



UNODC

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Accounting for Security and Justice in the Post-2015 Development Agenda

October 2013

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UNODC would like to extend its gratitude to the participants in the expert consultation, as well as to their colleagues who provided input to this paper.

This document has not been formally edited

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Executive Summary

The form and function of the post-2015 development architecture are being vigorously debated in and outside of the United Nations. A major question relates to the specific place of “security” and “justice” in the agenda. While the multi-directional relationships between security, justice and development are for the most part accepted in theory, there are nevertheless concerns that they could be diluted, or even excluded, from the future Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Many United Nations Member States and civil society actors are advocating for the establishment of autonomous goals, targets and indicators for security and justice. Others still need convincing that such metrics are warranted. A wide range of suggested inputs has been proposed during United Nations-led consultations as well as in the report issued by the High Level Panel at the request of the Secretary General¹.

Led by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in consultation with an Expert Group on issues related to rule of law, justice, and security, this concept paper considers a measurement framework for justice and security in relation to development. It builds upon the aforementioned High Level Panel Report, as well as upon the outcome document of the meeting hosted by UNDP on 18 – 19 June 2013². As such, it also sets out the case for a post-2015 development agenda that explicitly accounts for security and justice. While practically focused on these two concepts, it also acknowledges how they are fundamentally connected to achieving the rule of law. The paper advances a rationale for their inclusion, including evidence of how security and justice are quantitatively and qualitatively connected to development progress³. It features examples of goals, targets and indicators drawing from established inter-governmental and non-governmental work on the subject. It also considers the inclusion criteria for selecting metrics and impending challenges in advancing security and justice related themes. Finally, the annexes to this paper contain detailed information on the

¹ High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 2013. *A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development*.

² *Global Dialogue on Rule of Law and the Post-2015 Development Agenda Concept Note*, UNDP 2013

³ It should be noted that the evidence base linking aspects of justice and security to development can vary depending on the particular aspect being considered. This paper focuses on those aspects which can be quantitatively and qualitatively linked to development progress, though it should be recognized that the evidential basis for these links may vary.

suggested indicators for security and justice in order to define each indicator in terms of the availability and measurement of data, and describe any limitations or concerns with the use of the indicator. Taken together, the paper sets out a basic roadmap for measuring change from the global to the national levels.

Introduction

Insecurity and injustice are a daily fact of life for a large proportion of people around the world, especially the poor. Globally, around half a million people are killed each year as result of intentional homicidal violence.⁴ Over the last years, armed conflict is estimated to have claimed at least 50,000 direct deaths per year, with more than 200,000 persons dying each year in conflict zones from non-violent causes that result from the effect of war on populations.⁵ The vast majority of these intentional deaths occur in lower- and middle-income settings of Africa, the Americas and Asia. While violent and conflict-related deaths represent amongst the most serious consequences, insecurity is experienced in a multitude of ways, arising from armed conflict, interpersonal violence, and the reach of organized crime. Literally hundreds of millions of people all across the world are subjected to routine victimization, assault, robbery, sexual violence, harassment and intimidation every year.⁶ Insecurity need not even be characterized by violence itself. Fear of conflict, victimization, intimidation, corruption, and extortion may limit individual freedom of movement, expression or religion, and disrupt businesses, education or daily life. Only a small number of the most visible incidents are usually registered and the majority of acts go un-reported, with a minority finding their way into justice systems. Ineffective and inaccessible criminal justice systems in many low- and middle-income settings are unable to guarantee safety and security.

Though the centrality of criminal justice systems in providing for the safety and security of individuals is not disputed, when discussing development security should be conceived of in a wider sense⁷. Security thus includes not only the absence of the threat of direct interpersonal violence, but also the absence of the threat of conflict-related violence and violence linked to civil unrest. Furthermore, there may exist situations with little or comparatively lower levels of actual direct physical violence, but where fear of violence or intimidation is prevalent. Such situations are often characterized to some degree by: an unaccountable or ineffective state security sector; high levels of crime or corruption; and a breakdown of governance mechanisms. Fear of violence, corruption, a culture of impunity and a lack of accountability threaten the legitimacy of

⁴ See UNODC, 2011. Global Study on Homicide 2011. Available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf.

⁵ See Geneva Declaration, 2008. Global Burden of Armed Violence.

⁶ See Van Dijk, J. and Alvazzi del Frate, A. 2004. *Criminal Victimization and Victim Services across the World: Results and Prospects of the International Crime Victims Survey*.

⁷ See also 'Box 2: Describing security and justice' on page 14.

the social contract, undermine the rule of law and slow, and perhaps reverse, development progress.

Notwithstanding the importance attached to “peace and security” during Rio+20⁸ and consultations in and outside the United Nations since 2012, the development debate is relatively silent on issues related to the rule of law and in particular the place of security and justice in the post-2015 agenda.⁹ And while the interconnections between security, justice, and development are accepted in principle at the highest levels¹⁰, there are considerable disagreements about how they might be practically inserted into the process.

⁸ The Rio+20 declaration explicitly accounts for ‘peace and security’, and the ‘rule of law’. United Nations General Assembly, 2012. Resolution A/RES/66/288 on *The future we want*, 11 September 2012, in paragraphs 8, 109, and 252.

⁹ Whilst, for example, the UN General Assembly (2012) has noted that ‘We are convinced that the rule of law and development are strongly interrelated and mutually reinforcing, that the advancement of the rule of law at the national and international levels is essential for sustained and inclusive economic growth, sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development ...’, the resolution does not address in detail the possible links between security, justice and development. See United Nations General Assembly, 2012. Resolution A/Res/67/1 on *Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels*, 30 November 2012, para. 7.

¹⁰ The UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda stressed that the prevention and reduction of all forms of violence and abuse should be at the heart of any agenda that fully recognizes the centrality of human security, both as a human rights imperative and as being integral to development. See United Nations UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 2012. *Realizing the Future We Want for All – Report to the Secretary-General*, New York 2012.

Rule of Law as a framework for linking security, justice and development

The Secretary General has stated, “*For the United Nations, the rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.*”¹¹ The United Nations has therefore explicitly linked the concept of ‘rule of law’ – of which justice and security are a part – with international standards and norms in human rights. The rule of law also becomes an essential part of creating a ‘culture of lawfulness’, where there is both formal and informal respect for rule of law and human rights, reinforced, for example, through programmes for crime prevention.

We can therefore understand the rule of law as, simultaneously: a legal and political order based on the values of human rights where human security is guaranteed; an enabling condition¹² for development through the provision of social order, security, and enforced rights and obligations; and a process by which development outcomes are achieved through clear systems to adopt rules, make decisions, and deliver services that are essential for sustainable development, such as quality education.

This paper considers the security and justice aspects of rule of law in their relationship to development (see Box 2). The above understanding however should make it clear that other aspects of rule of law also need to be considered within the post-2015 development agenda, especially those aspects related to governance and decision-making.

Box 1: Rule of law as a framework for linking security, justice and development

At least part of the challenge is defining what is meant by ‘security’ and ‘justice’. These are broad concepts that are connected with other notions such as crime prevention, the rule of law and human rights. Establishing *practical* synergies between issues of security and justice and the wider post-2015 development discussion requires careful

¹¹ See UN, *Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*, (S/2004/616), 2004. Note also that in the 2012 Declaration of the High Level Meeting on the Rule of Law, the UN General Assembly recognized that “*all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to just, fair and equitable laws and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.*”

¹² Note also the Secretary General’s report that states in paragraph 95 that “*Peace and stability, human rights and effective governance based on the rule of law and transparent institutions are outcomes and enablers of development*” (United Nations, 2013. *A life of dignity for all: accelerating progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and advancing the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015*. Report of the Secretary General, 26 July 2013.)

delineation of the elements inherent in these concepts.¹³ Not all elements are easily measurable, much less impact equally on development processes. As Box 1 shows, facets of security and justice cut across a range of state structures and sectors, including institutions responsible for crime prevention and criminal justice, civil and administrative justice, governance, conflict prevention, as well as accountability and oversight.

The wide scope often ascribed to security and justice can introduce a high degree of uncertainty and speculation about the precise content of future benchmarks in the post-2015 deliberations. There are literally hundreds of consultations taking place on the form and function of the Sustainable Development Goals and an astonishing array of proposals emerging. Some advocate top-down goals, targets and indicators common to all states, while others call for bottom-up metrics that build on local specificities. An important contribution to helping clarify the parameters of how security and justice *might* be addressed is found in the High Level Panel (HLP) report to the Secretary General.¹⁴ Yet a measure of caution is warranted: there is no guarantee that its recommendations issued in May 2013 will be accepted and any final decisions will only be revealed in 2016.

What are clearly needed are a minimum set of security and justice metrics to help shape debate. These should derive from an evidence-based understanding of the interrelationships between security, justice and development. In line with the approach taken by the HLP on the post-2015 development agenda, they should be informed by the considerable intellectual engagement with the issue to date, and could consist of a small number of higher-order goals, a shortlist of targets, and a basket of indicators¹⁵. They could also usefully move beyond narrow traditional statistical measures towards a more comprehensive treatment of security and justice. Possible indicators could emphasize performance (outcomes), capacity (outputs) and resources (inputs)¹⁶. In

¹³ See United Nations Foundation (UNF), International Peace Institute (IPI), and Quaker UN Office 2013. *Conflict, Violence and Instability in the Post-2015 Development Agenda*, 26 April 2013 Workshop Report.

¹⁴ See High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 2013. *A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development*.

¹⁵ Note that additional work may be needed, through for example pilot programmes, to test new indicators and data collection methods. Such efforts should of course be fully documented so that lessons may be learned from the process.

¹⁶ It should be recognized, however, that the last two areas of measurement (inputs and outputs) should be considered only as contributing to an outcome, i.e. they may be means to an end but are

addition, goals, targets, and indicators could be selected on the basis of: their applicability in international or specific national contexts; data availability and measurability of the relevant indicator; and the ability to demonstrate progress in a particular dimension of justice or security.

It would also be advisable to select targets for which indicators are well established, data are readily available and related methodological issues largely resolved, and which exhibit global relevance. Moreover, it may also be worthwhile to also consider some targets for which measurement approaches, indicator data and methodologies are still evolving. Such an approach would avoid over-emphasizing accessible targets and data ('valuing what you measure') at the expense of potentially insightful but less easily demonstrable aspects of justice and security ('measuring what may be of value'). This paper therefore explores and develops a *tier*-based approach to measurement. Building on the extensive research and advocacy already assembled on issues of security and justice, a shortlist of goals, targets and indicators drawing from good practice could constructively inform the on-going discussion of the post-2015 development agenda. To be useful, however, they would need to anticipate political sensitivities, terminological confusion, and capacity constraints and methodological issues related to data collection and analysis.

A core mandate of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the promotion and measurement of security and justice. The Office is dedicated to the prevention of organized (and other forms of) crime together with support for effective, humane and accountable criminal justice systems.¹⁷ UNODC draws on extensive practical experience in tracking security and criminal justice trends.¹⁸ As such, UNODC is well placed to offer preliminary reflections on the rationale for including security and justice in the post-2015 development framework.¹⁹ Likewise, UNODC draws on

not ends in and of themselves. An overemphasis on measurement of capacity and resources runs the risk of creating perverse incentives that are contrary to the overall goals of inclusive sustainable development.

¹⁷ The UNODC 2012-2015 strategy also emphasizes measures to counter transnational crime, corruption, terrorism, and promote prevention, treatment, reintegration and alternative development. See United Nations ECOSOC, 2012. Resolution E/RES/2012/12 on *Strategy for the period 2012-2015 for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*, 10 August 2012.

¹⁸ See UNODC, 2011. *Global Study on Homicide 2011*, and the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, available at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html>.

¹⁹ The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, in its 22nd Session 2012, 'welcomes the efforts of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to assist Member States in improving systems for collecting and analyzing data on crime prevention and criminal justice at all levels,

extensive practical experience in tracking security and criminal justice trends.²⁰ To this end, the first section considers the definitions of key terms and sets out the rationale for including security and justice in the post-2015 framework. The second section highlights some basic selection criteria to consider when deciding on metrics. Section three proposes illustrative goals, targets and indicators based on emerging good practice, while the fourth section sets out likely challenges ahead. The annex features more than forty tentative indicators with explanatory notes to support future discussions. The paper is necessarily general, intended to stimulate rather than close discussion.

Limitations of this report

Though intended as a concrete and significant contribution to the ongoing discussions around justice and security within the Post-2015 framework, and especially by defining workable measures of aspects of justice and security, this report is not a definitive treatise on the subject. It is therefore prudent to consider aspects of the discussion that need to be enriched by further reflection and debate within the UN System and more particularly among Member States and with civil society actors.

Among limitations explicitly recognized by the authors of this document is the treatment of ‘informal’ systems of justice. These are mechanisms of dispute resolution that may fall outside of the formalized system of state-administered laws, courts and criminal justice officials. Among the poor and disadvantaged more than 80% of disputes may be solved through informal rather than formal channels, and such mechanisms are therefore the most important (and often only) method of dispute resolution for large numbers of people²¹. A complete treatment of justice as an ‘enabler’ of development should therefore take these informal mechanisms into consideration.

Informal mechanisms vary widely in, *inter alia*, scope of application, basis for decision-making, types of participation, identity of decision-makers and participants, relationship

where necessary, including gender-specific data, in order to promote the rule of law, crime prevention and criminal justice in the post-2015 development agenda.’ E/CN.15/2013/27, Draft resolution IV, on *The rule of law, crime prevention and criminal justice in the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015*, Advance Unedited Version, para. 7.

²⁰ See UNODC, 2011. *Global Study on Homicide 2011*, and the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, available at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html>.

²¹ See UNDP, *Doing Justice: How informal justice systems can contribute*, Wojkowska, 2006

with state-administered justice systems²², respect for norms of equality and human rights, and even in the degree of formalization (some informal systems having quite formalized rules and procedures)²³. Though UNODC and the expert meeting that informed this paper have recognized the place of informal justice in the context of development, the breadth and diversity of mechanisms of informal justice mean that such systems merit a more detailed treatment and discussion that uses as a starting point practitioners of informal justice and participants in informal justice systems. It should be emphasized however, that the discussion of informal justice should recognize and develop the links with goals in development that form part of the Post-2015 Framework.

This paper also takes as a basis the definition of Rule of Law offered by the Secretary General in his report *Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*²⁴. In this definition Rule of Law not only includes not only the traditional concept of Rule of Law (RoL) as a system of known and generally understood rules that are consistently and equally applied to all, but further defines RoL to include human rights norms, participation in legal decision-making, fairness and avoidance of arbitrariness. Rule of Law, in this sense, depends on the proper application of justice – broadly understood (see Box 2) – in an environment where individuals and groups are secure from both insecurity and fear. The focus of this paper is on these aspects of Justice and Security as part of Rule of Law. However, not addressed in this paper are other aspects of Rule of Law that are important for development. These include systems of government and governance, political participation, and aspects of the structure of decision-making institutions and processes. Some work on these issues has been done during the Expert Meeting on creating an accountability framework for conflict, violence, governance and disaster within the context of the Post-2015 Development

²² Ibid. Note that certain jurisdictions may make explicit, formal provision for informal systems of justice.

²³ See UNDP, *Informal Justice Systems*, 2012

²⁴ "For the United Nations, the rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency." See UN, *Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*, (S/2004/616), 2004

Agenda that was part of the UN Global Thematic Consultations on the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

1. Definitions and rationale for linking security, justice and development

For the purposes of this paper, *security* is defined as the right of individuals to live free of real and perceived and threatened collective and interpersonal violence to person or property. The concept of *justice* draws upon the notion of equity, equality and fairness in decision making, both by the criminal justice system, and in matters of civil and administrative justice. The multiple *elements* inherent in these concepts present a significant challenge to elaborating the association between security, justice and development, and to the subsequent definition of goals, targets, and indicators (see Box 2). A few markers can be put down however.

Describing ‘security’ and ‘justice’ in the context of development

Security encompasses both freedom from *physical* and *psychological violence* to person or property, as well as freedom from *fear* and *threat* of violence. Violence can be perpetrated, threatened and experienced by individuals or groups, at home, in the workplace, or during political, social and economic interactions with the state and other members of society. All such acts are typically serious crimes under national laws and include homicide, assault, kidnapping, wounding, rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as threats and use of force and violence in other crimes, such as burglary, robbery and mugging, extortion, intimidation or corruption. In addition, situations of armed conflict give rise to insecurity through the risk of death and injury, both to parties to the conflict as well as to civilians, caused by protracted armed violence. States of security and *insecurity* can be reflected both by the level of victimization experienced by individuals and groups, and by levels of fear of victimization. From the *response* perspective, both the state and individuals can take a range of actions to prevent violence and to promote security.

Justice in its broadest sense refers to notions of equity, equality, and fairness in decision making. In its *institutional* sense, the *justice system* corresponds to the structures created to resolve conflicts and to ensure accountability to, and enforcement of, laws. This includes criminal justice functions – the ability of the police, courts and penal system to fairly investigate, prosecute and punish crimes – as well as civil and administrative justice systems that offer legal redress as between individuals, enterprises, and the state; including in cases of contract, family, and land disputes. Aspects such as the *accessibility*, *effectiveness*, *speed*, and *quality* of justice delivered by state and informal justice systems impact upon the degree of realisation of justice as fairness. Effective *justice systems* are a prerequisite for upholding the **rule of law** – the principle of governance under which all persons are accountable to laws that are consistent with international human rights standards. Respect for the rule of law is integral

to preventing crime and promoting public safety and *security*. Conversely, contexts of *insecurity* risk undermining the rule of law by inhibiting the fair and effective operation of justice systems.

Box 2: Describing security and justice

The most visible threat to security is from acts of direct physical violence. These acts generate physical and psychological harm and create an environment of fear and uncertainty. Alongside physical violence are sexual, domestic, and psychological violence perpetrated by a wide range of actors – from individuals to state entities. In characterizing insecurity, it can be useful to describe the *nature* of violence *perpetrators*, such as the involvement of organized criminal groups or armed groups, as well as the nature of the state security or law enforcement and crime prevention response.

While violent criminality has evident threats, it is important to acknowledge that many types of crime – including non-violent manifestations – can undermine all manner of service delivery institutions (e.g. law enforcement, health and education, etc). Whilst, in many ways, all crime (including acts such as fraud and theft) are an affront to security in its broadest sense and can impact upon development, it is *violent and organized crime* that may be of particular concern.²⁵ In this respect, it is critical to examine both actual violent crime victimization *experienced* by individuals and groups, as well as levels of *fear* of victimization as a result of common and organized crime. Contexts in which organized crime operates, for example, may not necessarily be characterized by high levels of violence. Rather, insecurity is generated by a climate of fear, intimidation and extortion exercised by organized criminal groups.

During periods of armed conflict, in addition to direct conflict deaths and injuries, conflict operations can exert effects far beyond their immediate vicinity, creating insecurity, displacement and fear of harm in widespread populations. Armed conflict generates a series of lethal but *indirect* impacts on communities, including advancing the spread of communicable diseases, causing hunger and malnutrition, and loss of access to shelter, water, and basic health care²⁶. In almost all contemporary conflicts, the number of indirect victims of armed violence is many times larger than the number

²⁵ According to the UN *Convention on Organized Crime*, it can be defined as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”

²⁶ See, for example, Saferworld, *Addressing conflict and violence from 2015* (2012)

of direct conflict deaths. In addition, in fragile and (post) conflict settings with limited institutional infrastructure, criminal activities may flourish, blurring the line between on-going conflict and organized crime, exaggerating existing states of insecurity.

Finally, it is important to account for crime that falls outside of the aforementioned areas yet nevertheless influences development trajectories, and that may cut across several different areas, some beyond the definitions of justice and security in Box 2. In particular, crimes constituting corruption and offences against integrity can significantly impact upon development processes and outcomes. Whilst connected with crime prevention and criminal justice, such acts are also strongly associated with governance promotion and institution building. This paper refers to corruption and organized crime insofar as they impact on development. These issues are dealt with broadly in this paper, but it should be recognized that corruption and organized crime may have strong implications for other parts of the post-2015 framework beyond the areas of justice and security.

With respect to *justice*, whilst UNODC mandates primarily concern *criminal justice*, this paper recognizes the wider intersections between the operation of *all* forms of justice institutions and development. In this respect, the paper does not exclude broader justice goals, targets and indicators, such as those related to legal identity or legal certainty in business transactions. Equally, within the criminal justice sphere, it takes a broad approach, to include elements such as the operation of penal systems and the experience of persons in conflict with the law (meaning any person who has come in contact with the justice system as a result of committing a crime or being suspected of committing a crime). Aspects such as the *accessibility, effectiveness, speed, and quality* of services delivered by formal and informal justice systems impact upon the extent to which 'fair' justice is experienced and represent areas in which goals, targets and indicators could be formulated. It should also be recognized that the above aspects of justice are essential to – and inseparable from – the protection of human rights, as well as to the application of international standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice.

Security and justice are especially relevant to development when considered in the broader context of the rule of law. Yet the relationship between development and the rule of law, justice and security is not linear. The establishment of improved systems of governance and fair and transparent criminal justice systems that protect the human rights of citizens will not by themselves ensure improved social and economic circumstances for the majority of the population. Moreover, while a society that suffers

from endemic violence is unlikely to make significant developmental gains, it is not clear that the absence of violence will automatically improve social and economic wellbeing. However, the failure to address fundamental aspects of justice and security will likely impede and perhaps threaten existing gains in social and economic development. Though the international community can assist in identifying and addressing important these aspects of justice and security, ultimately development will be a transformative process that depends on the engagement of many actors, both nationally and internationally.

