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Independent final project evaluation of the

**“Strengthening the Counter Narcotics Service
of the Interior Ministry of the Kyrgyz
Republic”**

KGZ/K50

Kyrgyz Republic



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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Full name</i>	<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Full name</i>
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome	MDG	Millennium Development Goals
BLO	Border Liaison Office	MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
CADAP	Central Asia Drug Abuse Programme	MOBITS	Mobile Interdiction Teams
CARICC	Central Asian Regional Intelligence Coordination Centre	Mol	Ministry of the Interior
CBO	Community Based Organizations	NCD	Non-Communicable Diseases
CBT	Computer based training	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
CEDAW	Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women	NSDS	National Sustainable Development Strategy, 2013–2017
CD	Controlled Delivery	NVD	Night Viewing Devices
CENTCOM	(US) Central Command	OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
CLPs	Core Learning Partners	OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
CN	Counter Narcotics	OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CNS	Counter Narcotics Service	SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	SRT	Special Rapporteur on Torture
CPI	Corruption Perception Index	SOP	Standard Operations Procedure
CT	Counter Terrorism	SSDC	State Service on Drug Control
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism	TNA	Training Needs Analysis
DCA	Drug Control Agency	TTT	Train the trainer
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency	ROCA	(UNODC) Regional Office in Central Asia
DLO	Drug Liaison Officer	UN	United Nations

FIU	Financial Investigation Unit	UN women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
FSKN	Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation	UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
GBV	Gender Based Violence	UNCT	United National Country Team
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
HR	Human Rights / Human Resources	UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
INL	(US) International Narcotics and Law enforcement	UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Regulation
KR	Kyrgyz Republic	VAWG	Violence Against Women and Girls
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation	WHO	World Health Organization

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

<i>Recommendation</i>	<i>Management Response (accepted/partially accepted/rejected)</i>
<p>1: Regional study. Within the next 18 months the Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and ROCA, in conjunction with regional partners, should conduct and in-depth study into illicit drug smuggling, seizures and arrests within the region in order to better understand what has occurred, and the combined effectiveness of UNODC’s numerous regional LE coordination and cooperation mechanisms</p>	Accepted
<p>2: CNS needs analysis. Within the next 24 months the Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and ROCA should assist the CNS to conduct a full needs analysis of agency, assist in the development of an implementation plan and then use this plan to leverage both internal and IC resources. UNODC should consider using theory of change during this process and the design of any future interventions.</p>	Accepted
<p>3: Future UNODC assistance: Within in next 12 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia will need to programme assistance to numerous Kyrgyz LE agencies, while at same time not losing site that the CNS will still require support. Areas for future UNODC assistance are likely to include: counter terrorism, combating violent extremism and assistance for financial investigations.</p>	Accepted
<p>4. Legal reform and legal assistance. Over the next 24 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should continue to support legal reform in Kyrgyzstan, ensuring that it is human rights complaint and gender sensitive, and assist the Kyrgyz Government to develop and adopt respective legislation which can be quickly updated to incorporate new challenges in drug smuggling and new appearances in the drug market.</p>	Accepted
<p>5. Greater consideration of Gender and Human Rights during the design phase. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan should reach out to other IC actors who have specific gender programmes and ensure that their programmes and projects reinforce what is already being done, rather than develop unilateral activities and targets.</p>	Accepted
<p>6a. Joint national study. Within the next 18 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan should conduct a study of drug smuggling and seizures within Kyrgyzstan so that it can better demonstrate the benefit of UNODC assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic and donors. This study should explore the method used to construct the alternative narrative (contained in this evaluation)</p>	Accepted

which seeks to challenge the perception of declining seizures, by placing data in context. As part of this study, UNODC should consider how it can assist the CNS with the collection and analysis of drug seizure, arrest, prosecution and drug use data in the future.

6b. Improved project/programme design. The UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1-4 Coordinators for the Programme for Central Asia should ensure that future programme/project indicators are more relevant to the outcomes they hope to achieve and accurately reflect the sum of the outputs and quality of the inputs. UNODC should also ensure that baseline studies are completed and that obvious and reoccurring risks are identified and planned against.

Accepted

7. Regional participation. Within the next 6 months the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia and the SP1 Coordinator for the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries should consider how they can assist the CNS to participate in regional events and information sharing once direct funding, under K50, stops in Dec 2017. The provision of additional places for CNS officers on regional courses and linking the CNS to the BLO are areas for consideration.

Accepted

8. Priority setting. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should take care when devising working groups akin to the PSC for K50 to ensure that the Kyrgyz Government retains the sense of ownership that it did under K50. These working groups and/or priority setting meetings at the country level, must accord to the Kyrgyz Government's own priority setting timetable. The UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan should continue to engage other IC partners in the recently established LE meeting to ensure that assistance is coordinated and linked to the Kyrgyz Government's priority areas.

Accepted

9a. Human resources assistance. Within the next 12 months, following a formal needs analysis, the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should assist the CNS with the formulation of job descriptions for CNS officers so that there is a properly identified and resourced career path for CN officers.

Accepted

9b. Provision of mentors. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should consider the placement of short-term mentors within the CNS in order to increase their institutional capacity.

Accepted

9c. Increased in-kind contribution. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should advocate for in-kind contributions from the MoI. The use of MoI training facilities should be considered.

Accepted

10. Improved non-traditional reporting. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator should explore ways of improving both its formal (traditional) reporting and informal (non-traditional) reporting.

Accepted

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report represents the final independent evaluation of project KGZ/K50. The primary intended users are the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan and the Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA). The evaluation covers the period January 2015 to December 2017. It was conducted by a team of two independent evaluators and comprised of a desk level review, a field visit, interviews, three site visits, observations, and the mining of UNODC data.

Kyrgyzstan¹ lies on the northern distribution route which facilitates the movement of opiates from Afghanistan along the silk route into the Russian Federation². With limited natural resources, a weak criminal justice system, and historic border disputes, Kyrgyzstan is a prime transit country³. Relatively low levels of government spending, corruption⁴ and under-resourced law enforcement (LE) agencies⁵ pose significant barriers to the combating of drug trafficking⁶.

Established in 2010, the State Service on Drug Control (SSDC) was designed to oversee the implementation of the Kyrgyz National Strategy on Drug Control. The SSDC was comprised of a number of legal, investigative and law enforcement departments, and was the primary apparatus for inter-agency and international counter narcotics (CN) coordination. As part of a national LE optimisation programme, the Kyrgyz Government⁷ announced that the SSDC would to be abolished in November 2016. Its replacement, the Counter Narcotics Service (CNS), officially commenced operations in July 2017.

The overall objective of the K50 project was that “the Counter Narcotics Service be developed into an effective and sustainable specialized law enforcement organisation⁸”. UNODC provided support from August 2011 until December 2017. The project’s donors were the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and the United States of America. Three project revisions, extended the project by two years, doubled the budget, and allowed the project to support the CNS, as the SSDC’s legal successor. Although the project will finish in December 2017, the introduction of the Programme for Central Asia⁹ will see UNODC LE activities in Kyrgyzstan continue until to at least 2019; meaning that some of K50 activities will endure beyond the life span of the project.

¹ For ease of reading the official title “The Kyrgyz Republic” is often referred to as Kyrgyzstan.

² UNODC Regional Report <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/central-asia.html>

³ UNODC Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia http://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Illicit%20Drug%20Trends_Central%20Asia-final.pdf

⁴ https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/363_Overview_of_Corruption_in_Kyrgyzstan.pdf

⁵ Synthesis of UNODC reports as per the TORs for this evaluation (see Annex 1).

⁶ 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) - Country Report: Kyrgyzstan.

⁷ UNODC K50 Semi Annual Report for 2017.

⁸ K50 overall objective - as per the project documentation.

⁹ The Programme for Central Asia 2015- 2019

http://www.unodc.org/documents/centralasia/MOU/programme_for_central_asia_2015-2019_en.pdf

Relevance

In the context of Kyrgyzstan's post conflict development plan, the International Communities (ICs) development agenda, and the omni-present threat of illicit drugs emanating from Afghanistan, the project was highly relevant. It responded to a direct request from the Kyrgyz President and to the needs of the SSDC; as defined in a formal needs analysis. The project was highly relevant to the work of the IC, it supported SDG 16, the stated objectives of the donor nations and a number of UNODC programmes. K50 was an effective first layer of UNODC's concerted approach¹⁰ which seeks to interconnect Europe with West and Central Asia.

Design

The project had a simple structure that provided a clear implementation mechanism, which was well suited to supporting the formation and development of a newly created agency, in a post-Soviet county. Although the project documentation did not officially record what lessons it learnt from previous projects, its activities were based on identified capability gaps and it didn't repeat the mistakes associated with a previous UNODC projects.

Human Rights and Gender

Human rights and gender sensitive activities were not recorded in the project documentation; however, analysing what the project delivered, it became apparent that the project did consider both aspects. This is most clearly demonstrated through UNODC's assistance to the drafting and revising of Kyrgyz laws, which ensured that new legislation was human rights compliant and gender sensitive. Practical training sessions made recipients more aware of their human rights obligations, especially the treatment of detainees. Gender quotas for training were not well devised and the project team should have supported OSCE's and UNDP's gender objectives rather than inventing unilateral metrics.

Partnerships and Cooperation

The span of the project's partners encompassed many international, regional and national level stakeholders and all the relevant Ministries within the Kyrgyz Government. Stakeholders reported that they had been properly engaged and regularly informed by the project staff. The project assisted in developing numerous bilateral and multilateral partnerships, such as the working group that seeks to coordinate the ICs law enforcement fraternity, in support of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Efficiency

The project was highly efficient in what it provided, and in the manner that it utilised resources. The project was well managed and was delivered on time and to budget. The project team, a mixture of generalists and specialists, was suitable to the selected activities and worked well together. The requirement for the international coordinator to be a Russian speaking LE specialist cannot be

¹⁰ UNODC concerted approach for linking Central and Western Asia with Europe
http://www.unodc.org/documents/postungass2016/contributions/UN/UNODC_Ch.6_Europe_West_and_Central_Asia.pdf

understated. Many of the project's activities required personal interactions with senior Kyrgyz officials. One area for improvement is UNODC use of digital communications.

Sustainability

Infrastructure provided by the project is now owned by the MoI and its long-term sustainability resides with the CNS. Equipment, procured by the project, is assessed as sustainable, as the CNS is responsible for its upkeep and maintenance. The fact that all the SSDC's infrastructure and equipment was transferred to the CNS, when it was abolished, is extremely positive; as this was not the case when the DCA was abolished in 2009. The CNS is self-sustaining in regards to training and will continue to require training support for many years. The professionalization of the CNS is the critical path, and there is an urgent need to provide a long term sustainable solution in respect to the training and education of counter narcotic (CN) officials within the Kyrgyz Republic.

Effectiveness

When the SSDC was established it had little infrastructure or equipment. Due to the project, the SSDC/CNS received the tools (laws, infrastructure, equipment, laboratories and training) it required to function. How the CNS utilises these tools is the area where future assistance lies. While the project trained almost 400 LE officials, M&E was not well thought-out and project indicators did not demonstrate the true effect of training. Simply using the logical matrix's metrics, the project does not appear to be successful.

Impact

Overall the project achieved what it intended to achieve. The long-term impact resides in the 6 laws the project assisted in drafting/revising, as these will endure. The disappointing fact is that despite the quality of the assistance, the SSDC/CNS as an organisation was unable to increase the overall seizures of illicit drugs. Rather than accept this negative outcome, the evaluators analysed seizure data in greater detail. This report explores two differing narratives in relation to the data. The first compares total seizures in 2017 to the 2011 baseline. This indicates that seizures have declined and the narrative describes why this might have occurred, highlighting a number of factors in support. This report then introduces an alternative narrative, which seeks to counter these factors by highlighting areas where, for certain types of illicit drug seizures, there have been improvements. By extending the baseline to 2003, the report identifies what occurred on the two occasions when the Kyrgyz Republic did not have a central CN agency (DCA or SSDC) as a means of demonstrating what a CN agency provides. This report concluded that this alternative narrative better describes UNODC's assistance, what was achieved, how the SSDC/CNS was strengthened, and a correlation between strengthening and improved seizures and joint operations.

Conclusion

This evaluation concludes that the K50 project was successful, in what it delivered and also in the achievement of its outcomes. However, it is clear from the analysis contained within this report that illicit drug seizures, within Kyrgyzstan (and possibly the whole region), are low compared to the volume transiting the country. UNODC needs to understand what is occurring and what the overall impact of its combined activities are, within the region.

The CNS is not yet a self-sustaining agency and will require international assistance for many years. UNDP's 2017 development assessment recommends that UNDP should continue to build capacity

within Kyrgyz Ministries and agencies. This report concurs, and suggests a conceptual model for capacity building, to ensure that the entire organisation of the CNS is considered so that it can be assisted across a number, of mutually supporting, lines of development. UNODC will not provide support to the entire organisation but using this model will help to identify risk and assist with the coordination of the IC's joint efforts in support of the Kyrgyz LE agencies.

The Kyrgyz Government consider UNODC as a trusted partner¹¹ and there is more that UNODC can do to assist. The introduction of the Programme for Central Asia arrives at a vital time as there are many areas where UNODC can assist. Countering terrorism, countering violent extremism (CVE) and financial investigations were areas identified by Kyrgyz Officials. UNODC must not forget the CNS as it will continue to require support in developing CN laws, training and with regional intelligence sharing and cooperation.

In order to deliver this wide portfolio of activities, the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan must move forward as one, ensuring that LE activities do not remain in silos, within small project teams, and that it embraces a new way of working, under the Programme for Central Asia.

Recommendations

This report makes ten recommendations. Three major recommendations are listed below, as these will require resources if they are to be actioned. The remaining seven relate to improvements in delivery which can be implemented under current arrangements.

Recommendation 1: Regional study. Within the next 18 months the Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and ROCA, in conjunction with regional partners, should conduct an in-depth study into illicit drug smuggling, seizures and arrests within the region in order to better understand what has occurred, and the combined effectiveness of UNODC's numerous regional LE coordination and cooperation mechanisms.

Recommendation 2: CNS needs analysis. Within the next 24 months the Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and ROCA should assist the CNS to conduct a full needs analysis of agency, assist in the development of an implementation plan and then use this plan to leverage both internal and IC resources. UNODC should consider using theory of change during this process and the design of any future interventions.

Recommendation 3: Future UNODC assistance: Within in next 12 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia will need to programme assistance for numerous Kyrgyz LE agencies, while at the same time providing support for the CNS. Areas for future UNODC assistance are likely to include: counter terrorism, combating violent extremism and assistance for financial investigations.

¹¹ This conclusion is made based on a synthesis of the comments made by Kyrgyz Officials, donors, members of the IC and the issues that other international organisations, such as OSCE, were facing in the Kyrgyz Republic.

SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings ¹²	Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)	Recommendations ¹³
<p>1. The sum of various UNODC regional initiatives seeks to improve regional LE cooperation. The outcome of which, should be increased the seizures of illicit drugs. While each of these elements has been evaluated separately, there does not appear to be a holistic study. Data suggests that opiate seizures in Central Asia (and globally) peaked in 2011 and that since then there has been a decline. UNODC needs to understand if its focus on greater regional cooperation is working. The last formal UNODC study into illicit drug flows in Central Asia and detailed analysis of illicit seizures is dated April 2008.</p>	<p>Desk level review Web-based research</p>	<p>1. Within the next 18 months the Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and ROCA, in conjunction with regional partners, should conduct an in-depth study into illicit drug smuggling, seizures and arrests within the region in order to better understand what has occurred, and the combined effectiveness of UNODC's numerous regional LE coordination and cooperation mechanisms</p>
<p>2. Historical lessons indicate that providing technical assistance without institutional change does not necessarily deliver a better organisation or improve its performance. The CNS will require training assistance from the international community for many years to come, or until a sustainable training plan is developed. Considerable thought needs to be applied to</p>	<p>Interviews Observations Reporting Desk Level Review Previous Evaluations</p>	<p>2. Within the next 24 months the Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and ROCA should assist the CNS to conduct a full needs analysis of agency, assist in the development of an implementation plan and then use this plan to leverage both internal and IC resources. UNODC should consider using theory of change during this process and the design of any future interventions.</p>

¹² A finding uses evidence from data collection to allow for a factual statement. In certain cases, also conclusions may be included in this column instead of findings.

¹³ Recommendations are proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a project/programme; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions.

the mapping of inputs, activities to desired outputs and outcomes, ensuring that there is a logical and practical (realistic) progression		
3. UNODC is increasingly seen as trusted international partner and there is more that UNODC can do to assist the Kyrgyz Republic. Remaining donor funds that have been allocated to K50, and not spent by Dec 2017, will be swept up, under SP1 of the Programme for Central Asia which will continue to provide assistance to Kyrgyz LE agencies until at least 2019.	Interviews Desk level review Web-based research	3. Within in next 12 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia will need to programme assistance for numerous Kyrgyz LE agencies, while at the same time providing support for the CNS. Areas for future UNODC assistance are likely to include: counter terrorism, combating violent extremism and assistance for financial investigations.
4. One of the project's major long term achievements was assisting the Kyrgyz Government to draft, revise and adopt practical CN laws, that were both human rights compliant and gender sensitive.	UNODC Reports Interviews Review of Kyrgyz laws drafted with the assistance of UNODC via K50	4. Over the next 24 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should continue to support legal reform in Kyrgyzstan, ensuring that it is human rights complaint and gender sensitive, and assist the Kyrgyz Government to develop and adopt respective legislation which can be quickly updated to incorporate new challenges in drug smuggling and new appearances in the drug market.
5. There was little evidence, in the project's documentation, to suggest that human rights and gender equality had been formally incorporated into the project's design. An arbitrary figure of 20% female participation in training was added as an indicator.	Interviews Desk level review Web-based research	5. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan should reach out to other IC actors who have specific gender programmes and ensure that their programmes and projects reinforce what is already being done, rather than develop unilateral activities and targets.
6. There were some areas, in the initial project design, where improvements could have been made. The project sought to build capacity within a newly formed organisation (the SSDC) and the main project indicator was poorly	Interviews Desk level review Web-based research	6a. Within the next 18 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan should conduct a study of drug smuggling and seizures within Kyrgyzstan so that it can better demonstrate the benefit of UNODC assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic and donors.

<p>devised, it was too simplistic and prone to statistical anomalies. When the 2017 data was compared to 2011, it suggests that illicit drug seizures have decreased during the course of the project's assistance, rather than increased. This fact contradicts the qualitative evidence gained during the evaluation and suggests that the data required a more detailed analysis.</p>		<p>This study should explore the method used to construct the alternative narrative (contained in this evaluation) which seeks to challenge the perception of declining seizures, by placing data in context. As part of this study, UNODC should consider how it can assist the CNS with the collection and analysis of drug seizure, arrest, prosecution and drug use data in the future.</p> <p>6b. The UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1-4 Coordinators for the Programme for Central Asia should ensure that future programme/project indicators are more relevant to the outcomes they hope to achieve and accurately reflect the sum of the outputs and quality of the inputs. UNODC should also ensure that baseline studies are completed and that obvious and reoccurring risks are identified and planned against.</p>
<p>7. Senior SSDC/CNS officers felt that despite an increased regional focus at the higher level, their daily working relationships with other international agencies was poor. The CNS will continue to have limited access to financial resources, which means that participation in regional visits, workshops and international conventions will require external assistance in the future.</p>	<p>Interviews</p>	<p>7. Within the next 6 months the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia and the SP1 Coordinator for the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries should consider how they can assist the CNS to participate in regional events and information sharing once direct funding, under K50, stops in Dec 2017. The provision of additional places for CNS officers on regional courses and linking the CNS to the BLO are areas for consideration.</p>

<p>8. Kyrgyz Officials indicated that they greatly appreciated the PSC structure and wanted something similar to remain when K50 ended. The Kyrgyz Government has a system for prioritising security and law enforcement requirements. This system has a fixed calendar, with the process of refining priorities commencing in September, leading to a formal declaration of priorities in the January</p>	<p>Interviews Desk level review</p>	<p>8. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should take care when devising working groups akin to the PSC for K50 to ensure that the Kyrgyz Government retains the sense of ownership that it did under K50. These working groups and/or priority setting meetings at the country level, must accord to the Kyrgyz Government’s own priority setting timetable. The UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan should continue to engage other IC partners in the recently established LE meeting to ensure that assistance is coordinated and linked to the Kyrgyz Government’s priority areas.</p>
<p>9. The assistance that UNODC has provided to the SSDC/CNS, under K50, is broadly the same as it provided to the DCA, 14 years ago. This suggests that some of the projects activities might be unsustainable.</p>	<p>Interviews Desk level review Web-based research</p>	<p>9a. Within the next 12 months, following a formal needs analysis, the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should assist the CNS with the formulation of job descriptions for CNS officers so that there is a properly identified and resourced career path for CN officers.</p> <p>9b. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should consider the placement of short-term mentors within the CNS in order to increase their institutional capacity.</p> <p>9c. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should advocate for in-kind contributions from the</p>

		MoI. The use of MoI training facilities should be considered.
10. While UNODC reporting is accurate and timely there is still more that can be done to satisfy the information requirements of donors and the wider stakeholder community.	Interviews Desk level review Web-based research UNODC reporting	10. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SPI Coordinator should explore ways of improving both its formal (traditional) reporting and informal (non-traditional) reporting.

I. INTRODUCTION

Background

Kyrgyzstan became an independent state in 1991¹⁴. Although it is regarded as relatively progressive, it has suffered from ethnic divisions (between north and south) and political unrest¹⁵. As a consequence, the country's first two presidents were swept from power by popular discontent¹⁶. Inter-ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in the southern city of Osh left hundreds of dead shortly before independence in 1990 and again in June 2010.¹⁷ After the events of 2010, a national referendum endorsed a new Constitution and Kyrgyzstan became the first parliamentary republic in Central Asia¹⁸.



Map 1. Kyrgyzstan¹⁹.

Kyrgyzstan borders China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its surface area is more than 90% mountainous with 30% of its borders undefined and almost entirely uncontrolled. Kyrgyzstan also has a number of disputed borders. It is yet to ratify the 2001 boundary delimitation with Kazakhstan. Disputes in the Isfara Valley have delayed completion of its border demarcation with

¹⁴ <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/countryinfo.html>

¹⁵ <http://web.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/adr/kyrgyzstan.shtml>

¹⁶ <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/countryinfo.html>

¹⁷ United Nations Country Team in Kyrgyzstan Joint UNCT submission for the 2015 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Of Kyrgyzstan Second cycle. Dated 2014.

¹⁸ UNDP: About Kyrgyzstan <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/countryinfo/>

¹⁹ Official UN Map of Kyrgyzstan <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/kyrgysta.pdf>

Tajikistan and the border with Uzbekistan is hampered by disputes over enclaves. Although trust between Kyrgyzstan and its neighbours is slowly improving, cooperation and coordination between border forces and law enforcement agencies is limited. Initiatives such as Afghanistan – Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan (AKT²⁰) try to sponsor greater cooperation between neighbours, and are a sign of improving relationships.²¹

Following independence, Kyrgyzstan was the first Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) country to be accepted into the World Trade Organization. However, Kyrgyzstan's economic performance has been hindered by concerns about corruption and general regional instability and this has lowered foreign investment²². According to World Bank ratings, the Kyrgyz Republic has slipped from 70th position to 75th in the places to do business²³. Kyrgyzstan mainly relies on its agricultural sector and the salaries of Kyrgyz workers in the Russian Federation²⁴. Kyrgyzstan is a poor country and although poverty levels have reduced in recent years,²⁵ the 2016 global Human Development Report²⁶ still ranks it 120 out of 187 countries. Poverty presents an urgent social and political challenge that threatens sustainable development. A growing incidence of HIV and increasing morbidity rates for other communicable and non-communicable diseases pose serious challenges to its sustainable development²⁷.

Opiates Transiting Kyrgyzstan

The Northern Distribution Route (NDR) allows opiates to transit the Central Asia region²⁸ to the Russian Federation and beyond.²⁹ Kyrgyzstan is an integral element of the NDR and as such it is a major transit country for illicit drugs. Despite a progressive political regime and years of international assistance, ineffective border controls, serious economic challenges, high levels of public debt and corruption,³⁰ limit the government's ability to take meaningful and sustainable measures against the drug trade³¹ and have done little to stem the flow of opiates or the production of home grown marijuana. Most illicit drugs, entering Kyrgyzstan, pass through the Tajik border and into the southern province in the vicinity of Osh city.³²

²⁰ AKT is a Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries initiative. It provides a platform that allows Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to discuss cross border CN cooperation.

²¹ President of Kyrgyzstan visit to HQ UNODC

<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2015/March/president-of-kyrgyzstan-holds-security-talks-with-unodc-chief-during-vienna-visit.html>

²² <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/738921478590216270/pdf/109915-WP-DB17-PUBLIC-Kyrgyz-Republic.pdf>

²³ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.NREG?end=2016&locations=KG&start=2015&type=points&view=chart>

²⁴ Kyrgyzstan Economic Profile https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Kyrgyzstan

²⁵ UNDP <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/countryinfo/>

²⁶ UNDP 2011 <http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/humandevreportpresskits/2011report>

²⁷ UNDP 2011 <http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/humandevreportpresskits/2011report>

²⁸ Source: Transit route for Afghan opiates from UNODC's 2017 Annual Drug report


<https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/en/exsum.html>

²⁹ UNODC Regional Report <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/central-asia.html>

³⁰ Summary of the findings and background information from Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia (UNODC – Paris Pact) https://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Illicit%20Drug%20Trends_Central%20Asia-final.pdf

³¹ UNODC Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia a Threat Assessment.

³² Kyrgyz MoI as reported in UNODC The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment.



Map 2. Opiate Transit Routes from Afghanistan³³.

UNODC figures estimate that in 2017 approximately 9,000 tons of opium was produced in Afghanistan (³⁴ and ³⁵). According to UNODC data, this is equivalent to 450 tons of pure heroin or 900 tons of export quality heroin. If these estimates are accurate, then vast quantities for opium and/or heroin have transited the NDR over the last 5 years. The actual quantity of any illicit drug will depend on the refinement process and the level of internal consumption, but indicative figures would suggest that something in the region of 2000 tons of raw opium, or 200 tons of export quality heroin, or 100 tons of pure heroin may have crossed Afghanistan's northern borders. In addition, somewhere between 20-50,000 tons³⁶ of the pre-cursor chemicals, required to process this opium into heroin, may have flowed in the opposite direction.

Within the Central Asian region effective drug interdiction and border controls are hampered by insufficient national and regional cooperation and information sharing/exchange among legal and law enforcement authorities³⁷. Moreover, countries in the region often have limited capacities in the use of modern investigatory tools and methodologies³⁸. The recent years have witnessed a declining number of seizures within Central Asia³⁹, this in spite of the increase of opium cultivation in Afghanistan. During the same period seizures in the Russian Federation increased and the Southern Caucasus experienced a rise in narcotics trafficking cases⁴⁰.

³³ Source of map: https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/7.3.1_opiate_trafficking_flows.pdf

³⁴ http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_opium_survey_2017_cult_prod_web.pdf

³⁵ UNODC Annual World Drug Report for 2017.

³⁶ UNODC figures indicate that refining opium to pure heroin requires a 10:1 ratio of precursor chemicals to raw opium.

³⁷ UNODC Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia.

³⁸ UNODC Programme for Central Asia.

³⁹ https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/WDR_2017_presentation_lauch_version.pdf

⁴⁰ From UNODC Illicit Drug Trends in the Russian Federation.



Map 3. The Northern Distribution Route in detail⁴¹.

Other Drugs

Small-scale cannabis cultivation and large areas of wild cannabis are present throughout the eastern provinces of Kyrgyzstan. Wild growing cannabis in remote areas presents a real challenge to LE agencies. Although most cannabis is produced for local consumption, the entrenched smuggling networks, widespread insecurity and a drug-based economy, mean that Kyrgyzstan is able to export hashish and cannabis to the Russian Federation. While synthetic drug use is not widespread,⁴² primarily due to economic factors, there is an increasing amount entering the country. The Kyrgyz Republic has been slow to ban new substances⁴³ and there is a very real gap between what are legal and illegal drugs. Online pharmacies⁴⁴ and the so-called “clubbing type” of drugs have become a growth area and it is areas such as this that require urgent Government intervention.

Addiction

There has been a steady increase in the number of drug addicted persons in Kyrgyzstan⁴⁵. Drug use is widespread within all regions with 80 per cent of registered users reside in the main cities of Bishkek, Osh and Chui Province. Anecdotal evidence highlighted a growing substance abuse in the rural areas⁴⁶. The use of opioid substances prevails⁴⁷, although cannabis derivatives are also widespread in Naryn, Talas, Issyk-Kul, Jalal-Abad and Batken oblasts⁴⁸.

⁴¹ Source: map from UNODC report Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia.

⁴² UNODC the programme for Central Asia.

⁴³ In discussion with CLPs. There is a significant time delay (often years) between Agencies discovering substances and the legal measures taken to prohibit their use.

⁴⁴ In discussion with CNS Officials.

⁴⁵ UNODC Report into drug use in Central Asia as referenced by <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67176>

⁴⁶ Interviews with drug user community members within the Final Evaluation Project XCE A01 Partnership on Effective HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care among Vulnerable Groups In Central Asia and Eastern Europe –Phase II

⁴⁷ UNODC Report https://www.unodc.org/docs/treatment/CoPro/Web_Kyrgyzstan.pdf

⁴⁸ From SSDC Data translated by UNODC.

According to official statistics, there are 9,077 registered drug users in Kyrgyzstan. The number of registered opiate users has increased by 21 percent over the last five years⁴⁹. However, according to PEPFAR's data (the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief), there are 25,000 people in the country who inject drugs (PWID)⁵⁰. Other estimates which are much higher seem to be based primarily on expert opinion and not primary data sources⁵¹ although anecdotal data indicates that there are more than 50,000 drug users in Kyrgyzstan⁵².

The proportion of injecting drug users in Kyrgyzstan averages at 69%. Majority (about 80%) inject opiates and practice high-risk behaviour (use of contaminated injection equipment, engagement in unsafe sex, etc.) which coupled with the poor overdose prevention and management places Kyrgyzstan 7th among countries with highest death rate caused by drug use adjusted for age.⁵³ Prevalence of HIV among people who inject drugs in Kyrgyzstan is about 12.4% and that of prisoners is 11.2% (Country Progress Reports to UNAIDS)⁵⁴.

Organised Crime and Corruption

As one of the poorest countries in the region, Kyrgyzstan is regarded as facing severe problems of corruption.⁵⁵ At each stage of the drug supply chain, there are opportunities for corruption.⁵⁶ The linkages between organised crime, corruption and issues throughout the criminal justice system are serious within Kyrgyzstan⁵⁷. Since the start of the project there have been an increasing number of official arrests for corruption and drug smuggling⁵⁸. This has included, several high-ranking officials, primarily in the MVD (MOI), who have been implicated in corruption cases. Narcotics-related corruption is widespread, especially in the poorer areas of the country⁵⁹. Project reporting indicates that in March 2017, the CNS/MOI agents and investigators dismantled an organized criminal group dealing with heroin. The gang comprised of officers from the State National Security Committee (SNSC) who were smuggling Afghan heroin into Kyrgyzstan. Three (3) staff from the SNSC were found guilty and subsequently sentenced to jail terms⁶⁰. During the course of

⁴⁹ The National Report on the Drug Abuse Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic. 2012. The State Service for Drug Control under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic.

