation exercises³³ were a useful learning experience for national partners and highlighted legal problems which are now being addressed.

Hands-on training inputs proved effective and were judged by trainees to be particularly relevant to their needs: they were held both “on-the-spot”, which proved useful to improve integration in actual workflows, especially in initial project phases, and also at venues remote from the actual workplace, which were valued because they shield trainees from day-to-day distractions.

The support to expert meetings, alongside training and equipment, helped sponsor a core of key personnel with advanced level of expertise within the region, mainly but not only based at CARICC.

³³ Held during regional workshops on Promoting regional cooperation in Control Delivery and Joint Investigative Teams

ANNEX I. Terms of Reference of the Evaluation

Background and Context

Project number:	RERF23
Project title:	Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and exchange
Duration:	November 2001 – June 2017
Location:	Central Asian States, Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
Linkages to Country, Regional and Thematic Programmes:	UNODC Programme for Central Asia 2015-2019: a partnership Framework for impact related action in Central Asia, Sub-programme 1: 1. Countering Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking 1. (b) Member States are equipped to take effective action against transnational organized crime, including: drug trafficking; money laundering; trafficking in persons; smuggling of migrants; illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms; and emerging policy issues as mentioned in General Assembly resolution 64/179
Executing Agency:	UNODC ROCA
Partner Organizations:	N/A
Total Approved Budget:	\$6,333,630
Total Overall Budget	\$8,016,445
Donors:	Austria, Italy, Canada, France, Norway, Turkey, UNDP, United Kingdom and United States of America ³⁴
Project Coordinator:	Ms. Amelia Hannaford
Type and time frame of evaluation: (Independent Project Evaluation/In-depth Evaluation/mid-term/final)	Final Independent Project Evaluation, 28 August 2017- 31 December 2017
Timeframe of the project covered by the evaluation:	June 2012 – end of field mission (tentative: June 2017)
Geographical coverage of the evaluation:	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
Budget for this evaluation:	\$50,000
Type and year of past evaluations:	UNODC thematic evaluation of the project was conducted in December 2006;

	UNODC mid-term Independent Project Evaluation 2012
Core Learning Partners ³⁵ (entities):	Ministry of Interior of Kyrgyzstan Republic, Republic of Kazakhstan and Republic of Tajikistan, Drug Control Agency of Tajikistan (Analytical units/departments); CARICC Almaty, Kazakhstan, INL USA Embassies in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan

Project overview and historical context

The project's objectives are to provide "a coherent and comprehensive system for intelligence, and information collection, analysis and exchange is established".

The project area of responsibility includes the five Central Asian countries Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as well as Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.

Combating illicit drug trafficking requires well-organized systems of information/data collection, processing and analysis, as well as the exchange of the final information product among agencies involved at national and regional levels.

Project F23 has improved criminal intelligence analysis and information management capacities, and further developed mechanisms for collection, evaluation, exchange and dissemination of information between drug control agencies in the Central Asian region, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. However, the need to further develop a more sophisticated and proper mechanism for the collection, storage, exchange and analysis of information is required to fight against illicit drugs related problem in support to ongoing law enforcement investigations and has been set as one of the priorities for the continuation of F23 project's activities fully supported by the attending countries.

At present, counter narcotic agencies, cooperating within the frame of project F23, collect information and data in accordance with local requirements and needs.

The F23 "project philosophy" is to teach *similar* working methodologies and using *same* analysis software and database structures for the law enforcement analysts within the participating countries. Such approach will stimulate national and regional cooperation between agencies and encourage the sharing of information and analytical products between Intelligence analysts from participating countries.

The project has installed modern intelligence systems and i2 analysis software in 18 counter narcotic agencies in the project area. Approximately 400 officers have been trained in crime analysis techniques at various levels. All relevant agencies have analysts working with i2 software who are able to create analytical reports and visualization charts in support of criminal investigations and operational activities.

It is necessary to continue developing a sustainable data and information collection capacity and root the Intelligence Led Policing implementation focusing on criminal intelligence analysis and information processing at counter narcotic Intel units. This exercise should also aim to identify priorities and a sound information gathering strategy for drug law enforcement bodies in each country. National drug agencies will be assisted in developing their information sharing and exchange system suitable to their objectives in combating illicit drug trafficking.

Main challenges during implementation

The main government counterparts have shown commitment to the project and generally provide support towards implementation of project activities. The project team is able to have regular meetings and consultations with project beneficiaries to ensure proper implementation.

Project implementation is monitored by a Coordination experts meetings consisting of representatives of project beneficiaries, other state bodies, donors and international organizations working in the field of intelligence analysis.

The availability of accurate and timely statistical data on patterns and trends of crime is an essential prerequisite for the development of effective crime prevention policies.

Afghanistan remains the main global opium producer with a crop yield of some 4,800 tons, compared to 3,300 tons in 2015 (+43%). Furthermore, Central Asia countries are used as major transit routes for drug trafficking on the so-called Northern Route. The situation in northern Afghanistan remains unpredictable, as there is a big concentration of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also commonly referred to as ISIS) very close to the Central Asian border, which might lead to an increase in the drugs flow from Afghanistan.

More than ever before, the stakeholders in the Central Asia regions recognize the need and importance of expanding the efforts to address the complex challenges of drugs, crime and terrorism. Timely support to the law enforcement agencies (LEA) on countering narcotics and prevention of transnational organized crime is one of the key elements to peace, stability, and effective governance in the region. Moreover, it is important to stress that no country alone can address these complex problems and collaboration, joint programming, sharing of information, expertise and experiences are very crucial.

Cybercrime, illicit financial flows and drugs online are seen as emerging concerns for the region; therefore, it is very important to give a special focus on increasing the analytical capacity of drug law enforcement and other relevant organizations in this region. Also, it is essential to increase the knowledge database and efficiency of decision makers on drugs related crime in the region. The central task of criminal intelligence analysis is to help law enforcement officers, policy makers and decision makers deal more effectively and provide timely strategic reports as “an early” warning of drug trafficking by organized criminal groups and to support operational activities by analysing crime.

The need to continue developing a more sophisticated and proper mechanism for processing information and intelligence is obvious and has been set as one of the priorities for the F23 project’s activities fully supported by the Central Asian states.

Project documents and revisions of the original project document

Project document	Year	General information regarding the original project document
“Drug law enforcement systems for criminal	2001-2017	Project F23 has improved criminal intelligence analysis and information management capacities, and further developed mechanisms for collection, evaluation, exchange and

intelligence collection, analysis and exchange”		dissemination of information between drug control agencies of the project member states.	
Project revision	Year	Reason & purpose	Change in
<u>Revision 1</u>	2003	In line with the findings of the assessment mission (October 2002) the project was revised in terms of scope, duration and budget. The revised project envisages provision of more advanced training, organization of study tours and seminars on intelligence-led policing, procurement of software packages, as well as assistance in drafting interagency agreements on intelligence collection, analysis and exchange. The revised overall budget increased to USD 1,998,600	<u>Budget</u> <u>Timeframe</u> <u>Logframe</u>
<u>Revision 2</u>	2005	UNODC and UNDP signed an agreement (POLINT) that coordinates the activities of this UNODC project with new and related action executed by UNDP under the EC-funded CADAP programme. Thus, the current project revision addressed the provisions of this 2004 UNDP-UNODC MoU, expanded project duration, and refocused remaining activities of RER/F23 on those components not covered under CADAP. This revision did not change the conceptual approach, legal context and implementation arrangements of the approved project TD/RER/F23, unless specified in the document.	<u>Budget</u> <u>Timeframe</u> <u>Logframe</u>
<u>Revision 3</u>	2007	Increase the initial life span and shape the project activities to address new developments in Central Asia and neighbouring regions. The revision added two new outputs that were extending the country scope and fortify past results of the project. The first of the new outputs incorporated Afghanistan and Azerbaijan	<u>Budget</u> <u>Timeframe</u> <u>Logframe</u>

		into the F23 project. The second enhanced the project's positive results by implementing additional intelligence-led policing components in countries that were involved in the previous phases of the project. This revision did not change the conceptual approach, legal context and implementation arrangements of the approved project TD/RER/F23, unless specified in this document. The revised overall budget increased to USD 4,212,300	
<u>Revision 4</u>	2009	<p>Given successful delivery of the project assistance and in line with the interest of the governments of Azerbaijan and Afghanistan to participate in the project activities, the project was revised in 2007 to extend geographic scope of the project and increase its initial life span.</p> <p>It was expected that the project would continue activities once the project revision has been signed by recipient countries. Unfortunately, the national clearance procedures have taken longer time than was initially expected so that some project activities commenced with some delay.</p> <p>In addition, in view of the increased scope of responsibilities it was suggested to upgrade project coordinator post to a more senior level, but this activity has not been materialized.</p>	<u>Budget</u> <u>Timeframe</u> <u>Logframe</u>
<u>Revision 5</u>	2010	The fifth revision of the project has installed modern intelligence systems and analysis software providing operational analysis training at counter narcotic agencies in all five Central Asian countries. However existing mechanisms for collection, storage, exchange and analysis of information, including access to information sources, remain in need of	<u>Budget</u> <u>Timeframe</u> <u>Logframe</u>

		<p>further support in order to achieve their potential.</p> <p>The Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) are still in the process of developing its functionality after its inauguration and F23 continues to play an important supporting role in that development through its technical and operational assistance for national analytical capacity. The collection and dissemination of criminal intelligence at the national level is a prerequisite for successful regional intelligence cooperation.</p> <p>The challenges associated with supporting the rule of law in Afghanistan are self-evident. This project is contributing to international efforts by helping the Counter Narcotic Police Afghanistan (CNPA) to develop a criminal intelligence capacity. Existing activities are on-going and it is proposed to extend them to include the Afghan Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF). Because of the security situation, such activities are inevitably protracted and progressed cautiously.</p> <p>The project objective and output remain unchanged. The revised overall budget increased to USD 5,087,316</p>	
<u>Revision 6</u>	2012	<p>This project revision intended to increase the initial life span and shape project activities to address new developments in the regions. The revision added one new outcome that will extend the country scope and fortify past results of the project. The new outcome incorporated Armenia and Georgia into the F23 project. The revision allowed the project to continue to contribute to establishing a solid base for law enforcement agencies in the region to become self-sufficient in processing and</p>	<u>Budget</u> <u>Timeframe</u> <u>Logframe</u>

		sharing information/intelligence, and reach a capacity where project trained analysts will be able to provide intelligence analysis training. It did not change the conceptual approach and implementation arrangements of the approved project TD/RER/F23. The revised overall budget increased to USD 6,263,686	
<u>Revision 7</u>	2014	This project revision intends to increase the initial life span and shape the project activities to address new developments in the regions. The revision allowed the project to continue contributing to the establishment of a solid base for law enforcement agencies in the region to become self-sufficient in processing and sharing information/intelligence, and reach a capacity where project trained analysts will be able to provide intelligence analysis training. The revised overall budget increased to USD 8,016,445	<u>Budget</u> <u>Timeframe</u> <u>Logframe</u>

Main objectives and outcomes

The project is aligned with key national development priorities of the project member states, as set out in the following policy documents and laws.

The objective of RERF23 is defined as: A coherent and comprehensive system for intelligence, information and information collection, analysis and exchange is established. It is supported by three outcomes:

Specialized law enforcement personnel use enhanced management of information gathering and exchange systems.

Law enforcement personnel use enhanced analytical capacity in operational work.

Law enforcement personnel increase use of intelligence-led policing tools in operational work.

The outputs include delivery of capacity building activities, infrastructure development, equipment provision, and cooperation mechanisms to enhance the drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and exchange.