Notwithstanding the definitional caveats above, there is a compelling case for including security and justice in the post-2015 development framework. For one, security and justice are universal and declared aspirations for peoples around the world. Crime and victimization surveys conducted by UNODC and its partners across 80 countries and cities highlight the pervasiveness of insecurity and injustice amongst diverse and disaggregated population groups.²⁷ A recent 2013 survey of hundreds of thousands of respondents conducted by the *www.worldwewant.org* placed “protection against crime and violence” among their top priorities.²⁸ Repeated public opinion surveys in states and cities around the world underline the importance citizens attach to aspects of rule of law (such as accountability of officials) and to freedom from fear²⁹ and the ways perceived insecurity undermines mobility, investment and livelihoods. These findings persist across upper-, middle- and lower-income settings and are captured in a wide range of census processes, as well as, increasingly new social media and big data technologies.

A robust normative case also exists for ensuring security and justice is accounted for in the post-2015 development agenda. For one, the concepts of security and justice are already enshrined in a number of treaties, conventions, and resolutions. They can be to some extent construed as rights, embedded as they are in the opening articles of the *United Nations Charter*³⁰ and the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.³¹ The right to security of the person is guaranteed by Article 3 of the *Universal Declaration*, combined with the right to life and liberty. Article 9 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* also enshrines “the right to liberty and security of person” and

²⁷ See UNODC crime victim surveys, available at <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Crime-Victims-Survey.html>.

²⁸ See MY World 2015 Initiative. How the World Voted, available at <http://www.myworld2015.org/?page=results>

²⁹ See, for instance, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1603/crime.aspx>, Also <http://www.afrobarometer.org/>, <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/latinobarometro.jsp>, <http://www.arabbarometer.org/>, and <http://www.asianbarometer.org/>.

³⁰ See United Nations, 1945. Charter of the United Nations.

³¹ See United Nations General Assembly, 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

includes the prohibition of arbitrary arrest or detention. Notwithstanding the call for universal application, however, the specific content of “right to security of person” varies by jurisdiction.³² Meanwhile, while the existence of a broad and universally applicable “right to justice” does not exist, it can be tentatively inferred through a range of substantive rights including “rights to a fair trial” which is set out in Article 10 of the *Universal Declaration*. As with the rights associated with security, the specific application of justice-related rights is subject to varied interpretation and procedures vary from state to state.

The United Nations has consistently emphasized the critical importance of strengthening and consolidating security and justice in the context of the rule of law. This applies to situations characterized as peaceful, affected by armed conflict and emerging from war.³³ And for decades, the United Nations and its partners have emphasized how security, justice and development are not only worthwhile aspirations, but also mutually reinforcing imperatives.³⁴ Ultimately, the attainment of sustained security and justice is fundamental for the rule of law, and is the basis of interstate relations and the fulfilment of international obligations. In this way, they are cornerstones of effective and sustainable conflict prevention and resolution, respect for basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the preservation and advancement of equal social and political rights.³⁵

In addition to the aforementioned motives, there are pragmatic reasons to incorporate security and justice priorities in the post-2015 sustainable development framework. This is because improvements in some aspects of security and justice are statistically correlated with corollary gains in key development areas.³⁶ For example, countries

³² The Constitutions of Canada and South Africa, for example, describe security as a basic human right.

³³ See United Nations Security Council, 2004. Resolution S/2004/616 on *Report of the Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies*, 23 August 2004.

³⁴ See World Bank, 2011. *World Development Report 2011*.

³⁵ See, for instance, United Nations Security Council, 2004. Resolution S/2004/616 on *Report of the Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies*, 23 August 2004.

³⁶ See Global Observatory, 2013. *Less Violence, More Development*, available at <http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/484-less-violence-more-development.html>. See also the final declaration of the 22nd session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), which notes that the “[A]dvancement of the rule of law at the national and international levels is essential for sustained and inclusive economic growth, sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development, all of which in turn reinforce the rule of

exhibiting low homicide rates tend to achieve more rapid human development than countries registering higher homicide rates.³⁷ What is more, high rates of intentional violence are associated with failures in poverty reduction, increased youth unemployment and protracted hunger (MDG 1). It is also associated with declines in primary education enrolment (MDG 2) and impedes reductions in infant mortality (MDG 4).³⁸ Flagship reports by the World Bank (2011), UNODC (2011) and others have shown that societies registering above-average rates of non-lethal victimization and more limited access to justice experience lower-than expected economic growth.³⁹ By way of comparison, the Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor⁴⁰ has shown how improvements in access to justice are also correlated with gains in access to key development sectors such as health, education, environmental sustainability and gender equality.⁴¹

There is also anecdotal evidence of the ways in which organized crime undermines development. As noted by UNICRI (the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute), for example, organized crime feeds corruption and can infiltrate and corrode political, economic and social institutions.⁴² Corresponding weaknesses in public and private structures can result in diversion of resources away from critical infrastructure, including health, education and social welfare provision. Consequently, poverty and inequality are associated with increases in organised crime, not least in

law,' United Nations General Assembly, 2013. E/CN.15/2013/27, Draft resolution IV, on *The rule of law, crime prevention and criminal justice in the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015*, Advance Unedited Version.

³⁷ See UNODC, 2011. *Global Study on Homicide 2011*, p. 12.

³⁸ See Wenmann, A. and Muggah, R. 2010. *More Violence, less Development*. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat. Available at http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/MDG_Process/MoreViolenceLessDevelopment.pdf

³⁹ See World Bank, 2011. *World Development Report 2011*. Also consult http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/MDG_Process/MoreViolenceLessDevelopment.pdf for a review of the statistical evidence.

⁴⁰ For more information and an overview of activities, see http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/focus_areas/focus_justice_law/legal_empowerment.html. See also UNDP. 2011. *Fast Facts, Justice and Security*, available at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/focus_areas/focus_justice_law/legal_empowerment.html and <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/fast-facts/english/FF-Justice-and-Security.pdf>.

⁴¹ See Open Society Foundations, 2013. *Justice 2015: How Justice Impacts Development*, March 2013, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/fact-sheet-justice-impacts-development-2015-20130319.pdf>.

⁴² See, for example, http://www.unicri.it/topics/organized_crime_corruption/.

relation to human trafficking, smuggling of counterfeit goods, the production of illicit crops, and everyday extortion and bribery. Prominent examples of these insidious relationships are visible in Central and South America, West and North Africa and areas of Eastern Europe where a combination of drug cartels, transnational gangs, money laundering entities and public entities are colluding to devastating effect.⁴³ While often implied, there is less empirical analysis, however, of the ways in which practical efforts to combat organized crime have yielded concrete developmental dividends.⁴⁴

Put succinctly, security and justice are by and large a *means* to achieving improvements in poverty reduction, reversing inequality, and enhancing effective governance. When people's basic safety, sense of security, and access to justice improves, so to their willingness to make medium- and longer-term decisions, invest locally, and contribute to productive growth. Security and justice are also *ends* in themselves. They are rights, enshrined in international norms and rules, to which all citizens are entitled.⁴⁵ Pursuing security and justice as part of the wider development agenda, then, makes good ethical and economic sense. And while there are legitimate political sensitivities associated with the two themes, there is growing acceptance that security and justice warrant a prominent place in the post-2015 development agenda.

⁴³ See UNODC (nd) <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/1.The-threat-transnational-organized-crime.pdf>.

⁴⁴ In spite of these advances in knowledge, there are still deficits with respect to discerning the direct associations between organised crime prevention and improvements in development. While it is widely acknowledged that poorer, fragile and conflict-affected states are more susceptible to organized crime, there are fewer examples of countries successfully exiting such situations. See Kavanagh, C. 2013. Getting Smart and Scaling Up: Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Governance in Developing Countries, available at http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/kavanagh_crime_developing_countries_report.pdf and Miraglia, P., Ochoa, R. and I. Briscoe. 2012. *Transnational Organized Crime and Fragile States*, available at http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/Transnational_organised_crime_and_fragile_states_2012.pdf

⁴⁵ Sanctity of life and freedom from fear are enshrined in the Universal Declaration and the Millennium Declaration. See <http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/382-why-personal-security-should-be-part-of-the-post-2015-development-agenda.html>.

2. Establishing security and justice goals, targets and indicators

The United Nations has launched an unprecedented process of dialogue to set out post-2015 development priorities.⁴⁶ There are more than eleven parallel United Nations-led consultations on the future of the post-2015 development agenda and literally dozens of On-going processes in civil society.⁴⁷ Some of these debates touch on issues of peace and security, including under the rubric of “conflict, violence, and disaster”.⁴⁸ Others emphasize the central place of accountable, responsive and inclusive “governance” and “institutions” to ensure that the rule of law is taken into account.⁴⁹ In the process, a number of United Nations Member States and agencies have explicitly acknowledged the critical place of security and justice in achieving development.⁵⁰ Moreover, regional consultations conducted in the context of the post-2015 development framework in Monrovia⁵¹, Panama⁵², Jakarta⁵³ and Helsinki⁵⁴ put them centre stage.⁵⁵

⁴⁶ Virtually every UN agency now has a website devoted exclusively to the discussion. The central repository is <http://www.worldwewant2015.org/>. In addition, see, for example, http://www.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/post2015/en/, <http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/post-2015/lang--en/index.html>, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/index.shtml, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/MDG/Pages/MDGPost2015Agenda.aspx>, [http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BB128/\(httpProjects\)/38DF80F450689724C1257A7D004BD04B?OpenDocument](http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BB128/(httpProjects)/38DF80F450689724C1257A7D004BD04B?OpenDocument), <http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/post-2015>, <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/beyond2015.shtml>, <http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/mdg.shtml>, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/mdg_goals/post-2015-development-agenda/.

⁴⁷ See <http://www.beyond2015.org/>, <http://www.cigionline.org/project/toward-post-2015-development-paradigm>, <http://www.worldwewant2015.org/post2015hlp>, <http://www.post2015women.com/>, and others. See Muggah, R. 2013. *Monitoring Conflict and Violence: Reflections on Goals, Targets and Indicators*. Background Paper for UN Accountability Framework Conference, 20-22 June 2012, Glen Cove, New York, for a summary of some of these debates as they refer to conflict, violence and security.

⁴⁸ See <http://www.worldwewant2015.org/topics/160303>. (Conflict and Fragility)

⁴⁹ See <http://www.worldwewant2015.org/topics/160287>. (Governance)

⁵⁰ See Muggah, R. 2013. *Monitoring Conflict and Violence: Reflections on Goals, Targets and Indicators*.

⁵¹ See United Nations, 2012. *Conflict and Fragility and the Post-2015 Development Agenda*. Report, Global Thematic Consultation, 29-30 November 2012. Available at <http://data.worldwewant2015.org/documents/193/download>

⁵² See United Nations, 2013. Global Thematic Consultation on Violence, Citizen Security and the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Key Conclusions, 31 January – 1 February 2013. Available at <http://www.worldwewant2015.org/node/306337>

⁵³ See United Nations, 2013. *Concept Note Disaster Risk Reduction and the Post-2015 Development Agenda*. Global Thematic Consultation on Disaster Risk Reduction and the Post-2015

Security and justice within the Report of the High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda

The proposed goals and targets set out by the Panel offer parameters for advancing security and justice in the post-2015 development agenda. Two of the goals – those intent on “ensuring good governance and effective institutions” (goal 10) and on “building peaceful stable societies” (goal 11) – are noteworthy. Suggested targets for the former include free and universal legal identity; ensuring that people enjoy freedom of speech, association, peaceful protest and access to independent media and information; increasing public participation in political processes; guaranteeing the public’s right to information and to access government data; and reducing bribery and corruption. Targets for the latter include the reduction of violent deaths; ensuring justice institutions are accessible, independent, and well-resourced, and respect due-process rights; reducing external factors that lead to conflict, such as organized crime; and improving the quality and accountability of security forces, the police, and the judiciary. These targets were based on extensive consultations with academics, practitioners, advocates and government representatives.

Box 3: Security and Justice and the High-Level Panel Report

Meanwhile, the High Level Panel appointed by the United Nations Secretary General made a substantial contribution to the debate on security and justice in the post-2015 development agenda. The Panel’s May 2013 report called for a concerted focus on personal security, access to justice, freedom from discrimination and persecution, and a greater voice of the poor. These foundations, coupled with transparent, accountable, and responsive governance institutions, are described as at the core of development, and not “optional extras”.⁵⁶ The subsequent Secretary General’s report⁵⁷ further stated “Lasting peace and sustainable development cannot be realized without respect for human rights

Development Agenda, 19-20 February 2013. Available at

<http://www.worldwewant2015.org/node/311126>

⁵⁴ See United Nations, 2013. *Conflict, Violence and Disaster and the Post-2015 Development Agenda*. High-Level Meeting Global Thematic Consultation. Available at

<http://www.worldwewant2015.org/node/303452>

⁵⁵ There are also numerous parallel processes connected to production of rule of law metrics, conflict and fragility indicators, and justice and human rights standards independent of the post-2015 framework.

⁵⁶ See United Nations, 2013. UN High Level Panel on Post-2015 Report, available at <http://www.beyond2015.org/hlp-report>.

⁵⁷ See United Nations, 2013. *A life of dignity for all: accelerating progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and advancing the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015*. Report of the Secretary General, 26 July 2013.

and the rule of law.⁵⁸” The Panel report, while careful of being overly prescriptive, issued twelve illustrative goals and roughly sixty illustrative targets. The Panel intended these proposals to provide a foundation for debate and encourage states and development partners to focus greater attention on its thematic priorities. They emphasize both narrow and broad conceptualizations of security and justice and set out a worthwhile platform for consideration.

While not necessarily aligned explicitly to the post-2015 debate, the United Nations has undertaken lengthy and detailed consideration of ways to measure and monitor security and justice. This is based on extensive experience and is not the preserve of a single agency. Under the rubric of the “rule of law”, more than 40 United Nations agencies have invested in security and justice programs in over 50 countries since the 1990s.⁵⁹ Over the past decade, a range of Secretary General Reports⁶⁰, General Assembly Resolutions⁶¹, and Security Council debates⁶² have also signalled a renewed commitment to the bedrock principles of security and justice, not least the United Nations *Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ)*.⁶³ In the process, the UN has also elaborated practical standards to track country progress, including a *Rule of Law Indicators* handbook elaborating 135 separate metrics.⁶⁴

⁵⁸ Ibid, para. 95

⁵⁹ See an inventory of UN agencies at <http://www.unrol.org/files/A-63-64%20RoL%20Inventory.pdf>.

⁶⁰ See, for example, United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’ (2004); Report of the Secretary-General: Uniting our strengths: Enhancing the United Nations support for the rule of law (2006); Report of the Secretary-General: Strengthening and coordinating United Nations rule of law activities (2008); Report of the Secretary-General: Annual report on strengthening and coordinating United Nations rule of law activities (2009); and Report of the Secretary-General: Annual report on strengthening and coordinating United Nations rule of law activities (2010). See further United Nations General Assembly, 2005. Resolution A/RES/60/1 on *2005 World Summit Outcome*, 24 October 2005.

⁶¹ See United Nations General Assembly resolutions A/RES/61/39, A/RES/62/70, A/RES/63/128, A/RES/64/116, and A/RES/65/32.

⁶² See United Nations Security Council resolutions S/PRST/2003/15, S/PRST/2004/2, S/PRST/2004/32, S/PRST/2005/30, S/PRST/2006/28, and S/PRST/2010/11.

⁶³ For a review of the latest decisions of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, please visit <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CCPCJ/session/22-draft-resolutions.html>.

⁶⁴ The United Nations is in the process of field testing the handbook in a number of peacekeeping contexts. See http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2011/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf

There are of course other non-United Nations led processes that are also revisiting concepts of security and justice in relation to development. A prominent example is the *International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding*.⁶⁵ Initiated in 2010, the Dialogue has instigated a “new deal” between self-described fragile countries that form the g7+⁶⁶ and Member States of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). With support from United Nations agencies, the World Bank and civil society actors, the g7+ is elaborating common and country-specific targets and indicators for five established Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs). At least two of these PSGs focus on strengthening security and promoting access to justice and roughly 25-30 indicators have been developed to track progress in relation to capacity and performance.⁶⁷ On the basis of several “fragility assessments”, the Dialogue has called for “common” goals and targets, but also “contextualized” indicators that are tailored to the realities of every country. Finally, a draft ‘Action Agenda’ prepared by the Leadership Council of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network proposes 10 goals, of which one emphasizes the rule of law and improved security as a central component of good governance.⁶⁸

Setting Goals

Over the next few years the United Nations General Assembly, together with a post-2015 working group, will finalize a number of goals. A key argument of this technical paper is that to the extent possible, *goals* could and should privilege security and justice. Such goals would need to set out broad objectives and clearly emphasize the intended positive impact. While there are many possible candidates, past experience suggests that proposed goals should be universal, limited in number⁶⁹, and easily communicated.⁷⁰ As

⁶⁵ International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. For an overview of activities, see <http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/about/>.

⁶⁶ Member States include Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, The Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Togo. See <http://www.g7plus.org/>.

⁶⁷ See International Dialogue, 2013. *Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Indicators – Progress, Interim List and next steps*, available at <http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/documentupload/03%20PSG%20Indicators%20EN.pdf>.

⁶⁸ See Leadership Council of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network. 2013. *An Action Agenda for Sustainable Development*.

⁶⁹ As recommended at the Rio+20 conference in 2012. United Nations General Assembly, 2012. Resolution A/RES/66/288 on *The future we want*, 11 September 2012, para. 247.

⁷⁰ Evidence from psychology shows that easy facts and data are associated with cognitive absorption and familiarity (even where underlying facts are complex). People who are unable to understand

noted in the High Level Panel Report, “the focus of goals should be on issues with the greatest impact on sustainable development, measured in terms of the number of people affected, the contribution to social inclusion, and the need to move towards sustainable consumption and production patterns.”⁷¹ Any finalized goals, along with their respective targets and indicators, will of course be the result of discussions between Member States, civil society, and international actors such as the UN System. They will also need to take into account the fact that national systems will likely lead in the implementation of initiatives to achieve them.

There are a number of formulations of possible goals emerging from United Nations-led consultations and other processes noted above (see Figure 1). But it is important to stress that final decisions on goals will ultimately emerge on the basis of political negotiations rather than strict technical criteria. Indeed, it is entirely possible that instead of goals on security, justice, or the rule of law, what emerges is a high-level or meta-goal that ensures security and access to justice for all.

Figure 1: Visualizing goals for security and justice



There is widespread support in civil society and among many Member States for goals around the notions of security, safety and justice, as evidenced, inter alia, by the High Level Panel Report. A goal around “*safety and security for all*” for instance would

the target are unlikely to support it. Goals that are both ‘negatively’ and ‘positively’ framed are powerful and show strong cognitive salience.

⁷¹ See High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 2013. *A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development*. Annex III

likely receive support since it would send an emphatic message that personal security is both a means and an end for development. Another goal on *improving security conditions for women and girls* may also find ample support given the particular ways in which they are affected by insecurity and the particularly poor state of data collection on the issue. Likewise, a goal around the theme of *universal access to justice* would resonate for many governments and civil society groups. Again, considerable attention would need to be devoted to defining *what kind* of justice is included in the scope of the goals. Even so, there is a solid normative basis for adopting goals around these topics, particularly if they draw attention to the experience of children.⁷²

Promoting Targets

Just as important as establishing a meta-goal or a selection of more specific security and justice goals, is agreeing on a shortlist of plausible *targets*, each target translating the ambition of the goal into a practical outcome. A basket of targets should establish clear benchmarks and provide guidance to states and societies, allowing states to determine their own level of ambition in the pursuit of the goal. Indicators will then reflect the exact metric(s) by which states gauge progress towards the target⁷³. Targets should be realistic, defensible and achievable, but also ambitious. For the purposes of this paper, targets can be universal and eventually tailored to national contexts, and should also be sensitive to temporal (annual) changes. A number of proposals have emerged for security and justice-related targets, including most recently in the High Level Panel Report. For example, targets associated with reducing violent death, strengthening justice institutions, addressing issues of legal identity, mitigating external factors leading to conflict and crime, and a host of others are being proposed (see Figure 2).


To advance the debate, it will eventually be important to tighten the focus of security and justice targets and assign milestones, perhaps on a country-by-country basis for certain indicators. For example, assuming a goal is selected on improving safety and security, measurable targets might include “halving violent deaths” or “improving perceptions of safety for all”. In the case of a goal on “strengthening real and perceived

⁷² See United Nations General Assembly, 2009. Resolution A/RES/64/142 on *Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children*, 24 February 2009.

⁷³ The High Level Panel Report mentioned the “(...) *vital importance of building data systems to provide timely, disaggregated indicators to measure progress, in all countries, and at all levels* (...)” (p. 58). This is no less important for indicators in justice and security, where there exist large discrepancies between Member State data collection capabilities and where terminological and methodological issues may still need to be resolved.

safety for women and girls”, possible targets might include “doubling investment in female police presence” and “halving the rate of sexual violence”. Finally, with respect to the goal of “ensuring universal access to justice”, targets such as “ensuring legal identity for all”, “doubling confidence in formal and customary justice systems”, or “ensuring more than half the population trusts the justice process” could be appropriate. Of course, the specific target will need to be realistic and scientifically informed.