⁵⁰ Bureau Of International Narcotics And Law Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSR) - Country Report: Kyrgyzstan 2016

⁵¹ Population Size Estimation of People Who Inject Drugs in Selected High Priority Countries: Review of Current Knowledge, peer review, USAID, CDC, UNAIDS, UNODC, International HIV/AIDS Alliance, FHI360, 2014

⁵² Bureau Of International Narcotics And Law Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSR) - Country Report: Kyrgyzstan.

⁵³ <http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/kyrgyzstan-drug-use>

⁵⁴ Most recent available data for Kyrgyzstan – 2016.

⁵⁵ Kyrgyzstan is ranked 136 out of 176 countries in Transparency International's 2016 corruption perception index. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 It should be noted that within the Central Asian region, only Kazakhstan is ranked higher, at 131 out of 176.

⁵⁶ https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet_1_EXSUM.pdf

⁵⁷ The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) is an annual report by the Department of State to Congress prepared in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act.

⁵⁸ According to UNODC data, there were 5 arrests for drug related corruption in 2013 and 3 convictions in 2014. These were serving MoI officials.

⁵⁹ The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) is an annual report by the Department of State to Congress prepared in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act.

⁶⁰ K50 Semi-annual report for 2017.

the evaluation, press reports indicated that a serving Kyrgyz Army Colonel had been arrested for smuggling heroin into Kazakhstan.

Society

UNDP⁶¹ reports that transition and development in Kyrgyzstan have occurred without the full participation of women, to the detriment of women's position in political and socioeconomic life. UNDP data indicates that while 40% of civil servants are female, they mainly conduct lower level or administrative jobs. Research indicates that female police officers make up no more than 5%⁶² of the force. With these facts in mind, the probability that high level CNS officials or CNS investigative officers (who have received UNODC training) are female is approximately 1%. From a force of 200-300⁶³ there are probably no more than 3 senior officials or investigative officers within the CNS. UNODC data indicates that the majority of those prosecuted and convicted drug offenders are male. There was no gender disaggregated drug related corruption data available.

The State Service on Drug Control

UNODC assisted in the creation and development of the Drug Control Agency (DCA) of Kyrgyzstan (under project AD/KYR/G64) from 2003 until its abolition in 2009. From 2009-2011 UNODC supported the Kyrgyz Mobile Interdiction Teams (MOBITs) with project KGZ/I75. A Presidential Decree, dated 17 August 2010, created the SSDC as the recognized legal successor to the former DCA, and K50 commenced support to the SSDC from 2011.

The SSDC had two interconnected but distinct functions. It was a governmental agency that responsible for the implementation of the National Strategy on Drug Control and the Anti-Drug Programme. As such it had a number of departments which focused on legal and law enforcement activities. It was also Kyrgyzstan's primary apparatus for counter narcotics coordination across government. The SSDC was responsible for drafting counter narcotic laws, formulating policy and implementing national strategies across all Kyrgyz ministries. The SSDC was also the secretariat of the State Coordination Committee on Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors Control of the Kyrgyz Republic which is chaired by the Vice Prime Minister. The Deputy Chairperson of this committee is the head of the SSDC.

In July 2016, the Kyrgyz Republic initiated a comprehensive reform of all LE agencies⁶⁴. Among others, these reforms included measures to optimize and abolish all duplication. As part of this process, the SSDC, and the Main Directorate on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking under the Kyrgyz MoI were merged into a new Counter Narcotics Service (CNS). As a result, the national control functions on countering illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors, which were previously implemented by SSDC, were transferred to the CNS.

⁶¹ UNDP Kyrgyzstan Gender Mainstreaming Strategy 2008-2010.

⁶² No official figures were forthcoming. The following study indicated that the figure was 4.9%: Status of Women Police in Asia: An Agenda for Future Research Mangai Natarajan Ph.D. John Jay College of Criminal Justice the City University of New York http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/2005-policewomen/natarajan.pdf

⁶³ Actual figures for the CNS were hard to obtain due staff cuts as part of optimisation. Estimates ranged from 10-80% of the SSDC had been cut.

⁶⁴ UNODC K50 Semi Annual Report for 2017.

Between July 2016 and September 2017, the CNS went through a period of transformation. Some staff were moved. Others resigned and many operations stalled. At the point of the evaluation the CNS was only just operational, and there were still a number of unresolved issues relating to its mandate and ability to operate. The change of name not only reduced UNODC's ability to cooperate, until a project revision had been approved, but also the ability of bilateral donors to interact with the CNS. FSKN stopped additional pay and DEA agents were unable to unilaterally cooperate with the CNS, until new MoUs were signed.

The Project

The KGZ/K50 project "Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic" commenced in August 2011. The Project was designed to assist the SSDC to function as the lead body for the coordination of counter-narcotics activity within Kyrgyzstan. The project built on UNODC's experiences gained through the provision of technical assistance to both the Kyrgyz and the Tajik DCAs. The project was designed to complement the interventions of other stakeholders, partners, institutions and organizations operating in the area of drug law-enforcement reform in Kyrgyzstan. The project sought to complement OSCE's police reform initiative and was implemented in close consultation with other international stakeholders, as well as the UN Country Team in Kyrgyzstan. The Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) served as useful platform for promoting strategic partnerships with the SSDC, as well as facilitating joint operations within the region. Due to the SSDC's coordinating role, other national LE agencies involved in drug control also benefited from the project through improved coordination, clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, and cooperation in joint operations and the exchange of operational information. As wide sections of Kyrgyz society and neighbouring countries are affected by drug trafficking, organized crime and corruption, (it was hoped) that the general population of Kyrgyzstan and the region would derive some tangential benefit from the project⁶⁵.

Since 2011 the project has been revised three times. The effect of these revisions provided a project extended until Dec 2017, increased funds and allowed the project to support the CNS. The project's objective and outcomes are mapped in the table below.

	Objective/Outcome	Means of verification	Baseline
Objective	The SSDC is developed into an effective and sustainable specialized law enforcement organisation	Increased quantity of drug seizures and joint law enforcement operations	SSDC reports
Outcome 1	Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise/adopt legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of SSDC and implementation of the adopted National Strategy/ Programme on Drug Control which focuses on legal, legislative and policy support	The laws and regulations for effective functioning of the SSDC are reviewed, revised and adopted	No revised or adopted Laws

⁶⁵ This description of the project is taken from the original project documentation.

Outcome 2	Basic infrastructure of SSDC, including its regional departments strengthened which focuses on the provision of infrastructure	Improved basic infrastructure and facilities handed over to SSDC	Assessment of SSDC 's infrastructure needs
Outcome 3	Strengthening operational, investigative and analytical capacities of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners through provision of equipment and training	Number of officers trained	Zero
		Training curricula adopted in basic, intermediate and advanced skills for SSDC officers as well as for officers of other law-enforcement agencies with drug control mandates developed, endorsed and put under systematic implementation.	Training curricula not available
		Number of officers completed the training on CBT courses	Zero
		Plan on development of forensic science laboratories elaborated and implemented	No plan available
Outcome 4	The SSDC actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries and UNODC's overall coordination role of support to the SSDC is effectively attained which focuses on international cooperation	Number of SSDC Liaison Officers placed in neighbouring countries	Zero
		Activities in support of collecting and sharing operational information and participating in joint cross-border operations by SSDC through CARICC	No documented evidence

Table 1. K50 objective and outcomes

Funding

There are three donors to the K50 project, the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan who have jointly contributed \$4,899,800 USD. The USA and Russian Federation are also major bilateral donors to the Kyrgyz Republic and both deploy field agents in support of the SSDC. The Kazakh Government provided initial funding, but did not contribute towards the second phase of the project. The project will close with a short fall of \$2,000,000 USD, which although pledged, was never granted.

Donor	Collected / Pledged Amount	Percentage against Overall Project Budget
Kazakhstan	\$47,209	0.68%
Russian Federation	\$2,100,000	30.44%
United States of America	\$2,752,591	39.89%
Total Funded Budget:	\$4,899,800	71.01%
Unfunded Budget/Project Shortfall	2,000,000	28.99%
Project Overall Budget	6,899,800	100.00%

Table 2. K50 Donations




Figure 1: Project Costs in \$ USDs.

Opportunities and Risks

Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) which is mandated to promote regional information sharing and coordinate operations to combat transnational drug trafficking. On December 10, 2014, a senior Kyrgyz security services officer was selected to be the Director of the CARICC. It was hoped that with the long-standing dispute over the Directorship of CARICC would be resolved and that the organisation would function more freely and that international cooperation (between drug control agencies) would improve⁶⁶. While atmospherics seem positive, data from UNODC's world drug reports and from CARICC does not indicate a major increase in international cooperation or drug seizures within Central Asia; in fact, they indicate a decline⁶⁷.

Although not recorded directly, as risks, in the project documentation, the following assumptions (risks if not proven correct) were included and were subsequently articulated as risks in the ToRs for this evaluation. The main risks, as articulated by the project staff, relate to: corruption, a lack of recourses, and a lack of trained staff. These risks remain extant even after UNODC and international donors had provided support to the SSDC for more than 5 years.

⁶⁶ This hope was echoed by many Kyrgyz officials who felt that CARICC had been marginalised and that the change in leadership provided a new beginning.

⁶⁷ UNODC World Drug Report 2017 – Opiate interception data for Asia, this graph indicates a gradual reduction since 2011. It should be noted that Asia data follows a similar pattern to global data. Source: https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/7.2.6_Graphs_Opiates.pdf

Assumptions / Risks ⁶⁸		
insufficient state resources in the field of drug control	drug-related corruption	rivalry between SSDC and other law enforcement agencies
insufficient material-technical base to improve efficiency in the fight against drug trafficking	high turnover of SSDC staff	insufficient personnel skills to effectively fight organised drug trafficking and smuggling

Table 3. K50 Assumptions and Risks

Evaluation Scope and Methodology

This report represents the independent final evaluation of KGZ/K50; from August 2011 until December 2017. The primary intended user is the UNODC Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan and the Regional Office for Central Asia. The findings and recommendations of the evaluation will also inform stakeholders (Counter Narcotics Service of the Kyrgyz Republic and Donor countries) of the project's accomplishments.

The evaluation was conducted by a team of two independent evaluation consultants. The team leader had a LE background and had conducted evaluations and other consultancy work for UNODC. The substantive mater expert, from the region, had a medical and drug demand reduction background and had conducted numerous evaluations within the region, and the Russian Federation, for UNODC and other UN agencies. In addition, the substantive expert was a Russian speaker and acted as a translator, as and when required.

This evaluation comprised a mixed approach, of qualitative and quantitative methods, providing for a triangulation of findings. The evaluation took into account the human rights and gender considerations to identify key issues and define respective strategies for future planning.

The evaluation included a field mission to Kyrgyzstan where the evaluators were able to meet core learning partners (CLPs) and recipients, conduct interviews, observe routine and review project documentations. The evaluators were able to gather first-hand accounts of UNODC's assistance, and this represented the primary means of assessing the project's achievements. Furthermore, this report includes data and records of meetings with officials at various CNS field locations.

The key questions that this evaluation seeks to answer are:

<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	<i>Key questions</i>
Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent is the project relevant to the Kyrgyz Republic's State Drug Control Service (now CNS) needs and priorities

⁶⁸ These risks come from the TORs and are synthesis of the assumptions contained in the project's logical framework.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent are the project outputs and outcomes relevant to the recipient government's needs? • To what extent are the outputs, outcomes and objectives of this project / programme relevant to implementing the Sustainable Development Goals? • What is the future of international support to the CNS, and what assistance could or should UNODC provide?
Design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How was the project designed? • Did the project staff explore the needs of the participants and analysed the operational context?
Lesson learnt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the lessons learnt for future project implementation? • What are the best practices that could be applied in the future activities in frame of Sub-programme-1 of the UNODC Programme for Central Asia 2015-2019 (UNODC Z60 project) and other similar projects? • To what extent have recommendations from the previous evaluation/s been implemented? • Did observations and feedback alter delivery, and if so how?
Human rights and gender	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent are human rights considerations included in the project development and implementation? • To what extent are gender considerations included in the project development and implementation? • To what extent did the project intervention contribute to fulfilment of the National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security? • To what extent did the project intervention contribute to increased representation of women in the State Service on Drug Control /CNS?
Partnerships and cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent were stakeholders properly engaged and informed? • How was the project conducive to the development of partnerships at the bilateral and multilateral level? • Did the project strengthen the SSDC/CNS ability to cooperate in regional intelligence sharing through CARICC? • How were relevant partners and stakeholders identified?
Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent is the project implemented in the most efficient and cost-effective way compared to alternatives?
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What measures are in place to ensure future maintenance and repair of the equipment is provided? • To what extent are project interventions sustainable in the long term? If not, what is needed to ensure their continued resilience and viability in the future?
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what degree were the programme's outcomes and objectives achieved, or are anticipated to be achieved? What chief factors were responsible for the achievement or failure of the objectives?
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent has the anticipated long-term impact of this project been achieved? • Have there been any positive or negative unintended results? • To what extent did the project contribute to drug seizures in the region (in comparison with the beginning of the project in 2011)?

Table 4. Key evaluation questions

Main Sample Group

According to project documentation the universe of stakeholders was made up of approximately 19 identified individuals. All 19 were interviewed. The sample group was expanded out to approximately 50, to be more inclusive. Research indicated that in most organisations there was only likely to be a single person that had any knowledge or interaction with the project. Many of those on the periphery, of the project, did not respond to requests for an interview and those that did had limited knowledge of the project, or even meaningful knowledge of the subject matter. The ability to ensure that the sample group was diverse was extremely limited. Less than 5% of the Kyrgyz Police Force is female. Sex disaggregated data from training had not been recorded and statistics indicated that between 1-3 female officers would have been suitable (in the correct role and grade) to receive training.

The main sampling group is included the following. A full list of interviewees is at Annex IV.




Table 5. Sampling Strategy

The data collection strategy is a framework questionnaire (at Annex II) through which structured and semi-structured interviews were conducted. The framework questionnaire was designed to guide discussions and illicit responses from participants. Framework questions requested both fact and opinion. All answers were triangulated with various other sources of evidence as outlined above.

Field Mission

The field mission took place in the period from 08 October to 20 October 2017. The evaluation team worked in Bishkek, meeting with the project team, the main beneficiaries and partners. There were short trips to the CNS's Southern Department in Osh city, and the Eastern Department in Karakol city.

Interviews

The framework questions (at Annex II) guided all discussions. From a sample group of 50, a total of 38 people⁶⁹ were interviewed. Interviews were mainly in person, where that was not achievable they were conducted via Skype. Depending upon the nature of the meetings, some questions were not relevant and others asked instead. Interviewees were all asked to consent to the interview and were assured as to the confidentiality of the process. They were informed that quotes might be used in the report, but that their identifiers would not be used. Any information requested by an interviewee to be handled as confidential, was treated as such. During the interviews, the evaluators probed topics that were not originally contained in the guide, if they considered them relevant. Interviewees were also given an opportunity to address any topic they felt was not covered (sufficiently or at all). Ample opportunity was afforded to the respondents to tell their own story and to initiate discussion on any issues not considered in advance. These “new leads” were then pursued in discussions with other respondents in order to verify their veracity and to allow for the further investigation. Ongoing email and phone communications with stakeholders was used as required.

Observations

During the field mission the evaluators visited a number of CNS field locations and were able to observe daily routine. These observations assisted the evaluators to make qualitative judgements based on their experience delivering capacity building and training. Observations were then triangulated with desk level reviews and interviews.

Desk Review

The preliminary desk review included all relevant project documentation, as provided by UNODC, documents requested by the evaluators, and information independently accessed from open source data. In addition, project documents and equipment holdings were inspected during the field mission.

Data Mining

During the course of the evaluation, the team sought to data mine the project team’s library of documents and also the UNODC’s repository of data. Particular attention was paid to the metrics contained in the logical matrix, which included metrics for seizures and arrests compared to the 2011 baseline. It became apparent that this comparison would not yield a positive result and would suggest a downward trend in seizures since the commencement of the project. The evaluators sought additional data so as to identify statistical anomalies and or patterns, which might help to explain this finding.

Previous Evaluations

The K50 mid-term evaluation was conducted in September 2015. The project itself was preceded by G64⁷⁰, which supported the Kyrgyz DCA until it was abolished in 2009. The project was also

⁶⁹ Interviewees and focus groups included: 7 Females and 31 Males

⁷⁰ UNODC project KYR/G64 “Drug Control Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic.”

linked to: I75⁷¹ the development of Counter Narcotic Mobile Interdiction team; H03⁷² support to the Tajik DCA; and K22⁷³ border liaison offices. Project documentation states that the lessons identified in these evaluations had been used in the design and revision of K50. An Assessment of the key lessons learnt by UNODC and incorporated by the project is contained at Annex VI.

Limitations

Due to the fact that the SSDC had been disbanded, the evaluators were unable to find sufficient CNS officers with which to conduct meaningful focus groups. Focus groups were intended to provide an additional level of information relating to the quality of UNODC equipment and training. Evaluators canvassed the opinions of the few SSDC/CNS that had received training, were still serving and were available to be interviewed.

Due to the fact that UNODC training had no inbuilt M&E, the evaluation had no way of assessing the effectiveness of this training, beyond conducting interviews with SSDC/CNS officers who had attended training. Insufficient numbers of officers were available to discuss training in detail and the evaluation had to rely on general statements. INL had conducted a review, of all the training it had provided to drug law enforcement agencies across Central Asia, which included surveys and focus groups, involving participants of the UNODC provided training events. This evaluation, therefore, relied on data provided by INL, to supplement its findings.

⁷¹ UNODC project KGZ/175 “Establishment of Interagency Law Enforcement Mobile Groups in Kyrgyzstan.”

⁷² UNODC project TAJ/H03 “Tajikistan Drug Control Agency (DCA).”

⁷³ UNODC project CA/K22 “Border Liaison Offices (BLO).”

II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Relevance

- To what extent is the project relevant to the Kyrgyz Republic's State Drug Control Service (now CNS) needs and priorities?
- To what extent are the project outputs and outcomes relevant to the recipient government's needs?
- To what extent are the outputs, outcomes and objectives of this project / programme relevant to implementing the Sustainable Development Goals?
- What is the future of international support to the CNS, and what assistance could or should UNODC provide?

Needs of the Kyrgyz Government

The Kyrgyz Republic has undertaken intensive efforts to rebuild and strengthen the democratic state, ensuring sustainable development, overcoming internal problems (the legacy of the past) and preventing emerging risks and challenges⁷⁴. The National Sustainable Development Strategy (published in January 2013) indicated how the Kyrgyz Republic, in partnership with government agencies, civil society and international organizations was going to meet Kyrgyzstan's development challenges⁷⁵. President Atambayev⁷⁶ publicly stated that reducing drug trafficking was a priority area and emphasized that the capacity of the SSDC required improvement⁷⁷. Political support for UNODC and its activities, including K50, has been strong and the evaluators were informed, on numerous occasions, of the relevance of the project and importance that the Kyrgyz Republic placed in UNODC's assistance.

Needs of the SSDC / CNS

In 2010, when the SSDC was formed, it possessed very little infrastructure and equipment, despite previous UNODC and bilateral donor assistance. Most of the DCA's equipment and infrastructure was given to the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). The initial scoping for the K50 project identified the following capability gaps⁷⁸: insufficient state resources in the field of drug control; no national level strategy or plan; high levels of drug-related corruption; rivalry between law enforcement agencies; insufficient material/technical base; high turnover of staff; and insufficient personnel and collective skills to fight organised drug trafficking and smuggling. The project responded directly to these needs with an overarching objective to strengthen the SSDC and 4 outcomes related to: legal support, technical support and infrastructure, training support and international cooperation.

⁷⁴ UNCT <http://www.un.org/kg/en/publications/article/publications/by-agency/55-united-nations-office-of-commissioner-for-human-ri/4707-joint-un-country-team-s-in-the-kyrgyz-republic-submission-for-the-upr-process>

⁷⁵ UNCT website <http://www.un.org/kg/en/kyrgyzstan/overview>

⁷⁶ Joint UNCT submission for the 2015 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Of Kyrgyzstan <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/54c0b92c4.pdf>

⁷⁷ UNDP <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home.html>

⁷⁸ As assessed by UNODC in the original project documentation.

As an independent agency, the SSDC was mandated to coordinate the Kyrgyz Republic's counter narcotics response at the national level and across Government. UNODC's assistance to the SSDC was, therefore, highly relevant because the SSDC was more than just a LE agency, it had a comprehensive mandate to develop CN laws and policies. With the formation of the CNS, as a department within the MoI, it remains to be seen if the CNS can unilaterally enact cross governmental change in the same manner. The Kyrgyz Government are immensely appreciative of the project, and lobbied for the project to remain, as a stand-alone project and not fall under the Programme for Central Asia⁷⁹. While the Government might wish to retain the funding for the CNS (via the project) the project will end. Given the fact that the SSDC has been disbanded and the CNS recently formed, in its place as part of the optimisation of Kyrgyz security apparatus, moving to a programming approach via the Programme for Central Asia would appear to place UNODC in a better position to influence change across Government. This will allow UNODC to continue to engage at the ministerial level and not be relegated to dealing with a single department, within the MoI.

Alignment with international mandates and priorities

The project contributes to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and specifically to Goal 16: target 16.A – to strengthen relevant national institutions (SSDC and CNS), including through international cooperation (DLOs and CARICC), for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime (LE agencies); and 16.B – to promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies (outcome 1 related to the drafting of laws) for sustainable development. Kyrgyzstan is in the process of the nationalization of the SDGs, and UNODC contributes to this process through the UN Country Team to assist the Kyrgyz Government.

As a State emerging from conflict, Kyrgyzstan has a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) which analyses how the UN can effectively respond to the Kyrgyz Republic's development priorities. The UNDAF was guided by the goals of the Millennium Declaration and the Government's own Programmes and Action Plans. The UNDAF, in turn, translated these plans into a common operational framework of developmental activities, upon which individual United Nations organizations could formulate their own action plans. The UNDAF, which is relevant to this project, covers the period of 2012-2016⁸⁰. UNODC was party to the development of the UNDAF and is a contributing agency towards the implementation of the Peace and Cohesion, Effective Democratic Governance, and Human Rights pillar⁸¹.

Donors

The United States Embassy's stated law enforcement policy objectives in Kyrgyzstan are to strengthen the existing capacity of law enforcement bodies, expand its ability to investigate and prosecute criminal cases, enhance anti-corruption efforts, and increase overall security in the country; in particular to support to the national counter-narcotics program⁸².

⁷⁹ Senior Kyrgyz Officials stated that they had lobbied the Director of UNODC, so as to keep K50.

⁸⁰ The UNDAF has been extended.

⁸¹ UNDAF for Kyrgyzstan 2012 – 2016 <http://www.unesco.kz/new/en/unesco/news/2661/>

⁸² 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) - Country Report: Kyrgyzstan.

The Russian Federation’s counter narcotic interests⁸³ are driven by three factors: a. its geographical proximity to Kyrgyzstan; b. close historical links; and c. the threat posed by opiates emanating from Afghanistan, which transit the northern distribution route into the Russian Federation.

UNODC’s Mandate and programmes

K50 has contributed to the following UNODC Programmes:

Programme	Area	Outcome
UNODC’s Strategic Framework 2016-2017 ⁸⁴	Sub-Programme 1	Member States are equipped to take effective action against transnational organized crime, including: drug trafficking.
Strategy for the period 2012–2015 for the UNODC ⁸⁵	Sub-Programme 1	Countering transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking and illicit drug trafficking 1. Objective: To promote effective responses to transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking and illicit drug trafficking by facilitating the implementation at the normative and operational levels of the relevant United Nations conventions
UNODC’s Concerted Approach 2015 ⁸⁶	Law Enforcement Cooperation	Interconnecting Europe with West and Central Asia – country level connections to CARICC form part of the network of networks
Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries (phase I 2011-2016)	Sub-Programme 1	Regional Law Enforcement Cooperation - outcomes 1.1 and 1.2
Strategic Outline for Central Asia and Southern Caucasus 2012-2015: A Comprehensive Approach to Implement UNODC’s Drug and Crime Mandate	Regional Office for Central Asia	Priority areas 1 and 2: Greater regional cooperation and countering transnational organized crime and drug trafficking
The Programme for Central Asia	Sub-programme 1	Outcomes 1.1. and 1.2: Countering transnational organised crime, illicit drug trafficking and preventing terrorism
UNODC’s Integrated Country Programme of Assistance for Kyrgyzstan 2014-2016	Sub-programme 1	Outcome 1.1. “Drug and crime legislative and regulatory frameworks improved”
UNODC’s laboratory and forensic science services programme	International Collaborative Exercises (ICE) ⁸⁷	Improve the national forensic capacity and capabilities of Member States to meet internationally accepted standards

Table 6. *UNODC Programmes to which K50 contributes*

⁸³ A summarised version, as articulated by a representative from FSKN.

⁸⁴ http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/CCPCJ_Sessions/CCPCJ_23/E-CN15-2014-CRP3_E.pdf

⁸⁵ https://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/UNODC_2012_-_2015_Resolution_ECOSOC_merged.pdf

⁸⁶ http://www.unodc.org/documents/rpanc/Brochure_One_UNODC_Concerted_Apparoach.pdf

⁸⁷ <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/scientists/survey-on-impact-of-unodc-assistance-2016.html>

UNODC activities in the Kyrgyz Republic contribute to a number of different UNODC programmes. While the project is relevant to all the programmes listed above, there has been considerable overlap between the various programmes. Placing all the activities currently conducted by the project under SP 1 of the Programme for Central Asia seeks to simplify delivery and is designed to act as the first layer of UNODC's assistance. In addition to this overarching strategic framework, under which UNODC provides technical assistance within the Central Asian States, UNODC provides wider regional assistance via the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries; which is the second layer of UNODC assistance. Above these two layers are UNODC's global programmes, which are run from the HQ in Vienna; these global programmes form the third and final level of UNODC assistance. As a whole, these three levels of assistance aim to deliver effect in an integrated and comprehensive manner rather than via a series of standalone projects⁸⁸.

Future requirements

During the evaluation Kyrgyz Officials stated that the CNS would require UNODC assistance for the foreseeable future. The Kyrgyz Government via the MFA placed a formal request to the Director of UNODC for the project be extended beyond December 2017. While the move to the Programme for Central Asia provides greater flexibility to UNODC and to some extent donors, who can choose from a menu of activities, it does present a challenge to the CNS. Until Dec 2017, the CNS had a single point of contact which looked exclusively at their needs and only funded their requirements. The SP1 coordinator and team will now have a broader remit and will have to manage a larger number of stakeholders. It is unlikely that under SP1 the CNS will receive the same level of support that SSDC did under K50.

In discussion with senior Kyrgyz officials it was evident that activities such as counter terrorism, countering violent extremism and improving financial investigative techniques were now seen as high as, or even higher priority areas than, counter narcotics. In order to focus on these areas, the Kyrgyz Republic will require assistance from the international community and these are all areas where UNODC is suitably qualified to provide advice. The Kyrgyz Government recounted that it now has a system for prioritising their security and law enforcement requirements. This system has a fixed calendar which sees a process of refining priorities in September, leading up to a formal declaration of priorities in the new year. The Country Office for Kyrgyzstan should ensure that future SP1 working groups/ PSCs at the country level accord to this priority setting timetable.

With the change of status, of the OSCE⁸⁹ office in Bishkek⁹⁰, UNODC is in the position where it is probably the most trusted international LE focused partner that the Kyrgyz Republic has. At the same time, with the LE activities falling under SP 1 of the Programme for Central Asia, UNODC could find itself delivering more and taking more of a leading role for LE support within Kyrgyzstan. This presents both an opportunity, for UNODC to lead, and a risk, in that UNODC might not have the capacity, people and resources, to do so. The Country Office for Kyrgyzstan should continue the recently LE established meetings with partners which coordinate IC assistance

⁸⁸ https://www.unodc.org/documents/centralasia//MOU/programme_for_central_asia_2015-2019_en.pdf

⁸⁹ <http://www.osce.org/chairmanship/314196>

⁹⁰ <http://dem.kg/ru/article/22924/osce-center-in-bishkek-will-work-as-osce-program-office-in-kyrgyzstan-since-may-1>

to the Kyrgyz Republic so that it understands what other stakeholders are delivering and where gaps exist.

Summary

The In light of the Kyrgyz Republics developmental agenda and the omni-present threat posed by illicit drugs project was extremely relevant to the Kyrgyz Government. The project was also highly relevant to the SSDC/CNS as it responded directly to a needs analysis which concluded that they required considerable assistance if they were to provide legal, legislative and policy support to the Government and act as a LE agency. The project was highly relevant to the work of the international community, via SDG 16, and to the donor nations; as it allowed them to further their stated aims. The project supported a number of UNODC programmes and was an effective first layer in the UNODC's concerted (network of networks) approach⁹¹ which seeks to interconnect Europe with West and Central Asia.

Design

- How was the project designed?
- Did the project staff explore the needs of the participants and analysed the operational context?

The project was highly relevant to the needs of the Kyrgyz Republic and the SSDC, as it addressed capability gaps identified during a needs analysis. Although not formally recorded, the project incorporated lessons from previous UNODC projects, which had supported the Kyrgyz DCA, MOBITs and the Tajik DCA. Chapter V refers to lessons learned in detail.

Based on a formal request, armed with an understanding of the SSDC's needs and cognisant of what had, and what had not worked before, the project was then designed in detail. The resulting framework was logical and simple. The overall objective was to strengthen the SSDC via 4 main lines of activity. These were to: assist the SSDC to develop CN laws and to function as a cross governmental CN coordinating body; provide infrastructure; provide training and technical assistance; and to increase the SSDC's ability to share intelligence with regional partners. These four areas are mapped out below in table 6.

No	Outcome	Areas of focus
One	Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise/adopt legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of SSDC/CNS and implementation of the adopted National Strategy on Drug Control.	Legal, legislative and policy support
Two	Basic infrastructure of SSDC/CNS, including its regional departments strengthened.	Provision of infrastructure
Three	Operational, investigative and analytical capacities of SSDC/CNS and its national counter-narcotic partners through provision of equipment and training strengthened.	Equip and train
Four	The SSDC/CNS actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries and UNODC's overall coordination role of support to the SSDC/CNS is effectively attained.	International cooperation

⁹¹http://www.unodc.org/documents/postungass2016/contributions/UN/UNODC_Ch._6_Europe_West_and_Central_Asia.pdf

Table 7. *Project Outcomes*

Building on the outcomes (as listed in the table 6) the project was able to generate a series of logical outputs and activities which combined, sought to achieve the expected outcomes. The project was revised on three occasions. The initial project was due to run from 15 August 2011 – 15 August 2013 (2 years). Revision 1 was a no cost extension which extended the project until 15 December 2014 (3 years 4 months). Revision 2 (or phase 2) extended the project until 15 December 2017 (for a total of 5 years 4 months), and it increased the budget by approximately 100%. Revision 3 was required when the SSDC became the CNS. All three revisions were introduced to account for changing circumstances and additional donations. The fact that none of the outcome were changed and only minor alterations were made to the outputs, demonstrates how well the project was designed in the first place.