The Project implementation has been regularly monitored against the set baselines, targets and indicators via internal project monitoring and reporting mechanisms: statistical disaggregated data of the project implementing partners, work plans, guidelines and policy documents' expert analysis, coordination and steering committees' meetings, site visits to project locations, project and monitoring reports.

Contribution to UNODC's country, regional or thematic programme

Programme for Central Asia, a partnership framework for impact related action in Central Asia 2015 -2019

Sub-programme 1: Countering transnational organised crime, illicit drug trafficking and preventing terrorism.

Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries 2011 -2019

Outcome 1: Enhanced regional cooperation and coordination to address transnational drug - related crimes.

The Project also contributes and is linked to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) especially Goal 16, target 16. A -strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international co-operation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime. The countries are in varying stages of developing their national plans for the SDGs and UNODC contributes as part of the UN country teams.

Linkage to UNODC strategy context and Sustainable Development Goals

Within the United Nations' and UNODC's global strategic framework and based on the culture of shared responsibilities, collective action and benchmarking for progress the UN Sustainable Development goals, UNODC ROCA's contribution provides support to Member States to reach their Targets specifically under the following Sustainable Development Goal:

TARGET 16.A - Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime: UNODC will support Member States to reach the Targets under SDG 16 by improving criminal intelligence analysis and information management capacities, and further develop mechanisms for collection, evaluation, exchange and dissemination of information between drug control agencies in the Central Asian region, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. However the need to further developing a more sophisticated and proper mechanism for the collection, storage, exchange and analysis of information and data results to fight against illicit drug trafficking related problem in support to ongoing law enforcement investigations, has been set as one of the priorities for the continuation of F23 project's activities fully supported by the attending countries. The F23 project is going to be integrated into the **Programme for Central Asia, a partnership framework for impact related action in Central Asia 2015 -2019, Sub-programme 1: Countering transnational organised crime, illicit drug trafficking and preventing terrorism, as the UNODC Regional Programme for Central Asian States 2015-2019** signed in May 2015 by the CA (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) government representatives and based on the integrated programming approach which aims to deliver

outcomes and outputs through sub programmes rather than through standalone projects and initiatives.

This project is part of the UNODC Strategic Framework that works with Member States to enhance their responses to the interconnected problems of drug use, illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and firearms and, transnational crime, corruption and terrorism. To achieve this, UNODC helps Member States to create and strengthen legislative, judicial and health systems to better safeguard some of the most vulnerable persons in society.

The project is implemented under the Sub-programme 1 UNODC Strategic Framework for 2016 – 2017, countering illicit drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, to promote and support effective responses to transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking and illicit drug trafficking by facilitating the implementation at the normative and operational levels of the relevant United Nations conventions

The Project contributes to this initiative by improving criminal intelligence analysis and information management capacities, and further developed mechanisms for collection, evaluation, exchange and dissemination of information between drug control agencies in the region.

Disbursement History

<u>Time periods throughout the life time of the project</u> (November 2001 – June 2017)	Total Approved Budget	Expenditure	Expenditure in %
Overall Budget (as of 30.06.2017) USD 8,016,445	Total Approved Budget USD 6,333,630	Expenditure (as of 28.02.2017) USD 5,594,945	Expenditure in % (as of 28.02.2017) 94 %

<u>Time period of the project covered by the evaluation</u>	Allocation for the time period	Expenditure	Expenditure in %
January 2012 – June 2017	USD 1,507,000	USD 1,333,104 (as of 28.02.2017)	88.46 %

Purpose of the Evaluation

Reasons behind the evaluation taking place

Pursuant to UNODC evaluation norms and standards, as well as the project donors' requirements, apart from the mid-term evaluation already undertaken, a final Independent Project Evaluation is mandatory and is to take place prior to the financial closure of the project.

The evaluation timeframe will cover project activities conducted over the period from January 2012 (since the end of data collection for the mid-term evaluation) to the end of the evaluation field mission (tentatively end of June 2017).

The purpose of this final evaluation is to assess the evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, partnerships and cooperation, human rights and gender mainstreaming, with a particular focus on effectiveness, impact and sustainability, as well as assess the implementation of the recommendations from the mid-term Independent Project Evaluations in 2012 and derive lessons learned, best practices and recommendations for future project interventions to ensure ownership, result-based orientation, cost-effectiveness and quality of the UNODC services.

The results of this summative final evaluation are intended for use by the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia, Project Team, beneficiary agencies and Donor Countries. In particular, it will serve as a reference source for the lessons learned from the UNODC "Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and exchange" project, for its proper completion and integration with the necessary adjustments to the UNODC interventions in the Central Asian region within the undergoing UNODC Regional Programme for Central Asian States 2015-2019 signed in May 2015 by the CA (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) government representatives and based on the integrated programming approach which aims to deliver outcomes and outputs through sub programmes rather than through standalone projects and initiatives.

This final evaluation will be carried out by two Independent external Evaluators, with logistical arrangements provided by the UNODC Programme Office in the Republic of Tajikistan and in line with the UNODC evaluation policy, norms, standards, guidelines and templates.

Assumed accomplishment of the evaluation

Through this evaluation, UNODC ROCA will obtain an independent and objective assessment on the effectiveness of the activities conducted in this specific area and draw on recommendations and lessons learned to inform future programming. . Furthermore,

this evaluation will assess the progress made in implementing the recommendations from the previous mid-term evaluation in 2012.

Specific proposed questions, among others include ‘To what extent have the resources available been converted to outputs in a timely and cost-effective manner for the knowledge products?’; ‘To what extent has the Project improved comprehensive system for intelligence, information and information collection, analysis and exchange?’; and ‘To what extent are the project results (outcomes and impact, if any) likely to continue / be sustained after the project has finished?’.

This evaluation will provide for an opportunity to learn lessons for future UNODC interventions in the region; to provide accountability to donors by assessing the extent to which project objectives were met and resources were wisely utilized; and to suggest areas of improvement.

The main evaluation users

The main users and benefactors of this evaluation will be the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia and Project management, Core Learning Partners (see Annex 3) and the project donors and beneficiary agencies of the project member states.

The main stakeholders (CLPs) will be specifically selected, representing a balance of men, women and other marginalised groups (to be further refined by the evaluation team) in order to review and provide comments on the Terms of Reference and the evaluation questions,; review and provide comments on the draft evaluation report, as well as facilitate the dissemination and application of the results and other follow-up action. Their comments, opinions and ideas shall be reflected in the report where deemed appropriate by the evaluation team. The list of CLPs is found in Annex 3. Stakeholders include all those to be invited to participate in the interviews and surveys, including the CLPs.

Scope of the Evaluation

Unit of analysis (full project/ programme/ parts of the project/ programme; etc.)	This final evaluation covers the activities of the RER/F23 project implemented in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The purpose of this final evaluation is to assess the evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, partnerships and cooperation, human rights and gender mainstreaming, with a particular focus on effectiveness, impact and sustainability.
Time period covered by the evaluation	Activities conducted over the period from January 2012 until the end of the evaluation field mission (tentatively end of June 2017).

Geographical coverage of the evaluation	The scope for the geographical coverage of the project will be Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as project priority/pilot locations. Missions to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are proposed, consisting of meetings with national counterparts in Astana, Almaty, Bishkek, Dushanbe and Tashkent. Exact details of field mission, however, to be further refined and discussed with the evaluation team.
--	--

Key Evaluation Questions

Evaluation Criteria

The evaluation will be conducted based on the following DAC criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights and lessons learned. The questions will be further refined by the Evaluation Team.

<i>Relevance</i> <i>Relevance is the extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.</i>
1. To what extent is the project relevant to the respective beneficiaries' agencies needs and priorities?
2. To what extent do the objectives, outcomes and outputs respond to present circumstances and stakeholder expectations?
3. To what extent have recommendations on relevance from the previous mid-term evaluation in 2012 been implemented?
<i>Efficiency</i> <i>Efficiency measures the outputs - qualitative and quantitative - in relation to the inputs.</i>
1. To what extent is the project implemented in the most efficient and cost-effective way compared to alternatives?
2. Are there any good practices regarding efficiency, e.g. are certain aspects or arrangements of the project particularly efficient?
3. To what extent have recommendations on efficiency from the previous mid-term evaluation in 2012 been implemented?
<i>Effectiveness</i> <i>Effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.</i>
1. To what degree were the programme's outcomes and objectives achieved?
2. To what extent was the project management structure effective and allowed implementing the set objectives under the project?
3. To what extent have recommendations on effectiveness from the previous mid-term evaluation in 2012 been implemented?
4. To what extent did the project/programme contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals?
<i>Impact</i> <i>Impact is the positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.</i>
1. To what extent has the anticipated impact been reached by the project?
2. Have there been any positive or negative unintended results?
3. To what extent have recommendations on impact from the previous mid-term evaluation in 2012 been implemented?
<i>Sustainability</i>

<i>Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.</i>
1. What measures are in place to ensure future maintenance and repair of the facilities and equipment provided?
2. To what extent are project interventions sustainable in the long term?
3. To what extent have recommendations on sustainability from the previous mid-term evaluation in 2012 been implemented?
<i>Partnerships and cooperation</i> <i>The evaluation assesses the partnerships and cooperation established during the project/ programme as well as their functioning and value.</i>
1. To what extent were stakeholders properly engaged and informed?
2. How was the project conducive to the development of partnerships at the bilateral and multilateral level?
3. To what extent have partnerships been sought with national and international partners, including UN-agencies, UNODC-internally, public oversight bodies and civil society, etc.?
4. To what extent have recommendations on partnerships and cooperation from the previous mid-term evaluation in 2012 been implemented?
<i>Human rights</i> <i>The evaluation needs to assess the mainstreaming of human rights aspects throughout the project/ programme.</i>
1. To what extent are human rights considerations included in the project development and implementation?
2. To what extent have recommendations on human rights from the previous mid-term evaluation in 2012 been implemented?
<i>Gender</i> <i>The evaluation needs to assess the mainstreaming of gender aspects throughout the project/ programme.</i>
1. To what extent are gender considerations included in the project development and implementation? (
2. To what extent did the project intervention contribute to fulfilment of the National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security?
To what extent did the project intervention contribute to introduction and implementation of measures aimed at increasing women and minority representation in the police?
3. To what extent have recommendations on gender from the previous mid-term evaluation in 2012 been implemented?
<i>Lessons learned and best practice</i> <i>Lessons learned concern the learning experiences and insights that were gained throughout the project/ programme.</i>
1. What are the lessons learnt from the completed “Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and exchange” project?
2. What are the best practices that could be applied in the future activities and similar projects?
3. What are the necessary adjustments to the UNODC interventions in the region within the ongoing UNODC Regional Programme for Central Asian States 2015-2019?

Past Evaluations

The origins of the F23 project and its design lie in the UN Office of Drug Control & Crime Prevention (ODCCP) strategy of the time, which was itself governed by the Political Declaration adopted at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) 20th Special Session which was held in June 1998. The UNGASS resolution *Measures to Enhance International Cooperation to Counter the World Drug Problem* encouraged “[...]states in cooperation with competent international and regional bodies” to address the issues of data collection and information exchange.

At a meeting held in September 1999, at the initiative of the Uzbekistan government, the *Six plus Two Group* (the six countries bordering Afghanistan, namely China, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan along with the USA and Russia) expressed their concern at the increased cultivation, production and trafficking of illicit drugs in and from Afghanistan. In September 2000 at a high-level meeting of this group, a regional action plan on countering the Afghan drug trade was drawn up in consultation with ODCCP. This regional action plan approved by all the members encompassed a set of objectives to combat the Afghan drug trade in the fields of law enforcement, regional cooperation, criminal justice systems, eradication of illicit drug crops, alternative development, counter-narcotics efforts within Afghanistan, demand reduction and demand prevention.