Figure 2: Visualizing targets for security and justice



There are outstanding and unresolved questions regarding the setting of security and justice targets. There are some who call for universal standards in targets that apply across all countries (common milestones) and others who are adamant that targets should be regionally or nationally focused (context-specific milestones). Assuming consensus is reached on common global goals, would countries be required to adhere to universal targets and indicators, or should they identify and tailor metrics that are specific to their own circumstances? Indeed, a global benchmark of “halving” violent deaths or “doubling” confidence in justice systems may be impossible to attain for some countries. One way to get around this may be to adopt a hybrid approach – introducing both common and national benchmarks and indicators. Both the MDG process and the New Deal have proposed global benchmarks for goals, though encouraged the setting of nationally specific targets and indicators.

Criteria for selecting security and justice metrics⁷⁴

There are several international and national sources of data for measuring changes in security and justice. In addition to major global collection mechanisms⁷⁵, these include administrative data from public records, large-scale public opinion surveys, expert surveys, and specialized data from research institutions and monitoring entities, together with archival reviews. There is also a dramatic growth in new types of data online, including social media and (big) datasets from which attitudes and behaviour can be monitored and analyzed.⁷⁶ Indeed, an expectation of the post-2015 development framework is that it accounts for new types of analytics, including trend analysis in conventional and social media, thus moving beyond more traditional methods.

Data sources and possible tools to measure targets

UN Member States and the international community have a number of tools at their disposal in order to measure security and justice. Though every tool has its advantages and limitations, the following could be considered:

- **Surveys**

- Experience of events, such as victimisation from crime or violence
- Information on access to services and impact of policies
- Can collect data on opinions, attitudes and perceptions Can focus on specific segments of the population

- **Administrative records**

- Range of various kinds available (e.g. crime and health records, social records, case logs, etc.)
- Limited in that they may only measure a state response to an issue
- Limitations related to state data collection capabilities

- **Qualitative tools and participatory interviews**

- Can be used in conjunction with other indicators to complement available data
- Possible concerns related to the acceptability of qualitative information

- **Social media**

- **Risk assessments**

Box 4: Data sources and tools

⁷⁴ Note that, in addition to the High Level Panel Report, there has been additional work done in defining options for goals, targets and indicators. See, for example, Saferworld, *Addressing Conflict and Violence from 2015: A vision of goals, targets and indicators*, (2012)

⁷⁵ For example, the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS), which collects information on the main components of the criminal justice system such as police, prosecution, courts and prisons. Information available at <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html> and <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/crimedata.html>. See also <http://guides.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/content.php?pid=303217&sid=2499084> for a review of other major sources.

⁷⁶ See Mayer-Schonberger, V. and Cukier, K. 2013. *Big Data: A Revolution that will Transform How We Live, Work and Think*.

While many of these sources of data have particular strengths, it is important to underline that all feature weaknesses. Administrative data is often the most consistent and comprehensive over time and space, but may be based on uneven collection, storage, and reporting practices, and may be overly focused on state capacities and outputs relative to actual outcomes. Public surveys are often valuable for providing a cross-sectional snapshot and capturing public perception of progress, but are spotty in their temporal, demographic and geographic coverage and can suffer from serious biases when it comes to security and justice.⁷⁷ Expert surveys and related data collection efforts while offering important context and nuance, also frequently lack ‘generalizability’ and may feature composite ranking/scoring systems that obscure more than they reveal.

A number of basic parameters must be taken into consideration in deliberation on goals, targets and indicators for security and justice.⁷⁸ At a minimum, statistical criteria established by previous UN inter-agency working groups should be reflected in any final selection.⁷⁹ There is agreement that future metrics should be bold, aligned with international norms where these already exist, and action-oriented. More specifically, they should also be realistic, reliable and attainable, with attention to the following factors:

- *Adequate geographic, temporal and demographic coverage* (metrics available for as many states and years possible and also disaggregated by sex, age, identity group, etc.);

⁷⁷ Moreover, the time delays in both of these approaches often mean that datasets lose their relevance unless repeated on a routine basis.

⁷⁸ See also United Nations, 2012. *Governance and Human Rights: Criteria and Measurement Proposals for a post-2015 Development Agenda*. Expert Consultation, Meeting Report from 13-14 November 2012; and the aforementioned Rio+20 outcome document for more on these criteria. For example, Member States have agreed that future ‘sustainable development goals’ should be aspirational, global, consistent with international law, balanced, action-oriented and concise, limited in number, implemented with active involvement of all relevant stakeholders, and accompanied by targets and indicators. United Nations General Assembly, 2012. Resolution A/RES/66/288 on *The future we want*, 11 September 2012, para. 247.

⁷⁹ See United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda. Chaired by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme, the group involves more than 60 UN entities and agencies, and international organizations; a complete list is available at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/untt_members.pdf.

- *Consistent with international standards and good practices* (metrics should be gathered to the extent possible from, reliable, transparent and authoritative sources⁸⁰);
- *A focus on both performance (outcome) and capacity (output) variables* (though recognizing that the distinction between output and outcome variables may be blurred);
- *Inclusion of objective and subjective measures* (there is growing capacity to gather both administrative as well as survey-based data);
- *An accounting of both “formal” and “informal” means of security and justice provision* (indicators that capture both state and non-state activities to the extent possible); and
- *Attention to perverse incentives and ethical issues* (avoiding the selection of indicators that may create unintended negative effects, or where there are ethical issues related to data collection methods)

An additional principle that may be applicable is the commitment to investing in national capacity to generate and assess selected indicators rather than reproducing a “survey industry” or subsidizing foreign expertise.⁸¹ Indeed, an under-appreciated outcome of the MDG process was how it stimulated the development of national statistical and analysis capacities around the world. The High Level Panel acknowledges this contribution and specifically calls for a ‘data revolution’. This objective should be integrated throughout the development framework, including in building the capacity of justice and security institutions and civil society to gather, monitor and use diverse sources of data.

When setting goals, targets and indicators, it is necessary to recognize the difference between changes which are essentially prescriptive – that demonstrate adherence to a certain pre-existing norm (for example, international standards and norms) – and those that are more transformative in nature, i.e. that demonstrate a significant change in the circumstances of individuals, groups or entire societies. Though the former may enable the latter, causation is still contested. Indeed recent analytical work strongly suggests that, particularly in the areas of security and justice, the search for the ‘right’ institutions must be based not only on international norms but also more fundamentally on the types of functions and services the system is meant to perform. Transformative change

⁸⁰ It should however be noted the difficulties involved with defining metrics that establish this consistency with respect to Rule of Law.

⁸¹ This point was made by representatives of UNICEF and the World Bank during consultations in 2012 and 2013.

therefore depends on broad engagement, on non-linear trajectories, over long timeframes.

Measuring changes in security and justice is not straight-forward and can be exceedingly challenging. This is because apparent gains may be a function of changes in the way specific phenomenon are monitored or population reporting rates and not necessarily the observed phenomena. There is always a risk in prescribing a specific activity (e.g. significantly reducing sexual violence) that could result in unintended (and potentially destructive) practices.⁸² What is more, setting targets for positive change is also difficult since achieving a desired outcome (e.g. improving perceptions of safety or doubling legal aid facilities) are often a function of many institutions and interventions, some of them potentially unrelated to security and justice delivery. After all, what gets measured is what gets done and there is a risk that one “treasures what one measures” rather than the other way around. As such, it is recommended that indicators are never analyzed autonomously, but rather are bundled together and interpreted collectively.⁸³ Moreover, it is not advisable that indicators are consolidated into an index since weighting would require an additional layer of subjectivity. Owing to the likelihood of considerable data gaps, it would lead to highly distorted impressions of change.

Selecting Indicators

A challenging area is selecting *indicators* that are explicitly linked to measuring progress in attaining goals and targets. There are literally thousands of possible candidate indicators⁸⁴ and it is important to set some basic parameters on the “types” that are available. At the outset, *performance (outcome)* indicators are critical for measuring the ways in which people experience security and justice. They should

⁸² For example, if conviction rates in a given setting increase, this may be interpreted as an improvement in the justice system. But if a disproportionate number of one group is convicted over the other, than there are potentially negative ramifications for the onset of conflict. Likewise, if numbers of conflict deaths or homicide go down, this may indicate an overall improvement. However, if lethal violence is still disproportionately concentrated in one group, then this cannot be interpreted as contributing to conflict prevention. Scheye, E. and Chigas, D. 2009. *Development of a Basket of Conflict, Security and Justice Indicators*. Background Report for DFID. London: DFID.

⁸³ The idea of developing a ‘basket’ of indicators to measure changes in relation to a specific benchmark and goal is accepted in the social sciences.

⁸⁴ See, for example, Vera, 2003. *Measuring progress toward safety and justice: a global guide to the design of performance indicators across the justice sector*. New York: Vera.
<http://www.vera.org/pubs/measuring-progress-toward-safety-and-justice-global-guide-design-performance-indicators-across>.

register both objective and subjective dimensions and are arguably the best gauge of progress.⁸⁵ By way of comparison, *capacity* (output) indicators focus on the efficiency and effectiveness of security and justice entities – including how services are provided and to whom they are administered. To be most useful, however, capacity indicators would need to be considered within the context of the achievement of a particular outcome. *Resources* (input) indicators could also be highlighted, to demonstrate how personnel, budgets and equipment are allocated. However there is significant risk that input indicators drive perverse incentives and have little correlation to outcomes and an outcome-based approach is therefore preferable. Indeed, most experts agree that it is the performance of security and justice that should take precedent.⁸⁶ Any effort to set targets and indicators should move beyond metrics that are immediately accessible (owing to data availability). Targets and indicators must be realistic, but also ‘aspirational’ in nature.

Consultations held within and outside the United Nations have generated intense debate among academics, policy makers and practitioners about performance, capacity, resource-related and structural indicators. Advocates on behalf of affected populations also invoke hundreds of indicators to describe lived experience of insecurity and justice that may not easily conform to statistical models.⁸⁷ In addition to those proposed in Figure 4, a shortlist of performance indicators that are often advanced by the criminal justice community includes the extent of violence against women, levels of pre-trial detention, the prevalence of youth and children in detention, the scale of prison overcrowding. Other measures of capacities include the extent of pre-trial detention and reporting rates of victimization. Meanwhile, resources are often related to workload for police, judges and prosecutors, reported cases of bribery, and salaries for key personnel (see Annex 1 and 2).

⁸⁵ The United Nations separates monitoring of rule of law indicators into separate ‘baskets’ focusing on their performance, transparency, treatment of vulnerable groups, and human and material capacity. As noted by Messick, ‘any assessment of the courts should consist of the evaluation of their independence and accountability, the competence of their personnel, the efficiency of their work and their accessibility.’ Messick, R. 2001. *Key Functions of Legal Systems with Suggested Performance Measures*. Draft Paper for the World Bank. Washington DC: World Bank.

⁸⁶ There is a lively debate in the rule of law community about whether there is merit in tracking ‘capacity and resource’ indicators at all. Some argue that this may set perverse incentives, and in fact contribute to undermining performance.

⁸⁷ Moser, C. and McIlwaine, C. 1999. Participatory urban appraisal and its application for research on violence. See also the Everyday Peace Indicator project, available at <http://everydaypeaceindicators.org/> and de Coning, C. 2013. “Understanding Peacebuilding as Essentially Local”, *Stability Journal* 2 (1).

Several efforts have been undertaken across the United Nations and its partners to develop robust metrics that meet minimum quality standards to track changes in the performance, capacity and resources associated with security and justice.⁸⁸ Yet only a small subset of these processes are developing indicators that are comparable (across countries), longitudinal (gathered over time), reliable (are measuring the intended phenomena), accessible (available and cost-effective), and allow for disaggregation by demographic, geographic and other categories.⁸⁹

Taking such factors into account, **Figure 4** presents a possible list of goals, targets and indicators related to security and justice in the post-2015 development agenda. It is intended as a starting point for discussion based on an Expert Group meeting held in Vienna on 24th and 25th June 2013. Participants at the meeting consulted a wide range of data sources across the security and justice sectors and considered the types of metrics most appropriate to track high level goals concerning security and justice. In accordance with the Vienna meeting and in order to facilitate discussion, participants opted to build on the general structure of goals and targets established in the High Level Panel Report, with a few modifications. This paper offers more substantive background information to the list of indicators produced in Vienna (see Annex 1 and 2). The Figure does not directly link goals, targets and indicators horizontally, but rather lists example targets and indicators that may usefully define and measure higher order goals of improved security for all and fair and universal access to justice. For certain indicators, non-administrative data collection may be required (e.g. expert surveys and document reviews), and the methodologies and sampling strategies pursued should be carefully reviewed and standardized.

These indicators are intended to measure key aspects justice and security, in the context of Rule of Law, at international and national levels. For this purpose, the indicators should be considered as:

⁸⁸ For example, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has established a comprehensive *Rule of Law Indicators Handbook* that was extensively used in the preparation of this note and the accompanying annexes. United Nations, 2011. *The Rule of Law Indicators, Implementation Guide and Project Tools*. See also United Nations, 2013. MDG Working Group. *Numerical aspects of target setting, development of statistical capacities and the selection of robust monitoring indicators*. See also Vera, 2003. *Measuring progress toward safety and justice: a global guide to the design of performance indicators across the justice sector*. New York: Vera

⁸⁹ An example of a process seeking to identify common indicators while also building up government capacities is the Regional System of Indicators (SES) project being pursued by more than 14 countries in Latin America with support from the Inter-American Development Bank. Further information available at <http://www.seguridadregion.com/en/indicators/citizen-security-indicators.html> for the list of 22 indicators.

- Relevant to the aspect of justice and security that is being addressed;
- Measurable, i.e. that data could be expected to be available, and that methodologies exist for its collection;
- Able to demonstrate progress with regards to a certain aspect of justice and security at an international or national level, or both.

Of course, not every indicator will fulfil the above criteria to the same extent. However it may still be desirable to include measures of aspects of justice and security that approach but do not completely fulfil the above description, in areas where a more perfect measure does not exist. For this reason, it was decided to differentiate amongst different kinds of indicators according to their applicability, measurability (in terms of methodology and data availability), and comparability across countries. Additionally, certain indicators may need contextual information in the form of national-level targets, in order to effectively demonstrate progress.

In developing indicators it would of course be possible to develop a very extensive list in order to try to cover all the potentially relevant aspects of justice and security. The indicators in the table below do not pretend to be such an exhaustive list. The list rather reflects an attempt, during the expert group meeting and subsequent development of the paper, to refine a set of indicators according to their potential for actual use in a framework for justice and security. Consideration has therefore been given, in addition to the aspect of justice and security covered by a particular indicator, to the practical potential for measurement and use in decision-making. Some indicators, though perhaps desirable, may present challenges in terms of measurability or feasibility that are *currently* difficult to overcome. They have therefore not been included in this list.

3. Security and justice goals, targets and indicators

The tables below emerged from consultations in Vienna and are intended to assist in monitoring security and justice. The framework set out in Figure 4 differentiates between indicators that are likely to be internationally applicable and comparable (Global, ‘Glob.’) or more applicable in certain national contexts (National, ‘Ntl.’)⁹⁰. It also differentiates between indicators for which methodological issues and concerns have largely been resolved (Tier 1) and those where significant differences or uncertainties in methodological approach should be taken into account (Tier 2). The framework is intended to highlight the range of considerations taken into account when selecting appropriate metrics.

	Tier 1	Tier 2
Glob.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Well-established methodology Generally applicable to all countries Comparable across different countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing methodology Generally applicable to all countries Comparable across different countries
Ntl.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Well-established methodology More relevant for certain country contexts, or for consideration in conjunction with other country-specific indicators 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing methodology More relevant for certain country contexts, or for consideration in conjunction with other country-specific indicators

Figure 3: Guide to tier structure

In order to ensure that the framework can be practically applied, Annex 1 features a shortlist of indicators. Each indicator is described in terms of its feasibility, relevance, availability and source. What is more, the Annexes also provide information on appropriate measurement methodologies and methods. Meanwhile, Annex 2 also contains detailed information on ‘structural indicators’ – such indicators are often expressed in terms of ‘the existence of’ (or not) a particular system, institution or law’. The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators, for example, include indicators on the adequacy of policy operational policies, vetting processes, and administrative systems.

*Figure 4: Tables of security and justice goals, targets, and indicators**

Goal 2: Empower girls and women and achieve gender equality
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⁹⁰ A description of advantages and disadvantages to use of national and global indicators can be found in *Addressing Conflict and Violence From 2015: A Vision of Goals, Targets and Indicators* (Saferworld, 2013). By taking a dual approach, this paper hopes to build on the advantages of both while explicitly documenting indicator limitations within the annex.

Target: Prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls		
	Tier 1	Tier 2
Glob.	<p>Number of women killed by intimate partner per 100'000 women, per year (page 53)</p> <p>Percentage of women who have experienced physical or sexual violence within the last 12 months (page 55)</p>	
Ntl.	Percentage of women experiencing violent victimization who reported to police or other authorities (page 57)	
Target: Justice systems are gender-neutral		
	Tier 1	Tier 2
Glob.		Percentage of the total number of judges and prosecutors that are female (page 59)

Goal 10: Ensure Good Governance and Effective Institutions		
Target: Reduce bribery and corruption and ensure officials can be held accountable		
	Tier 1	Tier 2
Glob.	<p>Percentage of people who paid a bribe to a public official during the last 12 months (page 61)</p> <p>Percentage of businesses that paid a bribe to a public official during the last 12 months (page 63)</p>	<p>Frequency and amount paid in bribes by population and business (page 65)</p> <p>Percentage of the population believing that corrupt practices take place frequently when ordinary citizens deal with civil servants (page 67)</p> <p>Percentage of businesses believing that corrupt practices take place frequently when businesses deal with public officials procedures (page 69)</p> <p>Percentage of the mandatory requirements of the UNCAC reflected in domestic legislation (page 71)</p>
Ntl.		Percentage of public officials who have been hired through formal and standard procedures (page 74)
Target: Provide free and universal legal identity, such as birth registrations		
	Tier 1	Tier 2
Glob.	Percentage of children under 5 whose births have been registered (page 75)	

Goal 11: Ensure Stable and Peaceful Societies		
Target: Reduce and prevent violent deaths per 100'000 by x and eliminate all forms of violence against children		
	Tier 1	Tier 2
Glob.	<p>Intentional homicide rate per 100'000 population (page 77)</p> <p>Percentage of the population who feel safe in their own neighbourhood after dark (page 79)</p>	<p>Reported incidents of violence against children per 100'000 (page 83)</p> <p>Percentage of children who have experienced physical or sexual violence (page 85)</p>

	Percentage of the adult population who have experienced physical or sexual violence within the last 12 months (page 81)	
Ntl.	Direct deaths from armed conflict per 100'000 population (page 87) Percentage of persons convicted of a violent crime who have previously been convicted of a violent crime within the past five years (recidivism) (page 89)	Indirect Deaths from armed conflict per 100'000 population (page 91)
Target: Enhance the capacity, professionalism, accountability, security, police and justice institutions		
Tier 1		Tier 2
Glob.	Percentage of people who paid a bribe to a security, police or justice official during the last 12 months (page 93) Number of deaths in custody per 100,000 persons detained within the last 12 months (page 95) Number of police and justice personnel per 100'000 population (page 97)	Percentage of population who express confidence in police (page 99) Percentage of prisoners who report having experienced physical or sexual victimization while imprisoned over the past 6 months (page 101)
Ntl.		Proportion of violent criminal cases formally initiated that are resolved (page 103)
Target: Ensure justice institutions are accessible, independent, well-resourced and respect due-process rights⁹¹		
Tier 1		Tier 2
Glob.	Percentage of total detainees in pre-sentence detention (page 105) Percentage of victims of violent crimes who reported victimization to law enforcement or other authorities (page 107)	Percentage of defendants in criminal cases who are represented in court by legal counsel or by non-lawyers, where relevant (page 109) Average length of time spent in pre-sentence detention (page 111) Number of children in detention per 100'000 child population (page 113)
Ntl.		Proportion of businesses expressing confidence in enforceability of contracts in national courts (page 114) Percentage of criminal cases decided upon within a timeframe of 1 year (first instance) (page 116)

⁹¹ Though this wording is taken directly from the High-Level Panel Report, this target could also be rephrased to specifically include informal systems of justice. An expanded target would also then come closer to the target suggested by Saferworld to “*end impunity and ensure access to justice for all social groups.*” (Saferworld, *Addressing Conflict and Violence in Post-2015: A Vision of Goals, Targets and Indicators*, 2013)

Target: Stem the stressors that lead to violence and conflict, including those related to organized crime		
	Tier 1	Tier 2
Glob.	Intentional homicide by firearm rate per 100,000 population (page 117)	Level of global production of cocaine and opium (page 119)
Ntl.		<p>Value of illicit economy as a percentage of GDP (page 121)</p> <p>Percentage of people who have experienced what they consider racially or ethnically-motivated violence (page 122)</p> <p>Percentage of mandatory requirements of the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols that are reflected in domestic legislation of reporting States parties (page 124)</p>

Goal 12: Create a global enabling environment and catalyze long-term finance		
Target: Reduce illicit flows and tax evasion and increase stolen asset recovery by x dollars		
	Tier 1	Tier 2
Glob.	Percentage of countries that are party to international instruments related to drug control, corruption, transnational organized crime, and the illicit trade in arms (page 127)	<p>Value of the annual opium or coca production at farm-gate (page 129)</p> <p>Percentage of total production of cocaine and heroin seized (global interception rate) (page 131)</p>
Ntl.	<p>Value of laundered proceeds of crime that are confiscated/forfeited (page 133)</p> <p>Total amount of assets frozen or returned within the last 12 months (page 134)</p> <p>Numbers of detected Smuggled Migrants and of Victims of Trafficking, by citizenship (page 137)</p> <p>Total number of requests for (i) mutual legal assistance (MLA) and (ii) extradition sent and received (page 137)</p>	Quantity of seizures of heroin, cocaine, amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), cannabis (page 139)

Structural Indicators ⁹²
Existence of legislation on Violence Against Women (page 141)
Existence of a national crime prevention strategy in line with international standards (page 144)
Degree of civilian and parliamentary oversight of security institutions (page 146)

⁹² Refer to page 41 for information on structural indicators.