The logical framework on the whole was a sound document which provided the correct level of detail and guidance to the project team in order for them to implement the project and map progress. It does, however, have some areas of weakness, these were:

Poor indicators. The overall indicator was that a strengthened SSDC would produce a greater number of joint operations and increased seizures. This indicator required considerably more thought and might have been better focused on the quality of the inputs and activities, and their accumulation in building capacity within the organisation, rather than focusing on the output of the organization itself. In addition, the liaison indicator focused on the number of meetings and DLOs; however, this indicator should have focused on the quality of the liaison and its ability to assist information sharing and relationship building.

Lack of baseline studies. With the exception of the “basic” needs analysis no baseline studies were conducted. There was no in-depth baseline study conducted in reference to drug seizures in 2011, the year the project commenced. There was no training needs analysis, or a gender baseline study that sought to understand what UNDP or OSCE were trying to achieve and equate this to the SSDC.

Lack of identified risks. No risks were articulated in the logical matrix however, there were a number of assumptions made that could or should have been identified as potential risks and the mitigation, acceptance or transfer of risk annotated. The following are good examples of risk that was not articulated and/or planned for:

1. Since the establishment in 2011, the SSDC Chairpersons and Deputies have been constantly replaced.⁹² Some of the replacements were for (widely publicized) personal disagreements and others for technical failures⁹³. Despite the fact that the issue of senior officials being constantly rotated had been raised as a lesson from previous projects, it was not officially registered as a risk in the logical matrix and therefore no action was taken.
2. In July 2016, the Kyrgyz Republic abolished all duplicate functions within its LE structures. SSDC and the Main Directorate on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking under the MoI

⁹² The SSDC had 5 Chairpersons in the 4 years between 2011 and 2015. On each occasion, many of the deputies were transferred too.

⁹³ In conversation with numerous Kyrgyz officials, to include a member of reviewing body that recommended the removal of the previous Chairman.

(GUBNON) were merged into the CNS. The risk of the SSDC being abolished should have been considered, as this is what happened to the DCA in 2009.

The UNODC Office for Kyrgyzstan and the Regional Office for Central Asia should ensure that future programme/project indicators are more relevant to the outcomes they support and accurately reflect the sum of the outputs and quality of the inputs. They should also ensure that baseline studies are completed and that obvious and reoccurring risks are identified and planned against/

The K50 project will finish in Dec 2017, as planned. All donor funds leftover will be pooled into supporting Law Enforcement activities in the country within the Sub-programme 1: “Countering transnational organized crime, illicit drug trafficking and preventing terrorism” of the UNODC Programme for Central Asia 2015-2019. This will enable UNODC to provide assistance in a broader regional context including the efforts to countering the narcotics, terrorism, extremism, organized crime, corruption, cyber-crime, and human trafficking and smuggling of migrants, accept, mitigate or transfer this risk.

The SP 1 coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia will need to consider how best UNODC can support LE agencies in Kyrgyz Republic while at same time not losing site that the CNS will still require support

Summary

The project was well designed; it was suitable to the problem at hand and adaptable to the needs and priorities of the SSDC, and the CNS its legal successor. It provided these organisations with much of the support they required to build the agency. Over the entire lifetime (5 years 4 months) of the project, it was responsive to the participants’ changing requirements, through PSC meetings, and it provided assistance which has allowed the SSDC /CNS to mature. On the whole, the project was simple in its design and delivery, the outcome and outputs were logical, well thought out and were responsive to the needs of beneficiary organisation. However, there was a lack of attention paid to risk, to baseline studies and to devising suitable indicators

Human Rights and Gender

- To what extent are human rights considerations included in the project development and implementation?
- To what extent are gender considerations included in the project development and implementation?
- To what extent did the project intervention contribute to fulfilment of the National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security?
- To what extent did the project intervention contribute to increased representation of women in the State Service on Drug Control /CNS?

Human Rights considerations

Kyrgyzstan’s democratic progress in recent years has been undermined by: a number of discriminatory legislative proposals, including those related to “foreign agents⁹⁴”; interference in

⁹⁴ <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/04/uk-kyrgyzstan-rights-law-idUKKBN0OK1KA20150604>

the work of some human rights groups by the security services⁹⁵; laws against minorities; and shortcomings in the country’s legal and judicial framework⁹⁶. Violence and discrimination against women and minorities remain serious problems⁹⁷. In December 2013, the UN Committee against Torture⁹⁸ expressed grave concern “about the ongoing and widespread practice of torture and ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, in particular while in police custody to extract confessions”. Although the government acknowledges that torture occurs in Kyrgyzstan, impunity remains the norm⁹⁹. With the SSDC (now CNS) formally part of the MoI this might raise a concern, that any progress made in assisting the SSDC to become more human rights compliant could be eroded. This evaluation, however, did not find any evidence to support this theory.

Legislation and Policy Development

The Project provided support to the SSDC in developing the strategic documents signed and adopted by the Government of Kyrgyz Republic, namely, i) Anti-Narcotic Programme of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic¹⁰⁰ and ii) Action Plan on implementation of the Anti-Narcotic Programme of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic¹⁰¹. The former paper has a number of references to the UN Conventions, declarations and other international documents to which Kyrgyzstan is a signatory, all based upon recognition and respect of the human rights and gender equality.

Conventions referenced in Kyrgyz legal documents, which were drafted with the assistance of UNODC under the K50 project	
The UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961	The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971
Declaration S- 20/3 of the UN General Assembly as of 10 June 1998 on Guidelines of Drug Demand Reduction, the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards development of integrated balanced strategy to counter the world drug problem adopted at the Stage of high-level session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on March 11-12, 2009	Guidelines of the World Health Organisation (WHO) on pharmacological treatment of opioid dependence with a psychosocial support, which had been developed in pursuance of Resolution 2004/40 adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
On Development of Voluntary Code of the Chemical Industry Conduct, With Regards to People Travelling for Medical Treatment and Possessing Internationally Controlled Narcotic Drugs	The International Narcotics Control Board Guidelines on INCB Providing Statistic Data on Losses and Destruction of Drugs

Table 8. Conventions referenced by Kyrgyz laws drafted or revised with the assistance of K50

⁹⁵ <http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/kyrgyz.html>

⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/kyrgyzstan>

⁹⁷ UNWOMEN National Review of the Kyrgyz Republic in the framework of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.

⁹⁸ Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/106/04/PDF/G1210604.pdf>

⁹⁹ Amnesty International <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/kyrgyzstan/report-kyrgyzstan/>

¹⁰⁰ Adopted by Governmental decree on 27 January 2014 <http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/96036>

¹⁰¹ Adopted by Governmental decree on 25 November 2014 <http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/214132>

Following the adoption of the new constitution, in 2010, Kyrgyzstan initiated a process of judicial reforms, which identified laws that required amending in order to comply with national and international human rights principles. Kyrgyzstan has made progress towards developing these laws, although UNDP was concerned, at that time, that the tight reform deadlines imposed by the Kyrgyz Government might develop laws at the expenses of quality and compliance with international norms and standards¹⁰². Assisting the Kyrgyz Government to adopt laws that are both human right compliant and gender sensitive is a key area where UNODC can assist under the Sub-Programmes 1 and 2 of the Programme for Central Asia. ROCA should seek to continue supporting legal reform in Kyrgyzstan, ensuring that it human rights complaint and gender sensitive.

Beyond assisting the Kyrgyz Government to develop compliant new laws, there was little in project documentation to describe how the project would observe and protect universal human rights. In practical terms, all trainers and trainees were vetted before training was delivered to ensure that none had a record of human rights abuses before receiving UNODC sponsored training. A review of course content and general working practises indicated that the Project Team understood the principal of universal human rights and that human rights issues were embedded within all training material and courses (either delivered by UNODC or via third parties). In addition, all the CBT, modules which have been provided to the SSDC/CNS, are human rights compliant.

To date there have been no official reported instances of human rights abuses involving SSDC /CNS officers. During the field mission CNS Officers mentioned how UNODC's training had assisted the CNS to become more involved in community policing and community outreach. In addition, CNS officers were keen to mention how UNODC's assistance had improved the treatment of detainees and made improvements to detention facilities.

Gender sensitivity

UNDP¹⁰³ reports that development in Kyrgyzstan has occurred without the full participation of women to the detriment of women's position in political and socioeconomic life. To this end UNDP developed a plan¹⁰⁴ which sought to accelerate the progress towards gender equality within the Kyrgyz Republic; and the OSCE (which is at the forefront of assisting all Law Enforcement Agencies in Kyrgyzstan to reform) had a plan to increase female representation and ensure that police training and operations were gender sensitive. Although the project staff met with UNDP and OSCE counterparts, there was no written evidence in the project documentation which described if, or how the project would promote the UNDP's and OSCE's gender equality plans. A mid-term evaluation recommendation, that the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should conduct a gender baseline study and that gender specific indicators / targets for gender inclusion should be linked to OSCE's support of the Kyrgyz Republic's police reform plan and the UNDPs gender mainstreaming development plan. This recommendation was not enacted and remains extant. The UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan should reach out to other IC actors who have specific gender programme and ensure that their programmes and projects reinforce what is already being done, rather than develop unilateral activities and targets.

¹⁰² United Nations Country Team in Kyrgyzstan Joint UNCT submission for the 2015 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Kyrgyzstan

¹⁰³ UNDP Kyrgyzstan Gender Mainstreaming Strategy 2008-2010.

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/gender-equality.html>

There was no written evidence that gender considerations were included in the development of the project design and very little evidence that gender equality was considered in the implementation of the project, beyond the setting of training targets. The logical framework indicates that training would have 20% female participation. The training data provided to the evaluators did not record gender aggregated data and there was no way to ascertain how many females had participated in UNODC training events. However, the evaluation did discoverer that female representation within the SSDC/CNS and drug enforcement agencies on the whole was significantly less than 20%¹⁰⁵ and ¹⁰⁶ and more in the region of 1-5%. The figure of 20%, therefore, was arbitrary; an unrealistic metric.

The project did assist the Kyrgyz Government in achieving Goal 1 of the National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security objective 1.1 bring laws of the Kyrgyz Republic in the area of security into compliance with requirements of UN SC resolutions on women, peace and security. The central activity was the formation of inter-agency committee to review laws of the Kyrgyz Republic dealing with security.

Summary

Human rights and gender sensitivity outputs and activities were not expressly stated in the project's documentation. However, this evaluation discovered evidence to the effect that human rights and gender considerations were incorporated in the project's implementation. UNODC's assistance, in drafting laws, had a positive effect on human rights and gender equality in the areas that were legislated. UNODC's training made the SSDC/CNS more aware of its human rights obligations, especially the treatment of detainees. There is undoubtedly more that the project could have done to ensure that it was fully supporting the Kyrgyz Government's police reform programme by making sure that all its activities were fully conversant with wider UN objectives at the country level.

Partnerships and cooperation

- To what extent were stakeholders properly engaged and informed?
- How was the project conducive to the development of partnerships at the bilateral and multilateral level?
- Did the project strengthen the SSDC/CNS ability to cooperate in regional intelligence sharing through CARICC?
- How were relevant partners and stakeholders identified?

Stakeholder identification

The Kyrgyz President personally requested assistance from UNODC, when he decreed the formation of the SSDC. Due to the President's patronage, UNODC experienced, and has maintained, extensive and meaningful relationships with many high-level officials. This high-level

¹⁰⁵ UNDP report that while 40% of civil servants are female most occupy low level administrative or support functions and very few are in management roles.

<http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/gender-equality.html>

¹⁰⁶ While no official figures of female representation in the CNS were provided during the course of the evaluation, officials indicated that it was less than 5%; no more than 20, of which most were administrative staff.

buy-in enabled the project to work with all the relevant ministries and agencies within the Kyrgyz Government.

There are large number of UN agencies, IGOs and NGOs that work with the Kyrgyz Republic. UNODC cooperated with the UNCT and assisted with the drafting of the UNDAF. UNODC assisted against pillar A: Peace and Cohesion, Effective Democratic Governance, and Human Rights, as such it worked in coordination with other UN agencies under the UNCT umbrella.

Development of partnerships

Kyrgyzstan's two major CN partners are the Russian Federation and the United States of America. The project formed strong working relationship with Russian Embassy and FSKN, and the US Embassy (INL) and the DEA. Throughout the life span of the project, UNODC has maintained close working relationships with both. Within the international community (IC) there were a number of organisations that supported various LE agencies. While UNODC worked with and alongside many of these organisations, the mid-term evaluation identified areas where working procedures could have been improved. Working on these recommendations, UNODC has commenced a bi-monthly LE working group amongst the international actors in Bishkek, so that support to Kyrgyz LE agencies can be better coordinated.

Stakeholder engagement

During the course of the evaluation all the stakeholders interviewed reported good communication with the project and the project staff. The project staff have strong relationships with the various Kyrgyz ministries and agencies that they work with; as witnessed by the level of access and the discussions during the evaluation. The table below shows the various organisations that work in partnership with UNODC, most of whom attend the PSC.

International	Kyrgyz Authorities	Other external actors or bodies
OSCE	The Department for Law Enforcement and Emergency Situations	CARICC
UNDP	MFA	Afghan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Initiative
UNAIDS	MOI	UNODC Regional Programme for Afghanistan and neighbouring states
US Embassy / DEA	Customs	DLOs
Russian Embassy /FSKN	Border Police	Officers training with FSKN
Kazak Embassy	SSDC/CNS	BLOs
CADAP-6 (EU)		TRADOC
		BOMNAF

Table 9. *K50 Core Learning Partners*¹⁰⁷

Annual reports were well written, detailed, thorough, and covered all aspects of the project. However, the reports are long and complex, and donors reported that UNODC report are difficult

¹⁰⁷ Partners are defined as those who were interviewed as part of the evaluation and/or mentioned in the projects documentation.

to digest. Donors reported that they only skim read reports and much of the key information can be missed. Donor's expressed a desire to be updated of the project's activities on regular basis, not only by formal reports but rather trickle feed information. If possible suitable warnings, months before activities take place so that principles can be invited and or informed about project achievements in advance. This would allow donors to develop greater insight or pass relevant facts back to their national capitals in a time frame that suited the donor.

The SSDC/CNS, donors and the Kyrgyz Government reported that they were kept fully abreast of the project's progress. The project's steering committee (PSC) was mentioned as functioning well and particularly appreciated by Kyrgyz Officials. Meticulous notes were taken and then published as standalone documents; this highlights the level of detail covered during each PSC and the ownership achieved by the SSDC/CNS. Revisions to delivery and particularly alterations to the outcomes and outputs (in rev 2) were conducted in full conjunction with the Kyrgyz Officials and pertained to their requirements. There have been 14 PSC meetings since the project commenced. The post PSC publications are impressive in the level of detail that they recorded. Donors mentioned it would be useful for UNODC to provide a record of decisions, shortly after the PSC; preferably in both Russian and English (this echoes the midterm recommendation).

Kyrgyz recipients all voiced satisfaction with the PSC format and the reporting they received from the project. In conversation, many were concerned that when the K50 disappeared they would be unable to voice their priorities, concerns and praise in a suitable forum. In light of all LE activities falling under SP 1 of the Programme for Central Asia care should be taken when devising working groups akin to the PSC for K50 in order for the Kyrgyz Government to retain a similar sense of ownership, as they currently feel towards K50.

International cooperation

In addition to improving regional cooperation at the state to state level, there is a requirement to forge links at the working level. It is at this level that daily contact will be made and at this level that actionable intelligence is passed¹⁰⁸. Senior SSDC officers felt that despite regional initiatives such as AKT and CARICC, their daily working relationships with other international agencies was poor. UNODC should examine opportunities to improve international/regional cooperation at the working/tactical level. Linking the CNS to the BLO construct is one area which should be explored under SP 1 of the Programme for Central Asia (recommendation 6).

Evidence that the project strengthened the SSDC/CNS's ability to cooperate more widely in regional intelligence sharing through CARICC is varied. Since 2014 there has been a slight uplift in the number of international operations in which Kyrgyzstan participated, as reported by CARICC (see figure 2 below¹⁰⁹).

¹⁰⁸ Countering the flow of drugs is complicated due to difficulties in co-ordinating efforts between national agencies within Central Asia and between this region and Afghanistan. This is reflected in limited intelligence sharing along lines of supply" from UNODC Illicit Opium Flows in Central Asia.

¹⁰⁹ Data from CARICC.




Figure 2. International operations conducted by the SSDC/CNS

While the overall number of international operations has risen since 2012, the number of controlled deliveries has reduced. Evidence, from interviews, suggests that when there was a requirement to work with other nations, then the SSDC/CNS were amiable to sharing information, and of conducting joint operations. Certain officers, normally ones who had conducted training with outside agencies, were more likely to share information and request external assistance. When joint operations had been carried out, it was reported that SSDC/CNS officers were professional and reasonably capable. The issues with international cooperation appears to be two-fold. Firstly, there is the issue of will. The will to share information and classified intelligence with others, or to expose the fact that you don't have much intelligence. Secondly, there is an issue of trust. Trust is gained through personal contact and via building relationships in advance. Many of UNODC's international and regional activities attempt to build trust. Will, however, requires the active participation of two or more entities and cannot be forced. Only the CNS can change its will to share information and collaborate with others.

Summary

The project's span of partners encompassed many international, regional and national level stakeholders in Kyrgyzstan and all the relevant Ministries within the Kyrgyz Government. All stakeholders that were interviewed stated they had been fully engaged and had been regularly informed of events by the project staff. The project assisted in developing numerous bilateral and multilateral partnerships. A mid-term recommendation to improve coordination with international LE partners was enacted by the project team. There is now a LE/police reform working group consisting of the key LE actors from the IC that meets to coordinate the group effort. Kyrgyzstan will require continued assistance in the area of international cooperation in the years to come.

Efficiency

- To what extent is the project implemented in the most efficient and cost-effective way compared to alternatives?

Staff Structures

Project Staff	Support Staff	Comments
International Project Coordinator and head of Programme Office (Law Enforcement background)	Administrative Assistant (generalist)	The team contained a mix of generalists and specialists
National Project Coordinator (Ex-military officer – specialist)	Finance Assistant (generalist)	

Table 10. K50 Staff Structures

The Project was led by an international project coordinator. Based on the lessons learnt from previous projects, this position required an expert in the in the area of counter narcotics law enforcement. These LE skills and being a native Russian speaker significantly contributed to the project's success and the ability of UNODC to influence the SSDC/CNS.¹¹⁰ Kyrgyz Officials cited communication as a key attribute. The Project coordinator was assisted by national project coordinator and two national assistant staff. Overall the project was extremely well run and administrated. For the most part the project team was focused on procurement of equipment and infrastructure, in addition to providing regular training activities. This produced a heavy administrative burden on the team. Other projects¹¹¹ took on additional staff to cope with similar levels of work.

Delivery of Outputs

The outputs under outcome one, were delivered by the project coordinator supported by external consultants and HQ UNODC staff as and when required. Suitably qualified and appropriate consultants attended working groups with Kyrgyz officials to assist with the drafting of law and policies. The Kyrgyz Government and CNS officials interviewed expressed satisfaction with this process and stated that they had learnt much from consultants and UNODC staff who assisted them. These outputs were delivered in a relatively low cost – considering the price of external consul - and highly efficient manner – as it utilised existing UNODC resources.

The outputs under outcome two were delivered entirely by the project team. Considerable time and effort was spent working with UNDP developing tenders and contracts for the building of infrastructure. Having to work through the UNDP procurement system was reported as frustrating and time consuming. Although the tender and contract for the Karakol station had to be resubmitted due to some technical issues, the delay did not cost UNODC money and the final product was delivered within budget.

The outputs under outcome three were delivered via a number of different means. Procurement of equipment was conducted by the project team, in the manner described above. Training was via conducted by the project coordinator, other specialist UNODC staff, consultants and FSKN and DEA field agents. The procurement and development of laboratory equipment and the training of the laboratory staff was conducted via the project staff in conjunction with specialists in HQ UNODC staff.

¹¹⁰ As reported by SSDC/CNS officials and Kyrgyz Republic officials.

¹¹¹ T90 took on a second administrative assistant in 2014.

The outputs under outcome four were delivered via the project coordinator in consultation with the SSDC/CNS and supported by the administrative staff. This outcome also required coordination with other UNODC programmes, namely the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, XAC/K22 establishment of BLOs and RER/H22 for support to CARICC.

When the SSDC was abolished and the CNS formed UNODC staff worked hard to ensure that the equipment purchased by the project remained with the CNS and was not moved to other departments within the MoI.

Implementation

The project kept to a simple plan, delivered activities with the full support of the SSDC/CNS and had achieved an implementation rate of approximately 95% at the end of phase 2¹¹². The chart below indicates when funds were apportioned to the project by donors, and when the project spent these funds:

Yearly Expenditure & Budget¹¹³			
Time periods throughout the life time of the project	Expenditure ¹¹⁴	Total Budget	Expenditure % of annual budget
Sep 2011-Dec 2011 (1)	\$230,507	\$792,957	60%
Jan 2012-Dec 2012 (1)	\$697,164	\$1,554,157	99%
Jan 2013-Dec 2013 (1)	\$817,099	\$3,399,800	68%
Jan 2014-Dec 2014 (1)	\$1,242,087	\$3,399,800	97%
Jan 2015-Dec 2015 (2)	\$532,186	\$4,899,800	93%
Jan 2016-Dec 2016 (2)	\$682,648	\$4,899,800	94%
Jan 2017 ¹¹⁵ -Nov 2017	\$579,745 ¹¹⁶	\$ 4,899,800	84%
Total Expenditure	\$ 4,781,436	\$ 4,899,800	84% as of November 2017
Underspent	\$ 118,364		

Table 11. *K50 Budget by financial year*

Revision 1 was a no cost extension and, therefore, staff costs increased in direct proportion to the extension of time. The project did experience an increase in expenditure on travel due to similar reasons. There was also an increase in expenditure on equipment. This increase reflects the requirements for the SSDC and the procurement of items such as electronic gates, improved detainee cells and heating systems, all of which were not originally budgeted for, and only became apparent as the project matured. The project reduced expenditure on training due to the fact that it utilised officials from the donor nations and did not employ as many consultants, as initially expected. As of June 2017, project spent 84% of the allocated funds. Some of the funds were held

¹¹² UNODC Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan figures relate to monies spent as a ratio of the budget. Total spend to date, vice total allocation of funds, is lower as some planned elements of project have yet to be paid for.

¹¹³ UNODC ProFi information: as at Sept 2015.

¹¹⁴ UNODC data from TORs.

¹¹⁵ The project has been finalized with budget's deficit in the amount of \$2,000,000.

¹¹⁶ UNODC from ProFi November 2017.

back when the SSDC was abolished and have only just been re-allocated, which accounts for approximately 50% of the underspending. A proportion of the total underspending has been set aside to build additional CNS stations and the rest (in the region of \$250,000) will be swept up into SP1 of the programme for Central Asia. When these allowances are factored in, expenditure is significantly higher and will represent an implementation rate closer to 98% which was achieved earlier on in the project's life cycle¹¹⁷. Overall the project has been implemented in a very efficient and cost-effective manner.




Figure 3. K50 Expenditure broken into segments¹¹⁸

The largest expenditure segment is for staff and personnel costs. This covers the UNODC international and national staff, plus any cost shared administrative support, in the Bishkek office. The next largest segment is for the procurement of equipment and vehicles for the SSDC/CNS.

Reporting

The project team provided accurate and timely reports, as detailed by the project documentation and as required by HQ UNODC and the donors. While standard reports were required as a means of demonstrating good governance and financial propriety, these formulaic reports are perceived as dry and lacking in texture; they provide reporting after the fact, which means that the information is often historical and out of date. Donors expressed a desire to receive shorter, more visual and more frequent updates that could be used to suit their own reporting requirements (from embassy to national capitals). In addition to reviewing standard reports, the evaluators trawled the internet for data relating to the SSDC/CNS, UNODC and donors and found a disparity in the level and quality of information available. The UN in Kyrgyzstan web-page¹¹⁹ no longer works, there is now only a Facebook page, and there are very few references to the UNCT in Kyrgyzstan. The updated UNDAF could not be accessed. UNODC's own website is hard to navigate and there was little to no information readily available about the Programme Office or the project. The UNODC search engine is difficult to use and searching for the Programme office in Kyrgyzstan offers few useful links. The ROCA area on the UNODC website has limited information and only contains 15

¹¹⁷ As reported by UNODC project staff.

¹¹⁸ Source: UNODC Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan from Profi.

¹¹⁹ <http://www.un.org.kg/en/media/news-releases/list/news-center/75-unodc>

press releases from the last 12 months¹²⁰. None of the 15 relate to Kyrgyzstan. As examples: the Integrated Country Programme for Kyrgyzstan (pdf) cannot be found within the first 100 pages of search results; and any description of current documents is extremely hard to find.

The Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should explore ways and means of improving both its formal/traditional reporting and non-traditional reporting. Of note are the following:

- Shorter, visual and more frequent updates. Independent parcels of information which when added together build a full story but independently can be consumed as and when required¹²¹;
- Donor sound bites, photos and captions relating to current events, from which the donors can cut and paste information into their update briefs; and
- Improved web based communications, improvements to the online resources making it easier to navigate and data mine. UNODC should consider assisting the CNS122 public information department.¹²³

Summary

The project was highly efficient in what it provided and in the manner, it utilised resources. The project was well managed and delivered, and in the main, what it set out to deliver was on time and to budget. The project team worked well as a team and had complimentary skill sets. There was a mix of generalists and specialists. Project outputs were efficiently delivered and utilised a mixture of delivery methods and complementary skill sets within the team. Project reporting was accurate and timely when judged against UNODC standards; however, in the more immediate digital age there are areas for improvement, where UNODC could get information out more quickly and in a more digestible format

Sustainability

- | |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What measures are in place to ensure future maintenance and repair of the equipment is provided? • To what extent are project interventions sustainable in the long term? If not, what is needed to ensure their continued resilience and viability in the future? |
|---|

The functioning of many state agencies within the Kyrgyz Republic is beholden on international assistance. The CNS is no different. The simple fact is that without the support of the donors the SSDC would have been barely able to function as an agency. It only had a central HQ in Bishkek and the MOBITs HQ in Osh. The SSDC was unable to fund repairs to the central heating system in Bishkek or replace the front gates, from within its own budget and sought UNODC assistance.

¹²⁰ UNODC press releases <https://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/press/index.html>

¹²¹ Donors felt that the shorter the report the more likely it is to be read. What donors aspired to know is what is happening and being able to get positive feedback as events occur and participate more regularly.

¹²² Donors report that SSDC should take more credit for its successes, i.e. seizures to keep drugs off the street and

how their international cooperation and training has aided them to this end.

¹²³ Donors reported that UNODC should encourage SSDS to update its website to include activities with all partners. As present it does not do this and the information it does show is out of date. This support should also consider coordinating press releases and branding attributed in the press releases and training materials.

The legal assistance, under outcome 1, is fully sustainable. In the future, as the Kyrgyz Republic requires assistance the in country SP1 Coordinator, assuming they are an SME could provide assistance. SMEs from HQ UNODC could be called forward to assist with drafting of CN laws if required and the provision of consultants for discreet periods of time could be funded from a variety of sources. Placing these types of activities under a larger umbrella programme, such as the Programme for Central Asia, has many benefits (recommendation 6).

The project has provided a number of infrastructure improvements, including new builds. It has also provided vehicles and technical equipment¹²⁴. The K50 project and bilateral donor funding has enabled the SSDC (now CNS) to expand across the country and it now has offices in Karakol, Osh and Bishkek; three others locations under consideration. These offices have been handed over to the CNS, and they are now fully responsible for upkeep and maintenance. The same is true of the equipment that has been provided by the project, such as vehicles. The project has made certain consumables available to assist; notably laboratory equipment and certain chemicals required for testing. UNODC did not provide a long-term maintenance contracts. So, despite a limited budget, the SSDC was able to take over all the equipment provided by the project to date. The SSDC did (and the CNS do) have plans for sustainment but this requires a budget. At present the CNS do not have their own independent budget, as they are part of the MOI. The CNS hierarchy is currently applying for independent financial status. Therefore, current sustainment plans, are fragile. As equipment fails there is no disposal and/or procurement plan which would see the issue of sustainment taken into the longer-term. Given the current budgetary issues and lack of organic capability, the CNS will not be truly capable of sustaining itself for many years to come.

The SSDC was, in effect, receiving the same level of training that the Kyrgyz DCA received in 2006. FSKN and DEA agents still assist and the service would be unable to training itself without this level of international assistance. The SSDC/CNS is unable to replicate the level of training that it has received from external agencies. Developing its operational capacity will necessitate additional training and education, which is completely beyond the means of the SSDC/CNS, both in terms of expertise and cost. Donors¹²⁵ have assisted with the payment of salaries for investigative officers; as this was perceived as a key means of ensuring loyalty. Regular SSDC/CNS officers state that the basic level of pay is low and that new officers are continuously seeking promotion as a means of increasing their pay¹²⁶. Within the SSDC system promotion is often out of the SSDC and often back to their parent or another agency. This frequent change of staff reduced the effectiveness of the SSDC and is another factor which effects sustainability. Wholesale and frequent change of SSDC personnel impacts institutional knowledge and helps to explain why self-provided training is unsustainable in the near-term. The CNS will require training assistance for the international community for many years to come, or until there is a sustainable training plan developed within the MOI. This report recommends that UNODC should assist the CNS conduct a training needs analysis of the entire organisation and then develop an implementation plan so that the CNS (under the MOI) becomes more self-sustaining in regards to its training of officers and staff.

¹²⁴ Donors report that they have funded SSDC ((and DCA) for more than ten years, donating to many technical equipment and infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, requests continue to flow in. Sustainability linked to conditionality are pressing issues which need to be addressed.

¹²⁵ FSKN paid top up salaries to key investigative staff up until SSDC dissolution in 2016. MOBITs received additional pay and the previous UNODC project G64 made additional payments to vetted staff.

¹²⁶ In conversation with SSDC officers and backup by project staff and donors. This is another reason why donors continued to pay investigative staff.

Regional cooperation is not sustainable from within CNS means. The placement of DLOs is funded via UNODC. Officers on secondment at CARICC are funded via UNODC. Participation in visits, workshops and international conventions all require external assistance and will do for many years. SP1 of the Programme for Central Asia and SP 1 of the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries should consider how they can assist the CNS to participate in regional events and information sharing once direct funding, under K50, stops in Dec 2017.