From this it can be seen that a clear concern had already been identified globally and certain, concrete, high-level steps taken with the ODCCP involved from an early stage.

At around the same time, *The Programme Framework for International Cooperation on Drug Control in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Countries* (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan) was drawn up and this provided the framework for the F23 project which ODCCP was now preparing. The programme was divided into 2 strands:

- Strengthening (to the extent possible) the drug control capacities of individual countries
- Addressing the drug problem in the ECO region through jointly coordinated action by countries using as far as possible the regional cooperation mechanisms.

At the 5th ECO summit held in May 1998 the majority of the heads of state/government recognized the importance of concerted action within the ECO framework to pre-empt the rapidly escalating regional drug problem.

The *Programme Framework*, which was presented to major donors in October 1998 and aimed at providing response to the increasing appeals from all ECO countries for drug control assistance. The *Programme Framework* also aimed at addressing the drug problem in the world’s largest opium producing, consuming and trafficking region through an effective use of the cooperation mechanisms.

The *Declaration and Priorities for co-operation to counter drugs, organised crime & terrorism in Central Asia* adopted during the *International Conference on Enhancing Security & Stability in Central Asia: An Integrated Approach to Counter Drugs, Organized Crime & Terrorism* held in October 2000 indicated a genuine willingness of the Central Asian countries to improve cooperation and coordination, a readiness to develop systems for the collection, analysis, sharing and evaluation of data on drug trafficking and drug abuse and the establishment of mechanisms for gathering, sharing and exchange of information between all relevant agencies and bodies.

As can be seen in the original project document, a number of key areas were identified as being necessary for the successful implementation of the project. In summary they covered strategy development, adoption of standardised intelligence methodologies, establishment of dedicated operational intelligence analysis capacity, the supply of equipment, training, mentoring and the development of means for cooperation and information exchange. Three clear and logical outputs were formalised and incorporated into the project document;

Output 1 - A coherent and comprehensive system for data and information collection, analysis and exchange is established.

Output 2 – Specialist law enforcement personnel are properly trained in the management of information gathering and exchange systems.

Output 3 – A mechanism for information gathering and exchange is established at a regional level. For each output, a significant number of specific and detailed activities were formulated, breaking down the outputs into manageable elements, taking into account the scope of the project, the difficulties of implementing regional projects and the low starting point of many of the BAs. Indeed, the overall philosophy developed of parallel development of individual BAs under a regional framework was an eminently suitable one and has proved effective.

The project design identifies the pressing need to have full support and, crucially, the understanding of BC governments and BA senior management in the adoption of intelligence-led law enforcement and policing methods as operated in developed agencies and services around the world. The project proposed achieving this through the sensible step of a series of comprehensive and targeted workshops to be conducted at the commencement of the project. The workshops would also be the support tool for the exchange of views, agreement of requirements, identification of problems and beginnings of the establishment of national and international networks. This step at the outset of the project was vital to all the work that followed.

The project design also took into account the lessons learned from past experience in the delivery of assistance in the area of intelligence. The lessons identified included the needs for systematic delivery of assistance and genuine coordination between those delivering assistance. Projects such as the EU-funded *Central Asia Drugs Action Plan* (CADAP) and *National Drugs Information Networks in Central Asia* (NADIN) were identified as being potential partners and existing UN projects such as the *Immediate Technical Assistance on control and prevention of drug and related organized crime in the Russian Federation*, the Precursors Control in Central Asia and that concerning the establishment of a DCA in Tajikistan noted as foundations on which F23 could build. F23 also supported the *ROCA Strategic Programme Framework and the Regional Programme for Afghanistan & Neighbouring Countries*.

The project document details an ambitious end-of-project situation as “[...] *the countries of the region will have national mechanisms for information collection, storage, analysis and exchange. These mechanisms will allow the drug law enforcement bodies in each country to collect and share police information with regard to illicit drug trafficking. The project will have provided both technical and organizational means for establishing procedures and networks for the collection and exchange of information*[...]”.

Further it was recommended that the project became a part of the new UNODC “Programme for Central Asia 2015-2019: A partnership framework for impact related action in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)”, to ensure the integrated programming approach which aims to deliver outcomes and outputs through sub-programmes rather than through standalone projects and initiatives and where a Regional Steering Committee was established to review and endorse strategic and operational priorities at the regional level.

Evaluation Methodology

The methods used to collect and analyse data

The evaluation will be undertaken through a triangulation exercise of data stemming from desk review, structured interviews, as well as other sources to be established by the evaluation team. These could be primary data coming from questionnaires, surveys, or secondary data stemming from other entities. Quantitative as well qualitative data collection and analysis methods will be applied. Furthermore, the methodology will be gender-sensitive and inclusive and be further developed by the evaluation team as part of the inception report.

A desk review of relevant documents. These documents will include *among others*, the following: the project document, all project revision documents, semi-annual and annual project progress reports;

Field mission to ROCA office in Tashkent consisting of:

Briefing and individual interviews with Regional Representative, Senior Law Enforcement Advisor, Financial Officer.

3. Field mission to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan consisting of:

Individual interview with F23 Project Coordinator/Head of UNODC Tajikistan Programme-Office, Project Manager and briefings by UNODC staff members.

Briefing by UNODC staff in the UNODC Programme-Offices in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan;

Individual interviews with senior officials of project beneficiary agencies and other national counterparts, including officials from the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan;

Individual interviews with donor representatives;

Site visits to Analytical Units of the LEA of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and other sites for physical inspection and discussions both with beneficiaries and other people directly or indirectly affected by the project;

Phone/Skype individual interviews with staff at UNODC HQ.

The evaluation team will request further interviews, as needed.

As part of the Inception Report, the evaluation team will develop a sound evaluation methodology as well as develop specific tools such as questionnaires and interview schedules, which will be reviewed and cleared by IEU prior to the field missions.

Following completion of the missions, a draft evaluation report (in English) will be prepared, which will be sent to IEU for thorough review. The draft will be circulated to the Evaluation managers and to ROCA in sufficient time to allow for comments to be made and for any misunderstandings to be clarified. Final approval and clearance of the report will be done by IEU. The evaluators may choose to take the comments into account in producing the final report, for which they will be responsible.

The UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) will provide quality assurance and ensure compliance with the Norms and Standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) and UNODC guidelines³⁶ by providing comments on evaluation tools and methods, the draft report and clearance of the final report.

The sources of data

Interviews with CLPs and donors and relevant stakeholders outlined in Annex 3, as well as further interviews with stakeholders as proposed by the Evaluation team. Briefing and individual

³⁶ <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/about-projects-.html>

interviews with International Regional Representative, Senior Law Enforcement Advisor, International Project Coordinator, Project Manager and Financial Officer.

The evaluation will be undertaken through a triangulation exercise of data stemming from desk review, semi-structured interviews, field missions, questionnaires, observations and other sources to be established by the evaluator.

The independent project evaluation is to be conducted following UNODC/IEU's evaluation policy, norms, standards, guidelines and templates, (to be found on the IEU website, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/index.html>), as well as UNEG Norms and Standards.

Timeframe and Deliverables

<i>Duties</i>	<i>Time frame</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Deliverables</i>
Desk review and preparation of draft Inception Report	27 October – 9 November 2017 (10 working days)	Home base	Draft Inception report containing: preliminary findings of the desk review, refined evaluation questions, data collection instruments (including questionnaire and interview questions), sampling strategy, evaluation matrix and limitations to the evaluation
Review and subsequent clearance of draft Inception Report by the project manager and IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)	10 – 17 November 2017 (3 working days)	Home base	Revised draft Inception Report
Deliverable A: Final Inception Report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates	By 17 November 2017 (13 working days)		Final Inception report to be cleared by IEU
Interviews with staff at UNODC HQ (phone or Skype interviews) and FO; Evaluation mission: briefing, interviews; presentation of preliminary findings	20 November - 1 December 2017 (10 working days)	UNODC/ HQ Countries/ Cities	Presentation of preliminary findings Almaty, Astana, Kazakhstan; Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; Tashkent, Uzbekistan; and Dushanbe, Tajikistan
Drafting of the evaluation report	4 - 18 December 2017 (12 working days)	Home base	Draft evaluation report
Submission to Project Management for review of factual errors and to IEU for review and comments (can entail various rounds of comments)	19-26 December 2017		
Consideration of comments from the project manager and incorporation of comments from IEU	27 December 2017 – 31 December 2017 (3 working days)	Home base	Revised draft evaluation report
Deliverable B: Draft Evaluation Report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates	By 31 December 2017 (25 working days)		Draft evaluation report, to be cleared by IEU
Draft evaluation report to be shared with Core Learning Partners for comments	15 – 29 January 2018		
Consideration of comments from Core Learning Partners	30 January 2018 (1 working day)	Home base	Revised draft evaluation report
Final review by IEU; incorporation of comments and finalization of report (can entail various rounds of comments)	31 January – 9 February 2018 (3 working days)	Home base	Revised draft evaluation report

Deliverable C: Final evaluation report; presentation of evaluation results	By 9 February 2018 (4 working days)		Final evaluation report, to be cleared by IEU; presentation of evaluation results
Project Management: Provide Management response (if needed) and finalise Evaluation Follow-up Plan in ProFi	By 16 February 2018		Final Evaluation Follow-up Plan to be cleared by IEU
Project Management: Disseminate final evaluation report	By 23 February 2018		Final evaluation report disseminated

Evaluation Team Composition

Number of evaluators needed

The final Independent Project Evaluation will be carried out by a team of two evaluators with one International Independent external lead evaluator and one national independent evaluator (team member) identified by UNODC through a competitive selection process, with logistical support provided by Project staff.

The lead evaluator will have experience of evaluating technical assistance projects. The evaluator (team member) will be an expert in the area of criminal justice/law enforcement.

The role of the Lead Evaluator

Carry out the desk review; develop the inception report, including sample size and sampling technique; draft and finalize the inception report and evaluation methodology, incorporating relevant comments, in line with the norms, standards, guidelines and template on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; implement quantitative as well as qualitative tools and analyze data; triangulate data and test rival explanations; ensure that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled; draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy and the norms, standards, guidelines and template on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; finalize the evaluation report on the basis of comments received; present the final evaluation findings and recommendations to stakeholders.

Roles and Responsibilities of the Evaluator (team member)

- assist the Lead Evaluator in all stages of the evaluation process, as per the respective TOR;
- participate in selected missions.

More details will be provided in the respective job descriptions in Annex I.

Conflict of interest

According to UNODC rules, the evaluators must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

Reference to job description detailing qualifications and responsibilities

The lead evaluator should have the following qualifications and experience:

- An academic degree and post graduate educational qualifications in social sciences, business administration or international development and/or graduation from a recognised criminal justice/law enforcement academy;
- Substantial experience in evaluating technical assistance projects and/or programmes in international development and preferably regarding criminal justice/law enforcement (at least 7 years professional experience);
- Experience of having applied recognised quality management and assessment methodologies (such as the Balanced Scorecard or the Business Excellence Model of the EFQM) is desirable;
- Familiarity with the criminal justice/law enforcement situation in the region will be an asset;
- Technical knowledge of human rights and gender issues, including knowledge in women's empowerment, gender mainstreaming, gender analysis and the related mandates within the UN system on gender and human rights;
- Fluency in spoken and written English required, with proven drafting skills, working knowledge of Russian is an asset.

The lead evaluator will be responsible for drafting the evaluation report, ensuring the report meets the necessary standards and for submitting the drafts as described in a timely manner.