Average number of months of basic police training for new recruits (page 148)

Existence of a national anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing strategy (page 149)

**Goals and targets are taken from the 2013 High Level Panel report.*

4. Addressing challenges for advancing security and justice

In spite of a relatively high degree of consensus on the imperative of security and justice for development, there are still outstanding political, terminological and data-related challenges. Certain states are uneasy with the underlying assumptions and practices of security and justice.⁹³ For some, the emphasis on “security” has negative connotations while “justice” is too vague. A small but influential group of governments are wary of the ways these issues might trespass on national sovereignty or presage intervention in domestic matters.⁹⁴ Some diplomats also feel that these themes fall outside of the remit of traditional notions of “development” and should be reserved for other forums. The most orthodox insist that the post-2015 agenda should be limited exclusively to development staples such as poverty reduction, equality promotion, and managing the environment.

There are sensitivities and disagreements about the basic terms of the debate, not least security and justice. Indeed, language matters. As noted above, there have long been concerns about the definition of “peace” and “security”, not least since the emergence of norms on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that some states fear sanction intervention. More prosaically, other governments are concerned about the way such terms can potentially convey negative messages, undermine national pride, and tarnish their reputations. Negative signals, after all, have implications for tourism, credit ratings and foreign direct investment. There are also basic disagreements on the core terms of the debate in the security and justice sector, not least over the boundaries of the concepts, and these would need to be addressed in a forthright manner.⁹⁵

In light of these political and semantic tensions, it is hardly surprising that there are still on-going debates on the appropriate metrics by which to measure improvements in security and justice. Certain governments wish to confine the discussion to “output” measures such as the strengthening the capacity of institutions. In this way, they hope to

⁹³ The CIC, together with UNF and FDPKO are reviewing General Assembly resolutions and statements to determine what formulations may be most palatable to the G77/BRICs on these and related issues.

⁹⁴ See Robinson et al (2012) who note ‘It will not be easy to convince all United Nations Member States ... Some will argue that sovereignty must be respected. But every state would retain the right to set priorities, policies, and strategies ...’

⁹⁵ Any metrics on security and justice require clear and commonly agreed terminology so as to ensure shared understandings. While a degree of flexibility in their application is inevitable, basic terms such as ‘homicide’, ‘prisons’, ‘courts’, ‘prosecutors’, ‘prisoners’, ‘convictions’, and others are not always similarly defined among and even within countries.

direct the focus (and resources) toward measuring improvements in public institutions rather than on their impacts on the lives of people. Fortunately, considerable thinking by governments, think tanks, and researchers has gone into setting out a number of performance indicators to gauge real and perceived outcomes.⁹⁶ Many experts agree that reductions in the number of violent deaths, the incidence of rape and sexual violence and the proportion of people feeling unsafe are also fundamentally important to show changes in capacity and resources.

⁹⁶ See, for example, International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2011. *A New Deal for engagement in fragile states*, available at <http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/>, and Vera 2003. *Measuring progress toward safety and justice: a global guide to the design of performance indicators across the justice sector*.

Concluding reflections

The race is on to define and coordinate the form and function of the post-2015 development agenda. Literally hundreds of governments, international agencies and civil society organizations are involved in the discussion. While the case for including security and justice in the post-2015 development framework is compelling on moral, empirical and practical grounds, the outcome is by no means certain. Although there are ample precedents, there are also real constraints to mobilizing support owing to political resistance, semantic disagreements, and measurement challenges. It is important, then, that the United Nations and partners adopt a flexible approach setting out a number of options. This concept note has proposed some tentative ideas and there are at least three possible scenarios moving forward.

In *scenario 1* there would be agreement to develop an autonomous goal related to some aspect of security and justice. Examples might include a meta-goal focused on security and justice for all, or discrete goals such as improving safety and security, strengthening security for women and girls, or ensuring universal access to justice. There are of course many alternate formulations – including those proposed by the High Level Panel and the New Deal, but the key is to ensure they are action-oriented, accessible, and achievable. Such goals would dramatically refocus attention to these issues as critical priorities in their own right, with attendant targets and indicators. Since state positions are still evolving in relation to the post-2015 framework, including in terms of whether it will include goals, targets or indicators at all, it is hard to predict the likelihood of this first possibility.

By contrast, *scenario 2* entails the establishment of security and justice targets and indicators under another headline goal. For example, there is widespread commitment to goals on peace and stability, good governance and institutions, poverty reduction and human rights, health and education. Rather than focusing on an independent goal devoted to security and justice, the focus would instead be on identifying and inserting measurable targets – reducing violent deaths, improving safety and security for women and girls, and increasing public confidence in justice by measureable amounts – under other goals. Assuming targets are acceptable, then it follows that selected indicators would also be included, particularly those related to performance, capacity and resources. Such a scenario would require that considerable dialogue with other sectors to ensure synergies are correctly identified.

Finally, *scenario 3* involves a separate process occurring independently of the post-2015 development framework. Rather than setting-up specific goals, targets and indicators as proposed in scenarios 1 and 2, the focus would instead be on developing a parallel accountability monitoring system. In this case, United Nations agencies and civil society groups establish a range of security and justice goals, targets and indicators based on established practice and commit to global, regional and national monitoring. What such a process might lack in legitimacy would be made up in effectiveness and efficiency. Moreover, it could be tailored to capture not just global processes, but also national and sub-national processes. It is also worth noting that scenario 3 may not be exclusive from the abovementioned scenarios – and a shadow monitoring report could constitute an innovative proposal from civil society.

Whatever scenario (or scenarios) is adopted, global goals, targets and indicators on security and justice will have multiple objectives. First, they will establish and consolidate norms, instigate action, and enhance accountability and transparency. Second, it is expected that they will reflect principles of national ownership. Third, they will serve as signalling devices by demonstrating change and highlighting whether United Nations Member States are delivering on their development promises. In this way, they can stimulate the production and analysis of more extensive and higher quality data from the national to the sub-national level. And while universal goals will ensure unity of purpose, targets and indicators will need to be adjusted to reflect national and municipal conditions, priorities, capacities and resource limitations if they are to be applied.

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Annex 1: Comprehensive description of indicators

This annex contains detailed information for the indicators covered in the tables on pp. 35 – 38 of this report. The table is structured around goals and targets featured in the Report of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (‘A New Global Partnership’), with certain modifications.

Disaggregation of data

Indicator data should be collected and made available in relevant levels of disaggregation. This may include disaggregation by sex, location, age, ethnicity, functional role (when referring to, for instance, members of the criminal justice system), types of illicit drug, etc.

Measurability scale is defined in terms of:

The concept of measurability, as intended in this paper, focuses on a series of requirements to produce valid, accurate and comparable data for the indicators under exam. Measurability is different from data availability in the sense that the objective is to assess if sufficient methodological and operational requirements are in place for the production of statistics, irrespective of whether such data are actually produced by a large number of countries and made available at international level.

Such requirements are:

- Existence of a standard definition of the indicator: situations can range from cases where a standard definition is in use at international level, instances where it is subject to discussion at scientific/technical level or a definition is still at an early development.
- Source(s) of primary data exists: a source exists where information apt for statistical use is available. This might be in the form of administrative records with fairly complete and accurate registration of the variable of interest or statistical surveys, successfully implemented in a minimal group of countries, where the relevant information has been collected.
- Validated method of data collection/production exists: a procedure is in place to collect the information available in the primary source and produce the indicator of interest. This means that valid experiences exist, for a large and diverse group of countries, where a process is in place to collect all the information needed

(several variables might be necessary to compute the indicator) and produce accurate statistics for the indicator of interest.

- Data are produced/collected at national and international level: various experiences exist where data have been produced and/or collected at national or international level and they have showed a good degree of consistency and comparability.

Scoring system⁹⁷: for each item, possible scores are 0, 0.5 and 1. The total score is the sum of the item scores and measurability is defined according to the following scale:

Measurability scale	
0.0 - 1.0:	No or very little measurability
1.5 - 2.0:	low level of measurability
2.5 - 3.0:	medium level of measurability
3.5 - 4.0:	high level of measurability

Structural indicators

It should also be recognized that many approaches to rule of law, security and justice indicators include ‘*structural indicators*’. Such indicators are often expressed in terms of ‘the existence of’ (or not) a particular system, institution or law. The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators, for example, include indicators on the adequacy of policy operational policies, vetting processes, and administrative systems. Information for this type of indicator must usually be produced by expert assessment, document review, or detailed legal analysis of legislation. Qualitative information is often then converted to a ‘quantitative’ indicator, in the form of a scale, or percentage of questions that can be answered by the expert or reviewer in the affirmative. Experts consulted by UNODC also recommended a number of structural indicators for possible post-2015 goals related to good governance, effective institutions, and stable and peaceful societies. These included (i) ‘the existence of legislation on violence against women’; (ii) ‘the degree of civilian and parliamentary oversight of security institutions’; (iii) ‘the average number of months of basic police training for new recruits’; (iv) ‘the existence of national human rights institutions, and level of compliance with the Paris Principles’; (v) ‘the existence of a legal framework for challenging decisions by public officials’; and (vi) ‘the existence of legislation criminalizing hate crime’.

⁹⁷ Note that the measurability scale has not been applied to all indicator metadata

Deciding whether such indicators should be recommended for inclusion in a post-2015 monitoring framework entails both conceptual and methodological considerations. On the one hand, such indicators can provide important information about underlying systems that have the potential for significant positive impact on elements of security and justice. On the other hand, data on the mere existence of systems does not provide information about their functioning or effect in practice. In addition, indicators expressed as a simple ‘existence of’ (or not) are not well suited to providing more detailed information about changes over time, as they consist only of a binary ‘yes/no’ measurement. Some of these challenges may be overcome if structural indicators are defined as ‘the percentage of specified elements’ (defined by indicator metadata) that, for example, are incorporated in national law or policy. Such an indicator is more sensitive to smaller, more subtle, changes over time. Nonetheless, the collection of data and measurement of the indicator remains reliant on the expert assessment or legal opinion of an individual. While the view of the individual may be reviewed or approved by a wider governmental process, such methodologies still remain distinct from those used for, more clearly, quantitative indicators derived from aggregate administrative statistics or population sample surveys.

Due to the difference in methodology, and the fact that the information provided is ‘farther’ from the direct phenomena of ‘security’ and ‘justice’ than for other indicator types, structural indicators have not, in general, been included in the table of recommended post-2015 indicators in this paper. Exceptions to this position have, however, been made in respect of measurements concerning international legal instruments – both as regards global numbers of States parties to such instruments, and as regards their implementation in national legislation. Reasons for such an exception include the fact of established methodologies for determining these measurements, including the clear data on treaty ratifications maintained by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, and methodologies developed as part of the implementation review process for the United Nations Convention against Corruption. This recommendation was not reached lightly, however, and this paper retains the view that structural indicators, such as those described above, may have significant utility when measured at the national level by way of background to, or in support of, a post-2105 core indicator framework for rule of law, justice and security.

Global Tier One Indicators⁹⁸

Goal 2: Empower girls and women and achieve gender equality
Target: Prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls
Number of women killed by intimate partner per 100'000 women, per year (page 53)
Percentage of women who have experienced physical or sexual violence within the last 12 months (page 55)
Goal 10: Ensure Good Governance and Effective Institutions
Target: Reduce bribery and corruption and ensure officials can be held accountable
Percentage of people who paid a bribe to a public official during the last 12 months (page 61)
Percentage of businesses who paid a bribe to a public official during the last 12 months (page 63)
Target: Provide free and universal legal identity, such as birth registrations
Percentage of children under 5 whose births have been registered (page 75)
Goal 11: Ensure Stable and Peaceful Societies
Target: Reduce and prevent violent deaths per 100'000 by x and eliminate all forms of violence against children
Intentional homicide rate per 100'000 population (page 77)
Percentage of the population who feel safe in their own neighbourhood after dark (page 79)
Percentage of the adult population who have experienced physical or sexual violence within the last 12 months (page 81)
Target: Enhance the capacity, professionalism, accountability, security, police and justice institutions
Percentage of people who paid a bribe to a security, police or justice official during the last 12 months (page 93)
Number of deaths in custody per 100,000 persons detained within the last 12 months (page 95)
Number of police and justice personnel per 100'000 population (page 97)
Target: Ensure justice institutions are accessible, independent, well-resourced and respect due-process rights⁹⁹
Percentage of total detainees in pre-sentence detention (page 105)
Percentage of victims of violent crimes who reported victimization to law enforcement or other authorities (page 107)
Target: Stem the stressors that lead to violence and conflict, including those related to organized crime
Intentional homicide by firearm rate per 100,000 population (page 117)
Goal 12: Create a global enabling environment and catalyze long-term finance
Target: Reduce illicit flows and tax evasion and increase stolen asset recovery by x dollars
Percentage of countries that ratify international instruments related to drug control, corruption, transnational organized crime, and the illicit trade in arms (page 127)

⁹⁸ For an explanation of the system of classification of indicators, refer to the *List of security and justice goals, targets and indicators* on page 33

⁹⁹

Annex 1. Indicators

Indicator 1: Number of women killed by intimate partner per 100'000 women, per year	
Definition	Number of women victims of intentional homicide in a given year, whose perpetrator – as determined by law enforcement authorities – is the current or previous partner, where partner can be intended as spouse, partner or boyfriend (per 100'000 women). Note that incidents should be included irrespective of whether the victim and the intimate partner live together.
Current applicability and measurability	This indicator measures the most extreme form of Violence against Women (VAW) and it is globally relevant as available data clearly show that such killings occur in all regions and countries of the world. It is based on statistical data on intentional homicide, which are routinely produced by law enforcement authorities in most countries of the world with a high degree of international comparability. This indicator has a high level of measurability.
Why is it relevant?	All forms of physical violence against women represent a major threat to their human rights, dignity and health, as well as an impairment to their chances of personal, social and economic development. This is particularly true when such violence is perpetrated within the domestic sphere. Killings of women by intimate partners often occur as last and most tragic episode of an escalation of violent acts. While other and more frequent forms of intimate partner violence exist, data on homicide have fuller coverage and a higher degree of international comparability than other criminal offences. The term 'femicide' is increasingly used to identify cases of women killed for the fact of being women; female victims of homicides by intimate partners represent one specific form of femicides, among others. The regular production of figures on this indicator will raise awareness on this form of violence, which often remains hidden or tolerated.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	At the international level, data on women killed by intimate partner are collected and disseminated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC): (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html); at the regional level the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), collects and disseminate available data for Europe, North America and Central Asia (http://www.unece.org/stats/stats_h.html);

	<p>At the national level data on intentional homicides are regularly produced by either criminal justice or public health sources, or both. While information on the sex of homicide victims is provided by virtually all countries, not all can produce statistical data on homicide perpetrators. Information on homicide perpetrators can be produced by criminal justice data sources (usually the police) and it is needed to identify and count cases where the offender is an intimate partner of the victims. Intimate partner can be both current and former partner of the victim.</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>Definitions and classifications used by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the annual data collection on crime and criminal justice (UN Crime Trends Survey – UN CTS) are the international standards in use. Of particular relevance is the definition of intentional homicide for statistical purposes included thereto. Additional guidance will be provided by the forthcoming International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS).</p>

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	3.5
Methods: 1	
Data: 1	

Indicator 2 Percentage of women who have experienced physical or sexual violence within the last 12 months	
Definition	Number of adult women (18+) who have been victim of intentional acts of physical or sexual violence (by any type of perpetrator) during the last 12 months, as percentage all adult women
Current applicability and measurability	This indicator measures the prevalence of the most common forms of physical and sexual Violence against Women (VAW) and it is globally relevant as women from all regions and countries of the world are exposed to them. Since the reporting rate to authorities of such crimes is very low (typically below 10%), data for this indicator need to be collected through sample surveys on VAW. These surveys, when implemented according to standard methodological protocols, can accurately portray levels and patterns of violence experienced by women as victims. This indicator has a high level of measurability.
Why is it relevant?	All forms of physical and sexual violence against women represent a major threat to their human rights, dignity and health, as well as an obstacle to their chances of personal, social and economic development. Violence against women is at the same time cause and consequence of unequal gender roles. Monitoring of physical and sexual violence against women is required to assess whether international efforts and national policies to curb it are successful. The regular production of figures on this indicator will raise awareness on this form of violence, which often remains hidden or tolerated.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	At the international level, there is no comprehensive data repository on prevalence of physical and sexual violence against women. The international programme of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) has produced data on physical and sexual violence experienced by women in several countries (http://www.measuredhs.com/), the World Health Organization has conducted surveys on VAW in a number of countries (http://www.who.int/gender/violence/gbv/en/index1.html) and selected data, from various sources, have been collected and disseminated by the UN Women (http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/browser/files/vawprevalence_matrix_june2013.pdf). At the regional level, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) has collected data and metadata on Violence Against Women for Europe, North America and Central Asia (http://www.unece.org/stats/stats_h.html);

	<p>At national level, surveys on VAW are conducted by an increasing number of countries and in several cases they have become part of the regular production by official statistics.</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>The United Nations has recently produced the ‘<i>Guidelines for Producing Statistics on Violence against Women: Statistical Survey</i>’, which provide guidance on how to plan and implement statistical surveys to measure Violence against Women. In 2011, the Statistical Commission endorsed a list of standard tabulations on Violence Against Women and UNECE has developed a survey module to produce data on such list (http://www1.unece.org/stat/platform/display/VAW/Survey+module+for+measuring+violence+against+women).</p> <p>Recommended disaggregations for this indicator are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • type of violence (physical and sexual)¹⁰⁰ • type of perpetrator (intimate partner and non-intimate partner) • age of the victim

Scale	
Definition: 1	3.5
Sources: 1	
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

¹⁰⁰ Note that this may be disaggregated to include, for instance, female genital mutilation

Indicator 3 Percentage of women experiencing violent victimization who reported to police or other authorities	
Definition	Number of adult women (18+) who reported of having been victim of sexual or physical violence to police or other law enforcement authorities, as percentage of all adult women who have been victim of physical or sexual violence (by any type of perpetrator)
Current applicability and measurability	This indicator measures to what extent the experience of violent victimization is brought to attention of law enforcement authorities. Independently of the level of violent victimization of women, it provides information on whether conditions are in place for women to report freely and safely their experience. Given that VAW occurs in all countries, this indicator is to be considered as globally relevant. Data for this indicator are to be collected through sample surveys on VAW, which can accurately measure both women victims of violence and those who reported to authorities. This indicator has a high level of measurability.
Why is it relevant?	The reporting of violence victimization is the first step for proper investigation and other needed follow-up to take place. In most cases, female victims do not report their experience for different reasons, including fear of consequences and lack of trust in authorities. An increasing level of reporting indicates that measures have been successful to raise awareness that violent behaviours are unacceptable and/or reporting channels for victims of violent crime have improved and/or trust towards authorities has increased; moreover, higher reporting means that criminal justice institutions are in a better position to enforce the law and ensure justice.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	While there is no comprehensive data repository on physical and sexual violence against women at international level, various programmes and initiatives have produced or gathered relevant data. The international programme of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) has produced data on physical and sexual violence experienced by women in several countries (http://www.measuredhs.com/), the World Health Organization has conducted surveys on VAW in a number of countries (http://www.who.int/gender/violence/gbv/en/index1.html). At regional level, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), has collected data and metadata on Violence Against Women for Europe, North America and Central Asia (http://www.unece.org/stats/stats_h.html);

	<p>The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights is compiling information on violent victimization within EU member states.</p> <p>At national level, surveys on VAW are conducted by an increasing number of countries, sometimes as part of the regular production by official statistics. Such surveys would however need to ensure that information is collected on this indicator specifically.</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>The United Nations has recently produced the ‘<i>Guidelines for Producing Statistics on Violence against Women: Statistical Survey</i>’, which provide guidance on how to plan and implement statistical surveys to measure Violence against Women. UNECE has developed a survey module to produce data on VAW</p> <p>http://www1.unece.org/stat/platform/display/VAW/Survey+module+for+measuring+violence+against+women).</p> <p>Recommended disaggregations for this indicator are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • type of violence (physical and sexual) • type of perpetrator (intimate partner and non-intimate partner) • age of the victim

Scale	
Definition: 1	Total
Sources: 1	3.5
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 4 Percentage of the total number of judges and prosecutors that are female	
Definition	Number of judges who are women as percentage of all judges in a country in a given year; and number of prosecutors who are women as percentage of all prosecutors in a country in a given year.
Current applicability and measurability	<p>This indicator measures the ratio of women to men in the judiciary and the prosecution service. In addition to the percentage of the total number of judges and prosecutors that are female, the indicator provides information on whether conditions are in place for women to take on these professions. This indicator is to be considered as globally relevant. Data for this indicator are to be collected through national administrative data sources (Ministry of Justice). This indicator has a high level of measurability</p> <p>The indicator as mentioned above does not provide information on women holding positions of authority in the judiciary/prosecution service (nor the issue of “seniority”). For example, in many countries, women judges are prevented from being promoted to the upper courts. A solution could be to distinguish between share of women among supreme court judges and share of women among all judges.</p>
Why is it relevant?	Women’s participation in the judiciary and prosecution is important in order for the criminal justice system to reflect the society it serves. Women judges and prosecutors can promote the strengthening of the rule of law by contributing to an impartial judiciary and prosecution as well as through their role in the implementation of laws (including on access to justice for women and girls). Judges and prosecutors with diverse background and experience provide a more balanced and impartial perspective on cases brought before the court.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	At the international level, there is no comprehensive data repository on the percentage of the total number of judges and prosecutors that are female, various programmes and initiatives have produced or gathered relevant data. The UNWomen Report called “Progress of the World’s Women 2011-2012” calculated regional aggregates using UNODC 2009 CTS and population data from UN DESA 2009 World Survey on the Role of Women in Development (see Figure 2.5: Women’s representation in the justice system). Note that aggregates are based on 66 countries for which there are prosecution data and 88 countries for which there are judges and magistrates data..