The Programme for Central Asia lists a number of ways that UNODC can achieve greater sustainability. Against each of these the evaluation has compared what is currently occurring and makes comments about what could occur in the future.

Technique	Current situation	Recommendations
Increase ownership	The Kyrgyz Government and the SSDC/CNS owned the project. The move SP1 might reduce this level of ownership	UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator should continue to keep a close working relationship with the CNS
Elicit an in-kind contribution from the Kyrgyz Government	The Kyrgyz Government has limited resources and real time budgetary pressures	UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan, the SP1 Coordinator and donors should advocate for in-kind contributions from the MOI. The use of MOI training facilities should be considered
Increase cost effectiveness of activities	The project was well administrated and there is little that could be done, that has not already been done to reduce overheads. Moving to a programming approach may offer some limited savings	N/A
Increase institutional learning within the CNS and other LE agencies.	The majority of training is delivered by external instructors	UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator should consider providing additional places to CNS office on the course so that it runs
Provide the correct level of human resources in order to mentor and support the SSDC/CNS.	Currently there are no full-time mentors	UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator should consider how it can place short term mentors with the CNS to aid their institutional development
Increase the human capacity of the SSDC to absorb assistance and develop organically	The SSDC suffered from a high level of staff turnover and the new staff posted in often had limited skill sets. There is a requirement to professionalise CNS as an institution	UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan should assist the CNS to conduct a full training needs analysis and assist the CNS HR department to formulate a career structure for CN officials

Table 12. *K50 Sustainability*

Summary

Infrastructure and equipment provided by the project was taken onto the SSDC's accounting systems and its long-term sustainability now resides with the CNS and the MOI. The fact that all the SSDC's equipment was transferred to the CNS is a real positive. Project procurement under outcomes 2 and 3 are judged as sustainable as the CNS has taken full responsibility for the up keep of all the equipment and infrastructure. Training, under outcome 3, however, is not assessed as self-sustaining and the CNS will continue to require support from UNODC and donors. In order to become a self-sustaining training organisation, the CNS needs to fully understand the training needs of the entire organisation. The professionalization of the CNS, this is a key area where support will be required; there is an urgent need to provide a long term sustainable solution to training and education. The fact that the CNS do not have their own operational budget is an area of concern as they are beholden on the MOI for all their financial requirements and is indicative of fact that the CNS may require donor assistance for many years to come.

Effectiveness

- To what degree were the programme's outcomes and objectives achieved, or are anticipated to be achieved?
- What chief factors were responsible for the achievement or failure of the objectives?

In order to explore the effectiveness of the project, each outcome and output was explored in detail and (both qualitative and quantitative) evidence for its achievement and effectiveness assessed. The aggregation of these assessments was tabulated into the table below, areas which required highlighting and for discussion are then included in the paragraphs below.

Legend:

Objective or outcome successfully met or exceeded the stated target in the logical framework	
Objective or outcome partially met the stated target in the logical framework	
Objective or outcome failed to meet the stated target in the logical framework	

Objective / Outcome	Means of verification for each output	Baseline	Project achievement
The SSDC is developed into an effective and sustainable specialized law enforcement organisation	Increased quantity of drug seizures and joint law enforcement operations (when comparing situation before and after the project)	SSDC reports 2011	No improvement in seizure data. Joint operations indicate a small increase – although CDs have reduced
1. Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise/adopt legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of SSDC and implementation of the adopted National Strategy/ Programme on Drug Control which focuses on legal, legislative and policy support	The laws and regulations for effective functioning of the SSDC are reviewed, revised and adopted	No revised or adopted Laws	6 laws revised and adopted
	Meetings of the "State Coordination Committee on Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors Control of the Kyrgyz Republic" conducted	Minutes of meetings	Facilitated meetings of the State Coordination Committee on Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Control of the Kyrgyz Republic

2. Basic infrastructure of SSDC, including its regional departments strengthened which focuses on the provision of infrastructure	Improved basic infrastructure and facilities handed over to SSDC	Assessment of SSDC 's infrastructure needs	Improvements made and new facility in Karakol built. 2 more assessments are in process, which could result in additional facilities
3. Strengthening operational, investigative and analytical capacities of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners through provision of equipment and training	Number of officers trained	Zero	392 in 23 sessions
	Training curricula adopted in basic, intermediate and advanced skills for SSDC officers as well as for officers of other law-enforcement agencies with drug control mandates developed, endorsed and put under systematic implementation	Training curricula not available	Curricula available and implementation of coordinated training programme progressing slowly
	Required equipment is procured and handed over	Assessment report	All equipment procured ¹²⁷ and provided according to the needs assessment and procurement reports
	Number of officers completed the training on CBT courses	Zero	2 managers currently trained and employed 200+ SSDC / CNS staff have used CBT
	Plan on development of forensic science laboratories elaborated and implemented	No plan available	Plan available and enacted. Staff trained and two laboratories established
4. The SSDC actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries and UNODC's overall coordination role of support to the SSDC is effectively attained which focuses on international cooperation	Number of SSDC Liaison Officers placed in neighbouring countries	Zero	One. Target was for two DLOs to be posted
	Activities in support of collecting and sharing operational information and participating in joint cross-border operations by SSDC through CARICC	No documented evidence	Increase in overall number of joint operations. Documented cases of greater international cooperation

Table 13. K50 Outcome achievements

The overall project objective was to strengthen the SSDC / CNS. The indicator chosen to demonstrate progress was an increase in annual seizures, compared to 2011. On the surface, this indicator did not progress positively; it could be argued that annual seizures have in fact declined over the course of the project.

¹²⁷ See annex V for full details of all equipment donated to date.




Figure 4. Kyrgyz Republic illicit drug and pre-cursor seizure data in kgs¹²⁸

Although President Atambayev announced his intent to increase the effectiveness and capacity of the SSDC, it struggled to perform. According to the graph above, since 2011 there has been no increase in overall drug seizures and net seizures continue to remain low compared to the volume of drugs entering the country. Since its creation the SSDC has found it hard to find competent leadership, to focus on its inter-governmental coordination role and it often perused its law enforcement duties instead; often competing with the Main Directorate on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking under the Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior (GUBNON). Intergovernmental coordination and cooperation are not natural within Kyrgyz Governmental processes; they are difficult to achieve, they do not attract funds and are hard to measure. Seizing drugs, even those from drug addicts¹²⁹, on the other hand, is tangible. With the move of the CNS to the MoI, there is a risk that arrest figures and seizure data will become more important than cooperation and inter-governmental coordination. To have real impact the CNS needs to conduct both activities in earnest.

Outcome one was the most successful in terms of effectiveness. The project sought to assist with the drafting of 4 laws and ended up assisting drafting and revising 6. The new laws adopted by the Kyrgyz Republic had an immediate short-term effect and will continue to provide positive effect into the mid-term. The Project provided support to the SSDC in developing the documents signed and adopted by the Kyrgyz Government as follows:

- a. Anti-Narcotic Programme of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic;¹³⁰
- b. Action Plan on implementation of the Anti-Narcotic Programme of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic;¹³¹

¹²⁸ Data provided by UNODC staff, as supplied by the Kyrgyz Government.

¹²⁹ Evidence gained during the evaluation indicated that some MoI officials would target drug users as a means of boosting their arrest and seizure statistics.

¹³⁰ Adopted by Governmental decree on 27 January 2014 <http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/96036>

¹³¹ Adopted by Governmental decree on 25 November 2014 <http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/214132>

- c. Government Decree "On narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors subject to control in the Kyrgyz Republic" No. 543 as of 09 November 2007;¹³²
- d. Concerning the Law Enforcement Service of the Kyrgyz Republic;
- e. Concerning Social Guarantees and Pension Provisions for the Servicemen of the Kyrgyz Republic's Law Enforcement Service; and
- f. Concerning Procedures for the Use of Weapons, Non-Lethal Weapons and Physical Force by the Servicemen of the Kyrgyz Republic's Law Enforcement Service

Outcome two was also very effective in what it delivered. Improvements to the Bishkek HQ and the Osh regional office have been made. The Karakol station has been built and handed over and UNODC is scoping 2 additional sites for which funding might be available due to an in-year underspending.



Picture 1. Opening ceremony of the new SSDC Eastern Department HQ in Karakol, Dec 2016¹³³.

Outcome three was dedicated to the provision of equipment and training. UNODC realised that without this level of assistance (particularly training) the SSDC would be unable to progress against any of the other outcomes. The procurement of equipment was a success and there were no negative reports received during the evaluation. Training, despite being seen as a positive, did receive some criticism and there were areas for improvement. Training in Russian was perceived to be more beneficial. Within the logical framework there was no measure of effect attached to UNODC provided training. Simplistically, it was hoped that the impact of UNODC provided training would contribute towards the achievement of the overall objective and that illicit drug seizures would increase.

Although a considerable number of officers were trained, and the standard of the training was high, according to the CNS well received, it appears that the training did not have the desired effect. In order to understand what might have occurred the evaluation team explored what training had been delivered and to whom. Training was designed for field agents, however, some more senior

¹³² Adopted by Governmental decree on 04 December 2015 <http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/98249>

¹³³ Provided by the UNDOC K50 Project Team.

officers¹³⁴ took training places that were not suitable for their jobs¹³⁵ and some officers repeated training. Many officers were rotated out of the SSDC/CNS and corporate knowledge suffered. Training in Russian, especially hands-on basic skills and rudimentary LE techniques were better received than training delivered in English which had to be translated¹³⁶. However, DEA specialist training delivered through interpreters was well received when these sessions introduced new subject matter and skills that CNS officers had not seen before.



Picture 2. DEA training delivered to CNS officers under K50 ¹³⁷.

There is also a difference between short term tactical training related to equipment – to become a better LE agency – and a longer-term approach which seeks to professionalise the CNS. A long-term approach should be better placed to deliver against the overall objective, but will take longer to implement and will divert resources from near-term goals¹³⁸. The SSDC/CNS is a small organisation of no more than 400 staff. Independent, sustainable long-term education and training will only be achieved in conjunction with the other departments of the MOI. Hopefully, one positive from the formation of the CNS under the MOI, is a career path and dedicated for CN officials. In order for this to occur the CNS's Human Resource department needs to update its staff selection criteria, start standards and job descriptions to ensure that the CNS recruits, trains and retains the correct calibre of staff.

¹³⁴ INL reporting used feedback sheets, conducted surveys and focus groups. Results were not overly positive. The report indicates that of 40 SSDC staff interviewed only 54% attended all the training provided. Although the course was billed for new SSDC officers, some of those selected to attend were in fact very senior. Surveys indicated that more focus should be on practical job skills rather than lectures.

¹³⁵ INL sponsored evaluation of the training conducted by DEA agents in support of the project.

¹³⁶ In discussion with CNS officers who had attended UNODC training.

¹³⁷ Official press release: <https://css.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/unodc-supported-a-five-day-training-course-for-the-kyrgyz-counter-narcotics-service-of-the-ministry-of-interior.html>

¹³⁸ This observation is supported the UNDP 2015 evaluation of the developmental support the Kyrgyz Republic.

Recommendation 1: UNDP should further focus its support on strengthening the capacity of national institutions, especially at the subnational level, to implement existing policies and legislation.



Picture 3. Vehicles provided by K50¹³⁹

Capability management often breaks the constituent elements of the capability down into logical segments which can be easily understood and then delivered. When combined these segments create the complete capability. Breaking into segments is considered a suitable way of mapping implementation and managing delivery. There is no set method for developing institution change within a LE/CN agency. The closest models that exist are in the military. The US military analyses its capabilities in the dimensions of DOTMLPF: Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities. The UK MoD breakdowns Defence lines of development as TEPIDPIL: Training, Equipment, Personnel, Information, Concepts and Doctrine, Organisation, Infrastructure, Logistics. Based on the lines of activity contained in the project (K50) and cognisant of the two models above, the authors have developed a possible model for the international assistance to a LE/CN agency. Lines of development/activity: Legal assistance; Infrastructure; Equipment; Training (skills); Professionalization (organisation); Doctrine (the way of operating, to include SOPs); Personnel; Logistics; International Cooperation.



¹³⁹ UNODC library picture http://www.unodc.org/images/centralasia/pr/Vehicle_Handover_Nov12.jpg

Picture 4. Computer Based Training (CBT) provided by K50¹⁴⁰

While outcome four delivered a lot of activity it failed to meet the expectations as set out in the logical framework and more importantly there is little tangible evidence that it increased information sharing at the regional level. Outcome four is difficult to achieve unilaterally. International cooperation and coordination are wider ranging issues which will only be solved through a combination of projects and numerous activities. International cooperation is also highly dependent on the will of the member states to cooperate. Within Central Asia, where there are many political disputes that hinder cooperation.

Summary

Outcome one achieved what it intended to achieve and the effects of the legal assistance it provided will be enduring. Outcome two also achieved what it intended, and over time the requirement to provide this level of (infrastructure) support will reduce. Outcome three delivered what it stated (in terms of equipment), but the overall effect may not be what was intended as the effectiveness of UNODC's training support is difficult to gauge. While K50 assisted the SSDC/CNS to develop new skills it did not build any long-term institution capacity. While the quality of the instruction was high, it was not always targeted toward the right training audience. Despite the high participation rates, significant staff rotations reduced institutional knowledge. In addition, it proved difficult for K50 to achieve results under outcome four unilaterally; regional cooperation is achieved in direct correlation to the will of recipient, not the enthusiasm of UNODC or the donor. Overall results relating to international cooperation are mixed, while there has been slightly more cooperation, the effect of this cooperation has yet to appear. The sum of numerous UNODC initiatives such as K50 and other programmes such as the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries should yield an improvement in the area of international and regional cooperation. This effect has yet to be seen.

Impact

- | |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• To what extent has the anticipated long-term impact of this project been achieved?• Have there been any positive or negative unintended results?• To what extent did the project contribute to drug seizures in the region (in comparison with the beginning of the project in 2011)? |
|---|

Long-term

The long-term benefits of the project relate to the first outcome and the assistance that UNODC provided to the SSDC, on behalf of the Kyrgyz Government, when it drafted the National Strategy on Drug Control and the accompanying Action Plan. These documents did not exist before the project commenced. It is in the area of legal, legislative and policy support that UNODC has achieved the greatest impact, this is due to the level of its expertise UNODC provides¹⁴¹ and the fact that the Kyrgyz Republic lacked much of the knowledge required to independently develop these documents. The laws, strategies and actions plans drafted during the life-cycle of the project

¹⁴⁰ UNODC library picture http://www.unodc.org/images/centralasia/pr/CBT_class_launch_Nov12.jpg

¹⁴¹ Kyrgyz attendees reported that UNODC workshops challenge much of their current thinking and are useful tools to furthering their ability to develop CN laws and strategies.

will have a lasting impact within Kyrgyzstan as they endure beyond the project. The ability of the Kyrgyz Government to enact these laws and deliver against the action plan poses a different question.

Positive

The project positively contributed towards: SP 1 of UNODC's strategy for the period 2012–2015;¹⁴² the UNDAF Pillar A: Peace and Cohesion, Effective Democratic Governance, and Human Rights; the National Action Plan on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security. In the provision of infrastructure, the project delivered all it set out to achieve and is likely to deliver additional infrastructure in due course; at no additional overall cost. With the project's assistance CNS now has sufficient infrastructure to perform its duties. The original equipment requirements have been met and the CNS now possess the basic equipment that it requires to fulfil its role. While there is still equipment that the CNS requires, such as night viewing devices¹⁴³ (NVDs) this equipment was not part of the original needs analysis and only demonstrates the point that Kyrgyzstan will continue to require assistance in the long-term. As the methods of those smuggling drugs alter, so too must the methods used to detect them change too.

The Kyrgyz Republic has (or had) a SSDC which was equipped, trained (to some extent) and capable of conducting CN operations both within Kyrgyzstan and externally with regional partners and donors. The fact that the SSDC's equipment did not disappear when the SSDC was abolished and the CNS was formed is a major achievement. Previously when the DCA was abolished all of its equipment and most of its infrastructure was given to other agencies and the SSDC had to start from a blank sheet. These achievements, however, only represent the first step; it is how, when left to its own devices, the CNS operates and performs its duties that indicates the impact of the project.

Neutral

Over recent years, border disputes are slowly beginning to subside, and Kyrgyzstan is more positive about dealing with these issues. In the area of international cooperation, however, more needs to be done. By both the international community in assisting the Kyrgyz Republic and the Kyrgyz Republic, in positively cooperating with its neighbours. While many of the pieces are in place (BLOs, DLOs and CARICC etc.) real time international cooperation and coordination in the area of counter narcotics remains limited. International accords are required, as they provide the basis on which cooperation can occur, but agreements alone will not yield results. It is only when those who are meant to cooperate understand what it is they are to do and how they are cooperate that an effect will be achieved. This requires trust between states and individuals. Workshops and joint training events will continue to be required, so as to build and foster this trust.

Considerably (almost 100%) more officials were trained by the end of the project than planned for at the beginning. This is a real positive. The training delivered by UNODC was high quality and suitable to the target audience. However, the impact of this training was not as envisaged. Low start levels, high staff turnover and a focus on the junior officials (field officers) rather than the entire span of command (which would have built capacity throughout the organisation) reduced the

¹⁴² https://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/UNODC_2012_-_2015_Resolution_ECOSOC_merged.pdf

¹⁴³ The evaluators were informed by CNS officers that high-tech equipment such as NVDs and drones would be helpful due to the fact that the drug smugglers were well financed and well equipped and the CNS required additional equipment in order to conduct credible operations.

impact of training. This report recommends that UNODC assist the CNS/MoI and conducts a complete review of all CN training and staff procedures so that CNS, the MoI, UNODC and partners have a full understanding of what needs to be achieved to strengthen the CNS.

Negative

The overall objective of the project was to strengthen the capacity of the SSDC/CNS. The indicator chosen to demonstrate success was an increase in seizures and joint operations over the life-span of the project, this compared to the 2011 baseline. If seizure data for the years up to and including 2017 are plotted, then there appears to have been a reduction in seizures by over 50% (see Table 14 in effectiveness).

Unintended results: an alternative narrative

When the evaluators plotted seizure data in 2017 compared to the 2011 baseline, it became apparent that the data was not supporting what they heard from recipients, donors and UNODC. Therefore, this report sought data to explain this anomaly. The evaluators looked for positive effects that were not necessarily articulated in the project documentation, but perhaps should have been. The evaluators also sought to understand the data, understand what normal looked like and see if there was any statistical proof that the project or the SSDC/CNS had made a difference to the level of seizures or the quality of operations. This alternative narrative, builds on what is the project's major long-term impact, that of supporting the Kyrgyz Republic to draft new laws and policies, as these are what should have been the main indicators of success. It then looks at the second element, which relates to the additional tools the Kyrgyz Republic have been given, the infrastructure, training and equipment and suggests that the quality of these tools is what matters. The final strand is how effective the Kyrgyz Republic has been at implementing change and enforcing their laws using their new tools. Using this alternative narrative, it was hoped that UNODC support to the SSDC/CNS could be proven to have provided some positive results.

Comparison to 2011

When considering the evaluation question: to what extent did the project contribute to drug seizures in the region (in comparison with the beginning of the project in 2011) caution needs to be applied. Comparing simple seizure data (totals) as a methodology, is grossly simplistic and, as seen above indicates that the project's activities made the situation worse not better. This evaluation, however, will instead try and quantify the seizure results using the following logic:

- a. Seizure data should look back historically to 2003 when UNODC started to assist the Kyrgyz DCA and explore any similarities.
- b. Statistical anomalies should be investigated and reasons for their existence explored.

In order to understand the data, the following graph was generated. Precursors, were initially reduced to 10% of their value, so that they could be plotted on the same graph as illicit drugs. Precursors by their nature represent huge volumes of chemicals and annual variations in precursors have a disproportional effect to overall seizure total compared to the seizure of illicit drugs. When refining opium, precursor chemicals are used at a ratio of no less than 10-1.




Figure 5: Precursor and Illicit drug seizures in Kyrgyzstan (kgs): 2010-2017¹⁴⁴

The chart above indicates two spikes. The first spike, in 2011, relates to illicit drugs and precursors. The second spike, in 2015, is related to only precursors. It is clear that without 2011 (if it were an anomaly) there would be a broadly speaking a flat line in the illicit drug seizures data, with 2013 marking the high point. The years outside of this trend would be 2010, a year before the project and the year after the abolishment of the DCA, and 2017 the year after the SSDC was abolished. Possible reasons for the first spike are: this was the first year after the presidential elections and LE agencies and the MoI might have been given additional resources or support, as President Atambaev did place a priority on CN; Op TARCET¹⁴⁵ III was conducted in 2011 which included the Central Asian states, although OP TARCET¹⁴⁶ focused mainly on pre-cursor chemicals, increased operational activity would have resulted in increased drug seizures too; and finally, there was a global spike in heroin seizures in 2011, which is mirrored regionally and within Kyrgyzstan. No reason for the pre-cursor spike, in 2015, could be identified.




Figure 6: Global seizures of heroin and morphine: (2005-2015)¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Data supplied by UNODC as provided by the Kyrgyz Government.

¹⁴⁵ Under the Red Paper of UNODC's Rainbow Strategy, Op TARCET was a series of regional training events, joint operations, back tracking exercises and information sharing events that targeted pre-cursors chemicals en-route to Afghanistan. Data supplied by UNODC

¹⁴⁶ Page 8 at the of the Afghan Law Enforcement Cluster Evaluation (OP TARCET / AFG I85 data)

http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2013/AFG_Cluster/02_Project_Cluster_Evaluation_Afghanistan_Law_Enforcement_Cluster_JULY2013.pdf

¹⁴⁷ Source: UNDOC Annual Drug report 2017

When pre-cursors chemicals are removed and only illicit drugs plotted the following is apparent. Annual seizures of illicit drugs normally range between 1,250 and 1,500 kgs per annum, less the years when Kyrgyzstan does not have a DCA/SSDC or CNS. These years account for approximately 1,000 kgs (the 2017 estimate is based on 6-months of data). While illicit drugs seizure types fluctuate, hashish resin has remained the most common drug seized and of late there has been an increase in the amounts of hashish resin seized within Kyrgyzstan.




Figure 7: Illicit drug seizures in Kyrgyzstan (kgs): 2010-2017¹⁴⁸

Working on the assumption that, as the country’s primary CN LE agency the SSDC would / or should be targeting organised crime and not petty drug use, then data for opioids (mainly heroin), emanating from Afghanistan should be examined in detail, rather than all drugs; particularly home-grown cannabis. It is clear to see from the graph that Hashish is the most commonly seized illicit drug and it appears that cannabis and marijuana are more likely to be seized than opioids. This might suggest that Kyrgyz LE agencies concentrate more on countering internal drug products, than reacting to external smuggling. This could be a function of MoI CN forces being targeted toward internal threats. The following graph looks at seizure data relating only to opioids. From this graph, it is clear to see, that while seizures of opioids have declined overall, this was not across the board. There was a spike in poppy plant seizures in 2012 and increases in wet opium in 2013 and 2014. When 2011 is taken out as a statistical anomaly, it would appear that there has been a year on year improvement for heroin seizures, with a reduction in 2016, when the SSDC was abolished.

¹⁴⁸ Data supplied by UNODC as provided by the Kyrgyz Government.




Figure 8: Opioid seizures (all types) in Kyrgyzstan (kgs): 2010-2017¹⁴⁹

Seizure data for Kyrgyzstan from 2003 onwards seems to indicate that there were low levels of seizures prior to the creation of the DCA and the SSDC (if 2011 is removed).




Figure 9: Heroin seizures in Kyrgyzstan (kgs): 2003-2017¹⁵⁰

Seizures improved - slightly (more so, for the DCA) over time. Seizures then fell to approx 50% of the previous year, once the DCA and SSDC were abolished seizures fell. This. This negative indicator might just prove the effectiveness of the DCA and SSDC; the fact that a CN LE force do have an impact.

¹⁴⁹ Data supplied by UNODC as provided by the Kyrgyz Government.

¹⁵⁰ Data supplied by UNODC as provided by the Kyrgyz Government.




Figure 10: Heroin seizures in Kyrgyzstan (kgs): DCA vs. SSDC from formation to abolishment (in years) ¹⁵¹

UNODC should conduct a study into drug smuggling and seizures within to include Kyrgyzstan so that it can properly understand the relationship between this project’s activities and the impact on seizures and show the benefit of its efforts the Kyrgyz Government and to donors. It should do this in order to develop an alternative narrative to the impact of international assistance to SSDC/CNS (recommendation 1).




Figure 11: Opiates intercepted in Asia: 2005-2015¹⁵²

ROCA and / or the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries should conduct a detailed study into issue of narcotics smuggling within Central Asia as the last study is

¹⁵¹ Data supplied by UNODC as provided by the Kyrgyz Government.

¹⁵² Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2017.

dated April 2008.¹⁵³ In addition, UNODC should assist the CNS with the collection and analysis of drug seizure, arrest, prosecution and drug use data.

Competing narratives

Narrative One. When the seizure in 2016/17 are compared to 2011, the main narrative might conclude that - while the project was successful in what it delivered – the objective to strengthen the SSDC/CNS was not achieved. The main indicators went down, not up, which demonstrates that the CNS is not capable of fulfilling its primary role as a CN LE agency. In fact, the ability of the Kyrgyz LE agencies to seize illicit narcotics has, and is steadily declining. The reasons for failure are complex, and include: the fact that CN is not a real priority to the Kyrgyz Government; the abolishment of the SSDC was a cost saving measure; a lack of leadership caused by the rotation of chairpersons and deputies has had a detrimental effect on the organisation; endemic corruption has impacted operations; a lack of will to change within the SSDC has hindered their development and prevented them from cooperating internationally or regionally; the frequent turnover of staff has reduced their operational effectiveness and institutional knowledge; competing organisations did not deliver a joint response; a lack of intelligence sharing a limited desire to cooperate with others reduced their effectiveness; and the SSDC/CNS is an unsustainable organisation that received the same level of assistance as the DCA without being able to demonstrate any tangible improvement.

Narrative Two. The alternative narrative might conclude that – the project was successful in what it delivered, especially considering the fact that it was trying to assist a new organisation develop and operate with a limited mandate and budget. The quality of the inputs was high, the access and traction gained by the project team was immense and UNODC is now probably seen as the Kyrgyz Republic’s most trusted partner in the field of LE assistance. The SSDC/CNS now have the tools they require to operate and there have been small, but identifiable year on year improvements in the number of operations and particularly in the seizures of heroin. The overall seizures of illicit drugs within Kyrgyzstan is still low but with continued support the CNS, with the aid of the IC these will improve. In line with the UNDP mid-term evaluation – which states that Kyrgyz Institutions require strengthening¹⁵⁴ - this report recommends that a holistic approach to the CNS’ development should be taken. The CNS is not yet a self-sustaining organisation and it will require assistance in order to train and cooperate regionally and this should be the focus for the IC going forward.

The long-term impact of the project is related to the development of counter narcotics laws and policies. This is an area where the project has already delivered the most and where, as long as the CNS performs its secondary role of inter-agency coordination, it will continue to have the greatest impact. The provision of infrastructure, equipment and training and assistance with international cooperation all strengthen this central outcome, as they are the means which the CNS use to increase its effectiveness. This is ultimately about achieving a joint/multi-agency approach and not just about the effectiveness of a single LE department, the CNS. The extent to which the CNS, as a department within the MOI, can exert this influence across government remains to be seen. Secondly, the SSDC’s/CNS’s operational effectiveness was improved by the project via provision of infrastructure and training enabling it to conduct CN operations both within Kyrgyzstan and externally with partners. The impact of the SSDC/CNS is hidden from view by the seizure data. By accident 2011 was a poor year to choose for a baseline and the wide variations in illicit drug seizures potentially mask the effect of SSDC/CNS operations. By exploring negative indicators, such as

¹⁵³ https://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Illicit%20Drug%20Trends_Central%20Asia-final.pdf

¹⁵⁴ UNDP mid-term evaluation of the UNDAF

what occurred when there was no DCA or SSDC, the true impact of the Kyrgyz Republic's counter narcotics efforts becomes clearer.

Summary

Overall the project achieved what it intended to achieve. The disappointing fact is that despite the quality of the assistance that SSDC/ CNS received, it as an organisation was unable to increase the seizure of illicit drugs; which was the metric chosen in the logical framework to prove the success of the project's intervention. Drug seizure data alone does not tell the whole story and CNS will require assistance in analysing raw data, in order to determine the impact of their actions against narcotics trafficking and the impact that illicit drugs have on their country and their people.

III. CONCLUSIONS

In addition to the standard UNEG evaluation questions, the key question that this report seeks to answer is, what next for the CNS, the IC and UNODC? In order to make an informed comment it must first ask the question, was the project successful? It must then ascertain if the CNS are capable of functioning without assistance, and if not, what future assistance the CNS might require? Only then can it discuss the level of support that UNODC could or should provide to the CNS going forward, and determine what next?

Was the project successful?

In order to assess if the project was successful, its strengths and weaknesses were analysed:

Strengths	Weaknesses
Highly relevant to the Government, the recipient, SDGs, the IC, donors and UNODC	
Well designed. Learnt lessons from (did not repeat mistakes associated with) previous projects	Indicators, baseline studies and articulation of risk
New laws and training was human rights complaint and gender sensitive	Human rights and gender equality activities were not articulated in the formal design
Equipment and buildings are sustainable	Training is not sustainable
Well managed and highly efficient in use of resources – on budget and on time	Non-traditional reporting (use of the internet)
Full range of partners, PSC highly respected and it developed a new LE working group	
Outcomes 1 - 3 fully achieved.	Outcome 4, relating to regional effect, placement of DLOs and international assistance not fully achieved
Overall impact was positive as the SSDC/CNS was enabled as an organisation. The long-term impact was in the area of legal assistance.	SSDC/CNS did not progress as the project envisaged as only certain elements of the SSDC were strengthened. The SSDC/CNS failed to achieve the metrics set out in the logical framework. Results were hidden in the statistics

Table 14: Project strengths and weaknesses

On balance, there are considerably more positives than negatives, which speaks to the quality of UNODC’s assistance. The disappointing fact is that despite this, the SSDC/CNS was unable to increase the overall seizure of illicit drugs. Sometimes the facts required to support the notion of increased operational effectiveness can be hidden from view; buried in the raw data. This evaluation report analysed the data in greater depth and discovered that 2011 was a poor year to choose for a baseline (it was a global and regional record) and that the wide variations in illicit drug seizures in Kyrgyzstan masked the true effect of SSDC/CNS operations. By plotting data back to 2003 and exploring negative indicators, such as what occurred when there was no DCA or SSDC, the true

impact of the Kyrgyz Republic's counter narcotics efforts potentially become clearer. UNODC assistance did help the SSDC increase the seizure of Afghan heroin.

Future assistance?