The evaluator/team member should have the following qualifications and experience:

An academic degree and post graduate educational qualifications in social sciences, business administration or international development and/or graduation from a recognised law enforcement academy

A strong professional record in designing and leading independent evaluations

Extensive knowledge of, and experience in applying, qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods

Technical competence in the area of evaluation (at least 7 years)

Previous work experience with undertaking project design, management and/or evaluation exercises with criminal justice projects / agencies, particularly those involving the police

Experience of working on / with donor funded development projects in the Central Asian region

Experience of working with UN agencies, and ideally with UNODC

Excellent communication, facilitation and report writing / production skills

Technical knowledge of human rights and gender based approach, including knowledge in women's empowerment, gender mainstreaming, gender analysis and the related mandates within the UN system on gender and human rights

Fluency in spoken and written English required, with proven drafting skills, working knowledge of Russian is highly desirable.

Experience and knowledge on gender equality and women's empowerment, gender mainstreaming, gender analysis and the related mandates within the UN system – as well as experience and knowledge on human rights issues, the human rights based approach to programming, human rights analysis and related mandates within the UN system.

Management of the Evaluation Process

Roles and responsibilities of the Project Coordinator/Manager

Management Arrangements

The independent project evaluation will be carried out following UNODC's evaluation policy and UNEG Norms and Standards. The evaluation team will work closely with UNODC's Independent Evaluation Unit.

Project Coordinator/Manager

The Project Coordinator/Manager is responsible for:

- managing the evaluation,
- drafting and finalizing the ToR,
- selecting Core Learning Partners (representing a balance of men, women and other marginalised groups) and informing them of their role,
- recruiting evaluators following clearance by IEU,
- providing desk review materials (including data and information on men, women and other marginalised groups) to the evaluation team including the full TOR,
- reviewing the inception report as well as the evaluation methodology,
- liaising with the Core Learning Partners,
- reviewing the draft report for factual errors,
- developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations as well as follow-up action (to be updated once per year),
- disseminate the final evaluation report and facilitate the presentation of evaluation results;

The Project Coordinator/Manager will be in charge of **providing logistical support** to the evaluation team including arranging the field missions of the evaluation team, including but not limited to:

- All logistical arrangements for the travel of the consultants (including travel details; DSA-payments; transportation; independent interpretation; etc.)
- All logistical arrangement for the meetings/interviews/focus groups/etc., ensuring interview partners adequately represent men, women and other marginalised groups (including

independent translator/interpreter if needed; set-up of meetings; arrangement of ad-hoc meetings as requested by the evaluation team; transportation from/to the interview venues; scheduling sufficient time for the interviews (around 45 minutes); ensuring that members of the evaluation team and the respective interviewees are present during the interviews; etc.)

All logistical arrangements for the presentation of the evaluation results;

Ensure timely payment of all fees/DSA/etc. (payments for the evaluators need to be released within 5 working days after the respective deliverable is cleared by IEU).

For the field missions, the evaluation team liaises with the UNODC Regional/Field Offices and mentors as appropriate

Roles and responsibilities of the evaluation stakeholders

Members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) are selected by the project managers, representing a balance of men, women and other marginalised groups. The CLPs are the main stakeholders, i.e. a limited number of those deemed as particularly relevant to be involved throughout the evaluation process, i.e. in reviewing and commenting on the TOR and the evaluation questions, reviewing and commenting on the draft evaluation report, as well as facilitating the dissemination and application of the results and other follow-up action. Stakeholders include all those to be invited to participate in the interviews and surveys, including the CLPs.

Roles and responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Unit

The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) provides mandatory normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>.

IEU reviews and clears all steps and deliverables during the evaluation process: Terms of Reference; Selection of evaluator(s); Inception Report; Draft Evaluation Report; Final Evaluation Report; Evaluation Follow-up Plan.

Payment Modalities

The evaluator will be issued a consultancy contract and paid in accordance with UNODC rules and regulations. The contract is a legally binding document in which the evaluator agrees to complete the deliverables by the set deadlines. Payment is correlated to deliverables and three instalments are typically foreseen:

- The first payment upon clearance of the Inception Report (in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates) by IEU;
- The second payment upon clearance of the Draft Evaluation Report (in line with UNODC norms, standards, evaluation guidelines and templates) by IEU;
- The third and final payment (i.e. the remainder of the fee) only after completion of the respective tasks, receipt of the final report (in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates) and clearance by IEU, as well as presentation of final evaluation findings and recommendations.

75 percent of the daily subsistence allowance and terminals is paid in advance before travelling. The balance is paid after the travel has taken place, upon presentation of boarding passes and the completed travel claim forms.

ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR EVALUATOR

Title:	Independent Evaluator (Lead Evaluator)
Organisational Section/Unit:	UNODC Programme Office in Tajikistan
Name and title of Supervisor:	Amelia Hannaford, International Project Coordinator
Duty Station or home-based:	Home-based/with travel to Dushanbe Tajikistan; Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; Almaty/Astana, Kazakhstan and Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Proposed period:	27 October 2017– 23 February 2018
Actual work time:	42 working days
Fee Range:	C

Background of the assignment:

The project's objectives are to provide "a coherent and comprehensive system for intelligence, and information collection, analysis and exchange is established".

The project area of responsibility includes the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.

Combating illicit drug trafficking requires well-organized systems of information/data collection, processing and analysis, as well as the exchange of the final information product among agencies involved at national and regional levels.

Project F23 has improved criminal intelligence analysis and information management capacities, and further developed mechanisms for collection, evaluation, exchange and dissemination of information between drug control agencies in the Central Asian region, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. However the need to further developing a more sophisticated and proper mechanism for the collection, storage, exchange and analysis of information and data results is obvious and has been set as one of the priorities for the continuation of F23 project's activities fully supported by the attending countries.

At present, counter narcotic agencies, cooperating within the frame of project F23, collect information and data in accordance with local requirements and needs.

The F23 "project philosophy" is to teach *similar* working methodologies and using *same* analysis software and database structures. Such approach will stimulate national and regional cooperation between agencies and encourage the sharing of information and analytical products between Intelligence analysts from participating countries.

The project has installed modern intelligence systems and i2 analysis software in 18 counter narcotic agencies in the project area. Approximately 400 officers have been trained in crime analysis techniques at various levels. All relevant agencies have analysts working with i2 software who are able to create analytical reports and visualization charts in support of criminal investigations and operational activities.

It is necessary to continue developing a sustainable data and information collection capacity and root the Intelligence Led Policing implementation focusing on criminal intelligence analysis and information processing at counter narcotic Intel units. This exercise should also aim to identify priorities and a sound information gathering strategy for drug law enforcement bodies in each country. National drug agencies will be assisted in developing their information sharing and exchange system suitable to their objectives in combating illicit drug trafficking.

Further details can be found in the Evaluation Terms of Reference.

Purpose of the assignment:

The purpose of this assignment is to conduct the final Independent Project Evaluation of RER/F23. The evaluation needs to assess all evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, partnerships and cooperation, human rights and gender mainstreaming of the project achievements/non-achievements, with a particular focus on effectiveness, impact and sustainability, as well as assess the implementation of recommendations from the mid-term Independent Project evaluation in 2012 and as derive lessons learned, best practice and recommendations for future project interventions to ensure ownership, result-based orientation, cost-effectiveness and quality of the UNODC services. The evaluation-process needs to be fully independent and follow UNODC and UNEG evaluation norms and standards. The UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit is the clearing entity for all deliverables.

Through this evaluation, UNODC ROCA will obtain an independent and objective assessment on the effectiveness of the activities conducted in the above specific areas and draw on recommendation and lessons learned to inform future programming. This evaluation will also suggest areas of improvement for the future.

The results of this summative final evaluation are intended for use by the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia, Project Team, beneficiary agencies and Donor Countries. In particular, it will serve as a reference source for the lessons learned from the UNODC Law Enforcement Programme, for its proper completion and integration with the necessary adjustments to the UNODC interventions in Central Asian region within the undergoing UNODC Regional Programme for Central Asian States 2015-2019 signed in May 2015 by the CA (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) government representatives and based on the integrated programming approach which aims to deliver outcomes and outputs through sub-programmes rather than through standalone projects and initiatives.

Specific tasks to be performed by the lead evaluator:

Under the guidance of the Independent Evaluation Unit, the key responsibilities of the lead evaluator include (i) development of the evaluation design with detailed methods, tools and techniques, (ii) ensuring adherence to the UNEG Norms and Standards, UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates and the evaluation TOR, and (iii) ensuring that all deliverables are submitted in a timely and satisfactory manner and in line with the quality criteria checklist.

Expected tangible and measurable output(s)/deliverable(s):

The lead evaluator will be responsible for the quality and timely submission of his/her specific deliverables, as specified below. All products should be well written, inclusive and have a clear analysis process.

Draft inception report, containing: preliminary findings of the desk review, refined evaluation questions, data collection instruments (including questionnaire and interview questions), sampling strategy, evaluation matrix and limitations to the evaluation.

Presentation of preliminary evaluation findings and recommendations to internal and external key stakeholders (if applicable).

Draft evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates. Revised draft report based on comments received from the various consultative processes (IEU, internal and external).

Final evaluation report, in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates
Final presentation of evaluation results to stakeholders.

According to UNODC rules, the lead evaluator must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

The lead evaluator shall respect the UNEG Ethical Guidelines.

Dates and details of deliverables/payments:

<i>Deliverable</i>	<i>Output</i>	<i>Working Days</i>	<i>To be accomplished by (date)</i>
A.	Inception Report	13 working days	by 17 November 2017
B.	Draft Evaluation Report	25 working days	by 31 December 2017
C.	Final Evaluation Report	4 working days	by 9 February 2018

Payments will be made upon satisfactory completion and/or submission of outputs/deliverables.

Indicators to evaluate the lead evaluator's performance:

Timely, satisfactory and high-quality delivery of the above mentioned outputs as assessed by IEU (in line with UNODC norms, standards, guidelines and templates as well as UNEG Standards and Norms).

7. Qualifications/expertise sought (required educational background, years of relevant work experience, other special skills or knowledge required):

An academic degree and post graduate educational qualifications in social sciences, business administration or international development and/or graduation from a recognised law enforcement academy

A strong professional record in designing and leading independent evaluations Extensive knowledge of, and experience in applying, qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods

Technical competence in the area of evaluation (at least 7 years)

Previous work experience with undertaking project design, management and/or evaluation exercises with criminal justice projects / agencies, particularly those involving the police

Experience of working on / with donor funded development projects in the Central Asian region

Experience of working with UN agencies, and ideally with UNODC

Excellent communication, facilitation and report writing / production skills

Technical knowledge of human rights and gender based approach, including knowledge in women's empowerment, gender mainstreaming, gender analysis and the related mandates within the UN system on gender and human rights

Fluency in spoken and written English required, with proven drafting skills, working knowledge of Russian is highly desirable.

Experience and knowledge on gender equality and women's empowerment, gender mainstreaming, gender analysis and the related mandates within the UN system – as well as experience and knowledge on human rights issues, the human rights based approach to programming, human rights analysis and related mandates within the UN system.

Title:	Evaluator (team member)
Organisational Section/Unit:	UNODC Programme Office in Tajikistan
Name and title of Supervisor:	Amelia Hannaford, International Project Coordinator
Duty Station or home-based:	Home-based/with travel to Dushanbe Tajikistan; Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; Almaty/Astana, Kazakhstan and Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Proposed period:	27 October 2017– 23 February 2018
Actual work time:	25 working days
Fee Range:	C

Background of the assignment:

The project's objectives are to provide "a coherent and comprehensive system for intelligence, and information collection, analysis and exchange is established".

The project area of responsibility includes the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.

Combating illicit drug trafficking requires well-organized systems of information/data collection, processing and analysis, as well as the exchange of the final information product among agencies involved at national and regional levels.