	<p>At regional level, the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice of the Council of Europe has data on the number for female judges and prosecutors for its Member States (see 4th Evaluation report on European judicial systems - Edition 2012 (2010 data)).</p> <p>National data sources include administrative data from the Ministry of Justice and will have to be requested by the United Nations.</p>
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	There are currently no particular tools or methodologies for this indicator

Scale	
Definition: 1	3
Sources: 1	
Methods: 1	
Data: 0	

Indicator 5 Percentage of people who paid a bribe to a public official during the last 12 months	
Definition	Percentage of persons who paid at least one bribe to a public official in the last 12 months, as a percentage of all those who had contacts with a public official
Current applicability and measurability	<p>Corruption exists in all countries of the world, though it can appear under different shapes and show varying intensities. Bribery is the undue advantage (money, gift or a service) requested/offered by/to a public official in exchange of a special treatment. Administrative bribery is often intended as the type of bribery affecting citizens or businesses in their dealings with public administrations and/or civil servants: this form of bribery affects most countries of the world and it can be measured through sample surveys that focus on the experience of bribery.</p> <p>This indicator has a high level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	Corruption is an antonym of equal accessibility to public services and of correct functioning of the economy; as such, it has a negative impact on fair distribution of resources and development opportunities. Besides, corruption erodes public trust in authorities and the rule of law; when administrative bribery becomes a recurrent experience of large sectors of the population and businesses, its negative effects have an enduring negative effect on democratic processes and justice. By providing a direct measure of the experience of bribery, this indicator provides an objective metric of corruption, a yardstick to monitor progress in the fight against corruption.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>Various programmes and initiatives have produced data on the experience of corruption by the population. Programme of surveys on the experience of corruption have been supported by international organizations, including by UNODC:</p> <p>http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption.html)</p> <p>and the World Bank</p> <p>http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVA/NTCOR/0,,contentMDK:20726148~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html</p> <p>and UNDP. Surveys on corruption experience are also implemented by NGO's and the private sector: for example, the 'Global Corruption Barometer' is published annually by Transparency International and it</p>

	<p>includes survey data on the experience of bribery for a large set of countries.</p> <p>At national level, surveys on the experience of corruption are conducted by an increasing number of countries, sometimes as part of the regular production by official statistics.</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>Methodological documentation to develop and implement surveys on corruption can be found on the UNODC-UNECE Manual on Victimization surveys.</p>

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	3.5
Methods: 1	
Data: 1	

Indicator 6 Percentage of businesses who paid a bribe to a public official during the last 12 months	
Definition	Percentage of businesses who paid at least one bribe to a public official in the last 12 months, as a percentage of all those who had contacts with a public official
Current applicability and measurability	<p>Corruption exists in all countries of the world, though it can appear under different shapes and show varying intensities. Bribery is the undue advantage (money, gift or a service) requested/offered by/to a public official in exchange of a special treatment. Administrative bribery is often intended as the type of bribery affecting citizens or businesses in their dealings with public administrations and/or civil servants: this form of bribery affects most countries of the world and it can be measured through sample surveys that focus on the experience of bribery.</p> <p>This indicator has a medium level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	Corruption is an antonym of equal accessibility to public services and of correct functioning of the economy; as such, it has a negative impact on fair distribution of resources and development opportunities. Besides, corruption erodes public trust in authorities and the rule of law; when administrative bribery becomes a recurrent experience of businesses, its negative effects have an enduring negative effect on market functioning and the rule of law. By providing a direct measure of the experience of bribery, this indicator provides an objective metrics of corruption, a yardstick to monitor progress in the fight against corruption.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>Programme of surveys on the experience of corruption in the business sector have been supported by international organizations, including by UNODC:</p> <p>http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption.html)</p> <p>and the World Bank:</p> <p>http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVA/NTCOR/0,,contentMDK:20726148~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html</p> <p>At national level, surveys on the experience of corruption in the business sector are still limited, sometimes in conjunction with surveys on crime victimization.</p>
Tools, methodologies	Methodological documentation to develop and implement surveys on

and standards for measurement	corruption can be found on the UNODC-UNECE Manual on Victimization surveys.
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Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	3
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 7 Frequency of bribery and amount paid in bribes by population and business	
Definition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Average number of bribes paid to a public official by all those who paid at least one bribe to a public official during the last 12 months • Average amount paid in bribe by all those who paid at least one bribe in cash to a public official during the last 12 months
Current applicability and measurability	In order to assess the level and scope of corruption, a range of information is needed, besides the prevalence of bribery experiences among the population. Information supplied by the frequency of bribery experience and its average financial burden is particularly relevant in national contexts to produce specific policy guidance. It can be measured through sample surveys that focus on the experience of bribery. This indicator has a medium level of measurability.
Why is it relevant?	Frequency and cost of bribes provide valuable information to assess the overall impact of bribery. Frequency of bribery experience and its average financial burden posed on citizens provide essential information to assess pervasiveness of administrative bribery and its impact on household budgets. Moreover, frequent and costly experiences of bribery impact heavily on resource distribution and public trust in authorities. This indicator provides additional information to monitor effectiveness of policies to prevent and fight corruption.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>Various programmes and initiatives have produced data on the experience of corruption, often supported by international organizations (for example UNODC, UNDP and the World Bank). Such surveys usually provide disaggregated data on a number of public officials/civil servants and data can be made available to compute the indicator of interest.</p> <p>At national level, surveys on the experience of corruption are conducted by an increasing number of countries, sometimes as part of the regular production by official statistics.</p>
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	Methodological documentation to develop and implement surveys on corruption can be found on the UNODC-UNECE Manual on Victimization surveys, while other documentation is available on websites of relevant international organizations.

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	2.5
Methods: 1	
Data: 0	

Indicator 8 Percentage of the population believing that corrupt practices take place frequently when ordinary citizens deal with civil servants	
Definition	The proportion of citizens that believe that corrupt behaviours or practices take place frequently or very frequently when ordinary people have contacts with public officials and/or civil servants to process administrative procedures (answers of ‘4’ or ‘5’ in a 5-point frequency scale where 1 is lowest level, and 5 is the highest)
Current applicability and measurability	Corruption exists – in different shapes - in all countries of the world and public debate is often made very attentive to it. The measurement of public perceptions is applicable at global level; it can be measured through sample surveys where standardized questions on corruption perception can be asked. This indicator has a medium level of measurability.
Why is it relevant?	All countries of the world are aware of the negative impact of corruption and anti-corruption policies are implemented, with varying degrees of effectiveness, in all states. Monitoring individual perceptions on corruption can be useful as a form of public evaluation of anti-corruption policies; moreover, perception of corruption can have an indirect impact on corruption levels by influencing expectations and actual behaviours of parties during dealings between public officials and customers. Complementary to direct measures of the experience of bribery, this indicator can provide information on public opinion on corruption trends and anticorruption efforts.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	Various programmes and initiatives have produced data on perceptions of corruption, usually based on experts’ opinions. The adoption of standard formulation of questions to use in population surveys would improve validity, consistency and comparability of data. At national level, surveys on perception of corruption have been conducted in several countries, though issues of comparability exist.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	The indicator is measured using population-based sample surveys. Standardized survey instruments are not available and are typically developed according to national priorities and needs at country level. Testing of questions would be recommended to produce solid and consistent results.

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	3
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 9 Percentage of businesses believing that corrupt practices take place frequently when businesses deal with public officials procedures	
Definition	The proportion of businesses that perceive that corrupt behaviours or practices take place frequently or very frequently when businesses have contacts with public officials and/or civil servants to process administrative procedures (answers of ‘4’ or ‘5’ in a 5-point frequency scale where 1 is lowest level, and 5 is the highest).
Current applicability and measurability	Corruption exists – in different shapes - in all countries of the world and public debate often pays great attention to it. An indicator on businesses’ perceptions is applicable at global level; it can be measured through sample surveys where standardized questions on corruption perception can be asked. This indicator has a medium level of measurability.
Why is it relevant?	All countries of the world are aware of the negative impact of corruption and anti-corruption policies are implemented, with varying degrees of effectiveness, in all states. Monitoring businesses perceptions on corruption can be useful as a form of public evaluation of anti-corruption policies; moreover, perception of corruption can have an indirect impact on corruption levels by influencing expectations and actual behaviours of parties during dealings between public officials and economic actors. Complementary to direct measures of the experience of bribery, this indicator can provide information on public support to anticorruption efforts.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	Various programmes and initiatives have produced data on business perception of corruption, usually based on experts’ opinions. The adoption of standard formulation of questions to use in business surveys would improve validity, consistency and comparability of data. At national level, surveys on perception of corruption by businesses have been conducted in several countries, though issues of comparability exist.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	The indicator is measured using business sample surveys. Standardized survey instruments are not available and are typically developed according to national priorities and needs at country level. Testing of questions would be recommended to produce solid and consistent results.

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	2.5
Methods: 1	
Data: 0	

Indicator 10 Percentage of mandatory requirements of UNCAC reflected in domestic legislation	
Definition	<p>Percentage of mandatory requirements of United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) reflected in domestic legislation.</p> <p>This refers to the requirements in UNCAC Chapters II through V. ‘Mandatory’ requirements are those that use the phrasing “shall + verb”. Requirements may be classified as ‘semi-mandatory’ if they use the phrasing ‘shall seek to’ or ‘shall endeavour’.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>Indicator globally applicable and relevant (167 States Parties). Corruption exists globally and no country is immune to the negative effects of corruption and bribery. The UNCAC is a universally accepted comprehensive framework on anti-corruption. The mandatory requirements give a wide scope to measure several forms of corruption. This indicator has a low level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>The UNCAC is one of the most ratified UN conventions and is nearing universality, implying Member States’ commitment to tackle corruption at a minimum in line with the UNCAC mandatory requirements. The UNCAC contains a number of mandatory requirements (113 in total), which are provisions/measures that signatory countries parties have committed to implement by becoming party to the convention. Fully implementing the mandatory requirements of the UNCAC is proof of Member States’ will to fulfil their international commitments to combat corruption. Implementation of UNCAC provisions is done at the international level by the Implementation Review Mechanism, a peer review process whereby each State Party’s implementation of the UNCAC is reviewed by experts from two other States Parties. Through the UNCAC Implementation Review Mechanism, Member States are able to demonstrate and report on how far they have reached in implementing the UNCAC and its provisions, thus allowing them to establish a baseline against which progress can be measured. Fully implementing the mandatory requirements of the UNCAC is proof of Member States’ will to fulfil their international commitments to combat corruption.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>At the international level, UNODC collects information on mandatory requirements of UNCAC reflected in domestic legislation through the Implementation Review Mechanism of UNCAC. Furthermore, the recommendations on addressing shortcomings in a Member States’ implementation is reflected in the publicly available Executive</p>

	Summaries prepared with each country report.
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>On domestic legislation, the information is submitted to UNODC through the UNCAC self-assessment checklist the country is required to fill out in the context of the reviews. Several countries also choose to use their initial self-assessment as a bench marking tool or the basis for a National Anti-Corruption Strategy.</p> <p>The indicator could be used for both mandatory and semi-mandatory requirements (see ‘Definition’ above), and in two review cycles, i.e.</p> <p><i>Cycle 1 (2010-2015) total: 71 mandatory and 25 semi-mandatory requirements</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Chap III: 36 mandatory; 15 semi-mandatory</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Chap IV: 35 mandatory; 10 semi-mandatory</i></p> <p><i>Cycle 2 (2015-2020) total: 42 mandatory and 14 semi-mandatory</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Chap II: 21 mandatory; 14 semi-mandatory</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Chap V: 21 mandatory; 0 semi-mandatory</i></p> <p><i>Grand total: 113 mandatory and 39 semi-mandatory (grand total 152)</i></p> <p>All the provisions are subject to the implementation review which would flag any mandatory or semi-mandatory provision which has not been implemented. Furthermore, States parties that have been reviewed must agree to the wording of the country review as well as the executive summary where any such gap would also be highlighted. However, the Review Mechanism examines the implementation in two cycles (2010-2015 Chap 3 and 4; 2015-2020 Chap 2 and 5) and while at the end of each cycle, all the States parties should technically have been reviewed, the data would quite possibly be outdated, in particular if you consider a review carried out in 2012 providing data in 2020. At present, while States parties are encouraged to use the data for their own bench marking, there is no formal follow-up system in place. It is nevertheless possible that such a mechanism will transpire at a later stage, which could raise the reliability of the data.</p>

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 0.5	2
Methods: 0.5	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 11 Percentage of public officials who have been hired through formal and standard procedures	
Definition	Number of public officials who have been recruited following a standard and formal procedure of assessment composed by written exam and/or oral interview, as percentage of all public officials
Current applicability and measurability	<p>In countries where recruitment practices in the civil service are not yet regulated in a strict manner, this type of indicator can produce useful information. Necessary information can be collected through sample surveys among public officials; this indicator has a low level of measurability.</p> <p>Increasing the level of professionalism of civil service is a major challenge in several developing countries: enforcing high quality standards in the recruitment of new civil servants is an important tool to make sure that merit is the parameter to assess staff. Forms of nepotism and cronyism often affect public recruitment: an effective way to discourage such practices is to enforce tight regulations on hiring procedures.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	Sample surveys on civil servants can produce the needed information, such as those supported by UNODC and UNDP in countries of Middle East and Asia.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	The indicator is measured using sample surveys on civil servants. Standardized survey instruments are not available and are typically developed according to national priorities and needs at country level.

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 0.5	2
Methods: 0.5	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 12 Percentage of children under 5 whose births have been registered	
Definition	Note that birth registration should be understood as having the characteristics of, inter alia, recording the occurrence and characteristics of birth, in accordance with the legal requirements of the country, primarily for the purpose of establishing the legal documents provided for by law (refer to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics Division standard below). This indicator measures the rate of birth registration. The use of the under- five threshold allows for trends to be measured over time in five year cohorts
Current applicability and measurability	Indicator globally applicable and relevant. This indicator has a high level of measurability.
Why is it relevant?	<p>The right to be registered as soon as possible after birth is enumerated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 7) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 24, para 2). Registering a child's birth is a critical step towards his/her protection. It establishes the existence of the child under law and provides the foundation for safeguarding many of the child's civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights</p> <p>The data generated by Birth registration, as an essential component of a country's civil registry, supports vital statistics, efficient government and planning.</p>
International/national data sources and availability	At international level, data on Birth Registration is collected by UNICEF through the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and national civil registry systems. All developed nations and a majority of middle income countries have full data on BR rates, growing number of developing countries have full or partial data.
Applicable international standards	Birth registration—definition: Birth registration is the continuous, permanent, compulsory and universal recording of the occurrence and characteristics of births in accordance with the legal requirements of a country, carried out primarily for the purpose of establishing the legal documents provided for by law; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	Data collection should primarily be (at national level) through the Civil Registry as the organisation with the legal authority to record (register) births.

Scale	
Definition: 1	Total
Sources: 1	3.5
Methods: 0.5	
Data: 1	

Indicator 13 Intentional homicide rate (per 100 000 population)	
Definition	Intentional homicide is defined as the unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person; the rate is defined as the total count of intentional homicides divided by the total resident population, expressed per 100 000 population.
Current applicability and measurability	This indicator measures the most extreme form of violence; murders occur in all countries of the world and this indicator has a global applicability. It is based on statistical data routinely produced by law enforcement authorities and/or public health institutions, with a high degree of international comparability. This indicator has a high level of measurability.
Why is it relevant?	Given the pivotal role of life, intentional homicide is considered as one the worst offences by all countries and legal systems. Security from violence is a pre-requisite for individuals to enjoy a safe and active life and for societies and economies to develop freely. Monitoring intentional homicides is thus necessary to better assess its causes and consequences and, in the longer term, to develop effective preventative measures.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	At international level, data on intentional homicides are routinely collected and disseminated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC): (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html); the World Health Organization produces figures on homicides as part of its activities of data collection on mortality by cause (...). Several regional organizations collect and disseminate homicide data, especially in the Americas (OAS and IDB) and in Europe (Eurostat). At national level, data on intentional homicides are regularly produced by either criminal justice or public health sources, or both.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	Definitions and classifications used by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the annual data collection on crime and criminal justice (UN Crime Trends Survey – UN CTS) are the international standards in use. Further guidance will be provided by the forthcoming International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS). Data on homicides produced by public health authorities are guided by the International classification of diseases (ICD-10). Recommended disaggregations for this indicator are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • sex and age of the victim

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• means of perpetration (firearm, blunt object, etc.)• context/motivation (organized crime, intimate partner violence, etc.)• relationship between victim and perpetrator (intimate partner, other family member, acquaintance, etc.)
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Scale	
Definition: 1	Total
Sources: 1	4
Methods: 1	
Data: 1	

Indicator 14 Percentage of the population who feel safe in their own neighbourhood after dark	
Definition	<p>There are two widely used formulations of this indicator:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Number of adults (18+) who feel safe walking alone in their neighbourhood after dark, as percentage of all adults (18+). b) Number of adults (18+) who feel safe at home alone after dark, as percentage of all adults (18+).
Current applicability and measurability	<p>This indicator is widely used to measure the fear of crime, though it does not explicitly refer to ‘crime’. The two common formulations of this indicator are both based on indicators collected through sample surveys among the general population, most often through crime victimization surveys: such surveys, initially promoted by international organizations, are becoming part of the regular production of national statistical systems.</p> <p>The following standard questions have been adopted by many crime victimization surveys around the world to ensure comparability:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) How safe do you feel walking alone in your area/neighbourhood after dark? Answer: Very safe/fairly safe/bit unsafe/very unsafe/ I never walk alone after dark/don’t know b) How safe do you feel when you are at home alone after dark? Answer: Very safe/fairly safe/bit unsafe/very unsafe/ don’t know <p>This indicator has a medium level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>‘Fear of crime’ is generally acknowledged to have a negative impact on individual psychological well-being, public health, trust and community cohesion. Fear of crime is a subjective measure and is different from the actual likelihood of becoming a victim of crime. As such fear of crime may also be influenced by (experienced or perceived) external variables other than crime, such as lifestyle patterns and media reporting. Nevertheless, measuring fear of crime provides important insights into individual and collective well-being.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>At international level, there is no comprehensive data repository on feelings related to ‘fear of crime’. Selected data have been collected in national and international crime victimization surveys, such as the British Crime Survey or the International Crime Victimization Survey(ICVS), which has been conducted in over 70 countries worldwide between 1992 and 2005 and several more countries since then. Most of these surveys include one or two of the above question formulations.</p>
Tools, methodologies	<p>UNODC-UNECE Manual on Victimization Surveys (2010)</p>

and standards for measurement	
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Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	3
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 15 Percentage of the adult population who have experienced physical or sexual violence within the last 12 months	
Definition	Number of adults (18+) who have been victim of selected and intentional acts of physical or sexual violence during the last 12 months, as percentage all adults (18+)
Current applicability and measurability	<p>This indicator measures the prevalence of victimization from physical or sexual violence and it is globally relevant as violence in various forms occurs in all regions and countries of the world. Given that acts of violence are often underreported to the authorities, this indicator should be based on data collected through sample surveys of the adult population.</p> <p>While there are a number of specialized surveys on violence (violence against women, children, prisoners, by intimate partners, in schools etc.) general surveys of violence against the adult population are usually conducted as part of crime victimization surveys with questions on violent crime (assault, threat).</p> <p>This indicator has a medium level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>All forms of physical and sexual violence against persons represent a major threat to their human rights, dignity and health, as well as an obstacle to their chances of personal, social and economic development.</p> <p>The regular production of figures on this indicator will raise awareness on the most prevalent forms of violence and support state efforts in preventing and reducing violence.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	At international level, there is no comprehensive data repository on general physical or sexual violence. Selected data on specific forms of physical or sexual violence (against women, children, etc.) are collected and disseminated by the World Health Organization, UNICEF, UN Women, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Selected data have been collected in national and international crime victimization surveys, such as the British Crime Survey or the International Crime Victimization Survey(ICVS), which has been conducted in over 70 countries worldwide between 1992 and 2005 and several more countries since then. Most of these surveys include questions on violence.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	<p>Guidelines by UNSD</p> <p>UNODC-UNECE Manual on Victimization Surveys (2010)</p>