The CNS will still require international assistance for many years after K50 ends. Illicit drug seizures are still low compared to volume of opiates that flow along the NDR. The CNS is unable to fully function as a self-sustaining agency. So, the question is, what assistance might the CNS require in the future. Recommendation one of the UNDP assessment of development results¹⁵⁵, states "that UNDP should further focus its support on strengthening the capacity of national institutions.....to implement existing policies and legislation." This report endorses this recommendation, as it pertains equally to the CNS. The IC should seek to strengthen the capacity of the CNS as an institution.

As a newly formed organisation the CNS is experiencing considerable change. External expectations only add to the friction that change brings. The CNS will require nurturing before it can effectively operate. Development will be gradual and will take a number of years. In order to develop the CNS will require a simple plan, one that seeks to build capacity throughout the organisation and enable it to leverage resources. At certain points, external assistance will be required. This development process can't be forced it must be organic and fully owned by the CNS. While change represents an opportunity, there are risks, which are: too much change can lead to institutional paralysis; the MoU's between donors and the CNS are slow to materialise and this limits international assistance and funding; and complex regional politics limits regional cooperation.¹⁵⁶

What next?

The Kyrgyz Government see UNODC as trusted international LE partner. Its advice is listened to and generally accepted. The introduction of the Programme for Central Asia should allow UNODC to deliver more, and there are multiple channels where UNODC can assist. Countering terrorism, CVE and FIUs were all mentioned during the course of the evaluation. However, UNODC must not lose sight of the needs of the CNS. Although UNODC cannot meet all of the CNS's requirements, it can assist the CNS to understand what it needs to achieve, and assist it in leveraging resources. Directly UNODC should: continue to support legal reforms; provide training, but with a focus on building the institution, while encouraging donors to provide operationally focused training; and finally, UNODC must assist the CNS with improving its regional intelligence sharing and cooperation. The benefit of Programme for Central Asia, is that all activities that support regional intelligence are now merged under one programme. It is vital, therefore, that the various project teams don't remain in silos and that they begin to work as one larger LE team, which seeks to expand activities to across the entire LE community, thereby multiplying effect.

¹⁵⁵ Assessment of Development Results: The Kyrgyz Republic
<http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/library/assessment-of-development-results--the-kyrgyz-republic.html>

¹⁵⁶ During the recent presidential election, allegations of Kazakh interference resulted in a border dispute. The evaluators saw increased border inspections which resulted in up to 200 trucks at a time backed up at the main border crossing point.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations have been designed, primarily, to assist the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan so that it can better support Kyrgyz LE agencies and particularly the CNS. As K50 will be subsumed into the Programme for Central Asia, these recommendations also include the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia and were applicable the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries. Recommendations were formulated in cooperation with recipients, donors and UNODC staff. Before the evaluators departed from Bishkek, they back briefed the Project Coordinator and revised initial recommendations in light of feedback.

The sum of various UNODC regional initiatives seeks to improve regional LE cooperation. The outcome of which, should be increased the seizures of illicit drugs. While each of these elements has been evaluated separately, there does not appear to be a holistic study. Data suggests that opiate seizures in Central Asia (and globally) peaked in 2011 and that since then there has been a decline. UNODC needs to understand if its focus on greater regional cooperation is working? The last formal UNODC study into illicit drug flows in Central Asia and detailed analysis of illicit seizures is dated April 2008.

Recommendation 1: Regional study. Within the next 18 months the Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and ROCA, in conjunction with regional partners, should conduct an in-depth study into illicit drug smuggling, seizures and arrests within the region in order to better understand what has occurred, and the combined effectiveness of UNODC's numerous regional LE coordination and cooperation mechanisms.

Historical lessons indicate that providing technical assistance without institutional change does not necessarily deliver a better organisation or improve its performance. The CNS will require training assistance from the international community for many years to come, or until a sustainable training plan is developed. Considerable thought needs to be applied to the mapping of inputs, activities to desired outputs and outcomes, ensuring that there is a logical and practical (realistic) progression.

Recommendation 2: CNS needs analysis. Within the next 24 months the Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and ROCA should assist the CNS to conduct a full needs analysis of agency, assist in the development of an implementation plan and then use this plan to leverage both internal and IC resources. UNODC should consider using theory of change during this process and the design of any future interventions.

UNODC is increasingly seen as trusted international partner and there is more that UNODC can do to assist the Kyrgyz Republic. Remaining donor funds that have been allocated to K50, and not spent by Dec 2017, will be swept up, under SP1 of the Programme for Central Asia which will continue to provide assistance to Kyrgyz LE agencies until at least 2019.

Recommendation 3. Future UNODC assistance: Within in next 12 months the UNODC Country Office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia will need to programme assistance for numerous Kyrgyz LE agencies, while at the same time providing support

for the CNS. Areas for future UNODC assistance are likely to include: counter terrorism, combating violent extremism and assistance for financial investigations.

One of the project's major long term achievements was assisting the Kyrgyz Government to draft, revise and adopt practical CN laws, that were both human rights compliant and gender sensitive.

Recommendation 4. Legal reform and legal assistance. Over the next 24 months the UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should continue to support legal reform in Kyrgyzstan, ensuring that it human rights complaint and gender sensitive, and assist the Kyrgyz Government to develop and adopt respective legislation which can be quickly updated to incorporate new challenges in drug smuggling and new appearances in the drug market.

There was little evidence, in the project's documentation, to suggest that human rights and gender equality had been formally incorporated into the project's design. An arbitrary figure of 20% female participation in training was added as an indicator.

Recommendation 5. Greater consideration of Gender and Human Rights during the design phase. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan should reach out to other IC actors who have specific gender programmes and ensure that their programmes and projects reinforce what is already being done, rather than develop unilateral activities and targets.

There were some areas, in the initial project design, where improvements could have been made. The project sought to build capacity within a newly formed organisation (the SSDC) and the main project indicator was poorly devised, it was too simplistic and prone to statistical anomalies. When the 2017 data was compared to 2011, it suggests that illicit drug seizures have decreased during the course of the project's assistance, rather than increased. This fact, contradicts the qualitative evidence gained during the evaluation and suggests that the data required a more detailed analysis.

Recommendation 6a. Joint national study. Within the next 18 months the UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan should conduct a study of drug smuggling and seizures within Kyrgyzstan so that it can better demonstrate the benefit UNODC assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic and donors. This study should explore the method used to construct the alternative narrative (contained in this evaluation) which seeks to challenge the perception of declining seizures, by placing data in context. As part of this study, UNODC should consider how it can assist the CNS with the collection and analysis of drug seizure, arrest, prosecution and drug use data in the future.

Recommendation 6b. Improved project/programme design. The UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1-4 Coordinators for the Programme for Central should ensure that future programme/project indicators are more relevant to the outcomes they hope to achieve and accurately reflect the sum of the outputs and quality of the inputs. UNODC should also ensure that baseline studies are completed and that obvious and reoccurring risks are identified and planned against.

Senior SSDC/CNS officers felt that despite an increased regional focus at the higher level, their daily working relationships with other international agencies was poor. The CNS will continue to have limited access to financial resources, which means that participation in regional visits, workshops and international conventions will require external assistance in the future.

Recommendation 7. Regional participation. Within the next 6 months the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia and the SP1 Coordinator for the Regional Programme for

Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries should consider how they can assist the CNS to participate in regional events and information sharing once direct funding, under K50, stops in Dec 2017. The provision of additional places for CNS officers on regional courses and linking the CNS to the BLO are areas for consideration.

Kyrgyz Officials indicated that they greatly appreciated the PSC structure and wanted something similar to remain when K50 ended. The Kyrgyz Government has a system for prioritising security and law enforcement requirements. This system has a fixed calendar, with the process of refining priorities commencing in September, leading to a formal declaration of priorities in the January.

Recommendation 8. Priority setting. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should take care when devising working groups akin to the PSC for K50 to ensure that the Kyrgyz Government retains the sense of ownership that it did under K50. These working groups and or priority setting meetings, at the country level, must accord to the Kyrgyz Government's own priority setting timetable. The UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan should continue to engage other IC partners in the recently established LE meeting to ensure that assistance is coordinated and linked to the Kyrgyz Government's priority areas.

The assistance that UNODC has provided to the SSDC/CNS, under K50, is broadly the same as it provided to the DCA, 14 years ago. This suggests that some of the projects activities might be unsustainable. In order to build greater sustainability into UNODC activities the following might be considered:

Recommendation 9a: Human resources assistance. Within the next 12 months, following a formal needs analysis, the UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should assist the CNS with the formulation of job descriptions for CNS officers so that there is a properly identified and resourced career path for CN officers.

Recommendation 9b: Provision of mentors. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central Asia should consider the placement of short-term mentors within the CNS in order to increase their institutional capacity.

Recommendation 9c: Increased in-kind contribution. Within the next 12 months The UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator for the Programme for Central should advocate for in-kind contributions from the MoI. The use of MoI training facilities should be considered.

While UNODC reporting is accurate and timely there is still more that can be done to satisfy the information requirements of donors and the wider stakeholder community.

Recommendation 10. Improved non-traditional reporting. Within the next 12 months the UNODC Country office for Kyrgyzstan and the SP1 Coordinator should explore ways of improving both its formal (traditional) reporting and informal (non-traditional) reporting. Of note are the following:

- Shorter, visual and more frequent updates. Independent parcels of information, which when added together build a full story but independently can be consumed as and when required;

- Donor sound bites, photos and captions relating to current events, from which the donors can cut and paste information into their update briefs; and
- Improved web based communications, improvements to the online resources making it easier to navigate and data mine. UNODC should consider assisting the CNS public information department with similar improvements.

V. LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons learned concern the learning experiences and insights that were gained throughout the life-span of the project, from conception to terminal evaluation. This section examines what lessons were identified from previous projects, which were learnt (incorporated into the project's design) and which lesson might be relevant to the future, particularly the Programme for Central Asia 2015-2019.

- What are the lessons learnt for future project implementation?
- What are the best practices that could be applied in the future activities in frame of Sub-programme-1 of the UNODC Programme for Central Asia 2015-2019 (UNODC Z60 project) and other similar projects?
- To what extent have recommendations from the previous evaluation/s been implemented?
- Did observations and feedback alter delivery, and if so how?

Key lessons from evaluations

- Increased resources do not necessarily increase the capacity of the recipient agency.
- Increased resources at the operational end of an organisation might not deliver the expected outcomes if that outcome relates to the whole organisation. In order to strengthen an organisation, particularly if change is linked to its performance, the entire organisation needs to be taken into account and the whole organisation strengthened. If not then there must be a clear understanding of how a small change will (if possible) impact the whole.
- Capacity building takes time. It is insufficient to only deliver equipment and provide training, time needs to be spent strengthening every element within the organisation. This requires additional resource and will take longer. A degree of honesty, with both recipients and donors is required.
- For change to occur the organisation must be willing to change. Donors and the UNODC should not transpose their will to change onto the recipient organisation. The two will be markedly different.
- The indicators used to measure or demonstrate the effectiveness and impact of training need careful consideration and articulation. Training M&E needs to be considered during the design phase. Baseline studies and statistical anomalies need to be understood upfront.
- Sharing of intelligence is key to joint operations. Every previous evaluation report mentions this issue. Intelligence sharing is not just a training issue, it is inextricably linked to the will to share and enhanced by trust. The Will cannot be forced. Trust can only be developed during shared experiences and is built over time. With trust parties become more willing.

Best practises

The following best practices could be applied in the future to activities in support of Sub-programme-1 of the UNODC Programme for Central Asia 2015-2019 (UNODC Z60 project) and other similar projects.

- Carefully decide what is being delivered and why. Consider using theory of change to map desired outcomes during the design phase. Technical assistance without institutional change will not necessarily deliver a better organisation nor will it improve its performance. There may be many obstacles to change, and all must be identified and planned for.
- Regional participation needs careful consideration and dedicated resources if it is going to have the desired effect. Seizure data seems to suggest that a high-water mark was achieved during the Op TARCET period. For Kyrgyzstan OP TARCET III. Since then UNODC has sought to achieve similar effect through a regional approach, via the RP and ROCA projects (such as support to CARICC). However, the RP shares a single regional LE coordinator with ROCA and this post has been gapped. Evidence suggests that greater regional effect cannot be left to a programme, it requires dedicated resources, mainly people in countries enacting change, for it to deliver results¹⁵⁷.
- A training needs analysis should consider the professionalization of the entire organisation. A transformation change plan is then required, this must map how the organisation is going to morph into a more professional body and provide detail as how this will be achieved.

Previous Evaluations

The project design did not formally acknowledge learned lessons from previous UNODC law enforcement projects conducted in Central Asia. However, the project was based on a previous project which supported the DCA of Kyrgyzstan. In essence, the project understood and factored in the following lessons:

- K50 was the foundation, it was simple in design, sustainability was considered, and there was an understanding that this was a long-term project. A full needs analysis was conducted prior to implementation. The project coordinators were specialists, with a legal or LE background. Rivalry and information sharing between LE agencies were understood failings.¹⁵⁸
- MOBITs in Osh continued to receive UNODC support. Issues relating to intelligence generation and sharing remained valid. Whilst training was provided, a systematic approach to intelligence was not developed by the project¹⁵⁹.

¹⁵⁷ This observation is backed up by recommendation 35 in the RP Mid-Term evaluation which stated that the RP SP 1 Coordinator post and the ROCA LE should not share a single incumbent.

https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/indepth-evaluations/2015/RP_Afghanistan_Neighbouring_Countries_In-Depth_Evaluation_Report_April_2015.pdf

¹⁵⁸ From the Terminal Evaluation of Project No. KYR/G64 "Drug Control Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic." Published in 2008.

¹⁵⁹ Project No KGZ/175 Establishment of Interagency Law Enforcement Mobile Groups in Kyrgyzstan Final Evaluation. Published in 2012.

- Issues relating to cross border cooperation became the focus of outcome 4. WGs and PSCs were conducted and proved extremely valuable. The project team consisted of specialists and generalists¹⁶⁰.
- Progress to change CN laws became the focus of outcome 1. UNODC did not pay top up fees, this was left to donors. K50 was aware of importance of intelligence sharing and international cooperation, which become the focus of outcome 4¹⁶¹.

While most of the recommendations from the mid-term evaluation were accepted, limited progress has been made in their implementation. There are two reasons for this. The first is the abolishment of the SSDC and creation of the CNS. This in effect reduced the project's implementation by a year. The second factor is the time it takes UNODC (as an organisation) to react to and enact change. Simple changes to project documentation take at least 6 months to agree.

Recommendations that the project did not adopt were:

- A focus on intelligence.
- The provision of mentors.
- The need to conduct a full training needs assessment.
- CN officers require a transparent job description.
- Issues of corruption and internal audits.

As a means of assessing what lessons were identified and what has been learnt (as demonstrated by altered delivery) the table in the Annex VI lists the recommendations from previous evaluations and assesses what has changed.

The conclusion, from the analysis of these lessons, is that the project on the whole has learnt a great deal from other projects delivered by UNODC in similar LE fields. There are a few lessons that have not been learnt or enacted, and those mainly relate to data, intelligence, UNODC's reporting and human resources support. While there are many more that have not been fully enacted, they have generally been understood by the project team and have either been partially implemented or planned for. The recommendation section to this report has been developed with these shortfalls in mind and aims to assist UNODC to improve design and delivery of future programmes and project. Learning lessons requires resources, and there are implications if any organisation is to implement lessons. The issue of resourcing has not been addressed by this report.

By combining the many recommendations contained in previous evaluation reports, this report developed a conceptual model for capacity building. The use of this model might ensure that the entire organisation is considered and assisted across a number, of mutually supporting, lines of development. This report does not suggest that UNODC should provide support to all the lines of development. However, UNODC assistance should be cognisant of the fact that without influencing all lines it is unlikely to achieve long-term impact and/or lasting change. Without assistance in key areas any intervention runs a risk of failing to achieve its objective, and this risk should be

¹⁶⁰ Mid-term project evaluation of Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossing points and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices XAC/K22: Published in 2015

¹⁶¹ Independent mid-term project evaluations of the Tajikistan Drug Control Agency (DCA) Phase 2 TD/TAJ/03/H03. Published in 2012.

articulated. Conversely, a model such as the one below could be a useful tool when conducting coordination among other IC LE actors.

Line of development¹⁶²	Currently	Future
Legal assistance	highly effective	Continuing requirement, but only as and when laws are drafted and/or revised
Infrastructure	requirement has largely been met	Limited
Equipment	immediate requirement has largely been met	The CNS will require additional equipment in order to keep pace with the capabilities of drug smugglers. Due to budgetary pressures this will remain an extant requirement.
Training	operationally focused courses with a limited number of elected students sent to international schools	Continuing requirement for operationally focused training until the CNS can develop a sustaining training system
Professionalization	not considered by the project and is a major hindrance to the overall performance of the SSDC and CNS	A full training needs analysis of the organisation would be required before a plan can be developed. Leadership needs to be considered and so to the issue of data analysis
Doctrine	not considered by the project	As a new organisation, how the CNS collectively thinks, acts and operates should be addressed. The drafting and/or updating of SOPs may be required
Personnel	additional / performance pay from donors. UNODC suggested developing job descriptions and selection criteria related to training, but to date no progress has been made	CNS will continue to require assistance
Logistics	not considered by the project	Likely area of concern in the future depending on CNS budgets
International Cooperation	DLOs, visits, joint training, working groups and regional workshops	The ability to fund DLOs, regional workshops and working groups is beyond the ability of the CNS

Table 15: Potential assistance required by the CNS

¹⁶² These lines of development are suggested by the authors – a full explanation is contained in the Effectiveness section of this report

ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE EVALUATION

I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Project number:	KGZ/K50
Project title:	“Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic” ¹⁶³
Revised project title:	“Strengthening the Counter Narcotics Service of the Interior Ministry of the Kyrgyz Republic”
Duration:	15 August 2011–31 December 2017 (6 years, 4 months)
Location:	Sub-Region - Central Asia (Kyrgyz Republic)
Linkages to Country Programme:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNODC Country Programme of assistance for Kyrgyzstan 2014-2016; ▪ UNODC Programme for Central Asia 2015-2019: Sub-programme-1: Countering transnational crime, illicit drug trafficking and terrorism; Outcome 1.1: Member States more capable and proficient at countering the threats posed by narcotics trafficking.
Linkages to Thematic Programme:	Countering Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking
Executing Agency:	UNODC Programme Office in the Kyrgyz Republic
Partner Organisations	OSCE, CADAP
Total Approved Budget:	\$6,899,800 (21 November 2014)
Total Overall Budget:	\$6,899,800
Donors:	Russian Federation, United States of America, Republic of Kazakhstan
Project Manager/Coordinator:	Mr. Alexander Fedulov - Head of UNODC Programme Office in the Kyrgyz Republic
Type of evaluation:	Final Independent Project Evaluation
Time period covered by the evaluation:	January 2015 (end of previous independent evaluation) – December 2017
Geographical coverage of the evaluation:	The Kyrgyz Republic
Budget for this evaluation:	\$60,000
Type and year of past evaluations (if any):	Mid-Term Independent Evaluation in 2015

¹⁶³ In 2017 due to the law enforcement reform initiated in the Kyrgyz Republic, the project’s title has been amended as “Strengthening the Counter Narcotics Service (CNS) of the Interior Ministry of the Kyrgyz Republic”.

Core Learning Partners (entities): ¹⁶⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Apparatus of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic; ▪ State Service on Drug Control of the KR (SSDC); ▪ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic; ▪ Ministry of Interior of the KR; ▪ Customs Service of the KR; ▪ Border Service of the KR; ▪ National Institute for Strategic Studies of the KR; ▪ Embassy of the United States of America in Kyrgyzstan; ▪ Embassy of the Russian Federation in Kyrgyzstan; ▪ Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan; ▪ UNODC staff at HQ; ▪ UNODC staff at Regional Office for Central Asia.
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Project overview and historical context

Kyrgyzstan is a significant transit country for drug trafficking on the so-called Northern Route: from Afghanistan through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia and to world drug markets¹⁶⁵.

The Kyrgyz Republic is a key transit route for Afghan opiates travelling north out of Afghanistan. The geographical, political and socio-economic status of Kyrgyzstan is fraught with vulnerability. There have been a number of regime changes in recent years accompanied by often violent civil unrest. The new government is a fragile coalition and the country has serious economic challenges, including a high level of public debt and almost no inward investment. Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest countries in the region and is regarded as facing severe problems of corruption¹⁶⁶.

These and other factors have limited the ability of the government to take meaningful and sustainable measures against the drug trade.

The government has struggled to exert its authority in the south of the country where there has been active political opposition, serious inter-ethnic strife and where the city of Osh is recognised as being an important drug trafficking hub.

Kyrgyzstan borders China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its surface is more than 90% mountainous with 30% of its borders undefined and almost entirely uncontrolled. This makes Kyrgyzstan extremely vulnerable to drug trafficking.

In addition to the threat from Afghan opiates, there is thought to be extensive cultivation of cannabis in the country as well as 1,000 hectares of wild cannabis available for exploitation. The Ephedra plant, from which the amphetamine-type substance Ephedrone (Methcathinone) can be derived, grows wild on 55,000 hectares¹⁶⁷.

The high level of drug addiction in the country is also a major concern. The annual drug abuse (in opioids) prevalence rate is estimated at 0.8 percent of the population of Kyrgyzstan¹⁶⁸.

With depleted financial resources, ongoing political transition and challenges in establishing strong and stable central, regional and local government institutions, the impact of drug trafficking and associated criminal activity in Kyrgyzstan, unless adequately addressed, has the potential to have serious long term consequences on political stability.

¹⁶⁴ The CLPs are the key stakeholders of the subject evaluated (project, programme, policy etc.) who have an interest in the evaluation. The CLP works closely with the Evaluation Manager to guide the evaluation process.

¹⁶⁵ <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/>

¹⁶⁶ It is ranked 162nd of 180 countries in Transparency International's 2009 Corruption Perception Index.

¹⁶⁷ See "Strategy for Development of the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic (till 2014)" and EMCDDA Country overview of Kyrgyzstan (<http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/country-overviews/kg>)

¹⁶⁸ UNODC World Drug Report 2010, p. 154.

The main objective for the UNODC project “Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic” (KGZK50), established in 2011, is to provide comprehensive support to the Kyrgyz Republic in the field of drug control at the national level through developing the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic (SSDC) into an effective and sustainable law enforcement agency in the field of drug control. The support includes providing training and equipment for SSDC, promoting cooperation with its counterparts in the region as well as developing legal, administrative or physical infrastructure of SSDC.

SSDC of the Kyrgyz Republic was established by the Presidential Decree dated 17 August 2010. The SSDC is recognized as the legal successor to the former Drug Control Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic.

UNODC formerly supported the development of a Drug Control Agency (DCA) in Kyrgyzstan (project AD/KYR/G64), that (DCA) was abolished in late 2009.¹⁶⁹

In August 2010, the new President issued a decree establishing a new State Service on Drug Control (SSDC) and personally requested technical assistance from UNODC in a meeting with the UNODC Executive Director.

As a result, in April 2011 the UNODC KGZ/K50 project “Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic” was launched.

In 2014, the project was extended until 31 December 2017 with the overall project budget increasing from 3,399,800 USD to 6,899,800 USD.

In July 2016, the Kyrgyz Republic has initiated a “comprehensive reform of law enforcement system”. In accordance with it, the control functions of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors, which were previously implemented by the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic (SSDC) and the Main Directorate on Countering Illicit Drug Trafficking (GUBNON) under the Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior (MoI) have been merged and transferred to the newly created Counter Narcotics Service (CNS) under jurisdiction of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior. In addition, the control functions on licit drug trafficking (legal turnover of narcotic drugs) have been transferred to the Ministry of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic.

As a result, in mid of 2017 the project revision has been processed. The project’s goals and objectives remained unchanged. The project will continue its support to the Kyrgyz Republic’s drug control capacities by strengthening the newly created Counter Narcotics Service of the Ministry of Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic (the legal successor of SSDC). The project’s title has been amended as “Strengthening the Counter Narcotics Service of the Interior Ministry of the Kyrgyz Republic”.

A Mid-Term Independent Project Evaluation was carried out in 2015. The recommendations were incorporated into a follow up work-plan. Some of the key recommendations of the mid-term evaluation were: Concentrate more effort on assisting the SSDC to perform its interagency coordination role; Assist the CNS to develop strategic guidance for CNS development and operationalization of the Drug Control Strategy; Assist to develop the CNSs working routine, one that meets their requirement to manage, develop and coordinate the activities of the CNS; Develop plans for merging all LE activities so that they fit under SP 1 of the Programme for Central Asia; Assist the CNS to conduct a comprehensive training needs assessment, with the view to produce a training delivery plan, which seeks to develop the CNS as both an agency and a coordination body in support of the implementation of the National Strategy on Drug Control.

¹⁶⁹ In 2008, the evaluation of the project KYR/G64 “Kyrgyz Republic Drug Control Agency” covered the activities of the project implemented from 2003 (start of the project) up to the end of the project in 2008.

The project contributes to the Sub-programme-1 of the UNODC Programme for Central Asia 2015-2019.¹⁷⁰ The project also contributed to the Sub-programme-1 of the UNODC Integrated Country

Programme of assistance for Kyrgyzstan 2014-2016 (ICP).¹⁷¹

Project activities have been formally coordinated through a Project Steering Committee (PSC), which brings together the main Government counterparts, key international partners, donors and civil society organizations.

In order to avoid any duplication/overlapping in the assistance provided to the SSDC/CNS the project team has actively coordinated its activities through regular meetings with the counterparts such as the U.S. INL, U.S. DEA country offices in Bishkek and Representative of the Russian Federation MoI at the Russian Federation Embassy as well as CADAP, EU and others.

Monitoring and transparency have been ensured through quarterly narrative reports (QNR), semi-annual project progress reports (SAPPR) and annual project progress reports (APPR) as well as through quarterly narrative reports to donor (e.g. per INL format).

The project implementation has been managed & coordinated by the Head of UNODC Office – Senior Project Coordinator with support of the project staff consisting of the National Project Coordinator, Administrative Assistant and Finance Assistant.

Main experiences/challenges during implementation:

During the implementation the project did not encounter any challenges except those related to sustainability of the project's beneficiary, which sometimes hampered planned activities.

These include the following:

- 1) Abolishment of the beneficiary—the Kyrgyz State Service on Drug Control (SSDC) and creation of a new Counter Narcotics Service (CNS) under MoI. The process has been initiated in July 2016 in line with the reform of Law Enforcement system in the Kyrgyz Republic. Since up until now the LE reform is still ongoing process it has negative implications to the K50 project activities. This is because the newly created CNS is not sustainable yet and there still internal issues in HR, assets etc. As a result, some activities especially those planned to outcomes 3 (equipment) and 4 (INTL cooperation) have been put on hold.
- 2) In addition, in March 2017 received a request from INL (US donor) to put on hold utilization of US funds and to re-work allocation of INL funds for K50 project work plan. In accordance with the request the funds allocated for procurement of IT equipment and vehicles in the amount of \$75,000 have been cancelled. As a result, activities related to Outcome 3; Output 1 and 5 have been put on hold until the issue with utilization of INL funds is clarified and common agreement on the funds is achieved. Later on in June 2017 received a letter from INL setting that the "frozen" U.S. funds have been permitted for utilization for Outcome 4 and project running costs only. It also established that if pending MOU agreement between the DEA and the Kyrgyz MoI is signed the remaining funds will be available for utilization for other activities as well.
- 3) Long process of project revision, which has been initiated in October 2016. Initially the revision was created and submitted with aim to extend its duration for additional three years upon request received from the Kyrgyz Government. But later on after round of consultations with UNODC

¹⁷⁰ Sub-programme-1: Countering transnational crime, illicit drug trafficking and terrorism; Outcome 1.1: Member States more capable and proficient at countering the threats posed by narcotics trafficking.

¹⁷¹ Sub-programme-1: Drug trafficking, organized crime and border management: Outcome 1.1. Drug and crime legislative and regulatory frameworks improved; Outcome 1.2. Institutional capacity to identify, investigate and prosecute drug trafficking and organized criminal activity enhanced; Outcome 1.3. Border management enhanced to intercept criminal activity; Outcome 1.4. Technical capacity of forensic science laboratories upgraded.

HQ it's been decided to finalize the K50 project in December 2017. The current revision envisages change in the name of beneficiary.

4) Frequent turnover of leaderships and staffing/personnel;

In order to mitigate delays in project implementation the project team has been undertaking all possible measures aimed at continuing planned activities regardless emerging issues. This included coordination meetings with HQ, ROCA, donors and beneficiary. In addition, in cooperation with the CNS the project developed an Action Plan for 2017 project year. On 08 February 2017 the plan was approved and signed by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Project documents and revisions of the original project document:

Project document	Year	Please provide general information regarding the original project document.
Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic.	2011	The Kyrgyz Republic is a key transit route for the trafficking of Afghan opiates travelling north out of Afghanistan. In particular, the city of Osh is recognised as being an important drug trafficking hub along the Northern Route. UNODC formerly supported the development of a Drug Control Agency (DCA) in Kyrgyzstan (project AD/KYR/G64), that was abolished in late 2009. In August 2010, the new President issued a decree establishing a new State Service on Drug Control and personally requested technical assistance from UNODC in a meeting with the Executive Director. This project will provide comprehensive support to the new State Service in order for it to function as the lead and coordinating body for counter-narcotics activity in Kyrgyzstan as well as promoting cooperation with its counterparts in the region. The support will include training and equipment as well as any necessary development of legal, administrative or physical infrastructure. The project was designed as a result of a needs assessment mission to Kyrgyzstan in November 2010 and after extensive consultations with national counterparts.