Project F23 has improved criminal intelligence analysis and information management capacities, and further developed mechanisms for collection, evaluation, exchange and dissemination of information between drug control agencies in the Central Asian region, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. However the need to further developing a more sophisticated and proper mechanism for the collection, storage, exchange and analysis of information and data results is obvious and has been set as one of the priorities for the continuation of F23 project's activities fully supported by the attending countries.

At present, counter narcotic agencies, cooperating within the frame of project F23, collect information and data in accordance with local requirements and needs.

The F23 "project philosophy" is to teach *similar* working methodologies and using *same* analysis software and database structures. Such approach will stimulate national and regional cooperation between agencies and encourage the sharing of information and analytical products between Intelligence analysts from participating countries.

The project has installed modern intelligence systems and i2 analysis software in 18 counter narcotic agencies in the project area. Approximately 400 officers have been trained in crime analysis techniques at various levels. All relevant agencies have analysts working with i2 software who are able to create analytical reports and visualization charts in support of criminal investigations and operational activities.

It is necessary to continue developing a sustainable data and information collection capacity and root the Intelligence Led Policing implementation focusing on criminal intelligence analysis and information processing at counter narcotic Intel units. This exercise should also aim to identify priorities and a sound information gathering strategy for drug law enforcement bodies in each

country. National drug agencies will be assisted in developing their information sharing and exchange system suitable to their objectives in combating illicit drug trafficking.

Further details can be found in the Evaluation Terms of Reference.

Purpose of the assignment:

The purpose of this assignment is to conduct the final Independent Project Evaluation of RER/F23. The evaluation needs is to assess all evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, partnerships and cooperation, human rights and gender mainstreaming of the project achievements/non-achievements, with a particular focus on effectiveness, impact and sustainability, as well as assess the implementation of recommendations from the mid-term Independent Project evaluation in 2012 and as derive lessons learned, best practice and recommendations for future project interventions to ensure ownership, result-based orientation, cost-effectiveness and quality of the UNODC services. The evaluation-process needs to be fully independent and follow UNODC and UNEG evaluation norms and standards. The UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit is the clearing entity for all deliverables. Through this evaluation, UNODC ROCA will obtain an independent and objective assessment on the effectiveness of the activities conducted in the above specific areas and draw on recommendation and lessons learned to inform future programming. This evaluation will also suggest areas of improvement for the future.

The results of this summative final evaluation are intended for use by the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia, Project Team, beneficiary agencies and Donor Countries. In particular, it will serve as a reference source for the lessons learned from the UNODC Law Enforcement Programme, for its proper completion and integration with the necessary adjustments to the UNODC interventions in Central Asian region within the undergoing UNODC Regional Programme for Central Asian States 2015-2019 signed in May 2015 by the CA (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) government representatives and based on the integrated programming approach which aims to deliver outcomes and outputs through sub-programmes rather than through standalone projects and initiatives.

Specific tasks to be performed by the evaluator (team member):

Under the guidance of the Independent Evaluation Unit, the key responsibilities of the evaluator (team member) is to collaborate with and support the lead evaluator with inputs to all deliverables in the evaluation process.

Expected tangible and measurable output(s)/deliverable(s):

The evaluator (team member) will be responsible for collaborating with and support the lead evaluator with inputs to all the deliverables throughout the process and for the quality and timely submission of his/her specific deliverables, as specified below. All products should be well written, inclusive and have a clear analysis process.

Draft inception report, containing: preliminary findings of the desk review, refined evaluation questions, data collection instruments (including questionnaire and interview questions), sampling strategy, evaluation matrix and limitations to the evaluation.

Presentation of preliminary evaluation findings and recommendations to internal and external key stakeholders (if applicable).

Draft evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates. Revised draft report based on comments received from the various consultative processes (IEU, internal and external).

Final evaluation report, in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates
Final presentation of evaluation results to stakeholders.

According to UNODC rules, the evaluator (team member) must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

The evaluator (team member) shall respect the UNEG Ethical Guidelines.

Dates and details of deliverables/payments:

<i>Deliverable</i>	<i>Output</i>	<i>Working Days</i>	<i>To be accomplished by (date)</i>
A.	Inception Report	8 working days	by 17 November 2017
B.	Draft Evaluation Report	15 working days	by 31 December 2017
C.	Final Evaluation Report	2 working days	by 9 February 2018

Payments will be made upon satisfactory completion and/or submission of outputs/deliverables.

Indicators to evaluate the evaluator's performance:

Timely, satisfactory and high-quality delivery of the above mentioned outputs as assessed by IEU (in line with UNODC norms, standards, guidelines and templates as well as UNEG Standards and Norms).

7. Qualifications/expertise sought (required educational background, years of relevant work experience, other special skills or knowledge required):

An academic degree and post graduate educational qualifications in social sciences, business administration or international development and/or graduation from a recognised law enforcement academy

A strong professional record in designing and leading independent evaluations

Extensive knowledge of, and experience in applying, qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods

Technical competence in the area of evaluation (at least 7 years)

Previous work experience with undertaking project design, management and/or evaluation exercises with criminal justice projects / agencies, particularly those involving the police

Experience of working on / with donor funded development projects in the Central Asian region

Experience of working with UN agencies, and ideally with UNODC

Excellent communication, facilitation and report writing / production skills

Technical knowledge of human rights and gender based approach, including knowledge in women's empowerment, gender mainstreaming, gender analysis and the related mandates within the UN system on gender and human rights

Fluency in spoken and written English required, with proven drafting skills, working knowledge of Russian is highly desirable.

Experience and knowledge on gender equality and women's empowerment, gender mainstreaming, gender analysis and the related mandates within the UN system – as well as experience and knowledge on human rights issues, the human rights based approach to programming, human rights analysis and related mandates within the UN system.

ANNEX II. Evaluation tools: questionnaires & interview guides

Parts in grey shading were changed from the TOR. Parts in yellow shading are from the mid-term evaluation report.

Evaluation questions

Relevance³⁷

Relevance is the extent to which the aid activity is continuously³⁸ suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.

1. To what extent is / was the project relevant to the respective beneficiaries' agencies and governments'³⁹ needs and priorities? ...
...To the donors' & UN?
2. To what extent do the objectives, outcomes and outputs respond to present circumstances and stakeholder expectations? What would beneficiary agencies' drug law enforcement look like if it was just left to them?

2012 Evaluation: Further regional development, involving the existing members of the project, possible new members and CARICC is undertaken by the use of bench-marking exercises that brings all beneficiaries together to compare national situations with agreed standards. Did this happen, did standards align with stakeholder interests on the one hand and project plans & activities on the other?

2012 Evaluation: Needs analysis be conducted into the provision of new analytical and intelligence software packages; Did this help with alignment with actual needs?

Efficiency

Efficiency measures the outputs - qualitative and quantitative - in relation to the inputs.

1. To what extent is the project implemented in the most efficient and cost-effective way compared to alternatives? Are the activities the most cost-effective way of achieving the outputs / outcomes / objective?
2. Are there any good practices regarding efficiency, e.g. are certain aspects or arrangements of the project particularly efficient?

Effectiveness

Effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.

1. To what degree did the project achieve its outcomes and objectives⁴⁰? What other major factors (apart from the project) helped or hindered?
How good are beneficiary staffs skills relevant to the 3 Outcomes? How much do the 3 outcomes actually happen in live operations (proportion of time?) – What helps / hinders? what would this have been like without the project?

³⁷ UNODC guideline adds the “Design” criterion which is not mentioned in the ToR and is adequately covered under “relevance”.

³⁸ This word added from UNODC guideline

³⁹ Added from UNODC guideline

⁴⁰ Formulation changed in line with UNODC guideline (and the definition in the previous line) to clarify that the main interest is in what the programme itself achieved rather than what happened due to other reasons

How committed are stakeholder staff to the project Objectives? What helps / hinders them in this?

2012 Evaluation: Comprehensive awareness programmes be conducted amongst beneficiary agency operational staff to ensure full understanding of intelligence-led law enforcement, its requirements and its benefits; - did they happen / help?

2012 Evaluation: An international expert 'team'/pairing be established to mentor and provide skills transfer in situ with beneficiaries and on a rolling basis amongst them;

2. To what extent was the project management structure effective and allowed implementing the set objectives under the project? i.e. UNODC management & within stakeholders

4. To what extent did the project contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals?

GENDER contribution to gender-specific SDGs in particular?

Impact

Impact is the positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended⁴¹.

1. To what extent has the anticipated impact been reached by the project?

2. Have there been any positive or negative unintended results?

GENDER: specific impacts?

HUMAN RIGHTS: specific impacts?

2012 Evaluation: Continued support of CARICC via the work of the F23 project;

2012 Evaluation: The inclusion of Customs Administrations in the project in a more formalised and embedded way.

Sustainability

Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.

1. What measures are in place to ensure future maintenance and repair of the facilities and equipment provided?

2. To what extent are project interventions and impact⁴² sustainable in the long term? Political will?

What are the motivations of staff members?

What is the most important change which will happen in drug trafficking and enforcement in the next 5 years?

2012 Evaluation: Continued efforts to secure high level and donor support by UNODC, partners and beneficiary agencies .

Increased donor visibility

2012 Evaluation: Necessary IT updates be fulfilled by use of replaced UNODC equipment and renewed donor funding. Efforts should be made by beneficiaries for self-funding or direct outreach to potential donors;

2012 Evaluation: Staff recruitment, rotation and retention issues be addressed, at senior level if necessary to ensure greater stability and sustainability with beneficiary agencies;

Partnerships and cooperation

The evaluation assesses the partnerships and cooperation established during the project⁴³ as well as their functioning and value.

What is the nature of the relationship between the UNODC project and beneficiary agencies and BCs? (e.g. „donor-driven“, „bottom-up“ etc)? Whose project is it?

1. To what extent were stakeholders properly engaged and informed?

2. How was the project conducive to the development of agency partnerships at the bilateral and multilateral level? This includes a) between agencies within same country and b) internationally and c) with other national and international partners.

⁴¹ As mentioned elsewhere, this implies clarifying what the intended impact actually was

⁴² Added from UNODC guideline

⁴³ References to “project / programme” have been changed to “project”

3. To what extent has UNODC F-23 sought / established partnerships ~~been sought~~ with national and international partners, including UN-agencies, UNODC-internally, public oversight bodies and civil society, etc.?

2012 Evaluation: Delivery of assistance at regional level continues in the current model, using joint activities, in house training and expert meetings;

Human rights

The evaluation needs to assess the mainstreaming of human rights aspects throughout the project.

1. To what extent are human rights considerations included in the project development and implementation?

In addition, gender and human rights aspects of the other evaluation criteria will be included under their respective headings where relevant⁴⁴.

Gender

The evaluation needs to assess the mainstreaming of gender aspects throughout the project.

1. To what extent are gender considerations included in the project development and implementation?

is gender-disaggregated data available? If so, analyse & interpret.

2. To what extent did the project intervention contribute to fulfilment of the National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security?

To what extent did the project intervention contribute to introduction and implementation of measures aimed at increasing women and minority representation in the police?

Lessons learned and best practices

Lessons learned concern the learning experiences and insights that were gained throughout the project.

1. What are the lessons learnt from the completed “Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and exchange” project?

2. What are the best practices that could be applied in the future activities and similar projects?

3. What are the necessary adjustments to the UNODC interventions in the region within the undergoing UNOD Programme for Central Asian States 2015-2019?

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

Observation

Observation of partner activities was carried out where possible during site visits to Analytical Units of the Law Enforcement Agencies of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and other sites for physical inspection and discussions both with beneficiaries and other people directly or indirectly affected by the project. These visits were used to answer some additional questions as listed under the evaluation questions above, for example whether data collection and analysis are actually being carried out according to the project documentation.

Deskwork

Desk review of intervention records, desk review of published literature including comparison with standards. Project materials include the project documents, progress reports, outputs of the project.