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	3
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 16 Reported incidents of violence against children per 100'000	
Current applicability and measurability	Indicator globally applicable and relevant; challenges in matching definitions of violence between different criminal justice systems. Some systems only report on convictions of violence against children, not reported incidents.
What does it relevant?	<p>It measures the level of violence against children reported to child protection and legal authorities</p> <p>By providing information on reported incidence, this indicator unveils trends and patterns of violence affecting children. Though, trends and patterns of this indicator should be interpreted cautiously since they can be affected by changing reporting levels. Children and young people who have experienced violence rate their overall health as poorer than those who have not experienced violence, and affects development and adjustment as well as relationships with parents, other adults, and peers. Problems include aggression, withdrawal and isolation, and are associated with long term psychological and emotional problems such as depression, self-inflicted injuries, and an increased risk of substance abuse, aggression, and criminal activity.</p> <p>A child's right to be protected from violence is enumerated in article 18 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.</p>
International/national data sources and availability	<p>At international level, data on violent crime are collected and disseminated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); at national level, data for this indicator are produced by criminal justice sources (the police/judiciary), and in many developed and middle income countries, through social and child protection services.</p> <p>The last comprehensive report on the phenomena at global level was 2006 (the Secretary-General's Study on Violence against Children) but UNICEF now has indicators on Violence against children its new strategic plan.</p>

Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	<p>Definitions and classifications used by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the annual data collection on crime and criminal justice (UN Crime Trends Survey – UN CTS) are the international standards in use but challenges remain between jurisdictions on definitions of violence against children.</p> <p>Data on intentional homicides are regularly produced by either criminal justice or public health sources, or both. As noted above, the challenge is in the differing definitions of violence that exist in different criminal justice systems. In industrialised countries and some middle-income the data is disaggregated by age and sex, but not in all. Victimhood surveys also contribute data on trends but are usually only performed in wealthy industrialised countries.</p>
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Indicator 17 Percentage of children who have experienced physical or sexual violence	
Definition	Number of children who have experienced physical or sexual violence in the past 12 months
Current applicability and measurability	Indicator globally applicable and relevant; challenges in matching definitions of violence between different criminal justice systems. Some systems only report on convictions of violence against children, not reported incidents.
What is it relevant?	<p>It measures the level of violence against children reported to child protection and legal authorities</p> <p>By providing information on reported incidence, this indicator unveils trends and patterns of violence affecting children. Children and young people who have experienced violence rate their overall health as poorer than those who have not experienced violence, and affects development and adjustment as well as relationships with parents, other adults, and peers. Problems include aggression, withdrawal and isolation, and are associated with long term psychological and emotional problems such as depression, self-inflicted injuries, and an increased risk of substance abuse, aggression, and criminal activity.</p> <p>A child's right to be protected from violence is enumerated in article 18 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.</p>
International, regional national data sources and availability	<p>At international level, data on violent crime are collected and disseminated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); at national level, data for this indicator are produced by criminal justice sources (the police/judiciary), and in many developed and middle income countries, through social and child protection services.</p> <p>The last comprehensive report on the phenomena at global level was 2006 (the Secretary-General's Study on Violence against Children) but UNICEF now has indicators on Violence against Children in its new strategic plan.</p>

Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	<p>Definitions and classifications used by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the annual data collection on crime and criminal justice (UN Crime Trends Survey – UN CTS) are the international standards in use but challenges remain between jurisdictions on definitions of Violence against Children.</p> <p>Data on intentional homicides are regularly produced by either criminal justice or public health sources, or both. As noted above, the challenge is in the differing definitions of violence that exist in different criminal justice systems. In industrialised countries and some middle-income the data is disaggregated by age and sex, but not all. Victimhood surveys also contribute data on trends but are usually only performed in wealthy industrialised countries.</p>
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Indicator 18 Direct deaths from armed conflict per 100 000 population	
Definition	<p>The number of persons killed in one year per 100 000 population as a result of violence constituting part of an armed conflict.</p> <p>For the purposes of the indicator, an ‘armed conflict’ exists wherever there is recourse to armed force between states regardless of the intensity, or wherever there is protected armed violence of a minimum level of intensity between governmental authorities and organised armed groups with a minimum of organisation, or between such groups, within a state.</p> <p>Direct deaths result directly from lethal injuries caused by military or paramilitary operations, or by armed groups.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>As situations of armed conflict do not affect all states at all times, the indicator is applicable at national level with high applicability in certain country contexts.</p> <p>Approaches to defining armed conflict vary and a number of approaches to measurement exist, some of which have been elaborated in <i>‘Measuring and Monitoring Armed Violence: Goals, Targets and Indicators’</i>¹⁰¹.</p> <p>The indicator is nonetheless supported by emerging methodologies with some level of comparability across different countries.</p> <p>The indicator has a low level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>Deaths from armed conflict represent a threat to freedom from physical violence in conflict affected countries. Whilst the risk of violent death in armed conflict is generally lower than the global risk of homicidal violence, in affected countries armed conflict destroys lives and exerts substantial human costs, particularly in protracted internal conflict situations.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>At the international level, conflict death databases include the IISS Armed Conflict Database, the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, and PRIO Battle-Deaths Data. National level datasets exist for some countries.</p> <p>Attempts to reconcile and compare different datasets, such as that conducted by the Geneva Declaration Secretariat in the Global Burden of Armed Violence Report 2008, show that basic data is available for all countries experiencing armed conflict in recent years.</p>
Tools, methodologies and standards for	<p>The most common method of measuring direct conflict deaths is incident reporting, based on conflict-related events reported in the media. In some</p>

¹⁰¹ Secretariat of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development/UNDP, 2010

measurement	<p>cases, such data can be cross-referenced with hospital and morgue mortality records. Deaths of combatants and civilians due to operations of war are coded to classification Y36 in the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 10th Revision (ICD-10)¹⁰². Incident reporting systems, however, depend significantly on the quality of available documentation, and the effectiveness of media coverage and official reporting. Population-based surveys may also be used to estimate direct conflict deaths. However, undertaking high-quality population surveys in conflict affected areas is challenging. Such surveys may include ‘verbal autopsies’ in order to identify the cause of household deaths reported by a random or semi-random population sample. The use of multiple estimation techniques that take account of different limitations and strengths is recommended.</p>
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Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 0.5	2
Methods: 0.5	
Data: 0.5	

¹⁰² See <http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/>

Indicator 19 Percentage of persons convicted of a violent crime who have previously been convicted of a violent crime within the last five years (recidivism)	
Definition	The percentage of persons convicted of a violent crime who have previously been convicted of a violent crime within the past five years. For the purposes of the indicator, a ‘violent crime’ means all offences involving violence or threat of violence against the person, including all sexual offences, robbery, kidnapping and extortion.
Current applicability and measurability	Recidivism (measured by this indicator as <i>reconviction</i>) is a key gauge of the effectiveness of crime prevention and criminal justice systems and is applicable to all countries. While approaches to measurement of reconviction vary across countries, the indicator has a medium degree of measurability from court records.
Why is it relevant?	The United Nations Economic and Social Council highlights the importance of preventing recidivism as a key component of crime prevention approaches (ECOSOC Res 1995/9). Reduced recidivism means greater economic and social reintegration of previous offenders and potentially significant positive impacts on local crime levels. Approaches to reducing recidivism include diversification of punitive measures and treatment, an increased role of the community in offender rehabilitation, and increased socio-educational support within sentencing frameworks.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	At international and regional level, data on reconviction are quite limited. Sources such as the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS), EUROSTAT Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics, and the OAS Observatory on Citizen Security Data Repository do not routinely collect such information. Whilst theoretically calculable for most criminal justice systems, comparatively few countries currently make national data on reconviction publically available.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	Approaches to measuring reconviction vary between countries. Some countries maintain large administrative databases of offender histories that allow accurate calculations of reconviction rates for all offenders. Others make use of sample studies that may differ according to the characteristics of offenders included, and the length of the follow-up period.

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 0.5	2.5
Methods: 0.5	
Data: 1	

Indicator 20 Indirect deaths from armed conflict per 100 000 population	
Definition	<p>The difference between the total number of deaths (any cause) in one year per 100 000 population during a period of armed conflict, and the baseline mortality rate (the total number of deaths (any cause) in one year per 100 000 population during periods of non-conflict).</p> <p>For the purposes of the indicator, an ‘armed conflict’ exists wherever there is recourse to armed force between states regardless of the intensity, or wherever there is protected armed violence of a minimum level of intensity between governmental authorities and organised armed groups with a minimum of organisation, or between such groups, within a state.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>As situations of armed conflict do not affect all states at all times, the indicator is applicable at national level with high applicability in certain country contexts.</p> <p>In addition to differing approaches to defining armed conflict, the measurement of ‘excess mortality’ as the difference between crude mortality rates in conflict and non-conflict situations is highly dependent upon the availability of reliable baseline data. The concept of ‘indirect conflict deaths’ is relatively new and subject to further methodological development. This includes whether excess mortality identified can validly be attributed to the impact of conflict, in light of changes in adverse environmental and economic conditions that prevail in many countries where armed conflicts occur. As a result, the indicator currently has a low degree of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>The lethal impact of armed conflict extends far beyond the number of combatants and civilians who are killed as a direct result of conflict-related violence. Armed conflict generates a series of lethal but <i>indirect</i> impacts on communities, including advancing the spread of communicable diseases, causing hunger and malnutrition, and loss of access to shelter, water, and basic health care.</p> <p>In almost all contemporary conflicts, the number of indirect victims of armed violence is many times larger than the number of direct conflict deaths. Indirect deaths represent one measurable component of the destructive impact of conflict on national economies, infrastructure, social cohesion, and psychological health and well-being. Indirect deaths may also provide some indication of the extent to which international humanitarian law and human rights law are respected in situations of armed conflict.</p>

<p>International, regional, and national data sources and availability</p>	<p>At the international level, the most widely used datasets that include baseline mortality for most countries are collected by the United Nations Population Division and are available through publications such as World Population Prospects and UNICEF’s State of the World’s Children Report.</p> <p>In several conflict affected areas, however, little accurate data that can be used to estimate the demographic profile of a population is available. In addition, it can be difficult to designate a point in time at which to compare ‘excess’ and ‘baseline’ mortality for countries that exist in a chronic cycle of conflict and/or emergency or natural disaster. Currently, it is not possible to estimate indirect conflict deaths with reasonable precision for all countries experiencing conflict in recent years.</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>The most common method of measuring direct conflict deaths is the use of retrospective household mortality surveys. Where health facilities and death registries are sufficiently stable, records from these institutions should also be used. In accordance with its definition, the indicator is calculated from crude (overall) mortality rates, irrespective of cause of death.</p>

Indicator 21 Percentage of people who paid a bribe to a security, police or justice official during the last 12 months	
Definition	Percentage of persons who paid at least one bribe to a security, police or justice official in the last 12 months, as a percentage of all those who had contact with any of such officials
Current applicability and measurability	While corruption can affect all sectors of the state, corruption affecting security and justice administration has a direct and negative impact on the capacity of the state to maintain stability and foster justice. Available information shows that it affects a high number of countries around the world, thus suggesting this indicator has a global applicability. Bribery experienced by citizens in their dealings with security, police or justice official can be measured through sample surveys that focus on the experience of bribery. This indicator has a medium level of measurability.
Why is it relevant?	Ensuring security and maintaining conditions for the administration of justice are core competencies of the state. Corruption of security, police or justice officials undermines state authority and the rule of law. By providing a direct measure of the experience of bribery affecting these sectors, this indicator is an undisputed benchmark to monitor progress in the fight against corruption.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	Various programmes and initiatives have produced data on the experience of corruption, often supported by international organizations (for example UNODC, UNDP and the World Bank). Such surveys usually provide disaggregated data on a number of public officials/civil servants and data can be made available to compute the indicator of interest. At national level, surveys on the experience of corruption are conducted by an increasing number of countries, sometimes as part of the regular production by official statistics.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	Methodological documentation to develop and implement surveys on corruption can be found on the UNODC-UNECE Manual on Victimization surveys, while other documentation is available on websites of relevant international organizations. Improved standardization would be needed on types of officials to be considered as part of security, police and justice sectors.

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	3
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 22 Number of deaths in custody per 100 000 persons detained within the last 12 months	
Definition	Number of deaths of persons held in prisons, penal institutions or correctional institutions over the last 12 months, per 100 000 persons held in these institutions over the last 12 months
Current applicability and measurability	<p>The number of deaths of persons held in prisons is one indicator of prison conditions, health and safety of prison inmates. It is based on administrative data on the management of prisons that collect records of entry, exit and stay within the penitentiary system. Further disaggregation of this indicator should be available from administrative records and would allow a better analysis of the causes of mortality in prison settings (natural death or death due to external causes, of which deaths by intentional homicide and deaths by suicide).</p> <p>A time-sensitive calculation of the indicator requires the calculation of the average number of prison inmates over the last 12 months for the numerator; otherwise the stock of prisoners at one point in time can be taken as a proxy assuming little variability in prison occupancy.</p> <p>This indicator has a high level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	Deaths in prison may have a variety of causes, all of which have relevant implications for penitentiary policy and preventive measures by prison administrations. Keeping persons placed under the custody of the state, such as prison inmates, safe and in good health while avoiding physical harm, morbidity and death, is a core responsibility of the state and its penitentiary system. The indicator provides a measurement of safety, health and mortality in prison settings and has direct policy implications for the state penitentiary system. Further refinement of the indicators by causes of mortality, sex, type of prison setting, violent deaths, drug deaths, etc. can provide further insights into deaths in custody.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>At international level, data on persons held in prisons, penal institutions or correctional institutions are collected and disseminated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC): (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html).</p> <p>In 2013 UNODC for the first time carried out data collection on deaths in prison settings; another widely used database on prison populations is published by the International Centre for Prison Studies, the World Prison Population List, currently in its 9th edition (2010 data) which covers basic prison data on most countries of the world; at regional level, the Council of Europe annually publishes detailed prison data (SPACE I), including</p>

	<p>data on total number of deaths and suicides. In the Americas, the OAS has collected data on prison populations, conditions and deaths in prison settings. At national level, data on prison populations are regularly produced by the penitentiary systems and are often published on official websites, though often no information on deaths in prison settings is available.</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS), particularly the UN-CTS 2013 module on prisons</p>

Scale	
Definition: 1	Total
Sources: 1	3.5
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 23 Number of police and justice personnel per 100 000 population	
Definition	<p>A restrictive definition of police and justice personnel includes only operational police personnel and professional judges, defined as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) "Police Personnel" means personnel in public agencies whose principal functions are the prevention, detection and investigation of crime and the apprehension of alleged offenders. b) "Professional Judges or Magistrates" means both full-time and part-time officials authorized to hear civil, criminal and other cases, including in appeal courts, and to make dispositions in a court of law.
Current applicability and measurability	<p>The number of police personnel per 100 000 population is a relevant factor in the capacity of the state to prevent, detect and investigate crime, while the number of judges per 100 000 population is a relevant factor in the capacity of the state to adjudicate alleged offenders. Both indicators are typically measured as a stock of persons at a point in time which is conventionally defined as 31 December of the reference year. The following factors should be taken into consideration in measurement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Data on "Police Personnel" should include personnel from all police force units in the country but exclude member of the armed forces. Support staff (secretaries, clerks, etc.) should be excluded. b) Data on "Professional Judges or Magistrates" should include authorized associate judges and magistrates. <p>This indicator has a high level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>The effective enforcement of the law and the upholding of fair and equitable conditions for the administration of justice are core competencies of the state. The total number of police and justice personnel per 100 000 population provides a first indicator of the capacity of the state to police its territory and bring alleged perpetrators to justice. Changes in the level of this indicator over time may indicate a strengthening or weakening capacity of the state to fulfil its core functions in relation to security and justice.</p> <p>A further level of disaggregation by sex (male and female police personnel; male and female professional judges or magistrates) will add a gender aspect to these indicators.</p>
International, regional, and national data	<p>At international level, data on criminal justice resources, including police personnel and professional judges are routinely collected and</p>

<p>sources and availability</p>	<p>disseminated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC): (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html); Several regional organizations collect and disseminate data on the capacity of the police and justice systems, especially in the Americas (OAS and IDB) and in Europe (Council of Europe, Eurostat).</p> <p>It should be noted that comparability of data on police personnel may be limited by the inclusion of different types of police forces (e.g. traffic police, border police, etc.) and those on judges or magistrates by the inclusion of various types of judges (e.g. lay judges) and courts (e.g. administrative courts, specialized courts, etc.).</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>Definitions and classifications used by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the annual data collection on crime and criminal justice (UN Crime Trends Survey – UN CTS) are the international standards in use.</p> <p>UN DESA has published the 2003 Manual for the Development of A System of Criminal Justice Statistics with further guidance on systems for measuring crime and criminal justice indicators (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesF/SeriesF_89E.pdf)</p> <p>Further data and analysis can be found in the 2010 Publication by UNODC/HEUNI “International Statistics on Crime and Justice” (http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/International_Statistics_on_Crime_and_Justice.pdf)</p>

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	3.5
Methods: 1	
Data: 1	

Indicator 24 Percentage of population who express confidence in police	
Definition	<p>One formulation of this indicator refers to the perception of the population regarding police performance in their area, while an alternative formulation refers to confidence in the police directly:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Taking everything into account, how good do you think the police in your area are at controlling crime? Do you think they do a very good job, a fairly good job, a fairly poor job or a very poor job? b) Taking everything into account I have confidence in the police in this area? A: Very confident/fairly confident/not very confident/ not at all confident/don't know.
Current applicability and measurability	<p>Both indicators are used to measure confidence in the police. Both indicators are collected through sample surveys among the general population, most often through crime victimization surveys: such surveys, initially promoted by international organizations, are becoming part of the regular production of national statistical systems.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) This indicator measures the perception of the population in the effectiveness of the police operating in their immediate neighbourhood but is also used as indicative of the level of trust in the police generally. The formulation has been widely used in the ICVS. b) The question on confidence has been used in national surveys, such as the British Crime Survey as an alternative measure in the confidence in the local police. <p>Comparability of the indicators across countries may be influenced by different perceptions of authorities, differences in feelings of security and differences in the cognition of questions.</p> <p>This indicator has a medium level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>The perception of the police as being competent, fair and trustworthy is an important factor in trust in law enforcement. Viewing the police as efficient, fair and legitimate increases the feeling of security and is associated with a greater willingness to cooperate with the police and to report crime and may lead to higher compliance with the law. For the police, the level of trustworthiness is an important indicator of police performance, especially when pursuing crime prevention strategies such as 'neighbourhood policing'.</p>
International, regional,	<p>At international level, there is no comprehensive data repository on</p>

and national data sources and availability	perceptions of and confidence in the police. Selected data have been collected in national and international crime victimization surveys, such as the British Crime Survey or the International Crime Victimization Survey(ICVS), which has been conducted in over 70 countries worldwide between 1992 and 2005 and several more countries since then. Many of these surveys include one or two of the above question formulations.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	UNODC-UNECE Manual on Victimization Surveys (2010)

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	2.5
Methods: 0.5	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 25 Percentage of prisoners who report having experienced physical or sexual victimization while imprisoned over the past 6 months	
Definition	Prisoners who have been victim of intentional acts of physical or sexual violence (by any type of perpetrator) during the last 6 months, as a percentage of all prisoners
Current applicability and measurability	<p>This indicator measures the prevalence of the most common forms of physical and sexual violence against prisoners. Measurement should be both on inmate-on-inmate violence and on staff-on-inmate violence. Since the reporting rate to authorities of such crimes is considered to be very low, data for this indicator need to be collected through sample surveys on the prison population. Appropriate questions can be part of a survey of prison conditions and need to be carefully designed in order to produce valid estimates of physical and sexual violence in prisons. Issues like the choice of sample frame (all or selected prisons only), wording of questions, survey mode (face-to-face, self-administered written, etc.) and non-response may influence the accuracy of results.</p> <p>This indicator has a low level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	Prisons are often experienced as places with high levels of violence by inmates. At the same time, keeping persons placed under the custody of the state, such as prison inmates, safe from physical and sexual harm is a core responsibility of the state and its penitentiary system. The indicator can thus provide a measurement of safety and victimization risk in prison settings and has direct policy implications for the state penitentiary system. Further refinement of the indicators by sex, type of perpetrator, type of prison setting, etc. will provide further insights into the safety of penal institutions.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	At international level, there is no comprehensive data repository on physical or sexual victimization during imprisonment. At the national level, a few countries carry out regular surveys among current or former prisoners on prison conditions, including physical or sexual victimization. A number of limited small-scale surveys have been carried out by academic researchers and human rights groups, using different methodologies and question wording leading to widely diverging results.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	Methodological documentation has been developed by countries that conducted such surveys (for example, US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, and the Scottish Prison Service)