Project revision	Year	Reason & purpose	Change in (please check)
Revision I	2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The aim of the project revision was to extend the project until 15 December 2014. Revised duration of the project was 15 August 2011 - 15 December 2014 (3 years and 4 months). ▪ The extension allowed the project to complete all remaining activities and fully reach its objectives, particularly related to project's outcomes: 2, 3 and 4. ▪ In order to achieve all project goals it was necessary to have time to collect all pledged contributions. ▪ Output 2.3 was formulated as "New Administrative facility for the Eastern State Service department located in Karakol constructed". This issue has been approved by the Project Steering Committee in January 2013 in Bishkek. ▪ Proposed extension of the project's duration and amendment to output 2.3 did not lead to increase/decrease of the Overall Budget. 	<input type="checkbox"/> Budget <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Timeframe <input type="checkbox"/> Logframe
Revision II	2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In accordance with request from SSDC on further support to drug control regime in Kyrgyzstan, the Executive Director of UNODC Mr. Yury Fedotov confirmed the importance of continued UNODC assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic and proposed an extension of the K50 project. In April 2014 the K50 Project Steering Committee decided to initiate the project revision process for its extension. ▪ The consultations on the project's extension were held with the major 	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Budget <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Timeframe <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Logframe

		<p>project donors including the United States of America and the Russian Federation, who confirmed their position of continuation of support to the Kyrgyz Republic through implementation of this UNODC project. As a result, in September 2014, the UNODC received a letter from the Russian Federation with a pledge of 500,000 USD for the KGZ/K50 project extension. Furthermore, in July 2014, UNODC received a letter from the United States' Embassy to the Kyrgyz Republic commending the cooperation with the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and requesting a proposal for continuing the project.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The revision maintained the original project objective, but amended some previous outputs and activities while adding new ones in order to increase its effectiveness and expanding of the overall positive impact. ▪ The project revision was aimed at achieving the following outcomes: (i) improvement of a legal framework in the field of drug control and support in implementation of the newly adopted Anti-Drug Strategy/Programme; (ii) strengthening of the SSDC's infrastructures in regions; (iii) strengthening operational, investigative, analytical and technical capacities of the SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners as well as (iv) support in promotion of cooperation and information exchange with counter-narcotic partners at the national level and with partners from neighbouring and other countries. In addition, the revision of the project enabled the project to complete the ongoing activities started in 2014. ▪ The project also contributed to the Sub-programme 1 of the UNODC Integrated Country Programme of assistance for Kyrgyzstan 2014-2016 (ICP). ▪ As the result of the revision, the project's duration was extended until 31 December 2017 and the overall project budget was increased from 3,399,800 USD to 6,899,800 USD. 	
<p>Revision III</p>	<p>2017</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The aim of the revision was to continue comprehensive support to the Kyrgyz Republic's efforts in the field of drug control in connection with the state's law enforcement reform. ▪ In July 2016, the Kyrgyz Republic has initiated a comprehensive reform of the state's law enforcement (LE) system. The main goal of the initiated reform is to strengthen security for the benefit of society with ensuring the rule of law and building trust to the law enforcement institutions. Among others, the reform includes measures on optimizing and abolishing of all duplicate functions in the LE structures of the country. In accordance with these measures, the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic (SSDC) and the Main Directorate on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking under the Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior (GUBNON) have been merged into new Counter Narcotics Service (CNS) under jurisdiction of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior (MoI). As a result, the national control functions on countering illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors, which were previously implemented by SSDC, have been transferred to the newly created CNS. ▪ In September 2016, the UNODC has received a letter from the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic requesting revision of the UNODC KGZ/K50 project "Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic" with the aim of continuing the project but with the Counter Narcotics Service (CNS) of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior being the new beneficiary. ▪ Thus, the project's title has been amended as "Strengthening the Counter Narcotics Service of the Interior Ministry of the Kyrgyz Republic". 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Budget <input type="checkbox"/> Timeframe <input type="checkbox"/> Logframe

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This revision maintained the original project objective, and aimed at developing the Counter Narcotics Service (legal successor of the State Service on Drug Control) into an effective, sustainable law enforcement agency. 	
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Main objectives and outcomes

<p>The main objective of the project (as per project document/revision): The Countering Narcotics Service developed into an effective and sustainable specialized law enforcement agency.</p>	<p>Indicators related to the Project objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased quantity of drug seizures and joint law enforcement operations (comparing situation before 2011 and after 2019). <p>Baseline: Annual drug seizure reports. Target: Quantity of drug seizures and joint law enforcement operations are increased to 25% over the baseline figures.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quantity and volume of resources allocated to CNS and to its counter-narcotic partners to increase their interdiction capacity (comparing situation before 2011 and after 2019). <p>Baseline: Inventory balance report. Target: Increase to 80% over the baseline figures.</p>
<p>Outcome 1: Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of CNS and implementation of the adopted National Strategy on Drug Control.</p>	<p>Indicators related to Outcome 1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The laws and regulations for effective functioning of the CNS are reviewed, revised and adopted. <p>Baseline: 2 revised and adopted laws. Target: 4 laws revised and adopted.</p>
<p>Outcome 2: Basic infrastructures of CNS, including its regional departments improved.</p>	<p>Indicators related to Outcome 2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved basic infrastructure and facilities handed over to CNS. <p>Baseline: Assessment of infrastructure needs of CNS's regional departments. Target: CNS takes possession of infrastructures built/refurbished according to assessment.</p>
<p>Outcome 3: Operational, investigative and analytical capacities of CNS and its national counter-narcotic partners through provision of equipment and training strengthened.</p>	<p>Indicators related to Outcome 3:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of officers trained by ToT group. <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 100 officers are trained by ToT group.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training curricula adopted in basic, intermediate and advanced skills for CNS officers as well as for officers of other law-enforcement agencies with drug control mandates developed endorsed and put under systematic implementation. <p>Baseline: Training curricula not available. Target: Training curricula is under implementation.</p> <p>Number of officers completed the training on CBT courses (Computer Based Training). Baseline: 0 staff completed CBT training. Target: 200 officers completed CBT training.</p> <p>Plan on development of forensic science laboratories elaborated and implemented. Baseline: No plan available. Target: Plan is available and implemented.</p>

<p>Outcome 4: The CNS actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries and UNODC's overall coordination role of support to the CNS is effectively attained.</p>	<p>Indicators related to Outcome 4:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number of CNS Liaison Officers placed in neighbouring countries. Baseline: No Liaison Officers present. Target: 2 Liaison Officers placed in at least two countries. ▪ Number of cooperation arrangements such as MOUs, formal agreements and/or informal cooperation modalities for enhanced cooperation of the CNS with drug law enforcement agencies of foreign countries in the context of joint operations and information/intelligence exchange in place. Baseline: 2. Target: 10 documented cooperation activities between agencies. ▪ Activities in support of collecting and sharing operational information and participating in joint cross-border operations by CNS through CARICC conducted. Baseline: No documented cooperation in cross-border operations through CARICC. Target: 5 documented active cooperation between agencies.
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Contribution to UNODC’s country, regional or thematic programme:

- UNODC Integrated Country Programme of assistance for Kyrgyzstan 2014-2016 (ICP). Sub-programme 1 – Drug trafficking, organized crime and border management; Outcome 1.1. Drug and crime legislative and regulatory frameworks improved; Outcome 1.2. Institutional capacity to identify, investigate and prosecute drug trafficking and organized criminal activity enhanced; Outcome 1.3. Border management enhanced to intercept criminal activity; Outcome 1.4. Technical capacity of forensic science laboratories upgraded.
- UNODC Programme for Central Asia 2015-2019 (PCA), Sub-programme 1: Countering transnational crime, illicit drug trafficking and terrorism; Outcome 1.1: Member States more capable and proficient at countering the threats posed by narcotics trafficking.

Linkage to UNODC strategy context and to the Sustainable Development Goals:

- UNODC strategy 2012-2015, Sub-programme 1: Countering transnational organized crime and illicit drug trafficking.
- SDG #16 “Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions” (Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all; Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime; Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels)

II. DISBURSEMENT HISTORY

Time periods throughout the life time of the project	Overall Budget	Total Approved Budget	Expenditures	Expenditures in %
Jan 2017 ¹⁷² -Jun 2017	\$6,899,800	\$4,899,800	-	-
Jan 2016-Dec 2016	\$6,899,800	\$4,899,800	\$604,756	93%

¹⁷² The project has been finalized with budget’s deficit in the amount of \$2,000,000.

Jan 2015-Dec 2015	\$6,899,800	\$4,899,800	\$525,564	57%
Jan 2014-Dec 2014	\$6,899,800	\$3,399,800	\$1,242,087	97%
Jan 2013-Dec 2013	\$3,399,800	\$3,399,800	\$817,099	68%
Jan 2012-Dec 2012	\$3,399,800	\$1,554,157	\$697,164	99%
Sep 2011-Dec 2011	\$3,399,800	\$792,957	\$230,507	60%

III. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of this Final Independent Project Evaluation is to measure project progress all the way through the project duration and provide for lessons learned. The following evaluation criteria will be assessed: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, partnerships and cooperation in order to derive lessons learned as well as best practices. Furthermore, it will be assessed to what extent human rights aspects and gender mainstreaming have been taken into account during project design as well as throughout the project implementation. In addition, it will be assessed to which extent the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation have been implemented and to what effect.

The evaluation will assess the following DAC criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, established partnerships and cooperation and human rights. The evaluation will further specifically assess how gender aspects have been mainstreamed into the project as well as identify lessons learned and best practices and derive recommendations.

The evaluation's findings and recommendations will serve as the basis for future planning, design and management of the project during its final year, as well as to ensure ownership, result-based orientation, cost-effectiveness and quality of the UNODC services.

The results of this summative evaluation are intended for use by the project team and the Regional Office in Tashkent to learn from and make desirable adjustments to ongoing implementation.

It will also inform stakeholders and in particular the Core Learning Partners (see Annex III) including state partners, UNODC staff at HQ and staff in UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA), UNODC staff in the Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan (the Project Team) and the representatives of the Donor Countries (the Embassies of the Russian Federation, the United States of America and Kazakhstan in the Kyrgyz Republic) as well as recipient governments of project accomplishments or non-accomplishments.

The main stakeholders will get the possibility to provide comments on the Terms of Reference, take note of the selection of consultants; be interviewed and briefed as part of the evaluation process and shall receive the key findings. They will also be interviewed as informants as part of the evaluation process. Please see attached the list of the Core Learning Partners in Annex.

The final independent project evaluation will be carried out by a team of two Independent Evaluation Consultants (2 evaluators, 1 Team leader and 1 Substantive expert), with logistical arrangements provided by the UNODC Programme Office in the Kyrgyz Republic and in line with the UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates to be found on the IEU website: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html>.

Assumed accomplishment of the evaluation:

Through this evaluation, the project management team will obtain an assessment on the effectiveness of the activities conducted in this specific area and draw on recommendation and

lessons learned to inform future programming. This evaluation will also offer an opportunity to identify problems that may have to be addressed differently in the future. Furthermore, this evaluation will assess the progress made in implementing the recommendations in 2015.

The main evaluation users:

The main users of this evaluation will be the Core Learning Partners (see Annex III) including state partners, UNODC staff at HQ and staff in UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA), UNODC staff in the Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan (the Project Team) and the representatives of the Donor Countries (the Embassies of the Russian Federation, the United States of America and Kazakhstan in the Kyrgyz Republic) as well as recipient governments.

II. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

Unit of analysis (full project/programme/ parts of the project/programme; etc.)	Activities that have been carried out under the project KGZK50, i.e. the whole project including all components.
Time period of the project/ programme covered by the evaluation	From January 2015 (end of mid-term evaluation) until the end of the evaluation field mission (tentatively: by the end of December 2017)
Geographical coverage of the evaluation	The scope for the geographical coverage of the project will be Kyrgyzstan and project priority/pilot locations. One mission to Kyrgyzstan is planned, consisting of meetings with national counterparts in Bishkek, and field visits to project sites in Osh and Karakol.

IV. KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

EVALUATION CRITERIA

The evaluation will be conducted based on the following DAC criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights and lesson learned, and, will respond to the following below questions, however, provided as indicative only, and required to be further refined by the Evaluation Team

Relevance	
<i>Relevance is the extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.</i>	
1.	To what extent is the project relevant to the Kyrgyz Republic's State Drug Control Service needs and priorities?
2.	To what extent are the project outputs and outcomes relevant to the recipient government's needs?
3.	To what extent are the outputs, outcomes and objectives of this project/programme relevant to implementing the Sustainable Development Goals?
4.	To what extent have recommendations on relevance from the previous evaluation (if any) been implemented?
Efficiency	
<i>Efficiency measures the outputs - qualitative and quantitative - in relation to the inputs.</i>	
5.	To what extent is the project implemented in the most efficient and cost-effective way compared to alternatives?
6.	To what extent the project's reporting is accurate, timely and satisfactory?
7.	To what extent have recommendations on efficiency from the previous evaluation (if any) been implemented?
Effectiveness	

<i>Effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.</i>	
8.	To what degree were the programme's outcomes and objectives achieved, or are anticipated to be achieved? What chief factors were responsible for the achievement or failure of the objectives?
9.	To what extent did the project implement recommendations of the mid-term evaluation?
Impact	
<i>Impact is the positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.</i>	
10.	To what extent has the anticipated long term impact of this project been achieved?
11.	Have there been any positive or negative unintended results?
12.	To what extent did the project contribute to drug seizures in the region (in comparison with the beginning of the project in 2011)?
Sustainability	
<i>Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.</i>	
13.	What measures are in place to ensure future maintenance and repair of the equipment provided?
14.	To what extent are project interventions sustainable in the long term? If not, what is needed to ensure their continued resilience and viability in the future?
15.	To what extent have recommendations on sustainability from the previous evaluation (if any) been implemented?
Partnerships and cooperation	
<i>The evaluation assesses the partnerships and cooperation established during the project/ programme as well as their functioning and value.</i>	
16.	To what extent were stakeholders properly engaged and informed?
17.	How was the project conducive to the development of partnerships at the bilateral and multilateral level?
18.	How were relevant partners and stakeholders identified?
Human rights and gender	
<i>The evaluation needs to assess the mainstreaming of human rights as well as gender aspects throughout the project/ programme.</i>	
19.	To what extent are human rights considerations included in the project development and implementation?
20.	To what extent are gender considerations included in the project development and implementation?
a.	To what extent did the project intervention contribute to fulfilment of the National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security?
b.	To what extent did the project intervention contribute to increased representation of women in the State Service on Drug Control?
21.	To what extent have recommendations on human rights and gender from the previous evaluation (if any) been implemented?
Lessons learned and best practices	
<i>Lessons learned concern the learning experiences and insights that were gained throughout the project/ programme.</i>	
22.	What are the lessons learnt for future project implementation?
23.	What are the best practices that could be applied in the future activities in frame of Sub-programme-1 of the UNODC Programme for Central Asia 2015-2019 (UNODC Z60 project) and other similar projects?

V. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The methods to be used to collect and analyse data:

The evaluation will follow a mixed methods approach combining quantitative as well as qualitative data collection tools as well as analyses methods. Furthermore, the methods applied will be gender-

sensitive, ensuring inclusive, respectful and participatory approaches, methods and tools that capture gender equality issues. A gender-sensitive approach further includes voices and opinions of both men, women and other marginalised groups as well as ensures gender related and disaggregated data (e.g. age, sex, countries etc.) to be compiled and analysed. The evaluation team will triangulate any findings and test rival hypotheses.

The evaluation will be undertaken through a triangulation exercise of data analysis stemming from desk review, semi-structured interviews, as well as other sources to be established by the evaluator. These will be primary data coming from interviews, questionnaires, surveys, as well as secondary data stemming from project documents as well as other entities.

All evaluations of the United Nations system are guided by the principles of human rights and gender equality. Gender-sensitive evaluation methods and gender-sensitive data collection techniques are therefore essential in order to identify key gender issues, address marginalized, hard-to-reach and vulnerable population, as well as to define strategies for developing appropriate data bases for better gender analysis in future project planning. Please note that this goes beyond simply providing sex-disaggregated data.

1. A desk review of relevant documents including a preliminary analysis of findings to be presented in an inception report, containing a refined work plan, methodology and evaluation tools. The desk review list of documents will include but are not limited to the following (please see Annex for more details):

- the project document; all project revision documents; quarterly, semi-annual and annual project progress reports;
- Mid-Term Independent Project Evaluation Report of the project conducted in 2015¹⁷³;
- assignment reports (expert reports), trainers' reports and
- donor reports;
- financial reports;
- relevant press releases;
- mission and monitoring reports (a final list will be provided to the evaluator and further material can be requested by the evaluator at any time);

2. Field mission to Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) for 10 working days, this includes travels to project's pilot locations in Osh for two days and two-days to Karakol, consisting of:

- Briefing and individual semi-structured face-to-face interviews with the Core Learning Partners (see Annex III), including state partners;
- UNODC staff at HQ and staff in UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA), UNODC staff in the Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan (the Project Team) and;
- Representatives of the Donor Countries (the Embassies of the Russian Federation, the United States of America and Kazakhstan in the Kyrgyz Republic);
- Onsite visits to selected project locations in Bishkek city, Osh city and Karakol city for physical inspection and discussions with beneficiaries.

3. Telephone interviews:

- Telephone interviews are suggested to be made with: 1) relevant UNODC staff at HQ, i.e. Regional Section for Europe, West & Central Asia in Vienna; 2) and relevant UNODC staff in UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA).

¹⁷³

http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2016/KGZK50_Independent_Mid-Term_Evaluation_Report_February_2016.pdf

The inception report will outline the specific evaluation methodology and tools in detail in order to be approved by IEU.

The sources of data:

Semi-structured interviews with all relevant CLP's, i.e. donors, beneficiaries and all other relevant stakeholders, such as state partners, UNODC staff at HQ and UNODC staff in the Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA), the Project Team and the representatives of Donor Countries (the Embassies of the Russian Federation, the United States of America and Kazakhstan in the Kyrgyz Republic) outlined in Annex III, as well as further interviews with stakeholders as needed and proposed by the evaluator.

Field missions to project pilot locations; training assignment reports, adopted legislative acts/policies, internal/donor reports, statistical data.

The evaluation will be undertaken through a triangulation exercise of data stemming from desk review, structured interviews, field missions, questionnaires, surveys, observations and other sources to be established by the evaluator.

The independent project evaluation is to be conducted following UNODC/IEU's evaluation standards, norms, guidelines and templates, (to be found on the IEU website: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/index.html>), as well as UNEG Norms and Standards. A list of materials for the desk review is found in Annex II.

VI. TIMEFRAME AND DELIVERABLES

The Team Leader will have the overall responsibility for the quality and timely submission of all deliverables, as specified below:

- Inception Report (18 working days), in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines, and templates containing a refined work plan, methodology and evaluation tools (reviewed and cleared by IEU before the field mission can take place – this can entail various rounds of comments) by 11 October 2017;
- Draft Evaluation Report (30 working days) in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines, and templates by 22 November 2017 (to be reviewed and cleared by IEU – this can entail various rounds of comments);¹⁷⁴
- Final Evaluation Report (23 working days), in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines, and templates, including annex with management response (optional) and IEU's clearance by 25 December 2017.
- Presentation of evaluation findings and recommendations to the project team, CLPs and other stakeholders.

Duties	Time frame	Location	Deliverables
Desk review and preparation of first draft Inception Report	18-29 September 2017 (10 working days)	Home based	Draft Inception report in line with UNODC evaluation norms and standards

¹⁷⁴ To be found here: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html>.

Review of draft Inception Report by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)	02-07 October 2017 IEU review	Home based	Comments on the draft Inception Report to the evaluation team
Incorporation of comments from IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)	09-11 October 2017 (3 working days)	Home based	Revised draft Inception Report
Deliverable A: Final Inception Report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates	By 11 October 2017 (13 working days)		Final Inception report to be cleared by IEU
Interviews with staff at UNODC HQ/FO (including by phone/skype); Field mission: briefing, interviews; presentation of preliminary findings	12-25 October 2017 (10 working days)	UNODC PO in Kyrgyzstan; project locations (Osh & Karakol)	Presentation of preliminary findings
Drafting of the evaluation report; submission to Project Management and IEU;	26 October – 08 November 2017 (10 working days)	Home based	Draft evaluation report
Review of IEU for quality assurance and Project Management for factual errors	09–15 November 2017 IEU and PM review	Home based	Comments on the draft evaluation report
Consideration of comments from the project manager and incorporation of comments from IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)	16-22 November 2017 (5 working days)	Home based	Revised draft evaluation report
Deliverable B: Draft Evaluation Report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates	By 22 November 2017 (25 working days)		Draft evaluation report, to be cleared by IEU
IEU to share draft evaluation report with Core Learning Partners for comments	23 November – 06 December 2017 2 weeks for CLP review		Comments of CLPs on the draft report
Consideration of comments from Core Learning Partners	07–13 December 2017 (5 working days)	Home based	Revised draft evaluation report
Final review by IEU; incorporation of comments and finalization of report	14-25 December 2017 (5 days for review of IEU; 3 working days to incorporate comments)	Home based	Revised draft evaluation report
Presentation of evaluation results	25 December 2017	UNODC Office	Power Point Presentation delivered
Deliverable C: Final evaluation report incl. Management response (if needed); presentation of evaluation results	By 25 December 2017 (8 working days)		Final evaluation report; Presentation of evaluation results. All to be cleared by IEU
Project Management: Finalise Evaluation Follow-up Plan in ProFi	By 27 December 2017		Final Evaluation Follow-up Plan to be cleared by IEU
Project Management: Disseminate final evaluation report	By 29 December 2017		Final evaluation report disseminated

Time frame for the field mission:

Tentative time-frame for the mission to the Kyrgyz Republic is 12-25 October 2017 (10 days):

It is anticipated that the evaluation will involve visits to Bishkek and project locations in Osh and Karakol towns.

Duties	Time frame	Locations	Deliverables
Arrival to the Kyrgyz Republic	11 October 2017	Bishkek	
Introductory meeting with the project team and interviews with project beneficiaries and partners	12 October 2017 (1 working day)	Bishkek	Brief interview reports
Meetings and interviews with project beneficiaries and partners. Onsite inspection to CNS's central office in Bishkek.	13 October 2017 (1 working day)	Bishkek	Brief interview reports
Onsite inspection: SNC's Southern Department in Osh	16-17 October 2017 (2 working days)	Osh city	Onsite visit reports
Meetings with project beneficiaries and partners	18 October 2017 (1 working day)	Bishkek	Brief interview reports
Site inspection: visit to CNS's Eastern Department in Karakol city	19-20 October 2017 (2 working days)	Karakol town	Onsite visit reports
Meetings with project beneficiaries and partners	23 October 2017 (1 working day)	Bishkek	Brief interview reports
Meetings with project beneficiaries and partners; Presentation of preliminary findings to partners	24 October 2017 (1 working day)	Bishkek	Brief interview reports
Wrap up meetings with the project team and main project beneficiaries and partners	25 October 2017 (1 working day)	Bishkek	Brief interview reports
Departure	26 October 2017		

VII. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

Number of evaluators needed:

The Final Independent Project Evaluation of the project will be carried out by a team of two International Independent Evaluators (1 Team Leader & 1 Substantive expert) identified by the project management through a competitive selection process and supported by the Project staff. The selection needs to be reviewed and cleared by IEU.

The International Evaluators should be experts in criminal justice/law enforcement area, and have experience in applying qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods and experience in evaluating technical assistance projects. Costs associated with the evaluator will be borne by the project.

The International Evaluators shall act independently, in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards guidelines and templates and UNEG Ethical Guidelines and in his/her individual capacity and not as a representative of any government or organization that may present a conflict of interest. The evaluators will not act as representatives of any party and must remain independent and impartial. In his/her individual capacity and not as representative of the government or organization which appointed them. She/he will have no previous experience of working with KGZK50 project

(except as an independent evaluator) or of working in any capacity linked with it.

The International Evaluators shall act independently in his/her individual capacity and must not have been involved in the development, implementation or monitoring of the project neither will be not be rendering any service to UNODC in the near future, to avoid conflicts of interests.

He/she should adhere to the independence and impartiality of the evaluation process discussed in the UN Evaluation Group's Norms and Standards.

The role of the Team Leader:

Managing the evaluation, leading the evaluation team, carry out the desk review; develop the inception report, including sample, size and sampling techniques; draft and finalize the inception report and evaluation methodology, incorporating relevant comments, in line with the guidelines and template on the IEU website: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; implement quantitative and qualitative tools and analyze data; triangulate data and test rival explanations; ensure that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled; draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates on the IEU website: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; finalize the evaluation report on the basis of comments received; present the final evaluation findings and recommendations to stakeholders.

The role of the Substantive Expert:

Assist the team leader to carry out the desk review; develop the inception report, including sample, size and sampling techniques; draft and finalize the inception report and evaluation methodology, incorporating relevant comments, in line with the guidelines and template on the IEU website: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; implement quantitative and qualitative tools and analyze data; triangulate data and test rival explanations; ensure that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled; draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates on the IEU website: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; finalize the evaluation report on the basis of comments received.

Provision of translation services (English and Russian) for the Team Leader.

The International Evaluation Consultants will be responsible for all deliverables meeting the required standards in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates on the IEU website: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html> and submitted in a timely manner.

More details are and requirements provided in the respective job descriptions **in Annex I**.

IEU is the clearing entity for all deliverables of the evaluation-process.

Absence of conflict of interest:

According to UNODC rules, the International Evaluation Consultant must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

Furthermore, the evaluator shall respect and follow the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for conducting evaluations in a sensitive and ethical manner.

VIII. MANAGEMENT OF EVALUATION PROCESS

The Project Manager is responsible for:

- managing the evaluation;
- drafting and finalizing the ToR;
- selecting Core Learning Partners (representing a balance of men, women and other marginalised groups) and informing them of their role;
- recruiting evaluators following clearance by IEU;
- providing desk review materials (including data and information on men, women and other marginalised groups) to the evaluation team including the full TOR;
- reviewing the inception report as well as the evaluation methodology;
- liaising with the Core Learning Partners;
- reviewing the draft report for factual errors;
- developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations as well as follow-up action (to be updated once per year);
- disseminate the final evaluation report and facilitate the presentation of evaluation results;

Logistical support responsibilities:

The Project Manager will be in charge of providing logistical support to the evaluation team including arranging the field missions of the evaluation team, including but not limited to:

- All logistical arrangements for the travel of the Evaluators (including travel details; DSA-payments; transportation; etc.)
- All logistical arrangement for the meetings/interviews/focus groups/etc., ensuring interview partners adequately represent men, women and other marginalised groups (including independent translator/interpreter if needed; set-up of meetings; arrangement of ad-hoc meetings as requested by the evaluation team; transportation from/to the interview venues; scheduling sufficient time for the interviews (around 45 minutes); ensuring that members of the evaluation team and the respective interviewees are present during the interviews; etc.)
- All logistical arrangements for the presentation of the evaluation results;
- Ensure timely payment of all fees/DSA/etc. (payments for the evaluators need to be released within 5 working days after the respective deliverable is cleared by IEU).

Roles and responsibilities of the Core Learning Partners (CLPs):

Members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) are selected by the project managers. Members of the CLP are selected from the key stakeholder groups, including UNODC management, mentors, beneficiaries, partner organizations and donor Member States. The CLPs are asked to comment on key steps of the evaluation (Terms of Reference; Selection of evaluators; Draft Evaluation Report) and act as facilitators with respect to the dissemination and application of the results and other follow-up action.

Roles and responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU):

The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) provides mandatory normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>. Furthermore, IEU provides guidance and evaluation expertise throughout the evaluation process.

IEU reviews and clears all steps and deliverables during the evaluation process:: Terms of Reference; Selection of evaluator(s); Inception Report; Draft Evaluation Report; Final Evaluation Report; Evaluation Follow-up Plan.

IX. PAYMENT MODALITIES

The evaluator(s) will be issued consultancy contracts and paid in accordance with UNODC rules and regulations. The contract is a legally binding document in which the evaluator agrees to complete the deliverables by the set deadlines. The payment is correlated to deliverables and three instalments are foreseen:

- The 1-st payment (13 working days) upon clearance of the **Inception Report** (in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates) by IEU;
- The 2-nd payment (25 working days) upon clearance of the **Draft Evaluation Report** (in line with UNODC norms, standards, evaluation guidelines and templates) by IEU;
- The 3-rd and final payment (i.e. the remainder of the fee – 8 working days) only after completion of the respective tasks, receipt of the **Final Report** (in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates) and clearance by IEU, as well as presentation of final evaluation findings and recommendations.
- 75 percent of the daily subsistence allowance and terminals is paid in advance before travelling. The balance is paid after the travel has taken place, upon presentation of boarding passes and the completed travel claim forms.

ANNEX II. EVALUATION TOOLS: QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEW GUIDES

Interview Guide

Introduction:

UNODC has asked us to conduct an independent final evaluation of the project K50 “Strengthening the Counter Narcotics Service (CNS) of the Kyrgyz Republic” The evaluation is focusing on four main areas:

- what progress did the project make?
- how well did UNODC do in delivering the project?
- how can the gains made by the project be sustained into the future?
- what next?

As part of the evaluation, your feedback is very important.

Feedback, whether positive or negative, will help shape any future UNODC initiatives. Your responses will be kept confidential. You do not have to answer a question if you do not wish to do so; we can stop the interview when you wish.

Only summaries and/or non-attributable quotes will be presented in the evaluation report (any quotations being attributed to “a generic descriptive category”).

Thank you in advance for contributing to this evaluation.

Background

- Ascertain the background knowledge of the interviewee. “Please state your name, your position and what you know of the project.”

Relevance

- Are you able to explain the relevance of the project to the CNS?
- Does the project provide assistance in response to real needs and priorities? If so what at they?
- Is the project relevant to implementing the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals?
- What is the future of international support to the CNS, and what assistance could or should UNODC provide?

Efficiency

- In your opinion could the project have been implemented in a more efficient and cost-effective way? Are you able to give an example?

Effectiveness

- Is the SSDC/CNS better placed to provide CN LE support to the Kyrgyz Republic since 2011. Did UNODC help? If so how, in your opinion did they help?
- What did the project deliver? Can you give an example?

Outcome 1: Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise/adopt legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of CNS and implementation of the adopted National Strategy/Programme on Drug Control.

Outcome 2: Basic infrastructure of CNS, including its regional departments strengthened.

Outcome 3: Operational, investigative and analytical capacities of CNS and its national counter-narcotic partners through provision of equipment and training strengthened.

Outcome 4: The CNS actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries and UNODC's overall coordination role of support to the CNS is effectively attained.

Impact

- Has the anticipated long-term impact of this project been achieved?
- Have there been any positive or negative unintended results?
- Did the project contribute to increased drug seizures in the region (in comparison with the beginning of the project in 2011)?

Sustainability

- Can you explain what measures are in place to ensure future maintenance and repair of the equipment provided by the project?
- To what extent are project interventions sustainable in the long term? If not, what is needed to ensure their continued resilience and viability in the future?

Partnerships and cooperation

- As a stakeholder how were you kept informed by the project? Was this sufficient?
- Did the project develop any partnerships at the bilateral and multilateral level?
- How were relevant partners and stakeholders identified?
- In your opinion did the project strengthen the SSDC/CNS ability to cooperate in regional intelligence sharing through CARICC? Do you have any examples?

Human rights and gender

- In your opinion were human rights considerations included in the training and project assistance?
- In your opinion were gender considerations included in the project development and implementation?

Lessons learned and best practices

- In your opinion what are the lessons can be learnt for future projects?
- How did your observations and feedback alter delivery?

AOB

- Do you have any additional comments or suggestions?

THANK YOU!

Focus Group Guide

Introduction: UNODC has asked me to conduct an independent final evaluation of the project K50 “Strengthening the Counter Narcotics Service (CNS) of the Kyrgyz Republic”

As part of the evaluation, your feedback is very important. Feedback, whether positive or negative, will help shape any future UNODC initiatives. Your responses will be kept confidential. You do not have to answer a question if you do not wish to do so.

Only summaries and non-attributable quotes will be presented in the final report. Thank you in advance for contributing to this evaluation.

Background: Ascertain the background knowledge of the interviewee. “Please state your name, your position and what you know of the project and what support you have received; training or equipment.”