⁴⁴ As suggested in UNODC guideline. Also, the ToR adds questions on recommendations on Human rights & Gender from the 2012 evaluation; but none were found.

Possible additional interviews with CSOs

In this kind of project, especially one which has lasted over such a long period of time, it is normal to expect that there might be certain pressures on the agencies to answer our questions in ways which don't reflect the whole truth. The evaluation team suggested also talking to 1-3 NGOs in 1 or 2 of the countries to get an additional source of information to ask them about this issue, to help better understand the information from the agencies. This was arranged.

ANNEX III. Evaluation matrix

Methods have been chosen to best answer the evaluation questions and address the ToR. Each evaluation question below has been colour-coded for convenience to show the most important sources as follows:

DW primarily answered by deskwork

BA strong input from BAs

DO strong input from donor

UN strong input from UN

OB observation

This does mean a lot of evaluation questions are to be answered by beneficiary agencies, so some of those marked here may be skipped for individual BAs in order to focus on the questions an individual respondent is best placed to answer.

Clarify whether it might make sense to ask some or all of the appropriate questions in advance in written form.

Other sources may of course also provide data for questions for which they are not explicitly marked – for example, deskwork could turn up additional data for any of the questions.

It would be possible to break down these questions further into more detailed sub-questions. However as the evaluation report is to have maximum 25-30 pages, breaking the questions down further is not recommended.

Evaluation Question	Indicator(s), data	Collection method(s)	Data source	Sampling	Comments
Relevance ⁴⁵					
1. To what extent is / was the project relevant to the respective beneficiaries' agencies and governments' ⁴⁶ needs and priorities? ...	Triangulation between all sources	Ask contextualised question Prompt based on presentation of draft Theory of Change Compare project docs with National strategies	BA DW	See comments in section on Sampling	
... To the donors' & UN?	Triangulation between all sources	Ask contextualised question Prompt based on presentation of draft Theory of Change Compare project docs with strategy docs, UNDAF, etc	UN DO DW		
2. To what extent do the objectives, outcomes and outputs respond to present circumstances and stakeholder expectations? What would BAs' drug law enforcement look like if it was just left to them?	Triangulation between all sources	Ask contextualised question Prompt based on presentation of draft Theory of Change Compare project docs with strategy docs and background	BA DW		

⁴⁵ UNODC guideline adds the “Design” criterion which is not mentioned in the ToR and is adequately covered under “relevance”.

⁴⁶ Added from UNODC guideline

Evaluation Question	Indicator(s), data	Collection method(s)	Data source	Sampling	Comments
		information e.g. INL documentation			
2012 Evaluation: Further regional development, involving the existing members of the project, possible new members and CARICC is undertaken by the use of bench-marking exercises that brings all beneficiaries together to compare national situations with agreed standards. Did this happen, did standards align with stakeholder interests on the one hand and project plans & activities on the other?	Triangulation between all sources	Ask direct question Compare project plan with project monitoring docs, financials. Identify what were the “agreed standards”	BA DW		
2012 Evaluation: Needs analysis be conducted into the provision of new analytical and intelligence software packages; Did this help with alignment with actual needs?	Triangulation between all sources	Ask direct question Compare project plan with project monitoring docs.	BA DW		
Efficiency					
1. To what extent is the project implemented in the most efficient and cost-effective way compared to alternatives? Are the activities the most cost-effective way of achieving the outputs / outcomes / objective?	Triangulation between all sources	Ask about specific items from budget Ask direct question Ask for specific examples e.g. verify presence of specific hardware & software	DW (reference to budgets)BA DO OB (observation of waste)	Try to insist on observation in each active unit visited	

Evaluation Question	Indicator(s), data	Collection method(s)	Data source	Sampling	Comments
				; however may not be meaningful / possible in some occasions	
2. Are there any good practices regarding efficiency, e.g. are certain aspects or arrangements of the project particularly efficient?	Triangulation between all sources	Ask direct question Ask for specific examples Locate good examples from project monitoring data	UN BA		
Effectiveness					
1. To what degree did the project achieve its outcomes and objectives ⁴⁷ ? What other major factors (apart from the project) helped or hindered?	Triangulation between all sources	(reference to project monitoring documentation, financials) Search for other relevant contextual factors in other agency reports e.g. INL Direct question, also ask about	DW BA UN	See comments on observ	

⁴⁷ Formulation changed in line with UNODC guideline (and the definition in the previous line) to clarify that the main interest is in what the programme itself achieved rather than what happened due to other reasons

Evaluation Question	Indicator(s), data	Collection method(s)	Data source	Sampling	Comments
		monitoring results, see above Observation, do observed activities match project plan?	OB	ation above	
How good are beneficiary staffs skills relevant to the 3 Outcomes? How much do the 3 outcomes actually happen in live operations (proportion of time?) – What helps / hinders? what would this have been like without the project? GENDER Gender disaggregation of staff & skills?	Triangulation between all sources	Ask contextualised question and compare answers from BA and UN sources Clarify if possible to ask for data on the 3 outcomes from agencies e.g. proportion of time spent on them Direct observation if possible, focus on actual skills and use	BA UN OB		
How committed are stakeholder staff to the project Objectives? What helps / hinders them in this? 2012 Evaluation: Comprehensive awareness programmes be conducted amongst BA operational staff to ensure full understanding of intelligence-led law enforcement, its requirements and its benefits; - did they happen / help?	Triangulation between all sources	Ask indirect question Ask direct question & verify from monitoring docs, financials Deduce level of commitment from respondents' answers and attitude	BA OB		Indirect question e.g. what do you think about others, what are main motivations / rewards in this job

Evaluation Question	Indicator(s), data	Collection method(s)	Data source	Sampling	Comments
2012 Evaluation: An international expert 'team'/pairing be established to mentor and provide skills transfer in situ with beneficiaries and on a rolling basis amongst them;	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question – did this happen. Ask for evidence. Verify from project monitoring docs, financials	BA DW		
2. To what extent was the project management structure effective and allowed implementing the set objectives under the project? i.e. UNODC management & within stakeholders	Triangulation; In particular, compare answers from both respondent groups	Indirect question – ask about problems & responses; ask about others.	BA DO		
4. To what extent did the project contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals? GENDER contribution to gender-specific SDGs in particular?	Triangulation between all sources	Plausibility analysis on base of outcomes reported in annual reports & impact analysis, below	DW including other reports about general linkages between project Outcomes / Objectives and SDGs		
Impact					
1. To what extent has the anticipated impact been reached by the project?	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question, after using DW and interview to try to clarify what the intended impact was	BA UN DO DW		
2. Have there been any positive or negative unintended results? GENDER: specific impacts? HUMAN RIGHTS: specific impacts?	Triangulation between all sources, also using	Ask for other examples	BA UN DO DW		

Evaluation Question	Indicator(s), data	Collection method(s)	Data source	Sampling	Comments
	prompts suggested by other sources	Identify other examples in project M&E docs and national level reporting			
2012 Evaluation: Continued support of CARICC via the work of the F23 project;	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question; did it happen? Verify in project M&E, financials documentation	BA UN DW		
2012 Evaluation: The inclusion of Customs Administrations in the project in a more formalised and embedded way.	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question; did it happen? In particular, direct question to CAs (UZB, TAJ) Verify in project M&E, financials	BA UN DW		
Sustainability					
1. What measures are in place to ensure future maintenance and repair of the facilities and equipment provided?	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question Ask for examples of existing maintenance	BA DO DW		
2. To what extent are project interventions and impact ⁴⁸ sustainable in the long term? Political will? What are the motivations of staff members?	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question. Indirect questions about motivation. Analysis of how sustainable outputs	BA UN DO DW – project documentation		Motivation – see above

⁴⁸ Added from UNODC guideline

Evaluation Question	Indicator(s), data	Collection method(s)	Data source	Sampling	Comments
		and outcomes have been to date			
What is the most important change which will happen in drug trafficking and enforcement in the next 5 years?	Triangulation between all sources Interpret the responses from the perspective of sustainability	Direct question	BA UN DW – background information e.g. from INL reports		
2012 Evaluation: Continued efforts to secure high level and donor support by UNODC, partners and beneficiary agencies (BA)s. Increased donor visibility	Triangulation between all sources	Direct questions, ask for examples & success Look for examples of donor visibility	BA DO DW – project activity reports OB		
2012 Evaluation: Necessary IT updates be fulfilled by use of replaced UNODC equipment and renewed donor funding. Efforts should be made by beneficiaries for self-funding or direct outreach to potential donors;	Triangulation between all sources	As above Is equipment in place?	BA DO DW – project activity reports & financials OB		
2012 Evaluation: Staff recruitment, rotation and retention issues be addressed, at senior level if necessary to ensure greater stability and sustainability with BAs;	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question – in comparison with other functions within same agency	BA DW – hopefully on basis of staff data from BAs		Could as for this in advance

Evaluation Question	Indicator(s), data	Collection method(s)	Data source	Sampling	Comments
Partnerships and cooperation					
What is the nature of the relationship between the UNODC project and BAs and BCs? (e.g. „donor-driven“, „bottom-up“ etc)? Whose project is it?	Triangulation between all sources	Interpret answers to other questions; also ask directly	BA UN		
1. To what extent were stakeholders properly engaged and informed?	Triangulation between all sources	As above	BA DO		
2. How was the project conducive to the development of agency partnerships at the bilateral and multilateral level? This includes a) between agencies within same country and b) internationally and c) with other national and international partners.	Triangulation between all sources	Ask directly; ask for examples	BA DW - documentation of interagency links from BAs?		
3. To what extent has UNODC F-23 sought / established partnerships been sought with national and international partners, including UN-agencies, UNODC-internally, public oversight bodies and civil society, etc.?	Triangulation between all sources	As above	UN DO DW - documentation of interagency links		
2012 Evaluation: Delivery of assistance at regional level continues in the current model, using joint activities, in house training and expert meetings;	Triangulation between all sources	Ask directly Desk work	BA UN DW - documentation of regional assistance		
Human rights					
1. To what extent are human rights considerations included in the project development and implementation?	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question; ask for examples	UN DO DW - documentation of interagency links from BAs		

Evaluation Question	Indicator(s), data	Collection method(s)	Data source	Sampling	Comments
<i>In addition, gender and human rights aspects of the other evaluation criteria will be included under their respective headings where relevant⁴⁹.</i>		See also questions marked GENDER and HUMAN RIGHTS above			
Gender					
1. To what extent are gender considerations included in the project development and implementation?	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question; ask for examples	UN DO DW - project docs		
is gender-disaggregated data available? If so, analyse & interpret.		Desk work	DW		
2. To what extent did the project intervention contribute to fulfilment of the National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security?	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question; ask for examples	UN DW - national docs & strategy		
To what extent did the project intervention contribute to introduction and implementation of measures aimed at increasing women and minority representation in the police?	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question; ask for examples	UN DW - national docs & strategy		
Lessons learned and best practices					
1. What are the lessons learnt from the completed “Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and exchange” project?	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question Also interpret answers from other questions looking for lessons using evaluative reasoning	BA UN DO		Note that Lessons Learned is interpreted here as what was <i>actually</i> learned

⁴⁹ As suggested in UNODC guideline. Also, the ToR adds questions on recommendations on Human rights & Gender from the 2012 evaluation; but none were found.