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 0.5	2
Methods: 0.5	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 26 Proportion of violent criminal cases formally initiated that are resolved	
Definition	<p>Number of violent criminal cases (intentional homicide, assault, rape, robbery) formally under investigation by the police that were formally resolved within a certain time period, as a percentage of all violent criminal cases for which formal investigation was commenced by the police over one year.</p> <p>A common definition that is widely used is restricted to the number of completed intentional homicide offences formally cleared by the police:</p> <p>Number of completed intentional homicide offences (victims) for which a suspect has been identified or which has otherwise been solved by the police, as a percentage of all completed intentional homicide offences over one year.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>The number of violent offences (intentional homicide, assault, rape, robbery) “cleared” by the police, out of all investigations initiated by the police, is an indicator that is widely used by police forces to measure performance and effectiveness of law enforcement bodies.</p> <p>It is based on statistical data on criminal offences using a case management system that records when a new case (consisting of one or several offences) has been formally taken up and when it has been disposed of and for what reasons. The indicator can be calculated accurately only when linking individual cases over time through a case management system and should not be calculated on aggregate data on cases initiated and cases resolved.</p> <p>Given the requirements for the case management system, the indicator could be restricted to measure the clearance rate for completed intentional homicide offences.</p> <p>This indicator has a medium level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>The percentage of completed intentional homicide offences cleared by the police provide an indicator of police performance in the case of the most violent crime, the intentional unlawful killing of a person. A further level of disaggregation by situational context (by intimate partner, linked to robbery, gangs or organized crime) and type of weapon used (firearm, knife, other means) will add further insights to these indicators.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>At international level, data on clearance rates for completed intentional homicide are routinely collected by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC): (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html);</p>

	<p>At national level, data on clearance rates for a number of violent crimes (intentional homicide, assault, rape, robbery) are regularly produced by police administrative reports.</p> <p>It should be noted that comparability of data are challenged by different definitions of ‘clearance’ among national jurisdictions based on legal requirements and national recording practices. A case may be counted as ‘cleared’ when a suspect has been identified and the case is passed on to the next stage of the criminal justice procedure (prosecution), when the suspect is known to have died or is found to be not criminally liable, or when a suspect has been identified but is not or no longer available for arrest.</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>Definitions and classifications used by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the annual data collection on crime and criminal justice (UN Crime Trends Survey – UN CTS) are the international standards in use.</p>

Scale	
Definition: 1	Total
Sources: 0.5	3
Methods: 0.5	
Data: 1	

Indicator 27 Percentage of total detainees in pre-sentence detention	
Definition	<p>The total number of persons held in detention who have not yet been sentenced, as a percentage of the total number of persons held in detention, on a specified date.</p> <p>‘Sentenced’ refers to persons subject to criminal proceedings who have received a decision from a competent authority regarding their conviction or acquittal. For the purposes of the indicator, persons who have received a ‘non-final’ decision (such as where a conviction is subject to appeal) are considered to be ‘sentenced’.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>The percentage of total detainees in pre-sentence detention is applicable to all countries in light of the widespread use of the measure in criminal justice systems. While subject to some methodological challenges – such as ensuring that all places of detention are included nationally – the indicator has a high degree of measurability on the basis of administrative and court records.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>The indicator signifies overall respect for the principle that persons awaiting trial shall not be detained in custody. This, in turn, is premised on aspects of the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. From a development perspective, extensive use of pre-sentence detention when not necessary for reasons such as to prevent absconding, to protect victims or witnesses, or to prevent the commission of further offences, can divert criminal justice system resources, and exert financial and unemployment burdens on the accused and his or her family. Measuring the relative extent to which pre-sentence detention is used can assist countries in lowering such burdens and ensuring its proportionate use.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>At international level, data on the number of persons held in pre-sentence detention is available from the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS). At regional level, data is available from a number of collection initiatives including Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics (SPACE) and OAS Observatory on Citizen Security Data Repository. Data is available for almost all countries in the world.</p>
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	<p>The indicator is most commonly measured using data from administrative records. National decisions that need to be taken when collecting data for the indicator include the definition of ‘detention’ (data should include for example all persons held in police cells for more than a certain number of hours as well as persons in administrative detention), as well as the day of</p>

	<p>the year on which the data is collected. Data from all individual places of detention (which may be managed by different government authorities) must be aggregated and used for overall calculation of the indicator. Guidance on collection of information on detained persons, as well as example data collection sheets, is provided in the United Nations Manual for the Development of a System of Criminal Justice Statistics, as well as (for children), the UNODC/UNICEF Manual for the Measurement of Juvenile Justice Indicators.</p>
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Indicator 28 Percentage of victims of violent crimes who reported victimization to law enforcement or other authorities	
Definition	<p>Number of victims of violent crime who reported the incident to law enforcement or other authorities, as a percentage of all victims of violent crime; by type of violent crime (threats, assault, rape, robbery)</p> <p>Law enforcement authorities include police, prosecutors or other authorities with competencies to investigate certain crimes (such as corruption or fraud), while ‘other authorities’ may include a variety of institutions with a role in the informal justice or dispute resolution (e.g. tribal or religious leaders, village elders, community leaders, local militias), depending on local contexts.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>Reporting rates of crimes are known to vary widely by type of crime and indicate what proportion of crimes experienced are and are not reported to the police or other authorities. As administrative data do not capture crime that is not reported, reporting rates can only be estimated based on data from crime victimization survey. Such surveys, initially promoted by international organizations, are becoming part of the regular production of national statistical systems.</p> <p>This indicator has a high level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>Reporting rates typically are higher for more serious crimes than for lesser crimes and are influenced by the level of trust and confidence in the ability of the police or other authority to provide effective redress. As such, reporting rates provide an indirect measure of the confidence of victims of crime in the ability of the police or other authorities to provide assistance and bring perpetrators to justice. Together with prevalence rates of victimization from violent crimes, reporting rates provide also a measure of the ‘dark figure’ of crime, that is that proportion of violent crimes not reported to the police. Trends in reporting rates also help to understand trends in reported crime that may not be due to underlying changes in the levels of crime.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>At international level, there is no comprehensive data repository on the percentage of victims of crimes who reported victimization to law enforcement or other authorities. Selected data have been collected in national and international crime victimization surveys, such as the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS), which has been conducted in over 70 countries worldwide between 1992 and 2005 and several more countries since then. Many of these surveys include</p>

	questions on reporting rates by type of crime, including violent crime.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	UNODC-UNECE Manual on Victimization Surveys (2010)

Scale	
Definition: 1	Total
Sources: 1	3.5
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 29 Percentage of defendants in criminal cases who are represented in court by legal counsel or by non-lawyers, where relevant.	
Definition	<p>The total number of defendants in criminal cases who are represented by legal counsel or by a non-lawyer when allowed by the national system, as a percentage of the total number of defendants in criminal cases, on a specific date.</p> <p>“Defendants” refers to any person served with a writ of summons or process, or served with notice of, or entitled to attend, any proceedings, or charged with an offence (according to the United Nations Multilingual Terminology Database¹⁰³).</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>Access to legal counsel is a universal principle. As such, indicator is applicable globally. However in some countries, in particular post-conflict and transitional countries access to legal counsel is limited by the few numbers of lawyers available or by the inexistence of legal aid systems.</p> <p>Challenges relate to the definition of Legal Aid. It is currently defined widely to include legal advice, assistance and representation, legal education, access to legal information and other services provided for persons through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and restorative justice processes. Therefore, it needs to be decided whether the indicator should focus only on legal representation by a lawyer or if it should go beyond legal counsel. The other option is to also consider advice and representation by non-lawyers, and this will reflect the true situation in certain countries where representation by non-lawyers is permitted. If this is the approach taken, the findings should be presented separately (i.e. how many are represented/advised by a lawyer and how many by non-lawyer).</p> <p>According to the new UN Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems, legal aid should be provided throughout the criminal justice process. In practice, however, legal representation is rarely provided at the pre-trial and post-trial stages. It is therefore suggested that the data collected will be disaggregated by the different phases of the criminal process, and accordingly, questions will refer to</p>

¹⁰³ See <http://unterm.un.org>

	<p>these different phases.</p> <p>It should be taken into account that the indicator will not show the actual quality of services or effectiveness of legal representation, but will establish a useful common ground for comparing and for measuring progress.</p>
<p>Why is it relevant?</p>	<p>Representation by a lawyer is an essential element of a fair, humane and efficient criminal justice system that is based on the rule of law and that it is a foundation for the enjoyment of other rights, including the right to a fair trial, as a precondition to exercising such rights and an important safeguard that ensures fundamental fairness and public trust in the criminal justice process.</p> <p>State-funded legal aid is essential in ensuring that legal advice and assistance is available. This is crucial in terms of securing legal empowerment of the poor. Without access to legal aid, the poor or disadvantaged are vulnerable to unfair treatment, unlawful actions and bribe-taking. In many countries arrest can result in detention for months, and sometimes years, without charge, trial or conviction. Detention facilities are often seriously overcrowded and dangerous, and are breeding grounds for torture, criminality, and corruption. They also act as incubators of disease, and the release of detainees still suffering from untreated diseases contracted whilst in prison adversely affects the health of the wider community.</p>
<p>International, regional, and national data sources and availability</p>	<p>Data sources include court administrative records and national criminal justice statistical systems,</p> <p>Also, National Legal Aid Authorities can also be approached for data, as well as NGOs providing legal aid services on a voluntary basis.</p> <p>Currently the Global Justice Project collects global data on legal aid in the context of rule of law indicators (see http://worldjusticeproject.org/questionnaires.)</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>No standard methodology has been developed to compute this indicator, which should be based on sample surveys of defendants.</p> <p>Survey methodologies are currently being considered jointly between UNODC and UNDP.</p>

Indicator 30 Average length of time spent in pre-sentence detention	
Definition	<p>The average number of continuous days spent in detention by persons completing a period of pre-sentence detention (greater than one day) in a specified year, counted from the first day of deprivation of liberty following arrest or apprehension.</p> <p>‘Sentence’ refers to a decision from a competent authority regarding conviction or acquittal. For the purposes of the indicator, persons who have received a ‘non-final’ sentencing decision (such as where a conviction is subject to appeal) are considered to be ‘sentenced’.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>The length of time spent in pre-sentence detention is applicable to all countries in light of the widespread use of the measure in criminal justice systems. While subject to some methodological challenges – such as ensuring that all places of detention are included nationally – the indicator has a medium degree of measurability on the basis of administrative and court records.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>The indicator signifies overall respect for the principle that persons awaiting trial shall not be detained in custody. This, in turn, is premised on aspects of the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. From a development perspective, long periods of pre-sentence detention can divert criminal justice system resources, and exert financial and unemployment burdens on the accused and his or her family. Measuring the average time spent in pre-sentence detention can assist countries in lowering such burdens and ensuring its proportionate use.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>At international and regional level, data on the length of time spent in pre-sentence detention are quite limited. Sources such as the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS), the Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics (SPACE) and OAS Observatory on Citizen Security Data Repository do not routinely collect such information.</p> <p>Whilst theoretically calculable for most prison systems, comparatively few countries currently make national data on pre-sentence detention duration publically available.</p>
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	<p>The average length of time spent in pre-sentence detention can be calculated from administrative detention records. Where persons have been detained continuously, but in different places of detention (such as police cells, remand facilities, and prisons), it is important that administrative records are able to track the total length of time spent in <i>all</i></p>

	<p>places of detention.</p> <p>Where administrative records are not sufficiently detailed, sample surveys of persons exiting detention may be used as a data source.</p> <p>Guidance on collection of information on detained persons, as well as example data collection sheets, is provided in the United Nations Manual for the Development of a System of Criminal Justice Statistics, as well as (for children), the UNODC/UNICEF Manual for the Measurement of Juvenile Justice Indicators.</p>
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Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	3
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 31 Number of children in detention per 100 000 child population	
Definition	<p>The number of children held in detention per 100 000 child population, on a specified date.</p> <p>For the purposes of the indicator, a child is held in detention where he or she is placed in any form of detention or imprisonment in a public or private setting, from which the child is not permitted, by order of any competent authority, to leave at will.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>The number of children in detention is applicable to all countries in light of the widespread use of the measure in criminal justice and juvenile justice systems. While subject to some methodological challenges – such as ensuring that all places of detention are included nationally – the indicator has a high degree of measurability on the basis of administrative prison records.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>Children in detention are especially vulnerable to its negative influences, including a higher risk of being subjected to violence and abuse. International standards state that detention of children shall only be used as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>At international level, data on children in detention is available from the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS). At regional level, data is available from a number of collection initiatives including the UNICEF TransMONEE Database and the OAS Observatory on Citizen Security Data Repository. Data is available for the majority of countries in the world.</p>
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	<p>The indicator is most commonly measured using data from administrative records. National decisions that need to be taken when collecting data for the indicator include the definition of ‘detention’ (data should include for example all children held in police cells for more than a certain number of hours, as well as children held in remand homes, closed educational or rehabilitation facilities, and prisons), as well as the day of the year on which the data is collected. Data from all individual places of detention (which may be managed by different government authorities) must be aggregated and used for overall calculation of the indicator. Guidance on collection of information on detained children, is provided in the UNODC/UNICEF Manual for the Measurement of Juvenile Justice Indicators.</p>

Indicator 32 Proportion of businesses reporting confidence in enforceability of contracts in national courts	
Definition	<p>The proportion of businesses that report confidence levels of ‘4’ or ‘5’ that legal contracts can be enforced in national courts (on a 5-point confidence scale where 1 is lowest confidence, and 5 is highest confidence).</p> <p>For the purposes of the indicator, a ‘legal contract’ is an agreement between two or more persons or entities, recognized by law, in which there is a promise to do or not to do something in exchange for sufficient value.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>Legal contracts represent an almost universal modality of business, production, trade, and employment activities involving more than one person or entity. An indicator in contract enforcement is therefore applicable to all countries.</p> <p>As a perception-based measure, the indicator has a medium degree of measurability through business sample surveys.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>Certainty in performance of agreements is central to economic development. Agreements for exchange of goods, services and value, permit firms and individuals to specialize, leading to division of labour, productivity and growth.</p> <p>Whilst legal contracts can be enforced in many different ways (including by private mechanisms, by government regulatory authorities, and by arbitration or mediation), courts can be one of the most important public institutions for contract enforcement. They thus play a significant role in the provision of legal certainty of the performance of agreements.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>At international and regional level, data on business perceptions of the enforceability of contracts in national courts are not widely available, though the World Bank Enterprise Surveys may provide one possible source of information. Related data derived from expert perceptions, such as the number of days required to enforce a contract, the costs of doing so, and the number of procedural steps required are, however, available from the World Bank.</p> <p>At the national level, a number of countries have carried out sample-based business perception surveys that include questions on perceived enforceability of contracts.</p>
Tools, methodologies and standards for	<p>The indicator is measured using business sample surveys. The sample frame for such surveys should take account of business size, geographic</p>

measurement	location within the country, and enterprise sector. Standardized survey instruments are not widely available and are typically developed according to national priorities and needs at country level.
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Indicator 33 Percentage of criminal cases decided upon within a timeframe of 1 year (first instance)	
Definition	The total number of criminal cases who are decided upon by a court of first instance, as a percentage of the total number of criminal cases, at a specific date.
Current applicability and measurability	The indicator is globally applicable. It will measure the efficiency of the criminal justice process. Measurability will depend on access to court records and use of case management systems.
Why is it relevant?	<p>The <i>UN Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels</i> recognizes the importance of rule of law for development and economic growth and consequently the importance of strengthening justice and security institutions, ensuring that they are accessible and responsive to the needs and rights of all individuals.</p> <p>From a development perspective it is key to expand access to justice for poor and disadvantaged groups in society who do not fully benefit from the protection of the law in their daily lives. Justice needs to be efficient to meet the needs of poor people in particular. Efficient justice will lead to reduced use and length of pre-trial detention.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	National case management systems and court records would contain the relevant information.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	There are currently no particular tools or methodologies for this indicator

Indicator 34 Intentional homicide by firearm rate (per 100 000 population)	
Definition	Intentional homicide by firearm is the intentional homicide committed with a firearm; the rate is defined as the total count of intentional homicides by firearm divided by the total resident population, expressed per 100 000 population.
Current applicability and measurability	In all countries an important share of homicides are committed with a firearm and this indicator has therefore a global applicability. It is based on statistical data routinely produced by law enforcement authorities and/or public health institutions, with a high degree of international comparability. This indicator has a high level of measurability.
Why is it relevant?	While further empirical research is needed to disentangle the complex relationship between firearms and homicides, firearms often facilitate homicidal violence by strengthening the link between violence, accessibility to lethal weapons and readiness to use them. Availability of data on intentional homicides by firearms is an essential element to evaluate firearms control policies.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	At international level, data on intentional homicides by firearms are routinely collected and disseminated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC): (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html); the World Health Organization produces figures on homicides by firearms as part of its activities of data collection on mortality by cause (...). At national level, data on intentional homicides by firearms are regularly produced by either criminal justice or public health sources, or both.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	Definitions and classifications used by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the annual data collection on crime and criminal justice (UN Crime Trends Survey – UN CTS) are the international standards in use. Further guidance will be provided by the forthcoming International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS). Data on homicides by firearm produced by public health authorities are guided by the International classification of diseases (ICD-10) ¹⁰⁴ .

¹⁰⁴ See <http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/>

Scale	
Definition: 1	Total
Sources: 1	3.5
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 35 Level of production of cocaine and opium	
Definition	<p>Amount of cocaine base (of 100% purity) potentially manufactured illicitly per year.</p> <p>Amount of opium (oven-dry weight) potentially produced illicitly per year.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>While production of cocaine and opium is concentrated in a small number of countries, it determines the global supply of two illicit drugs (cocaine and heroin) and therefore has a global relevance.</p> <p>Production estimates are based on estimates of the area under illicit crop cultivation and yield estimates. Cultivation area estimates are available for all major producing countries by means of highly sophisticated systems for statistical monitoring of illicit crops. For some countries, yield estimates for recent years are not available And this contributes to a certain level of uncertainty in the production estimates.</p> <p>The measurability of the indicator is high.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>Opium is the base for heroin, together with cocaine one of the main problem drugs. The amount produced annually determines how much drug enters the market, basically defining the challenge both for law enforcement and for health systems. A larger quantity of drugs produced indicates more money potentially being made by organized crime groups, more law enforcement efforts necessary to detect illicit drug shipments, more drug-related crime happening. Thus, the indicator is a good measurement of the magnitude of the drug problem the global community and individual Member States are facing.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>The sources are national monitoring systems of illicit drugs, based on area surveys and imagery surveys, regularly published by concerned countries The indicator is published annually in UNODC's World Drug Report¹⁰⁵, based on national surveys and Member State reports</p> <p>For cocaine, the indicator is available until 2008 (UNODC), while it is expected to be produced again in the near future once revised conversion ratios from coca leaf to cocaine will be produced for some of the major producing countries</p>
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	<p>The main tools are national surveys implemented following a complex and validated methodological protocol, developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The survey results are subject to a</p>

¹⁰⁵ See <http://www.unodc.org/wdr/>

	quality control mechanism established at international level and procedures for estimation and quality control are published in national survey reports (for national estimates) as well as in the World Drug Reports (for global estimates).
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Scale	
Definition: 1	Total
Sources: 1	3.5
Methods: 0.5	
Data: 1	

Indicator 36 Value of illicit economy as a percentage of GDP	
Definition	Total value of income arising from criminal activities over a 12 months period, as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product over the same period
Current applicability and measurability	<p>Various estimates of the value of the illicit economy have been made on the national level and a few at the global level. Estimates vary depending on the definitions of ‘illicit’ as opposed to the broader concepts of shadow, underground or informal economy. The illicit economy is often understood as comprising income from criminal activities such as drug dealing, burglary, robbery, etc.</p> <p>This indicator has a low level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	Income from illicit activities represent a damage to the rightful owners of property or capital and thus constitute a burden on society. Income from illicit activities is often used for expanding the reach and operational capacities of criminal groups and thereby increase their power to commit more crime and influence individuals and groups.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	At international level, there is no comprehensive data repository on the value of the illicit economy as a percentage of GDP. A number of studies have been carried out by academic researchers, using different methodologies and definitions leading to widely diverging results.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	UNODC, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and other Transnational Organized Crimes, Research Report, 2011

Scale	
Definition: 0	Total
Sources: 0	1
Methods: 0.5	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 37 Percentage of the adult population who have experienced what they consider racially or ethnically-motivated violence¹⁰⁶ within the last 12 months	
Definition	Number of adults (18+) who have been victim of selected and intentional acts of violence considered by them to be partly or completely racially or ethnically-motivated during the last 12 months, as percentage of all adults, by racial, ethnic or minority group
Current applicability and measurability	This indicator measures the prevalence of racially or ethnically-motivated violence and it is globally relevant as such practices occur in all regions and countries of the world. Given that violent crimes, and in particular racially or ethnically-motivated crimes, are often underreported to the authorities, this indicator is based on data collected through sample surveys of the general population, or on particular minorities or ethnic groups. Such surveys are being implemented in a growing number of countries. A standardized survey has been carried out in all 27 Member States of the European Union by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) ¹⁰⁷ . This indicator has a medium level of measurability.
Why is it relevant?	Governments have a particular duty to protect vulnerable groups in society from violence and human rights violations. Knowing about the percentage of the adult population, and in particularly about the percentage of the adult population with a particular racial, ethnic, minority or immigrant background, who have experienced racially or ethnically-motivated violence, will help governments to understand the patterns and extent of these forms of aggravated crimes in order to take preventive and protective action. The regular production of figures on this indicator will raise awareness on this form of violence, which often remains hidden or tolerated.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	At international level, there is no comprehensive data repository on prevalence of racially or ethnically-motivated violence. Selected data have been collected in general or specific crime victimization surveys, such as in the British Crime Survey or in selected countries employing the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS). The 2008

¹⁰⁶ Such an indicator could potentially include violence motivated by the victim's perceived sexual orientation

¹⁰⁷ European Union Minorities and Victimisation Survey – EU-MIDIS

<http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2012/eu-midis-data-focus-report-6-minorities-victims-crime>