- How relevant are the project’s activities to your job/role in the SSDC or CNS?
- How well was the training delivered?
- How well was the equipment delivered?
- Has the seizure of illicit narcotic drugs increased during the last couple of years, if so by how much?
- Can you describe an event which indicates how the training and or equipment you received increased your abilities to seize illicit drugs or make an arrest? - Case Study -
- How is maintenance and repair of the equipment conducted?
- What follow up training might you or your associates need to ensure there is no skill fade? Is there a plan in place for this training?
- How does CNS coordinate its counter-narcotic activities with other internal and external law-enforcement agencies?
- What human rights considerations did the project discuss or introduce as part of your training?
- What gender issues were included in your training?

AOB

Do you have any additional comments?

THANK YOU!

ANNEX III. DESK REVIEW LIST

During the course of the desk level review, as part of the inception process, and the evaluation field mission the following documents were reviewed.

Document – name	Comments
K50 Final Project Document (English)	
K50 Revised Project Document (Revision 1)	
K50 Revised Project Document (Revision 2)	
K50 Revised Project Document (Revision 3)	
Progress Report K50 Annual dated 2011	
Progress Report K50 Annual dated 2012	
Progress Report K50 Annual dated 2013	
Progress Report K50 Annual dated 2014	
Progress Report K50 Annual dated 2015	
Progress Report K50 Annual dated 2016	
Semi Annual Report 2012	
Semi Annual Report 2013	
Semi Annual Report 2014	
Semi Annual Report 2015	
Semi Annual Report 2016	
Semi Annual Report 2017	
PSC minutes and presentations No 2	
PSC minutes and presentations No 3	
PSC minutes and presentations No 4	
PSC minutes and presentations No 5	
PSC minutes and presentations No 6	
PSC minutes and presentations No 7	
PSC minutes and presentations No 8	
PSC minutes and presentations No 9	
PSC minutes and presentations No 10	
PSC minutes and presentations No 11	
PSC minutes and presentations No 12	
PSC minutes and presentations No 13	
PSC minutes and presentations No 14	
The Anti-Narcotic Programme of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic	http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/96036
The Action Plan on implementation of the Anti-Narcotic Programme of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic	http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/214132
Government Decree "On narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors subject to control in the Kyrgyz Republic" No. 543 as of 09 November 2007	http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/98249
The law Concerning the Law Enforcement Service of the Kyrgyz Republic	
The Law Concerning Social Guarantees and Pension Provisions for the Servicemen of the Kyrgyz Republic's Law Enforcement Service	
The Law Concerning Procedures for the Use of Weapons, Non-Lethal Weapons and Physical Force	

by the Servicemen of the Kyrgyz Republic's Law Enforcement Service	
SOPs – Customs Clearance	
List of equipment delivered during the tenure of K50	Hard copy – attached as Annex V
Annual work plans	
Financial records – from profi	
Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia (UNODC – Paris Pact)	https://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Illicit%20Drug%20Trends_Central%20Asia-final.pdf
Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: the transnational threat of Afghan opium	https://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/CounterNarcotics/Addiction_Crime_and_Insurgency_The_transnational_threat_of_Afghan_opium.pdf
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014 Cultivation and Production	https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan-opium-survey-2014.pdf
The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment	https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf
Opiate flows through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia: a Threat Assessment (UNODC)	https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf
UNODC Drug Treatment Data	https://www.unodc.org/docs/treatment/CoPro/Web_Kyrgyzstan.pdf
UNODC Evaluation Meta-Analysis	http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Meta-Analysis/UNODC_Evaluation_Meta-Analysis_2011-2014.pdf
UNDP Assessments of the development of the Kyrgyz Republic 2016	http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/library/assessment-of-development-results--the-kyrgyz-republic.html
Independent final project evaluation of the Tajikistan Drug Control Agency (DCA) Phase 2 TD/TAJ/03/H03	https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2012/Tajik_DCA_H03_Final_Evaluation_Report_rev.pdf
Mid Term Evaluation Report AD/KYR/G64 Drug Control Agency – Kyrgyz DCA Kyrgyzstan	https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProjEvals-2006/projeval-2006-9-1_rev.pdf
Terminal Evaluation of Project No. KYR/G64 “Drug Control Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic.” Published in 2008	https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2003-2009/2008/KYRG64_Terminal_Evaluation_Report.ENG.pdf
Final Evaluation of Project No KGZ/175 Establishment of Interagency Law Enforcement Mobile Groups in Kyrgyzstan	https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/ProEvals-2011/kgz_i75_establishment_of_interagency_law_enforcement_mobile_groups_in_kyrgyzstan_rev.pdf
Project evaluation of Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossing points and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices XAC/K22	https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2015/XACK22_Final_Evaluation_Report_March_2015.pdf
UNODC - Programme for Central Asia: A partnership framework for impact related action in Central Asia	https://www.unodc.org/documents/centralasia/MOU/programme_for_central_asia_2015-2019_en.pdf
Integrated Country Programme for Kyrgyzstan	Hard copy
Strategic Outline for Central Asia and Southern Caucasus 2012-2015: A Comprehensive Approach to Implement UNODC's Drug and Crime Mandate	Precedes the Programme for Central Asia - hard copy only
United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the Kyrgyz Republic 2012-2016 (extended until 2017)	http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/operact/Technical_Cooperation/Delivering_as_One/UNDAF_country_files/Kyrgyzstan_UNDAF_2012-2016_ENG.pdf
UN MDGs in Kyrgyzstan: Third periodic report dated 2012	http://www.un.org/kyrgyzstan/en/publications/article/publications/un-agencies/50-united-nations-development-programme-in-kyrgyzstan/6177-third-periodic-report
United Nations Country Team in Kyrgyzstan	http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/54c0b92c4.pdf

Joint UNCT submission for the 2015 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Of Kyrgyzstan	
UNDP Gender Main Streaming in Kyrgyzstan	http://www.kg.undp.org/content/dam/kyrgyzstan/Publications/gender/kgz-UNDP_Kyrgyzstan_GM_Strategy_ENG.pdf
INL: Final Evaluation Report: Performance Evaluation of Central Asia Counter narcotics Programs dated August 25, 2015	Hard copy only
US Embassy Statement reference development of Kyrgyz Anti-Drug Strategy	http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/pr_02-28-14_us-government-supports-unodc-counter-narcotics-program.html
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) - Country Report: Kyrgyzstan	http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol1/238987.htm
CIA World Fact book; Kyrgyzstan	https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kg.html
US State Department 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report	http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/index.htm
Kyrgyz Service of Drug Control Shows Results in Drug Seizure- UNODC website	https://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/kyrgyz-service-of-drug-control-shows-results-in-drug-seizure.html
UNODC-supported State Service on Drug Control in Kyrgyzstan showing results	http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/October/unodc-supported-state-service-on-drug-control-in-kyrgyzstan-showing-results.html
Drug control and crime prevention in Kyrgyzstan	https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/September/drug-control-and-crime-prevention-in-kyrgyzstan.html
Drug Trafficking Corrupts Kyrgyzstan's Politics and Underworld	http://www.princeton.edu/news-and-events/news/item/drug-trafficking-corrupts-kyrgyzstans-politics-and-underworld#sthash.hOfMTWy8.dpuf
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction	http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/country-overviews/kg
Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez, A/HRC/19/61/Add.2, February 21, 2012	http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNODC/GEN/G12/106/04/PDF/G1210604.pdf
Evidence of UNODC police reform in the press	https://europa.eu/eyd2015/en/unodc/stories/policepeoplekyrgyzstan
An example of UNODC working with OSCE	http://www.osce.org/bishkek/120492
United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the Kyrgyz Republic 2012-2016	http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Kyrgyzstan/Kyrgyzstan_UNDAF_2012_2016_eng.pdf
The Three Evils of Narco-Policy in Central Asia	http://registan.net/2013/07/09/the-three-evils-of-narco-policy-in-central-asia/
A meeting of the coordinating committee on drug control will be held in Osh (local news report)	http://kyrtag.kg/news/v-oshe-sostoitsya-zasedanie-koordinatsionnogo-komiteta-po-narkokontrolyu/
Article on drug use (local news report)	https://24.kg/obschestvo/56088_vmire_12millionov_chelovek_upotreblayut_narkotiki_inyektsionnyim_putem/
Article on drug production (local news report)	https://24.kg/obschestvo/56116_85_protsentov_posevov_opiumnogo_maka_naterritoriyah_podkontrolnyih_talibanu/
UNODC supported a five-day training-course for the Kyrgyz Counter Narcotics Service of the Ministry of Interior	http://kg.one.un.org/content/unct/kyrgyzstan/en/home/news/kg-news/2017/nodc-supported-a-five-day-training-course-for-the-kyrgyz-counter.html
Cooperation between Central Asian law-enforcement agencies for combating transnational organized crime and illicit drug trafficking	http://kg.one.un.org/content/unct/kyrgyzstan/en/home/news/kg-news/2016/cooperation-between-central-asian-law-enforcement-agencies-for-c/

U.S. Experts team with Kyrgyzstan's law enforcement drug unit commanders on methods to counter illicit drug trafficking	http://kg.one.un.org/content/unct/kyrgyzstan/en/home/news/kg-news/2016/u-s--experts-continue-to-team-with-kyrgyzstans-law-enforcement-d/
Experts from U.S. and Kyrgyzstan share their experiences of combating new illicit drugs	http://kg.one.un.org/content/unct/kyrgyzstan/en/home/news/kg-news/2016/experts-of-u-s--and-kyrgyzstan-share-experience-in-combatting-ne/
US experts train Kyrgyz law enforcement investigators to better counter drug trafficking	http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/us-experts-trained-kyrgyz-law-enforcement-investigators.html
The new administrative building for the Kyrgyz State Service on Drug Control opened in Issyk-Kul province	http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/press/the-new-administrative-building-for-the-kyrgyz-state-service-on-drug-control-was-opened-in-issyk-kul-province.html
CNS outreach in Bishkek	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z_tcBM6tleA
Law enforcement agencies in Kyrgyzstan cooperate for better combating illicit drugs	http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/cooperate-for-better-combatting-illicit-drugs.html
Experts from the US and the Kyrgyz Republic shared their experience in combating synthetic drugs	http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/usa-kyrgyzstan-sharing-experience.html
Better working conditions for Law Enforcement Officers in Kyrgyzstan	http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/better-working-conditions-for-law-enforcement-officers.html
26 June Celebration in Central Asia	http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/26-june-celebration-in-central-asia.html
UNODC assisted the SSDC on improving the quality of forensic expertise	http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/unodc-assisted-the-state-service-on-drug-control.html
In Osh, 3705 drug addicts are registered (local news)	http://www.turmush.kg/ru/news:126857
WHO: ATLAS of Substance Use Disorders Resources for the Prevention and Treatment of Substance Use Disorders (SUD) Country Profile: KYRGYZSTAN	http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/atlas_report/profiles/kyrgyzstan.pdf
Eradication of Cannabis in Kyrgyzstan	http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/eradication-of-wild-cannabis-in-kyrgyzstan.html
Example of DEA and UNODC delivering joint training in Kyrgyzstan	https://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/unodc-supported-a-five-day-training-course-for-the-kyrgyz-counter-narcotics-service-of-the-ministry-of-interior.html
Example of OSCE and UNODC delivering joint training in Kyrgyzstan	http://www.osce.org/secretariat/324931
Terms of reference of the Final Independent Project Evaluation of KGZK50	Attached at Annex III
Mid-term Independent Project Evaluation of KGZK50	http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2016/KGZK50_Independent_Mid-Term_Evaluation_Report_February_2016.pdf
UNODC Position Paper on Human Rights (2011)	http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/UNODC_Human_rights_position_paper_2012.pdf
Guidance Note on Gender Mainstreaming in UNODC (2013)	http://www.un.org/womenwatch/directory/docs/UNODC-GuidanceNote-GenderMainstreaming.pdf
UNODC evaluation guidelines, templates, handbook, policy	http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/normative-tools.html
Guide to writing an evaluation report	http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Guidelines/Guidelines_for_UNODC_Evaluation_Reports.pdf
UNODC Inception Report Guidelines and Template	http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html#Undertaking.html
UNODC Evaluation Report Guidelines and Template	http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html#Undertaking
UNEG: Integrating human rights and gender equality in evaluation	http://www.uneval.rgdetail/980
US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2016	https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2016/vol1/253281.htm

US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2017	https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/268025.pdf
UNCT SWAP Scorecard for Kyrgyzstan October 2017	https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/UNCT-SWAP-Scorecard-KR-Report-2017_Final-1.pdf
Comparative Gender Profile of Kyrgyz Republic 2017	http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/library/womens_empowerment/comparative-gender-profile-2017--kyrgyz-republic-.html
UNDP National Human Development Report: Trade and Human Development in the Kyrgyz Republic 2017	http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/library/poverty/national-human-developemnt-reporttrade-and-human-development-in-/
UNDP Human Development Report 2016	http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/KGZ.pdf
UNDP Website – Kyrgyzstan	http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/countryinfo.html
UN Data – Kyrgyzstan	http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Kyrgyzstan
UNOHR – Kyrgyzstan	http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/ENACARegion/Pages/KGIndex.aspx

Number of documents reviewed: 137

ANNEX IV. LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED DURING THE EVALUATION

<i>Number of interviewees</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Sex disaggregated data</i>	<i>Country</i>
1	MFA	Male: 1 Female: 0	Kyrgyzstan
1	Government Department for defence, law and order and emergency situations	Male: 1 Female: 0	Kyrgyzstan
8	HQ CNS	Male: 7 Female: 1	Kyrgyzstan
4	CNS Osh	Male: 4 Female: 0	Kyrgyzstan
5	CNS Karakol	Male: 5 Female: 0	Kyrgyzstan
2	US Embassy	Male: 3 Female: 0	Kyrgyzstan
1	Russian Embassy	Male: 1 Female: 0	Kyrgyzstan
1	CADAP 6	Male: 1 Female: 0	Kyrgyzstan
1	UNAIDS	Male: 0 Female: 1	Kyrgyzstan
1	OSCE	Male: 1 Female: 0	Kyrgyzstan
1	UNP	Male: 1 Female: 0	Kyrgyzstan
2	UNODC ROCA	Male: 1 Female: 1	Uzbekistan

ANNEX V. LIST OF EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT

	Equipment handed over to SSDC/CNS from 2011-2017	Model	Year of Purchase	Quantity
VEHICLES				
1	Lada Niva 21214		2012	9
2	ZAZ "Lanos"		2012	6
3	Toyota Land Cruiser 78	Toyota Land Cruiser 78 Hardtop 13 seater	2013	6
4	Ford Ranger DC2.2L Diesel	Ford Ranger DC2.2L Diesel, 4x4 6MT, white	2014	5
5	Light signal loudspeakers for vehicles		2013	6
Forensic Equipment				
1	Gas Chromatograph with Mass Spectrometry Detector (GC-MSD) set	Agilent GC7890	2014	1
2	Gas Chromatograph with Flame Ionization Detector (GC-FD) set	Agilent GC7890	2014	1
3	Gas Helium balloon		2014	2
4	Forensic Analytical balances DL-150 (up to 150 kg)		2013	3
5	Forensic Analytical balances PR-30B (up to 30 kg)		2013	3
6	Laboratory precision balance		2014	2
7	Laboratory analytical balance		2014	2
8	Fridge for chemical storage		2014	2
9	Centrifuge		2014	2
10	Forensic Crime Scene kits	TSAMOTA	2013	3
11	Forensic Crime Scene Re-supply kits	TSAMOTA	2013	3
12	Table for forensic analytical balances with granite cover		2014	2

13	Table		2014	3
14	Table		2014	1
15	Table		2014	1
16	Drawer unit		2014	1
17	Wardrobe		2014	2
18	Cabinet		2014	3
19	Cabinet		2014	1
20	Chair		2014	8
21	Drawer unit		2014	4
22	Armchair		2014	1
CBT classes				
1	4 in 1 Multifunction device (printer, copier, scanner, fax)	A4 15/2ppm (Black/Colour), 600x600dpi,60-163g/m2, 1200x1200 scanner,295Mhz, 128Mb, LCD, ADF, LAN network USB	2012	1
2	Computer	HP 8200 Elite MT PC, Keyboard HP USB Standard JB-Russia Cyrillic , HP USB Optical BLK Mouse, Software-MS office 2010 Home and Business, Monitor HP Compaq LA2306x23 LED LCD EURO	2012	1
3	Computer	HP 8200 Elite MT PC , Keyboard HP USB Standard JB - Russia Cyrillic, Mouse HP USB Optical BLK, Software Microsoft Windows 7, Professional Edition 64-bit, IntelCorei5-2400 Processor , Monitor HP Compaq LA2306x23 LED LCD EURO	2012	20

Equipment supplied during the course of the Project

4	Computer	HP 8200 Elite MT PC , Keyboard HP USB Standard JB - Russia Cyrillic, Mouse HP USB Optical BLK, Software Microsoft Windows 7, Professional Edition 64-bit, IntelCorei5-2400 Processor, MS Office Home and Business 2010, Monitor HP Compaq LA2306x23 LED LCD EURO	2012	2
5	16-Port Fast Ethernet Switch	16-Port Fast Ethernet Switch, "Tenda", Brown colour	2012	1
6	24-Port Fast Ethernet Switch	24-Port 10/100 Mbps Fast Ethernet Switch, Inner Switching PSU, IEEE802.3u	2012	1
7	Plug Power Adapter	100-240V, EU PL (31730900100)	2012	2
8	Digital Projector	BenQ MS 500+ , with ceiling mount	2012	1
9	Desk	for computer class in Osh, Milano medium, Brown colour, 90*70*75, brown colour	2012	1
10	Desk	for computer class in Osh, Milano medium E48, Brown colour, 120*70*75, Connecting element for desk R08-01.99Л, 70*70, brown colour	2012	1
11	Desk	for computer class in Osh, Milano medium E48, Brown colour,90*70*75, Connecting element for desk R08-01.99Л, 70*70, brown colour	2012	1
12	Desk	for computer class in Osh, Milano medium E48, Brown colour, 120*70*75	2012	3
13	Desk	for computer (right sided) class in Osh, Milano medium EB4-01.99C, Brown colour, 140*100*76	2012	1
14	Desk cupboard	for CBT class in Osh, Milano medium MC1-01.99C, Brown colour, 422*600*735mm	2012	1
15	Wardrobe	for CBT class in Osh, S82, Brown colour, 83*43*220mm	2012	1
16	Built-in closet with doors	for computer class in Osh, FD2, Brown colour, 83*34*220mm	2012	2
17	Chair	for Computer Based Training class, black colour	2012	30
18	UPS	SVC, 600 VA, V-series, 360W, AVR stabilizer 165-270V, batt.:12V/7.5 Ah, Black colour	2012	23

19	Desk	for the trainer in the Bishkek Computer Class, brown colour	2012	1
20	Desk cupboard	Computer Class, brown colour	2012	1
21	Bookcase	for Computer Based Training class, brown colour	2012	1
22	Air conditioner	LG G-12 LH, white colour	2012	1
23	Printer	HP Laser Jet P2055dn	2012	1
24	Printer	HP Laser Jet P2055dn	2012	1
25	Digital Projector,	BenQ MS 500+ with ceiling mount	2012	1
OTHER				
1	Automatic gates for SSDC office in Bishkek		2014	1
2	Air conditioners	Vestel ARS09	2013	6
3	Digital Video Camera	Sony HDR-PJ200E, with Secure Digital card 8Gb and bag	2012	1
4	Digital Photo camera	Canon EOS 1100D kit 1855, with Secure Digital card 8Gb and bag	2012	1
IT Equipment				
1	Transcend 500GB HDD extern 2.5" M2		2014	8
2	Toner	HP Black up to 10000 pages for HP M712xh	2014	10
3	Toner	HP Black upto 12500 pages for HP M525dn	2014	10
4	Toner	HP Black 80X up to 6900 pages for HP Pro 400 M401dn	2014	30
5	Speakers	HP LCD Speaker Bar (to be mounted on monitor)	2014	36
6	Computer	HP 800 G1 TWR (Russian/English)	2014	30
7	Monitor	HP EliteDisplay E231 23-In Monitor	2014	56
8	Notebook	HP Elitebook 850 G1 SOF, Microsoft Windows 7, WEBCAM, Intel, Bluetooth, Dual Point Backlit keyboard RUS, Microsoft office 2013, 65 Watt Smart AC Adapter, HP top load case, Logitech M525 Wireless Mouse, Danoffice IT Mousepad	2014	10

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Equipment supplied during the course of the Project

9	Computer	HP EliteDesk 800 G1 TWR ADV (Russian/English)	2014	6
10	Printer	HP printer LaserJet Pro 400 M401dn, cable patch	2014	15
11	Printer	HP LaserJet enterprise 700 M712xh (Black&White)	2014	2
12	Printer	HP printer multifunction LaserJet enterprise M525dn, cable patch	2014	6
13	HUB Switch	HUB Switch 24 ports TP-LINK TL - SF1024D	2013	4
14	UPS	Mercury ELITE 650 VA PRO (AVR)	2013	45
15	Printer	HP Printer Laser Jet P2055dn	2012	1
16	HUB Switch	HUB Switch 24 ports TP-LINK TL - SF1024D	2014	4
17	Scanner	HP Scanner scan jet N6310 document flatbed	2014	1
18	UPS	UPS SSD 3kVA TECH-COM	2014	1
19	Server	HP ProLiant ML350p Gen8 Tower Server	2013	1

CBT classes				
	Item	Description	Year	
1	4 in 1 Multifunction device (printer, copier, scanner, fax)	A4 15/2ppm (Black/Colour), 600x600dpi,60-163g/m2, 1200x1200 scanner,295Mhz, 128Mb, LCD, ADF, LAN network USB	2012	1
2	Computer	HP 8200 Elite MT PC, Keyboard HP USB Standard JB-Russia Cyrillic , HP USB Optical BLK Mouse, Software-MS office 2010 Home and Business, Monitor HP Compaq LA2306x23 LED LCD EURO	2012	1
3	Computer	HP 8200 Elite MT PC , Keyboard HP USB Standard JB - Russia Cyrillic, Mouse HP USB Optical BLK, Software Microsoft Windows 7, Professional Edition 64-bit, IntelCorei5-2400 Processor , Monitor HP Compaq LA2306x23 LED LCD EURO	2012	20
4	Computer	HP 8200 Elite MT PC , Keyboard HP USB Standard JB - Russia Cyrillic, Mouse HP USB Optical BLK, Software Microsoft Windows 7, Professional Edition 64-bit, IntelCorei5-2400 Processor, MS Office Home and Business 2010, Monitor HP Compaq LA2306x23 LED LCD EURO	2012	2
5	16-Port Fast Ethernet Switch	16-Port Fast Ethernet Switch, "Tenda", Brown colour	2012	1
6	24-Port Fast Ethernet Switch	24-Port 10/100 Mbps Fast Ethernet Switch, Inner Switching PSU, IEEE802.3u	2012	1
7	Plug Power Adapter	100-240V, EU PL (31730900100)	2012	2

8	Digital Projector	BenQ MS 500+ , with ceiling mount	2012	1
9	Desk	for computer class in Osh, Milano medium, Brown colour, 90*70*75, brown colour	2012	1
10	Desk	for computer class in Osh, Milano medium E48, Brown colour, 120*70*75, Connecting element for desk Ro8-01.99Л, 70*70, brown colour	2012	1
11	Desk	for computer class in Osh, Milano medium E48, Brown colour,90*70*75, Connecting element for desk Ro8-01.99Л, 70*70, brown colour	2012	1
12	Desk	for computer class in Osh, Milano medium E48, Brown colour, 120*70*75	2012	3

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Equipment supplied during the course of the Project

13	Desk	for computer (right sided) class in Osh, Milano medium EB4-01.99C, Brown colour, 140*100*76	2012	1
14	Desk cupboard	for CBT class in Osh, Milano medium MC1-01.99C, Brown colour, 422*600*735mm	2012	1
15	Wardrobe	for CBT class in Osh, S82, Brown colour, 83*43*220mm	2012	1
16	Built-in closet with doors	for computer class in Osh, FD2, Brown colour, 83*34*220mm	2012	2
17	Chair	for Computer Based Training class, black colour	2012	30
18	UPS	SVC, 600 VA, V-series, 360W, AVR stabilizer 165-270V, batt.:12V/7.5 Ah, Black colour	2012	23
19	Desk	for the trainer in the Bishkek Computer Class, brown colour	2012	1
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21	Bookcase	for Computer Based Training class, brown colour	2012	1
22	Air conditioner	LG G-12 LH, white colour	2012	1
23	Printer	HP Laser Jet P2055dn	2012	1
24	Printer	HP Laser Jet P2055dn	2012	1
25	Digital Projector,	BenQ MS 500+ with ceiling mount	2012	1

ANNEX VI. LESSONS LEARNT FROM PREVIOUS EVALUATIONS

As a means of assessing what lessons were identified and which were learnt (as demonstrated by altered delivery) the following table lists the recommendations from the evaluations of G64 (support to the Kyrgyz DCA) I75 (support to MOBITs), K22 (Border Liaison Offices), TAJ/H03 (Support to Tajik DCA) and the K50 (mid-term evaluation) and assessed what changed.

Legend:

Colour	Meaning	Comment
	Lesson Learnt and change has occurred	Lesson has been identified, understood, and either change implemented or design reflects the lesson
	Lesson “partially” Learnt and some change has occurred	Lesson has been identified and understood, and either some change has been implemented or some elements of design reflects lesson but not fully implemented and not fully reflected in the projects design
	Lesson not Learnt and no change has occurred	Lesson may have been identified and understood but not implemented e.g. due to a lack of resources or lesson may not have been seen as valid by the project team/donor or recipient
	Lesson is no longer valid	Lesson either no longer valid due to time or circumstance.

No	Lesson Identified	Comment	Assessment
Terminal Evaluation of Project No. KYR/G64 “Drug Control Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic.” Published in 2008			
1	The project should have been regarded as a foundation.	K50 is very much regarded as a foundation project for the SSDC and Rev 2 is phase 2 in a progressive series of activities.	Yes
2	G64 was far too ambitious in the context of a post-Soviet developing country.	K50 had 4 simple outcomes. It did not try and develop the SSDC into a multi agency CN law enforcement department.	Yes
3	It was unrealistic to expect a new counter narcotics agency to mature in just 5 years.	Although not expressly stated, K50 was designed for far longer than 5 years. Assistance to the CNS is more likely to be delivered for somewhere in the region of next 10-12 years.	Yes
4	Given the economic situation it was questionable if the DCA could become self-sustaining.	Sustainability is an issue, but is not a defining issue. There is realisation that given the current economic climate the CNS will continue require donor assistance.	Understood
5	Delivery could have been better had the needs analysis been conducted before the project documents were drawn up.	The SSDC was formed from the DCA and previous experience of that project and the experience gained from the DCA project in Tajikistan provided useful lessons on which the design was based.	Yes
6	All UNODC Project Officers associated with what is essentially a law enforcement issue should have a	The current International Project Officer is from a law enforcement background.	Yes

	solid background in either policing or law.		
7	The insistence on polygraph as the primary measure of the integrity of candidates caused considerable misgivings.	This observation is no longer valid.	Not valid
8	The necessary laws regarding asset forfeiture and communications interception were not developed in time.	While the detail of this observation is no longer valid, the Kyrgyz Republic still requires improvements to its laws. Outcome 1 addresses this issue.	Yes
9	Negative inter-agency rivalry worked to detriment of the joint operations.	With the formation of the CNS under the MoI this observation is no longer relevant	Yes
10	The assumption that the former Soviet intelligence system would operate to current international law enforcement standards was naïve.	UNODC has done much to encourage and improve cooperation with international partners.	Understood but limited response compared to investment
11	The whole concept of intelligence needed addressing urgently otherwise international co-operation and information sharing leading to the disruption and interdiction of major criminal gangs is less successful than it should be.	This remains a valid observation.	Understood
12	Professional mentoring and training by people with policing backgrounds was required.	This remains a valid observation.	Understood
Project No KGZ/175 Establishment of Interagency Law Enforcement Mobile Groups in Kyrgyzstan Final Evaluation. Published in 2012			
13	Concept of mobile interagency secure teams is valid. The need for special resources within the southern border region is confirmed.	Donors have now taken over direct responsibility for MOBITs from UNODC.	Yes
14	The value of these resources to the counter trafficking agenda suggests a potentially broader role.	MOBITs are still limited in the use and role. UNODC, however, has limited influence over their use.	Understood but no ability to change
15	The potential for a broader role for MOBITs should be the subject of review within the new host agency (SSDC).	The MOBITs role remains broadly the same as the one that was assessed in the evaluation report	Understood but no ability to change
16	The SSDC should develop an information and analysis infrastructure to introduce information-led methodology. As part of this methodology, the SSDC should consider the adoption of proactive management systems for its middle and senior managers. Anti-corruption strategies should be part of any design work on the building of such an infrastructure.	This remains a valid observation.	Partial
17	For a development of affordable, practical and efficient methodology for the building and maintenance of teams with high integrity, the International Anti-Corruption Academy should be asked to use Kyrgyzstan as a case study and in particular contribute guidance on processes for monitoring integrity	This remains a valid observation. Anti-corruption remains an issue that needs to be addressed.	Partial

	measures in future projects such as this.		
18	The acceptance of SSDC as the lead agency on counter trafficking work should be used to create protocols on information sharing and specific areas of operational responsibility between the national agencies. The Customs and Border Services should continue to have responsibility for overt detection of concealed contraband at recognised border crossing points but protocols regarding access to information from this activity should be made available to the SSDC. Discussions with other agencies should be held to identify areas of particular responsibility and the necessary protocols for the sharing of information within a legal framework. The development of multi-agency co-operation on drug trafficking should form part of the project to develop the SSDC.	This remains a valid observation. The ability of the CNS to lead on counter trafficking may be diminished after optimisation.	Partial
19	Continuation of the work by UNODC to clarify the use of (common) terms and to ensure that more detailed and specific design of information, intelligence and analysis components in (all UNODC) Projects. Complex inactions with other projects should form a specific part of project design and mechanisms for joint progress should be put into place. Projects must be managed for the whole of their duration and standards of reports must be maintained. Binary, quantitative and qualitative indicators should be collected to monitor progress of projects. In complex projects pursuing unproven theories (i.e. the best method of achieving integrity), indicators should measure key components of activity to enable detailed assessment.	Reporting and evaluation recommendations, which seek to improve the quality and use of data have not matured	Understood, limited progress
Mid-term project evaluation of Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossing points and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices XAC/K22: Published in 2015 ¹⁷⁵ .			
20	Project activities must support and promote institutionalized BLO training sponsored by the host government(s) and opened to intra-agency participation.	Understood but not yet enacted.	No

¹⁷⁵ Recommendations from the Mid-term Independent Project Evaluation of the Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossing points and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices XACK22.