Evaluation Question	Indicator(s), data	Collection method(s)	Data source	Sampling	Comments
2. What are the best practices that could be applied in the future activities and similar projects?	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question Also interpret answers from other questions looking for lessons using evaluative reasoning	BA UN DO		
3. What are the necessary adjustments to the UNODC interventions in the region within the undergoing UNODC Regional Programme for Central Asian States 2015-2019?	Triangulation between all sources	Direct question Also interpret answers from other questions looking for lessons using evaluative reasoning	UN		

ANNEX IV. Desk review list

UNODC documents

UNODC Strategic documents

UNODC Medium-term Strategy 2012-2015

UNODC Strategic Framework 2014-2015

Strategic Outline for Central Asia and Southern Caucasus 2012 – 2015; A comprehensive approach to implement the UNODC drug and crime mandate

UNODC Programme for Central Asia 2015-2019: A Partnership Framework for Impact Related Action in CA

Project documents

Project Document (07.06.2001)

Financial and budget documents

Project revision documents

Project Revision document (13.02.2003)

Project Revision Document (06.10.2005)

Project Revision Document (14.05.2007)

Project Revision Document (04.08.2009)

Project Revision Document (22.12.2010)

Project Revision Document (22.06.2012)

Project Revision Document (22.07.2014)

Project annual and semi-annual progress reports

Annual Project Progress Reports (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016)

ToR of the final Independent Project Evaluation

Mid-term evaluation of TD/RER/F23 (2012)

UNODC Guidance documents

UNODC Position Paper on Human Rights (2011)

Guidance Note on Gender Mainstreaming in UNODC (2013)

UNODC evaluation guidelines, templates, handbook, policy

UNODC Inception Report Guidelines and Template

UNODC Evaluation Report Guidelines and Template

UNODC and the SDGs Brochure

2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGS)

Other external documents

UNEG: Integrating human rights and gender equality in evaluation

UNDAFs for all four countries

National Development Plans for Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and National Drug Strategy for Tajikistan

INL International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2017 vol. 1 & 2

USAID Central Asia Regional Development Cooperation Strategy

ANNEX V. List of persons contacted during the evaluation

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Type of stakeholder⁵⁰</i>	<i>Sex disaggregated data</i>	<i>Country</i>
UNODC Tajikistan & F23 office	Project management	Female:2 Male:	Tajikistan
INL Tajikistan	Donor	Female: Male: 1	Tajikistan
Spin Plus	Civil Society	Female: Male: 1	Tajikistan
Ministry of Internal Affairs	beneficiary agency	Female: Male: 3	Tajikistan
AFEW	Civil Society	Female: Male: 2	Tajikistan
Drug Control Agency, Analytical Unit	beneficiary agency	Female: 1 Male: 5	Tajikistan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Other Govt. Agency	Female: Male: 2	Tajikistan
UNODC Kazakhstan	Project management	Female: 1 Male:	Kazakhstan (Astana)
INL Kazakhstan	Donor	Female: 1 Male:	Kazakhstan (Astana)
Agency for Civil Service and Anti- Corruption	beneficiary agency	Female: Male: 4	Kazakhstan (Astana)
Ministry of Internal Affairs,	beneficiary agency	Female: Male: 4	Kazakhstan (Astana)

⁵⁰ This could be e.g. Civil Society Organisation; Project/Programme implementer; Government recipient; Donor; Academia/Research institute; etc.

Counter-Narcotics Department			
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Other Govt. Agency	Female: 1 Male: 1	Kazakhstan (Astana)
UNODC Tajikistan & F23 office (2nd meeting)	Project management	Female: 1 Male:	Kazakhstan (Almaty)
CARICC	beneficiary agency	Female: Male: 4	Kazakhstan (Almaty)
MOI Drug Control Service	beneficiary agency	Female: Male: 2	Kyrgyzstan
UNODC Kyrgyzstan	Project Management	Female: Male: 1	Kyrgyzstan
MOI Operational Analysis Department	beneficiary agency	Female: 2 Male: 3	Kyrgyzstan
National Center on Drug Control; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Internal Affairs; State Custom Committee	beneficiary agency	Female: 0 Male: 5	Uzbekistan
ROCA Regional Representative	Project Management	Female: 1 Male: 0	Uzbekistan
ROCA Monitoring & Evaluation Officer	Project Management	Female: 0 Male: 1	Uzbekistan
ROCA Financial Officer	Project Management	Female: 0 Male: 1	Uzbekistan
F23 Project Manager	Project Management	Female: 0 Male: 1	Uzbekistan
Total		Female: 10 Male: 43	

ANNEX VI. Sampling strategy

The project coverage is 9 countries, however since 2012 F23 had available funds only for the Central Asia states received from INL USA. Out of 5 Central Asia states Turkmenistan did not sign the project extension for internal reasons. As a result since 2012 the project was implemented only in these four countries, therefore at the country level the sample is a so-called census, i.e. all are covered.

So agency selection is only relevant in terms of selecting agencies within countries.

Statistical sample-size calculations are not relevant with such a small sample especially as nearly all the data is qualitative rather than quantitative. However representativeness is an important question.

Work was carried out with the F23 office to clarify how typical the pre-selected agencies are; if they are not typical, what is different about those who are not covered. Conclusion was that (understandably) the sample covers the agencies with better cooperation, so this was taken into account in interpreting the results – see footnote on p. 8.

ANNEX VII. CURRENT LOGFRAME

Outcome 1

Specialized law enforcement personnel use enhanced management of information gathering and exchange systems.

Unchanged

Output 1.1

Necessary training for the use of new software is provided.

Activities

1.1.1 Provision of Intelligence analysis training for the LE analysts of counter narcotics LEA of project member states.

Output 1.2

Train the trainer approach to develop a self-sustaining competence.

Reformulated

Activity

1.2.1 To organize train-the-trainers courses to develop a self - sustaining national competence within each agency (***Reformulated***).

Activity

1.2.2 To organize peer- to-peer seminars for the LE analysts of the LE agencies at the regional level (***New***).

Outcome 2

Law enforcement personnel use enhanced analytical capacity in operational work.

Reformulated

Output 2.1

Conduct an assessment of analytical and intelligence led policing capacity in respond to the existing needs.

Reformulated

Activities

2.1.1 Assess the analytical capacity of the Intelligence law enforcement structures in respond to the existing needs (***Reformulated***);

2.1.2 Work plan for realistic and feasible implementations of criminal intelligence analysis technique and methodologies prepared (*New*);

2.1.3 Intelligence analysts producing analytical reports as a complement to criminal investigations and operations and to the senior leadership as a resource planning and strategic analysis support (*Reformulated*).

Output 2.2

Enhance efforts of the beneficiaries for self-funding or direct outreach to potential donors.

New

Activity

2.2.1 Regular meetings organized with the beneficiaries and donors to discuss funding possibilities and self-sustainability issues (*New*).

Outcome 3

Law enforcement personnel increase use of intelligence-led policing tools in operational work.

Output 3.1

Necessary IT equipment (hardware and software) provided to meet existing challenges.

Reformulated

Activity

3.1.1 The IT equipment (hardware and software) provided/upgraded based on the individual requests from the LE analytical units/departments (*Reformulated*);

3.1.2 To create and install intelligence database for storage and analysis of collected information related to the law enforcement structures (*Reformulated*).

Output 3.2

Organize regular semi-annual regional meetings involving participating countries, with a view to increasing knowledge and strengthening LE (analytical) cooperation and information exchange.

Reformulated

Activity

3.2.1 To conduct regular experts meetings together with CARICC with a view to continue developing a strategy and implementation plan how to root and establish sustainable information exchange channels between CARICC and the counter narcotic law enforcement agencies in the region.

ANNEX VIII. COMMENTS ON LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The project documents including logical framework were discussed and cleared by the relevant governments' agencies. Below, the project logical framework is examined to explicate more precisely what the project was actually aiming to do in order to be able to evaluate its actual achievement against those aims. This step is essential particularly because the evaluation is supposed to be summative in nature⁵¹.

Objective

The project Objective is: "A coherent and comprehensive system for intelligence, information and information collection, analysis and exchange is established." This is quite a limited (though not necessarily easy-to-achieve) aim as it deals only with the establishment of a system (i.e. a network, agencies and functional tools) and not with whether that system is used or what the positive consequences of that should be. Indeed, the original project Objective was "To increase interdiction and the crime control effectiveness of drug law enforcement structures..." which was then reduced to "To increase crime control effectiveness ..." and again, whereas the present Objective is reduced again only to the establishment of systems – a much less ambitious but perhaps more realistic Objective. But does the establishment of a system also imply that it is actually used or even that such use is to have positive consequences?

On the one hand it seems not, because the current Indicator for this is "Each project country has at least operational analysis unit⁵² with functional and comprehensive database as a support tool for the ongoing investigations." – and indeed this is a meaningful aim as this was not the case originally; but no baseline is defined and obviously it is difficult to define "functional and comprehensive".

On the other hand, all three *Outcomes* below this Objective do clearly mention use, see below. So it seems that the Objective is intended as a "*definitional* Objective" i.e. the three Outcomes define it, rather than cause it. This means that no separate indicator is needed for the Objective, as it is deemed as being achieved when the Outcomes are achieved. And it suggests that the Objective is indeed to be understood as implying not just the *establishment* but also the *use* of systems.

Outcomes

The three Outcomes are as follows (slightly abbreviated). The phrases in **italics** are presumably intended to carry express the intended changes, the difference made by the project.

⁵¹ Scriven, M. (1991). Beyond formative and summative evaluation.

⁵² Presumably this should read "Each project country has at least ONE operational analysis unit"

Specialized law enforcement personnel use **enhanced** management of **information-gathering and exchange** systems.

Law enforcement personnel use **enhanced** **analytical capacity** in operational work

Law enforcement personnel **increased** use of **intelligence-led policing** in operational work [emphasis added]

So each Outcome focuses on *use*. This is admirable successful and sustainable technical assistance usually depends on behaviour change of key players.

The Outcomes also imply that (at least in most cases) the groundwork has already been done (helping to establish specific analytical units with trained staff and relevant hardware and software in the initial project phases) and the focus is now on increasing / improving actual use. This is consistent with the findings of the mid-term evaluation⁵³.

The Objective and Outcomes nowhere define the desired extent / scale of the project – do they refer to one beneficiary agency, or all of them, or to individual countries? Indeed the indicator for the Objective (“Each project country has *at least operational analysis unit* [sic; and emphasis added] with functional and comprehensive database as a support tool for the ongoing investigations”) is hard to understand – does this mean each country has at least *one* such agency?– is it *enough* to have just one agency functioning in each country? If not, which different agencies should be involved?

Does the logical framework imply or state which kind of crime is to be targeted? Trafficking only of narcotics and only by organised transnational criminal groups would be the narrowest interpretation consistent with the project title; but the Objectives and Outcomes leave broader interpretations open.

Finally, does the logical framework imply or state what kind of *data exchange* between agencies is intended? In particular, is data to be exchanged within or between countries? The narratives in the project documents imply *between* countries. E.g. “Combating illicit drug trafficking requires

well-organized systems of information/data collection, processing and analysis,

the exchange of the final information product among agencies involved at national and regional levels”

But in the logframe itself, only the indicator (but not text) for Outcome 3 mentions international collaboration.

⁵³ From 2011 Annual Report: “The project has now installed modern intelligence systems and i2 analysis software in 17 counter narcotic agencies throughout Central Asia Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. Approximately 180 officers have been trained in crime analysis techniques at various levels. All relevant agencies have analysts working with i2 software who are able to create analytical reports and visualization charts in support of operational activity.” This differs only slightly from the parallel statement in the 2017 semi-annual report, implying that the new focus is on strengthening existing achievements.

The suggested minimum and additional success dimensions are as follows.