[https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent Project Evaluations/2015/XACK22 Final Evaluation Report March 2015.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent%20Project%20Evaluations/2015/XACK22_Final_Evaluation_Report_March_2015.pdf)

21	The project team must facilitate dialogue with the CLPs on the establishing of cross border cooperation.	Outcome 4 of K50 seeks to achieve this objective.	Yes
22	Project staff should prepare and present information on the projects outputs and accomplishments to perspective donors.	This remains a valid observation.	Partial
23	To UNODC/ROCA: Recruit and retain knowledgeable staff members who are dedicated to UNODC mandates.	This recommendation is supported. ROCA's desire is to recruit more specialists than generalists in the near future.	Partial
24	Through trainings, seminars, and workshops bring together the PSCs and WGs to promote dialogue that will facilitate mechanisms that promote the exchange of information	This recommendation is supported and expanded on, to include country level PSC meetings of some type after K50 ends.	Yes
Independent mid-term project evaluations of the Tajikistan Drug Control Agency (DCA) Phase 2 TD/TAJ/03/H03. Published in 2012.			
25	The DCA to seek external legal assistance to develop proposals, make appropriate representations and gain support for new or amended legislation/ regulations in relation to money laundering; access to telephone billing; the polygraph vetting process; decriminalising some aspects of drug abuse and informant protection. Such assistance might be found through the Government or Donor community.	Similar to the situation in Kyrgyzstan – part of outcome 1 – support to SSDC to draft laws	Yes
26	A transparent job application system is devised for potential recruits to the DCA to ensure that all applications are acknowledged and accounted for.	This evaluation takes this recommendation further and recommends that training needs analysis to assist in the development of standard job descriptions.	Yes
27	Employed staff who fail a polygraph examination be subject to rigorous investigation by Internal Affairs and proportionate action taken to ensure credibility of the process.	Not valid.	Not valid
28	The staff vetting process is enhanced by including financial and asset declarations and random drug testing.	Similar to the situation in Kyrgyzstan, where SSDC staff are vetted before they can serve	Unknown
29	When resources become available the capability of Internal Affairs is enhanced to enable proactive investigation of alleged or suspected inappropriate behaviour or wrongdoing.	No data gathered in relation to internal affairs as this does not feature within the current project.	Unknown
30	An exit strategy for the additional allowance is negotiated with the Government. This should form part of any project extension. Negotiations with the Government should seek a phased transfer of this financial responsibility and consider the practicalities of a phased reduction in the level of allowance as a percentage of basic salary.	UNODC did not top up the salaries of the SSDC or CNS this is only done via a bilateral agreement between the CNS and a donor.	Yes

	Continued Donor support will be needed into the medium term.		
31	An assessment of training needs for the intelligence and analysis function and covert policing.	Echoed by the mid-term evaluation, but yet to be acted on	Still to occur
32	Inexperienced officers need a wide range of technical training. This requires expert training provision and the techniques to be undertaken require training design and implementation to take advantage of any available funding. Opportunities for training conducted by bilateral partners should be explored.	UNODC has leverage	
33	Law enforcement agencies are aware of the need for joint work to develop working protocols. Standardisation is not yet achieved. The ongoing work under UN Project F23 is progressed to develop standardised systems and agreed protocols for information sharing between law enforcement agencies.	Similar problems exist within SSDC and across Kyrgyz agencies. The issue is understood and a common thread in a number of projects, but to date little concrete change has been achieved.	On going
34	Internal Inspectorate and Audit functions are enhanced within the DCA.	No data gathered.	Unknown
35	Research be undertaken to establish the feasibility of the DCA Forensic Services being marketed to other law enforcement agencies.	The MOI is grouping all labs into one facility	Yes
36	Equipment issues relating to vehicles, radios, mobile phone interception and satellite phones are progressed.	Outcome 3 of K50 relates to this issue and has largely been achieved	Yes
37	Research should be undertaken to develop performance measures that give credit for international joint operations.	SSDC is better at self-publicity. Donor reports do provide some credit to SSDC. The issue of reporting is expanded on in this evaluation.	Aware
38	Seizures of drugs by the DCA appear to be on the low side given the estimated scale of drug trafficking in Kyrgyzstan. Performance targets are set for the DCA in respect of arrests, drug seizures, controlled deliveries, drug networks disrupted and prosecutions. The targets should be challenging and be a substantial increase compared to current levels.	Similar problems exist within Kyrgyzstan and along the Northern Distribution Route. While Opium production has increased seizures along the NDR have fallen.	Aware limited improvement
Independent mid-term project evaluations of the Strengthening the SSDC KGR/K50. Published in 2015.			
39	Over the next 6 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should develop plans for merging all LE activities (to include K50) under SP 1 of the Programme for Central Asia.	K50 will be assumed into the regional programme in Dec 2017	Yes
40	As part of the merging all LE activities into SP1 of the Programme for Central Asia, over the next 12 months, the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should explore the possibility of supporting other LE agencies within means and capability	K50 will be assumed into the regional programme in Dec 2017	Yes

	to achieve the outcomes and outputs within the Programme for Central Asia that relate to inter agency cooperation, coordination and information sharing.		
41	Over the next 6 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should continue to develop plans which aim to concentrate more effort on assisting the SSDC to perform its interagency coordination role. This could include UNODC providing assistance to other agencies so that they are better able to work with SSDC in delivery of the National Strategy on Drug Control.	CNS still has this remit but as a department within the MoI it is likely to have less authority to change the views and delivery of other ministries	Mentioned but not enacted
42	Over the next 6 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan (and donors) should assist the SSDC to conduct a comprehensive training needs assessment, with the view to produce a training delivery plan which seeks to develop the SSDC as both a law enforcement agency and as an inter-agency coordination mechanism ¹⁷⁶ .	This was been suggested by UNODC and was agreed to by a previous SSDC chairperson. There is no evidence that this has been conducted by the CNS.	Mentioned but not enacted
43	Over the next 3 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should explore the T90/K50 working model and examine if it has utility to be expanded as a means of increasing cooperation between the SSDC and other Kyrgyz ministries / agencies.	CNS still has this remit but as a department within the MOI it is likely to have less authority to change the views and delivery of other ministries	Mentioned but not enacted
44	Over the next 24 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should assist the Chairman to develop strategic guidance for SSDC, the operationalization of the NSDC.	Mentioned but no progress from the SSDC. The formation of the CNS has hindered the accomplishment of this objective	Mentioned but not enacted
45	Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should assist the SSDC leadership to develop a working routine that meets the requirements to manage, develop and coordinate the SSDC.	Mentioned but no progress from the SSDC/CNS	Mentioned but not enacted
46	Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should assist the establishment of below deputy level platforms and working groups, as a means of empowering the more junior officials to take responsibility.	Mentioned but no progress from the SSDC/CNS	Mentioned but not enacted
47	Over the next 6 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should: Conduct a Joint Project Steering Committee so that all LE (SP1) activities are discussed with Kyrgyz	This activity is occurring as part of the move from K50 to SP 1	In progress

¹⁷⁶ This plan needs to include detailed M&E tools so that the effectiveness of training can be assessed and the overall impact of training qualified.

	<p>Government counter-parts, international partners and donors in one forum¹⁷⁷;</p> <p>The Programme Office should map all common LE outcomes and outputs and ensure that commonality is identified;</p> <p>Explore how administrative staff can be shared between projects, by identifying overlaps and commonality of tasks.</p>		
48	<p>Over the next 24 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should discuss with IEU the requirement for a joint evaluation of all LE (SP1) activities within Kyrgyzstan, instead of conducting a final evaluation of K50. This evaluation could then feed a cluster evaluation of all SP1 activities across the Central Asian Region.</p>	A final evaluation of K50 was conducted	Not accepted
49	<p>Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should further develop their plans for assisting the SSDC to increase its international cooperation. Areas for consideration are:</p> <p>Continued support of Regional Programme initiatives and ROCA inter-regional activities- DLOs and CARICC etc.</p> <p>Ensuring that all SSDC education includes an international cooperation element</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Examining opportunities for working level cooperation which allows case officers to regularly meet and exchange information with their counter-parts. 	Understood but limited change from the SSDC / CNS due to optimisation	Mentioned but not enacted
50	<p>As part of the key recommendation to conduct a full training needs analysis, over the next 6-12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should look to expand the training and general education of SSDC officials¹⁷⁸, to include updating the SSDC's staff selection criteria, start standards and job descriptions.</p>	This was suggested to the SSDC and a former chairperson agreed that it should occur. However, no change was made and the SSDC was reformed into the CNS. The observation remains valid.	Aware and working towards
51	<p>Over the next 24 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should examine mechanisms for developing sustainable training.</p>	This is widely known and understood. Limited progress towards this recommendation is mainly due to funding.	Aware and working towards
52	<p>Within the next 3 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan</p>	No evidence that this recommendation has been acted on.	No

¹⁷⁷ The Regional Section state that this recommendation is being addressed through ROCA Programme Governance mechanism, which includes Technical Working Groups and National Level Working Groups. The Programme Governance should function before/while all activities are merged under the Programme.

¹⁷⁸ The Regional Section state that this recommendation could possibly be done as part of ROCA Programme Exercise covering all CA countries and other LE agencies.

	should devise and implement a more robust mechanism for evaluating UNODC provided training.		
53	Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should explore greater cooperation and joint working with other UN Agencies, Donors and IGOs (specifically OSCE); to include the formation of LE/Police reform platform.	UNODC has taken the lead in establishing a LE platform which includes other IC actors	Yes
54	Over the next 3 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should conduct a gender participatory desk review and include the results in the logical matrix.	No progress.	No
55	Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should seek to reinforce OSCE's gender equality programme and UNDP's gender programme rather than devise unilateral activities.	No progress.	No
56	Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should look to augment its PSC reporting with action points in both English and Russian, which should be released shortly after meetings.	Progress.	Yes
57	Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should examine its reporting schedule and media plan. External public relations assistance may be required and the eventual aim should be to develop: Shorter and more frequent reports ¹⁷⁹ ; Donor sound bites; and improved web based information.	No change to date.	No

¹⁷⁹ This does not reduce the requirement for official reports. These reports would be tailored to the more immediate information requirement of donors and the internet and would report activities, they would not present analysis as this would be left to more formal / traditional reporting.

ANNEX VII. K50 LOGICAL MATRIX

UNODC Logical Framework			
Project Title: “Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic-Phase I”.	Sub-Programme: 1. Countering transnational crime and illicit trafficking, including drug trafficking.	Region/Country: Kyrgyz Republic Date: 04 April 2011.	Project Number / Code: KGZ/K50 Duration: 15 August 2011 – 31 December 2017 (6 years 4 months 17 days)
Expected Accomplishment: 1.(b) Member States are equipped to take effective action against transnational organized crime, including: drug trafficking; money laundering; trafficking in persons; smuggling of migrants; illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms; and emerging policy issues as mentioned in General Assembly resolution 64/179.			
Relationship with Country/ Regional/ Thematic Programmes: The project contributes to the UNODC Integrated Country Programme of assistance for Kyrgyzstan 2014-2016 (ICP). Sub-programme 1 – Drug trafficking, organized crime and border management.			
Objectives/Outcomes/Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions/Risks
Project Objective: The State Service on Drug Control developed into an effective and sustainable specialized law enforcement agency. (Unchanged).	Indicators related to the Project objective: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased quantity of drug seizures and joint law enforcement operations (when comparing situation before and after the project). ▪ Baseline: This information will be supplied by SSDC at later project implementation stage. ▪ Target: Quantity of drug seizures and joint law enforcement operations are increased over baseline figures. 	Means of Verification: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SSDC Drug Seizure Reports; ▪ Assessment mission reports; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Project Steering Committee reports; ▪ Publications; ▪ Press-releases; ▪ Communication letters; ▪ Quarterly, semi-annual and annual reports of the project. 	Assumptions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Government of Kyrgyzstan continues to be fully committed to ensuring the SSDC’s self-sustainability and taking the necessary national measures in supporting SSDC’s coordinating role among

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quantity and volume of resources allocated to SSDC and to its counter-narcotic partners to increase their interdiction capacity (before and after the project). ▪ Baseline: To be supplied by SSDC. ▪ Target: Increase over the baseline figures. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessment reports; ▪ Hand-over reports; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Hand over documents and onsite inspection reports; ▪ Press-releases; 	<p>law enforcement agencies in the country.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Government of the Kyrgyz Republic is committed to the project and fulfils its responsibilities as partner. ▪ Countering drug trafficking remains as a political priority for the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
<p>Outcome 1: Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of SSDC and implementation of the adopted National Strategy/Programme on Drug Control. (Reformulated).</p>	<p>Indicators related to Outcome 1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The laws and regulations for effective functioning of the SSDC are reviewed, revised and adopted. ▪ Baseline: No revised and adopted Laws. ▪ Target: Laws on Amendments to the National Legislation revised and adopted. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy on Drug Control developed and adopted. ▪ Baseline: No Plan adopted. ▪ Target: The Plan is under implementation. 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governmental decrees on adoption of Laws; ▪ UNODC project activity records/reports; ▪ Consultant’s assessment report; ▪ Communication and information from the Government, incl. official newspapers, etc. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Government Decree on adoption of the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy on Drug Control; ▪ Project activity records/reports; ▪ Consultant’s assessment report; ▪ Reports on progress of the Implementation Plan. 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The government sustains its political will to support the legislative process for effective functioning of the SSDC; implementation of the newly adopted National Strategy/Programme on Drug Control with its Implementation Plan; and regular working of the State Committee on Drug Control.

<p>Output 1.1: The legal framework including current legislation revised and proposed for the SSDC consideration. (Reformulated).</p>	<p>Indicators related to Output 1.1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number of the laws and regulations for the effective functioning of the SSDS developed. ▪ Baseline: 0. ▪ Target: 4. 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessment report of the consultant/expert, containing the analysis of the existing legislation, providing recommendations for adoption/amendments, i.e. draft laws/regulations; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Communication letters. 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC and other key stakeholders involved in reviewing and drafting legislation remain committed to the exercise.
<p>Activities related to Output 1.1:</p> <p>1.1.1 Conduct assessment and draft assessment report.</p> <p>1.1.2 Workshop to review the assessment report and to formulate recommendations.</p> <p>1.1.3 Revision and submission of the report to the Government/SSDC for approval.</p>			
<p>Output 1.2: The coordination functions of the Kyrgyz State Committee on Drug Control in implementation of the National Strategy/Programme on Drug Control supported. (Reformulated).</p>	<p>Indicators related to Output 1.2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number of meetings held by the State Committee on Drug Control. ▪ Baseline: 1. ▪ Target: 6. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number meetings held by the State Committee on Drug Control in regions. ▪ Baseline: 0. ▪ Target: 18. 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Adopted decisions; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Communication letters. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Adopted decisions; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Communication letters. 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic is strongly committed to implement the National Anti-Drug Strategy.
<p>Activities related to Output 1.2:</p> <p>1.2.1 Facilitation of the meetings by the State Committee on Drug Control twice per year.</p> <p>1.2.2 Workshops on reviewing the progress on implementation of the National Strategy on Drug Control.</p> <p>1.2.3 Facilitation of State Committee on Drug Control working groups/mechanisms in regions.</p>			

<p>Outcome 2: Basic infrastructure of SSDC, including its regional departments strengthened. (Reformulated).</p>	<p>Indicators related to Outcome 2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improved basic infrastructure and facilities handed over to SSDC. ▪ Baseline: Assessment of infrastructure needs of SSDC’s regional departments. ▪ Target: SSDC takes possession of infrastructures built/refurbished according to assessment. 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessment reports; ▪ Tender/procurement documents; ▪ Steering Committee Reports; ▪ Hand over documents and onsite inspection reports; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Communication letters 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC is committed to sustain the improved infrastructures in proper condition.
<p>Output 2.1: New Administrative facility for SSDC Western Department located in Talas constructed. (New).</p>	<p>Indicators related to Output 2.1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Completed construction of a new building for SSDC Department located in Talas. ▪ Baseline: Needs identified in the assessment of infrastructure for SSDC Department in Talas. ▪ Target: SSDC Department in Talas built according to assessment. 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessment reports; ▪ Tender/procurement documents; ▪ Steering Committee Reports; ▪ Hand over documents and onsite inspection reports; ▪ Activity reports/records; 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC is involved and supports refurbishment/construction works and committed to project implementation and its obligations.
	<p>Activities related to Output2.1:</p> <p>2.1.1 Assessment of the construction work volume. 2.1.2 Announcement of tender and selection of Construction Company. 2.1.3 Preparatory works to initiate the construction. 2.1.4 Commence and complete the construction.</p>		
<p>Output 2.2: New Administrative facility for SSDC South-eastern Department located in Jalal-Abad constructed. (New).</p>	<p>Indicators related to Output 2.2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Completed construction of a new building for SSDC Department located in Jalal-Abad. ▪ Baseline: Needs identified in the assessment of infrastructure for SSDC Department in Jalal-Abad. ▪ Target: SSDC Department in Jalal-Abad built according to the assessment. 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessment reports; ▪ Tender/procurement documents; ▪ Steering Committee Reports; ▪ Hand over documents and onsite inspection reports; ▪ Activity reports/records; 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC is involved and supports refurbishment/construction works and committed to project implementation and its obligations.
	<p>Activities related to Output 2.2:</p> <p>2.2.1. Assessment of the construction work volume.</p>		

	2.2.2. Announcement of tender and selection of Construction Company. 2.2.3. Preparatory works to initiate the construction. 2.2.4. Commence and complete the construction.		
Output 2.3: New Administrative facility for SSDC Eastern Department located in Karakol constructed. (Unchanged ongoing activity).	Indicators related to Output 2.3: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Completed construction of a new building for SSDC Department located in Karakol. ▪ Baseline: Needs identified in the assessment of infrastructure for SSDC Department in Karakol. ▪ Target: SSDC Department in Karakol built according to the assessment. 	Means of Verification: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessment reports; ▪ Tender/procurement documents; ▪ Steering Committee Reports; ▪ Hand over documents and onsite inspection reports; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Press-releases. 	Assumptions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC is involved and supports refurbishment/construction works and committed to project implementation and its obligations.
	2.3.1. Assessment of the construction work volume. 2.3.2. Announcement of tender and selection of Construction Company. 2.3.3. Preparatory works to initiate the construction. 2.3.4. Commence and complete the construction.		
Output 2.4: New Administrative facility for SSDC Eastern Department located in Naryn constructed. (New).	Indicators related to Output 2.4: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Completed construction of a new building for SSDC Department located in Naryn. ▪ Baseline: Needs identified in the assessment of infrastructure for SSDC Department in Naryn. ▪ Target: SSDC Department in Naryn built according to the assessment. 	Means of Verification: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessment reports; ▪ Tender/procurement documents; ▪ Steering Committee Reports; ▪ Hand over documents and onsite inspection reports; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Press-releases. 	Assumptions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC is involved and supports refurbishment/construction works and committed to project implementation and its obligations.
	Activities related to Output 2.3: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2.4.1. Assessment of the construction work volume. 2.4.2. Announcement of tender and selection of Construction Company. 2.4.3. Preparatory works to initiate the construction. 2.4.4. Commence and complete the construction. 		
Outcome 3: Operational, investigative and analytical capacities of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners through	Indicators related to Outcome 3: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number of officers trained by ToT group. ▪ Baseline: 0 	Means of Verification: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SSDC Training records; ▪ Certificates; ▪ Activity reports/records; 	Assumptions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners committed to

<p>provision of equipment and training strengthened. (Reformulated).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Target: 100 officers (80male/20female) are trained by ToT group. ▪ Training curricula adopted in basic, intermediate and advanced skills for SSDC officers as well as for officers of other law-enforcement agencies with drug control mandates developed endorsed and put under systematic implementation. ▪ Baseline: Training curricula not available. ▪ Target: Training curricula is under implementation. ▪ Number of officers completed the training on CBT courses (Computer Based Training). ▪ Baseline: 0 staff completed CBT training. ▪ Target: 200 officers completed CBT training. ▪ Plan on development of forensic science laboratories elaborated and implemented. ▪ Baseline: No plan available. ▪ Target: Plan is available and implemented. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Pre/post testing; ▪ Post training survey/focus group feedback; ▪ Press-releases. ▪ Assessment reports; ▪ Training curricula; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ SSDC Training records; ▪ Press-releases; ▪ Certificates; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Post training survey/focus group feedback; ▪ Press-release. ▪ Plan implementation progress reporting; ▪ Assessment reports; ▪ Plan on LAB development; ▪ Activity reports/records. 	<p>properly utilize the equipment and the skills obtained for the relevant functions prescribed under the legislation/regulations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners committed to institutionalize the training capacity through endorsement of the training curricula and its continuous implementation.
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<p>Output 3.1: Specifications, type and quantity of equipment needed for SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners assessed, procured and handed over. (Reformulated).</p>	<p>Indicators related to Output 3.1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Required equipment is procured and handed over. ▪ Baseline: Assessment report. ▪ Target: Equipment procured and provided according to the needs assessment and procurement report. 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessment reports; ▪ Tender/procurement documents; ▪ Steering Committee Reports; ▪ Handover ceremonies; ▪ Hand over documents and onsite inspection reports; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Press-releases. 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC is committed to ensure inventory and proper utilization of the equipment.
<p>Activities related to Output 3.1:</p> <p>3.1.1 Conduct assessment and draft assessment report, containing the list of equipment needed and the procurement plan.</p> <p>3.1.2 Identify the companies (producers of equipment) based on the UN/UNODC procurement rules and regulations and conclude procurement contracts. Ensure procurement of the equipment, and monitor the timeliness and quality of the delivered equipment.</p>			
<p>Output 3.2: A group of selected SSDC officers trained to serve as trainers for their peers. (Unchanged).</p>	<p>Indicators related to Output 3.2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number of officers trained by ToT group. ▪ Baseline: 0 ▪ Target: 100 officers (80male/20female) are trained by ToT group. 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Training records; ▪ Certificates; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Post training survey/focus group feedback. 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC nominates targeted specialists/officers.
<p>Activities related to output 3.2:</p> <p>3.2.1. Organize and conduct four Training of Trainers (ToT) courses for SSDC officer's trainers.</p>			
<p>Output 3.3: Training curricula in basic, intermediate and advanced skills for SSDC officers as well as for its national counter-narcotic partners finalized, endorsed, incorporated into the current national training curriculum for law enforcement officers and implemented together with the national professional training institutions. Training programmes will focus on:</p>	<p>Indicators related to Output 3.3:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Training curricula in basic, intermediate and advanced skills for SSDC officers as well as for its national counter-narcotic partner's officers developed. ▪ Baseline: Curricula not available. ▪ Target: Curricula developed. ▪ Number of training courses (relevant, timely and practical) delivered to SSDC and for its 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessment reports; ▪ Training curricula; ▪ Communication letters; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ SSDC training records; ▪ Certificates; ▪ Approved plan on training activities. ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ SSDC training records; 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC collaborates fully in the design of curriculum and training materials. ▪ The staff of SSDC and its counter-narcotic partners committed to applying new skills in daily work.

<p>(a) basic and specialized investigative techniques; (b) intelligence-led investigations; (c) collection and analysis of intelligence; (d) collection, storage and examination of physical evidence (forensic science, including digital forensics); (e) use of specialized equipment provided by the project; and, (f) management skills (including leadership, managing performance, financial responsibility, etc.). (Reformulated).</p>	<p>national counter-narcotic partners (including 'train the trainer' components). Number of officers trained. ▪ Baseline: 0 courses, 0 officers trained. ▪ Target: 10 courses where 80% of trainees indicate that training met needs, 100 officers (80male/20female) trained.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Certificates; ▪ Steering Committee Reports; ▪ Post training survey/focus group feedback; ▪ Quality is assessed through anonymous questionnaires indicating how well the training courses have matched the needs of the SSDC. 	
<p>Output 3.4: Computer Based Training (CBT) classrooms within national counter-narcotic partners of the SSDC established. (Reformulated).</p>	<p>Indicators related to output 3.3:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number of CBT classrooms established. ▪ Baseline: 2. ▪ Target: 4. <p>▪ Number of CBT Training managers trained. Number of officers trained on all relevant CBT modules.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Baseline: 2 CBT training managers. ▪ Target: 4 CBT Training managers trained, 200 officers completed training on CBT courses. 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Procurement documents; ▪ Steering Committee Reports; ▪ Communication letters; ▪ Hand over documents and onsite assessment/ inspection reports. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Communication letters; ▪ Post training survey/focus group feedback; ▪ Press-releases. 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC nominates targeted specialists/officers. ▪ LEAs are committed to applying new skills in daily work.
	<p>Activities related to Output 3.4:</p> <p>3.4.1. Procurement of hardware. 3.4.2. Installation of the e-Learning software. 3.4.3. Installation of relevant software packages in Russian. 3.4.4. Training the Training Managers on all relevant CBT modules.</p>		
<p>Output 3.5:</p>	<p>Indicators related to Output 3.5:</p>	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessment reports; 	<p>Assumptions:</p>

<p>Capacities of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners enhanced through assessment of vehicle requirement. (Reformulated).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Required amount of vehicles are procured and handed over. ▪ Baseline: Amount identified in the assessment report. ▪ Target: Required amount of vehicles handed over, as per the assessment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Tender/procurement documents; ▪ Steering Committee Reports; ▪ Hand over documents and onsite inspection reports; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Communication letters; ▪ Press-releases. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC is committed to ensure inventory and proper utilization and maintenance of the vehicles.
<p>Activities related to Output 3.5: 3.5.1. Assessment of required amount of vehicles and specifications. 3.5.2. Execute procurement procedure. Monitor delivery of vehicles. Handover the vehicles.</p>			
<p>Output 3.6: Technical capacities of forensic science laboratories of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners upgraded. (Reformulated).</p>	<p>Indicators related to Output 3.6:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Laboratory equipment procured and handed over. ▪ Baseline: Needs identified in the assessment report. ▪ Target: Forensic science laboratories have required equipment, as per the assessment. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number of specialized training on LAB equipment and forensic research methods for LAB experts conducted. ▪ Baseline: 2 ▪ Target: 10 experts trained (8male/2female). 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessment reports; ▪ Tender/procurement documents; ▪ Steering Committee Reports; ▪ Hand over documents and onsite inspection reports; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Press-releases. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ SSDC training records; ▪ Post training survey/focus group feedback. 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Forensic Science LAB experts are committed to utilize new equipment and applying skills in daily work to ensure quality analysis in accordance with UN methodology and INTL standards.
<p>Activities related to output 3.6: 3.6.1. Assessment of requirement for Analytical Instruments and additional laboratory equipment. 3.6.2. Identify suitable Analytical Instruments and additional laboratory equipment. 3.6.3. Execute procurement of Analytical Instruments and additional laboratory equipment.</p>			
<p>Outcome 4: The SSDC actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries and UNODC's</p>	<p>Indicators related to Outcome 4:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number of SSDC Liaison Officers placed neighbouring countries. ▪ Baseline: No Liaison Officers present. 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Government records on the posting of the officers in these countries, signed agreements/protocols, budgetary records 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Government of Kyrgyzstan/SSDC is committed to establish and continue the

<p>overall coordination role of support to the SSDC is effectively attained. (Unchanged).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Target: Liaison Officers present in at least two countries. ▪ Number of cooperation arrangements such as MOUs, formal agreements and/or informal cooperation modalities for enhanced cooperation of the SSDC with drug law enforcement agencies of foreign countries in the context of joint operations and information/intelligence exchange in place. ▪ Baseline: 2. ▪ Target: 10 documented cooperation activities between agencies. ▪ Activities in support of collecting and sharing operational information and participating in joint cross-border operations by SSDC through CARICC conducted. ▪ Baseline: No documented cooperation in cross-border operations through CARICC. ▪ Target: Documented active cooperation between agencies. 	<p>(allocating funds for the placement of the officers).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Signed/ratified agreements/MOUs; ▪ UNODC workshop and study tour records/reports. ▪ CARICC reports; ▪ CARICC/UNODC communications/reports; ▪ Steering committee records. 	<p>cooperation with the (potential) foreign partners.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Foreign governments/agencies are committed to establish and continue the cooperation with the SSDC. ▪ The willingness of the member-states to share information/intelligence via CARICC as well as continuous willingness to participate in the joint cross-border operations coordinated.
<p>Output 4.1: The placement of the SSDC Liaison Officers in <i>inter alia</i> Afghanistan, China, Tajikistan and Russia facilitated. (Unchanged).</p>	<p>Indicators related to Output 4.1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number of SSDC Liaison Officers trained. ▪ Baseline: 1 ▪ Target: 4 SSDC Liaison Officers are trained. <p>Activities related to Output 4.1:</p>	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Government records on posting of the officers to these countries, signed agreements/protocols, budgetary records (allocating funds for the placement of the officers); ▪ Activity reports/records. 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC is committed to placement of the SSDC Liaison Officers. ▪ The SSDC cooperates and remains committed to the project. ▪ The SSDC nominates targeted officers.

	<p>4.1.1. Convene meetings, in coordination with the UNODC Offices in Afghanistan, China, Tajikistan and Russia for the development and signing of agreements/protocols on the placement of SSDC Liaison Officers</p> <p>4.1.2. Deliver necessary trainings to the SSDC Liaison Officers before and during their placement.</p>		
<p>Output 4.2: Cooperation arrangements between SSDC enhanced with DCA of Tajikistan, FSKN of Russia, DEA of the United States, and other relevant foreign agencies facilitated. This will involve the conclusion of agreements/MOUs, and the support for study tours, workshops, and information sharing to promote joint cross-border law enforcement operations (including controlled deliveries) and the exchange of best practices and lessons learned. (Unchanged).</p>	<p>Indicators related to Output 4.2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number of meetings held for signing of cooperation agreements. Activities in support of cooperation agreements are conducted. ▪ Baseline: 1 ▪ Target: 3 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Signed/ratified agreements/MOUs; ▪ UNODC workshop and study tour records/reports; ▪ Communication letters; ▪ SSDC reports; ▪ Steering Committee records; ▪ Press-releases. 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC is committed to cooperate with the (potential) foreign LE partners.
<p>Output 4.3: Utilization of the facilities of CARICC by SSDC for the purposes of information sharing and coordinating of joint law enforcement operations supported. (Unchanged).</p>	<p>Indicators related to Output 4.3:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Use of CARICC for information sharing and joint operations. ▪ Baseline: 0 ▪ Target: 1 SSDC Liaison Officer at CARICC placed. 	<p>Means of Verification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CARICC reports/records; ▪ Activity reports/records; ▪ Communication letters; ▪ SSDC reports; ▪ Steering Committee records. 	<p>Assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SSDC is committed to use CARICC platform for information sharing and joint operations.
	<p>Activities related to Output 4.2:</p> <p>4.2.1. Convene meetings for the development and signing of agreements/protocols/ MOUs on law-enforcement cooperation in drug control.</p> <p>4.2.2. Organize and conduct study tours for the SSDC's officers to selected countries to exchange experience and establish personal contacts.</p> <p>4.2.3. Organize and conduct workshops on promoting law-enforcement cooperation in the region, focusing on joint trans-national operations as well as information/data/intelligence exchange.</p>		
	<p>Activities related to Output 4.3:</p> <p>4.3.1. Organize visits of SSDC delegations to CARICC to promote the use of the CARICC facilities in the exchange of information/intelligence and joint cross-border operations.</p>		