Essential success dimensions: Within at least one agency within each participating country, with respect to trafficking of narcotics, the project **must** increase/enhance the three Outcomes: 1) information gathering and 2) analysis, and 3) this is to be increasingly intelligence-led. “Intelligence-led” means in particular that the work of agencies is not only responding to crimes but using intelligence to understand and anticipate crime in a pro-active way, also impacting resource allocation⁵⁴; so the overall success of the project is to be judged against these three outcomes. There are also additional aims (“nice to have”) which are implied at various points in the project documentation but not so consistently that they can be judged to be binding:

Additional success dimensions:

progress on these dimensions in *more than one agency* in each country
application a) in particular to *transnational* narcotics trafficking and b) more generally to *other* organised crimes
increased exchange of intelligence between agencies *within* one country
increased exchange of intelligence *between* countries

This still leaves open which countries are “the participating countries” – this phrase is used in the Logframe but the only list of countries is the Project Location which includes the full list - Central Asian States, Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. It is acknowledged that funding was only in fact available for the four countries covered in the ToR for this evaluation mission, so these four countries will be considered to exhaust the participating countries for the purposes of this evaluation, although wider networking includes also those countries which were previously involved, coordinated by the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC)⁵⁵.

The question remains *how much* improvement is required or implied on these essential and additional success dimensions. Inspection of the indicators, targets and baselines in the logical framework does not help as they are somewhat difficult to understand and not very consistent⁵⁶. So it will be assumed that *any* difference made to these dimensions should be counted as success⁵⁷.

Project documentation implies that all these dimensions are synergistic, i.e. improvement on any of them is likely to contribute to improving the whole system: an overall, intelligence-led and intelligence-sharing, multiple-agency, international counter-narcotics system: “Combating illicit drug trafficking requires well-organized systems of information/data collection, processing and

⁵⁴ Ratcliffe, J. H. (2016). Intelligence-led policing. Routledge.


⁵⁵ However this is not standard practice; normally if the coverage of a project is reduced compared to the original plan, this is noted within a project revision.

⁵⁶ In particular, Outcome 1: Baseline refers to skills, Target refers to trainings delivered and Outcome refers to use. Baseline and Target for Outcome 2 refer to Output 2.1 (conducting needs analyses) rather than to use of analytical capacity. Outcome 3: Baseline and Target refer to expert meetings whereas the Outcome refers to use of intelligence-led policing

⁵⁷ In particular, project reports from previous years make it clear that in some cases there may be a tendency for some achievements to regress over time without additional input. This means that the baseline level of a criterion or indicator is not a fair estimate of the counterfactual (http://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/understandcauses/compare_results_to_counterfactual). For example merely *maintaining* a system or level of use in a particular agency over time may in some circumstances represent a significant achievement; and raising it even a little may represent an even bigger one. This is why the word “difference” rather than “change” has been used above.

analysis, as well as the exchange of the final information product among agencies involved at national and regional levels”⁵⁸

Figure 5. A graphical representation of the project logical framework from the latest Revision (7), with adjustments*



*All Outputs potentially contribute to each Outcome; dotted lines to and around Objective show it is defined in terms of the Outcomes rather than caused by them

Finally, how do the project Outputs contribute to the Outcomes? Most of the Outputs contribute to more than one or even to all three Outcomes⁵⁹. So for example Output 1.1, training on software, helps with all three Outcomes, not just Outcome 1 as implied in the logframe.

Perhaps the logframe can be better understood as in Figure 2. This reproduces the Logical framework exactly except for two changes: 1) the Outputs collectively lead to the Outcomes (so each and every Output potentially contributes to Outcomes 1, 2, and 3); and 2) the Objective is shown with dotted lines because it is defined as a *summary* of the Outcomes rather than being an independent variable which is *caused* by them.

Deeper understanding of how the project is intended to work depends on understanding factors not shown in this diagram or explicitly mentioned in the logframe. It is quite normal that project

⁵⁸ Original PROJECT DOCUMENT: AD/RER/00/F23.

⁵⁹ With the kind of hierarchical logframe format used at UNODC it is difficult to show an Output contributing to more than one Outcome

logframes omit some of these additional factors, perhaps for the sake of simplicity. But for this evaluation it will be useful to discuss them. One omission is *skills* which form the crucial link between Outputs and Outcomes – for example, an officer *attends a training course* (Output), develops *skills* (missing link) with which they are able to *use* the systems (Outcomes).

Another omission is the many other important inputs into the mechanism which are provided by others, in particular national governments which of course provide the majority of inputs into intelligence systems (staffing, premises, etc) and individuals (whose performance depends on their own motivation etc).

ANNEX IX. MORE DETAILS ON THE RECOMMENDATION ON MONITORING AND EVALUATION

This text follows on from the corresponding outline recommendation on p. 37.

It has proved difficult in F23 to predict in advance which areas and topics will prove most possible and most fruitful, so the target-setting procedure should consider adopting minimum success standards (such as “at least one agency in at least three of the project countries reaches minimum standard ...”) enriched by a “menu” of additional, optional, success dimensions as outlined for the present evaluation on p. 3 (such as, “additional agencies within each country reach the minimum standard ...”; “the project approach is applied to other law enforcement areas ...” etc.) These standards and dimensions could overlap with a benchmarking approach.

Also clarify whether the project Objective is really a separate item which is *caused* by the Outcomes or whether it is simply a *summary* of them (as is probably the case at present). If not, consider defining the Objective in terms of consequent successes in prosecutions in which the software and skills were *used*. While some agencies might be reluctant to share this information, not all will be (at least one agency spontaneously volunteered this information to the evaluation team). So the causal chain could look in outline something like this: Outputs (e.g. training, provision of hardware) → Outcomes (e.g. Increased use of key skills and data exchange in agency work) → Objective (e.g. Increased prosecutions using F23 inputs). Such a modified framework would need to explicitly state that “Increased prosecutions” is influenced by many factors beyond the control of the agencies and UNODC and cannot be directly interpreted as an indication of project success; nevertheless it is valuable as a statement of a final purpose of the project.

The project logical framework is its foundational document and UNODC should provide expert input to ensure that it satisfies standards of evaluability and logical consistency.

These standards and dimensions for project outcomes should then be formulated in a SMART way and used for real-time project monitoring, for example in two or three simple, corresponding spreadsheets which can be used for the Annual Reports and for day-to-day management and resource allocation. Standard practices for assessing training courses should be followed wherever possible, e.g. with brief pre-course and post-course tests of knowledge.

ANNEX X. MORE DETAILS ON RECOMMENDATION ON BENCHMARKING AND TRAINING STANDARDS

This text follows on from the corresponding outline recommendation on p. 37.

Basic training needs (“Level I”) should be covered at national level, with only minimum help from the project such as awareness-raising sessions and possibly provision of equipment. CARICC can participate in providing some standardised training modules. Basic training should cover those more standardised aspects which change slowly like basic skills.

Mid-level training (“Level II”) and other inputs is already provided via CARICC using trainers from CARICC and the participating countries, and this should be continued. This reinforces the need for more advanced training for CARICC personnel, in particular on the operational side of i2.

Mid- and advanced- level training needs to urgently address the list of emerging challenges, see p. 30, and provide more customised inputs for individual agencies and groups of agencies.

Advanced-level training (“Level III”) and other inputs should be provided by trainers from beyond the region working in tandem with CARICC trainers who can learn through assisting in training provision.

Training provision needs to link into the benchmarking minimum standards for individual skills. Although certificates are already issued there is the need to better quantify and evaluate training, for example with before and after scores on tests for each trainee, or with a trainer rating. UNODC should identify an external institute with expertise in constructing this kind of multi-agency technical training support, which can provide pedagogical input on how to construct and test modular minimum standards for this kind of environment. These kinds of standards can help provide some measure of staff progress for the agencies but also for the project. So, a minimum standard for an Law Enforcement Agency could specify, for example, that it should have at least one level III trainer and two analysts who have been trained to level II.

Whether these benchmarks are additional to national training curricula and academies or integrated into them should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. If integration is desired, the project should be aware that this procedure could take a considerable amount of time.

Improved recording of staff progress in this way in collaboration with the agencies could help circumvent the current problem that beginner trainees are sometimes incorrectly sent to advanced training.

However, CARICC still needs to demonstrate its ability to maintain its role as a centre of excellence and cannot be allowed to fall behind on constantly developing challenges. It must continue to

contribute to F23 areas of work such as identifying minimum standards, maintaining lists of trainers, helping with curricula, identifying new models of work etc.

ANNEX XI. Expenditure breakdown

Period 2012-2015	USD
International expert	201,360.00
ST consultants	23,100.00
Travel	125,155.46
Other Personnel Costs	287,067.12
Training	54,120.27
Conferences/Meetings	84,700.97
Exp. Equipment	2,087.01
Non-exp Equip	60,026.99
Rental for Premises	15,971.75
General Operating Exp	66,242.09
Evaluation	23,600.00
Sub total	943,431.66
FCR	5,506.86
PSC, 13%	120,475.09
TOTAL	1,069,413.61
Period 2016-02.2017	
FT30_CLASS_160 : Travel	91,050.58
FT30_CLASS_010 : Staff Personnel	77,819.29
FT30_CLASS_120 : Contract Service	12,140.26
FT30_CLASS_130 : Suppl Com Mater	1,055.59
FT30_CLASS_125 : Operat Oth Costs	21,312.01
FT30_CLASS_135 : Equip Veh Furnit	31,342.94
FT30_CLASS_155 : UN-PSC	29,061.11
TOTAL:	263,781.78

As the accounting system changed during this period, the headings for the two different periods are not fully compatible with one another.

ANNEX. Anti-narcotics provision in National development Strategies

In the evaluated countries covered within this project, the following relevant documents have been published:

Kazakhstan

"Sectoral Program to Combat Drug Addiction and Drug Business in The **Republic of Kazakhstan for 2012-2016**. " Lost force by the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 29.06.2016 No. 383, so it will not be considered here.

Kyrgyzstan

"Anti-Drug Program of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic". Approved by the Decree of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic dated January 27, 2014 No. 54. Still active.

Tajikistan

"National Strategy for Combating Illicit Trafficking in Drugs for 2013-2020" Approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan on February 13, 2013, No. 1409. Still active.

Also, the "Sectoral program for the implementation of the National Strategy for Combating with illegal drug trafficking in the Republic of Tajikistan for 2013-2020 ". Approved by Decree of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan of April 28, 2017 No. 211. Still active.

Uzbekistan

"Program of comprehensive measures to counteract abuse of drugs and their illicit trafficking for 2016-2020". Still active.

Summary

Within the framework of these strategies and programs, there are tasks covering the formation in each country of a uniform system for the reduction of the supply and demand for drugs and the strengthening of trafficking within and between countries.

In practically in all the specified program documents there are tasks related to the collection and analysis of operational information. So, in section 4.3.3. "Fighting against illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors", the programs of the **Kyrgyz Republic** sets the following tasks:

- "Development of methods for the collection and use of operational data and evidence, including those authorized by courts, methods of evidence collection such as electronic surveillance and controlled deliveries "
- "Creation of information-analytical systems, improvement of collection, processing and data analysis, the creation of electronic databases and access to them specialists, as well as the exchange of operational data with securing non-disclosure and protection of information sources "

In the Program of **Uzbekistan**⁶⁰, the following is noted:

- "In order to improve the mechanism of information exchange and organization of its centralized processing, a unified database format for basis of modern information-analytical software IBM i2, provided in the framework of international projects. Installation of this program in the analytical departments of law enforcement bodies of the republic, and a simplified form of the data bank was developed. "... .." At present work on the development of the National Database System (by analogy with law enforcement systems of the EU countries) ".

The Sector Program (Action Plan) in **Tajikistan** has the following tasks:

- "To improve the database of law enforcement agencies in relation to legal entities and individuals involved in trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors ";

- "Provision of law enforcement bodies whose activities are related to disclosure of drug crimes, modern technical equipment and equipment, introduction of new methods of gathering information for disclosure of crimes ".

⁶⁰ (according to the website www.freecity.lv, unfortunately, the text is not otherwise available)