	European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey also produced data on minorities as victims of racially motivated crime (serious harassment, assault or threats that happened over the last 12 months partly or completely because of an immigrant or minority background).
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	UNODC-UNECE Manual on Victimization Surveys (2010) European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS), Minorities as Victims of Crime, 2012 Ministry of Justice of the UK, Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2010

Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	3
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 38 Percentage of mandatory requirements of the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols that are reflected in domestic legislation of reporting States parties	
Definition	<p>Mandatory requirements are taken from the Convention and include requirements from the protocols: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.</p> <p>The elements to be considered are all those mandatory provisions of the Organized Crime Convention and its protocols that require legislative measures. Articles are considered as ‘included in domestic legislation’ when every relevant provision of the article is reflected in domestic legislation, as appropriate, otherwise the entire article is considered as ‘not yet’ included in domestic legislation.</p> <p>A percentage is calculated based on the total number of mandatory articles of the Convention and its Protocols that require legislative actions to be taken by reporting State parties.</p> <p>There are the following numbers of mandatory provisions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convention – 107 • Protocol on Trafficking in Persons – 29 • Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants – 48 • Protocol on Trafficking in Firearms – 28
Current applicability and measurability	<p>Indicator is globally applicable and relevant (177 States Parties to UNTOC, 157 to the Human Trafficking Protocol, 137 to the Migrants Smuggling Protocol and 101 to the Firearms Protocol). The Organized Crime Convention is one of the most widely ratified treaties dealing with criminal law. The mandatory requirements give a wide scope to measure the national response to combat transnational organized crime. However, the Convention does not have a reporting mechanism in line with article 32(5). Voluntary reporting takes place using the omnibus self-assessment survey. This indicator has a low global level of measurability..</p>

<p>Why is it relevant?</p>	<p>The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, is the main international instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime. State parties to the Convention bind themselves to taking a series of mandatory measures against transnational organized crime, including the creation of domestic criminal offences (participation in an organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption and obstruction of justice); liability of legal persons, protection of witnesses, assistance to and protection of victims and the adoption of frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation.</p> <p>This indicator relates to the goal to “Ensure Stable and Peaceful Societies” and the associated target to “Stem the stressors that lead to violence and conflict, including those related to organized crime”. Through the adoption of a standard legislative framework, States are better prepared to take measures to cooperate internationally in the fight against transnational organized crime. The protocols also provide the basis for common international standards in.</p> <p>Existing tools, such as the Omnibus Survey Software can be used by any State party to self-assess implementation, establishing a baseline against which progress can be measured in reporting States. Fully implementing the mandatory requirements of the Organized Crime Convention and its Protocols is proof of States parties will to fulfil their international commitments to combat transnational organized crime.</p>
<p>International, regional, and national data sources and availability</p>	<p>The United Nations Treaty Collection maintains up-to-date information on the ratification status of the Convention and protocols. UNODC collects information on implementation of the mandatory requirements of the Organized Crime Convention and its Protocols through the Omnibus Self-Assessment Survey. Other tools such as the Annual Report Questionnaire (Part I. Legislative and institutional framework) can also be used for this purpose.</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>Consideration of whether a mandatory requirement is included in domestic legislation or not is founded on self-reporting and a comparative analysis by the Secretariat, based on the relevant principles and instruments of international law.</p> <p>On domestic legislation, the information is gathered through the Omnibus Self-assessment Survey and the Annual Report Questionnaire. States parties could also choose to make use of other UNODC tools specifically focused on needs assessments.</p>

Scale	
Definition: 1	Total
Sources: 0.5	2
Methods: 1	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 39 Percentage of countries that are party to international instruments related to drug control, corruption, transnational organized crime, and the illicit trade in arms	
Definition	The total global number of approvals, acceptances, accessions, successions or ratifications of (i) the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 (as amended); (ii) the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971; (iii) the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988; (iv) the United Nations Convention against Corruption; (v) the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; (vi) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; (vii) the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, (viii) the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; (ix) the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; and (x) the Arms Trade Treaty, as a percentage of total possible approvals, acceptances, accessions, successions or ratifications representing universal adherence by all countries.
Current applicability and measurability	<p>International instruments related to drug control, corruption, transnational organized crime and the trade in arms are open to approval, acceptance, accession, succession or ratification by all countries. Taken as a single global measurement, the indicator provides information on the extent of international legal obligations undertaken towards a global enabling environment.</p> <p>The act of becoming a State Party to an international instrument is recorded by the United Nations Secretary-General in his capacity as depository. The indicator therefore has a high degree of measurability from depository notifications.</p>
Why is it relevant?	The international legal framework related to penal matters, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances sets out internationally agreed commitments that may be undertaken by countries towards reducing illicit flows, regulating use and trade, and promoting confiscation of proceeds of crime. Measurement of the number of States parties to such instruments provides information on the degree to which countries have undertaken obligations to harmonize national laws and to take common preventative steps.

International, regional, and national data sources and availability	Global information on approval, acceptance, accession, succession, or ratification of the instruments included in the definition of the indicator is available from the Treaty Section of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	The Database of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General (http://treaties.un.org) provides standardised reporting on signatures, approvals, acceptances, accessions, successions, and ratifications, as well as declarations and reservations for all of the instruments included in the definition of the indicator.

Indicator 40 Value of the annual opium or coca production at farm-gate	
Definition	The farm-gate value of an illicit crop is the total value of product when it leaves the farm. It is a composite of the average price of the product at which it is sold by the farm (the farm-gate price) and the total (potential) production.
Current applicability and measurability	<p>The farm-gate value of illicit crop production in a Member State represents the total, potential gross income accrued by farmers from illicit crop production.</p> <p>It is a composite of production estimates and price data. Production estimates are based on estimates of the area under illicit crop cultivation and yield estimates. Cultivation area estimates are available for all major producing countries in good quality. For some countries, annual yield estimates are available but not for all. This contributes to a certain level of uncertainty in the production estimates. All major producing countries have price monitoring systems in place.</p> <p>The measurability of the indicator is high.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>Illicit crop production is often linked to the lack of alternative, licit ways of farmers that secure livelihoods. The farm-gate value is used for measuring the degree to which rural livelihoods depend on illicit crops. This indicator is often brought into relation with licit GDP and/or the value of the licit agricultural sector.</p> <p>One way of reducing illicit crop production in a Member State is “Alternative Development”. Alternative development is a process that aims at preventing and reducing the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotics and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national growth and sustainable development efforts in countries.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	Data sources for this indicator are national drug plant production estimates and national price monitoring systems. The indicator is estimated in all major illicit crop surveys undertaken by UNODC.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	<p>Production estimates are based on well-established yield and cultivation estimates using a scientific, UNODC approved methodology. Procedures for estimations and quality control have been established by UNODC and are published in national survey reports,</p> <p>http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop-monitoring/index.html</p>

Scale	
Definition: 1	Total
Sources: 1	3.5
Methods: 0.5	
Data: 1	

Indicator 41 Percentage of total production of cocaine and heroin seized (global interception rate)	
Definition	Global aggregate quantities of heroin and cocaine seized annually, adjusted for purity and expressed as a percentage of illicitly manufactured heroin and cocaine, respectively
Current applicability and measurability	<p>This indicator builds on two separate components: seizure quantities and manufacture estimates. Heroin trafficking and consumption on a substantial scale occurs in most countries worldwide; cocaine trafficking also affects a very large number of countries but the volumes of consumption are likely concentrated in the Americas and Europe. Manufacture of heroin and cocaine are concentrated in a small number of countries. Interception rates as defined here are most useful at a global level; while it is conceivable to express national seizures as a percentage of quantities manufactured globally, at national level it would be much more relevant (but also difficult) to express seizures as a proportion of quantities transiting the given country. A major drawback is the uncertainty in purities; related to this is the differentiation of the illicit drug in different chemical forms.</p> <p>This indicator has a low level of measurability.</p>
Why is it relevant?	Seizure quantities reflect the combined effect of two concomitant factors: the availability of drugs in the illicit markets, which is itself one of the stressors leading to violence and conflict, and the efforts of law enforcement authorities to stem this availability. The interception rate attempts to disentangle the second of these components from the first, and effectively helps to assess the relative success of law enforcement efforts in reducing the illicit flows of cocaine and heroin.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>The global interception rate for heroin and cocaine has been estimated in the past by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in some editions of the World Drug Report.</p> <p>http://www.unodc.org/wdr/en/previous-reports.html</p> <p>However, due to the difficulties in producing accurate estimates based on the available data, UNODC does not systematically update these estimates.</p>
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	<p>The concept of a global interception rate is theoretically clear, but obtaining accurate estimations on the available data is an open challenge.</p> <p>This task would be much more tractable if detailed information were made available from a large and diverse set of countries on the</p>

	distribution of seizures by purity.
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Scale	
Definition: 1	Total
Sources: 0.5	2
Methods: 0	
Data: 0.5	

Indicator 42 Value of laundered proceeds of crime that are confiscated/forfeited	
Definition	<p>The indicator measures how much money as a direct consequence of money laundering is confiscated/forfeited.</p> <p>For the purposes of the indicator, ‘confiscation’ which includes forfeiture, means the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>The international community recognised the need to permanently deprive criminals of their laundered proceeds of crime and to send the message that crime does not pay. All countries have confiscation/forfeiture mechanisms in place to attain this goal. The indicator is thus applicable at national level. The value of laundered proceeds of crime that are confiscated/forfeited shows a high degree of measurability from administrative records of prosecution and court institutions.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>Information on the value of laundered proceeds of crime that are confiscated/forfeited unveils trends and patterns of the effectiveness of a national government to combat illicit financial flows.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>At national level, data for this indicator are produced by judicial authorities. At international level, no data sources are available.</p>
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	<p>Most judicial authorities have data available on how much money as a direct consequence of money laundering is confiscated/forfeited, usually contained in court records as the outcome of conviction based confiscation/forfeiture or non-conviction based confiscation/forfeiture procedures. Not all countries can produce statistical data on confiscations /forfeitures primarily due to a lack of financial resources to have adequate systems in place to capture the relevant data.</p>

Indicator 43 Total amount of assets frozen or returned within the last 12 months	
Definition	<p>Indicator may cover two measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Total amount of assets returned over specific time period – Total amount of asset frozen over specific time period
Current applicability and measurability	<p>According to <i>Tracking anti-corruption and asset recovery commitments</i>¹⁰⁸ (StAR/OECD, 2011) the following issues are frequently encountered when collecting data on asset recovery:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data on corruption and asset recovery cases are collected at the federal level, but not at the state/provincial/canton level. In some countries, the federal government was aware of asset returns – because • They involved mutual legal assistance requests that went through federal authorities – but was not able to collect information on all asset tracing investigations and freezing orders, because these could be initiated by prosecutors and investigating magistrates at the state/provincial/canton level. • Data on domestic and foreign cases, whether pertaining to corruption or asset recovery, are not counted separately. • Data on money laundering offences do not distinguish the predicate offence of corruption. • Data are difficult to collect because a number of different institutions are involved in investigating and prosecuting corruption (e.g. courts, prosecutors, police, anti-corruption agencies). • Data on ongoing cases are sensitive and therefore cannot be universally provided. For example, freezing orders that have been issued without notice to the asset holder (ex parte orders) may not be shared where there is a risk that information may be leaked to the asset holder, leading to a subsequent dissipation of assets and destruction of evidence
Why is it relevant?	<p>Vast sums of financial assets are stolen from developing countries and hidden in financial centres around the world – money that could provide education, food or health services to the poor. Estimates reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and, although, there is some disagreement about these figures, it is clear that they probably exceed the level of</p>

¹⁰⁸ See <http://star.worldbank.org/star/publication/tracking-anti-corruption-and-asset-recovery-commitments>

	official development assistance by a significant margin.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	Data is currently collected from OECD member states through the StAR/OECD questionnaire.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	Other than the StAR/OECD questionnaire there are currently no particular tools or methodologies.

Indicator 44 Numbers of detected Smuggled Migrants and of Victims of Trafficking, by citizenship	
Definition	<p>Smuggled Migrants</p> <p>The citizenship of the migrants detected in destinations is an indicator that can be used as a proxy for the diffusion of certain smuggling flows. The number of smuggled migrants that are detected represents the main transits or destinations for these smuggling flows. The indicator is affected by the capacity of the relevant country to detect smuggled migrants.</p> <p>Victims of Trafficking</p> <p>National use of this indicator for trafficking would increase the comparability of data. The indicator is dependent on the ability of the country to detect and assist victims of trafficking. The citizenship of detected victims is a proxy for the diffusion of certain trafficking flows.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	The indicator can be used both Globally and Nationally.
Why is it relevant?	The indicator represents the ability of each country to detect, identify and assist smuggled migrants, and to identify and assist victims of trafficking. At the same time, the citizenship of the detected migrants and of detected victims can be used to assess the dimension of the flows at origin.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>Currently information on smuggled migrants is reported by the border control authorities in many countries, but not collectively and not everywhere. However, several countries including the United States, the EU, Australia and others countries do have a systematic data collection in place.</p> <p>Information on trafficked persons is collected and published by UNODC in its biennial Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (www.unodc.org/glotip.html)</p>
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	<p>Administrative information on smuggled migrants can be collected from Member States following the standard methods of data collection used for other types of crimes.</p> <p>At present, apart from the Global Report above, there are no other sources or methods for data on trafficked persons.</p>

Indicator 45 Total number of requests for (i) mutual legal assistance (MLA) and (ii) extradition sent and received	
Definition	<p>The total number of incoming requests received and outgoing requests sent for (i) mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and (ii) extradition in one year.</p> <p>For the purposes of the indicator, ‘mutual legal assistance’ means assistance afforded by one state to another state in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to criminal matters, including with respect to the freezing, seizing and confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime and terrorist property, irrespective of the legal basis for such assistance.</p> <p>For the purposes of the indicator, ‘extradition’ means the decision to transfer, from one state to another, a person who is wanted in the requesting state for prosecution for an extraditable offence or for the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in respect of such an offence.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>All countries engage in international cooperation in criminal matters to varying extents. The interpretation of changes in the indicator over time, however, requires contextual information, including information on underlying levels of transnational criminal activity. The indicator is thus applicable at national level. The number of requests sent and received for mutual legal assistance and extradition shows a high degree of measurability from administrative records of prosecution, court and central authorities’ institutions.</p>
Why is it relevant?	<p>International cooperation in criminal matters is critical to the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes involving a transnational element such as illicit trafficking or cross-border movement of stolen assets or proceeds of crime. At the global level, enhanced cooperation in criminal matters contributes to reduced criminal safe havens and mitigates the impact of cross-border crimes, helping to protect trade tax revenues and supporting a safer environment for legitimate business and investment.</p>
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>At the international level, data on incoming and outgoing requests for mutual legal assistance and extradition has been collected by the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS). At national level, whilst theoretically calculable for most countries, comparatively few countries currently make national data on mutual legal assistance and extradition requests publically available.</p>
Tools, methodologies	<p>The indicator is measured from administrative records of prosecution,</p>

and standards for measurement	court, and central authority institutions. No standards presently exist for counting rules in respect of the recording and reporting of numbers of international cooperation requests sent and received.
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Indicator 46 Quantity of seizures of heroin, cocaine, amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), cannabis	
Definition	Total aggregate quantities of heroin, cocaine, ATS and cannabis seized annually
Current applicability and measurability	Illicit drugs are seized in virtually every country worldwide, including countries where drugs are produced, trafficked or consumed. Hence this indicator has global as well as national relevance. It is based on data which are routinely produced by law enforcement authorities in most countries of the world. The most important methodological issue relates to purity; since purity varies greatly among different countries and within the same country, producing purity-adjusted estimates is problematic, especially in the case of ATS and for the purposes of comparisons across countries. However, the current approach of using bulk enables meaningful comparisons over time, at both national and global levels. This indicator has a medium level of measurability.
Why is it relevant?	Seizure quantities reflect the combined effect of two concomitant factors: the availability of drugs in the illicit markets, which is itself one of the stressors leading to violence and conflict, and the efforts of law enforcement authorities to stem this availability. Combined with other indicators, such as production of illicit drugs, this indicator can help the efforts of the international community to focus its efforts where they can be most effective and worthwhile.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	At the international level, data on drug seizures are collected and disseminated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC): http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/drug-trafficking.html At the regional level the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) collects and disseminate available data for the European Union (and partner countries). http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats13 At the national level seizure data are variously produced by law enforcement agencies, ministries of justice, ministries of the interior, etc. Not all countries are regularly produce data on the number of seizure cases, and not all countries are able to produce data on purity of seizures, which would be needed to produce purity-adjusted estimates.
Tools, methodologies	Definitions and classifications used by the United Nations Office on

and standards for measurement	Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the annual data collection on drug supply (UN Annual Report Questionnaire – UN ARQ – Part IV) are the international standards in use.
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Scale	
Definition: 0.5	Total
Sources: 1	3
Methods: 0.5	
Data: 1	

Annex 2: Structural indicators

Structural Indicator 1 Existence of legislation on Violence Against Women	
Definition	Existence (enactment) of national legislation criminalising violence against women in line with international standards.
Current applicability and measurability	<p>Indicator applicable in national contexts.</p> <p>Violence against women is a worldwide phenomenon which requires dedicated legislation or legal provisions. Therefore the indicator is applicable to all countries.</p> <p>The existence of legislation is measurable in most countries by reviewing official records of parliament, government gazette or national and international reports. In order to measure the quality of the legislation a number of elements will have to be taken into account in line with international standards.</p>
Why is it relevant?	Violence against women impedes the social and economic development of communities and States, as well as the achievement of internationally agreed development goals. When Member States create conditions where women are safe, healthy and fully empowered to realize their potential, women can deliver a key contribution to transforming families, communities and economies. Fighting violence against women is also an important element in breaking the cycle of violence in families and societies, which is also highly related to general criminality.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>Internationally , data on VAW legislation is collected by UN Women as well as UNODC. See following sources:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) UN Women database on violence against women at: http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/home.action 2) 2011 UN Women report “In pursuit of Justice” at http://progress.unwomen.org/ 3) Information are also contained in 2013 SG report on crime prevention and criminal justice responses to VAW (E/CN.15/2012/13) <p>A number of regional organizations such as the EU, Council of Europe, Organization of American States as well as various international and national NGOs contain relevant information. At national level the Official</p>

	<p>Gazette, Parliamentary publications or Ministry of Justice/Interior/Women Affairs website should include such information. Some countries have a dedicated observatory on the incidence of violence against women at the national level.</p> <p>National reports to the CEDAW Committee will also typically include such information (see http://tb.ohchr.org/default.aspx).</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>To review the quality of the legislation the following elements should be included (as per the <i>Model strategies and practical measures on the elimination of violence against women in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice</i> (A/RES/65/228, annex) that urges MS to adopt criminal laws that ensure that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Persons who are brought before the courts on judicial matters in respect of violent crimes or who are convicted of such crimes can be restricted in their possession and use of firearms and other regulated weapons, within the framework of their national legal systems; (ii) Individuals can be prohibited or restrained, within the framework of their national legal systems, from harassing, intimidating or threatening women; (iii) The laws on sexual violence adequately protect all persons against sexual acts that are not based on the consent of both parties; (iv) The law protects all children against sexual violence, sexual abuse, commercial sexual exploitation and sexual harassment, including crimes committed through the use of new information technologies, including the Internet; (v) Harmful traditional practices, including female genital mutilation, in all their forms, are criminalized as serious offences under the law; (vi) Trafficking in persons, especially women and girls, is criminalized; (vii) Individuals who are serving in the armed forces or in United Nations peacekeeping operations are investigated and punished for committing acts of violence against women; <p>Furthermore, and more in general, data should be gather if possible on the existence of national laws that criminalize the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1) domestic violence 2) sexual violence

	<ol style="list-style-type: none">3) sexual harassment4) stalking5) human trafficking6) force prostitution7) Forced and early marriage8) Female genital mutilation9) Crime against women committed in the name of honour10) Harmful practices11) Gender-related killings/femicide12) Forced abortion and sterilization13) Physical violence14) Psychological violence15) Economic violence. <p>Concluding observations of the CEDAW Committee (see http://tb.ohchr.org/default.aspx) as well as country reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/CountryVisits.aspx), its causes and consequences can useful serve as a reference to review quality of legislation.</p>
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Structural Indicator 2 Existence of a national crime prevention strategy in line with international standards	
Definition	The indicator measures the existence of a national crime prevention strategy, which is a time-bound strategic document outlining the country's strategy to prevent crime, developed through a participative process with all levels of government and civil society and adopted at highest national level. Crime prevention comprises strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes. (<i>UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime, ECOSOC Resolution 2002/13, Annex.</i>)
Current applicability and measurability	<p>Indicator applicable in national contexts.</p> <p>Some regions have also adopted regional crime prevention strategies which can be accounted for under this indicator.</p> <p>Most countries would benefit from adopting such a strategy, to avoid ad hoc short-term responses to crime and to allow for crime prevention measures to be linked to development.</p> <p>Measurement will include reviewing some basic elements of the strategy to ensure that international standards are being met.</p>
Why is it relevant?	Crime and violence hamper development. Well-planned crime prevention strategies not only prevent crime and victimization, but also promote community safety and contribute to the sustainable development of countries. Effective, responsible crime prevention enhances the quality of life of all citizens. It has long-term benefits in terms of reducing the costs associated with the formal criminal justice system, as well as other social costs that result from crime (see 2002 UN Guidelines on the Prevention of Crime).
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	<p>Data on crime prevention strategies has been collected in 2006/2007 by UNODC through an Information-gathering instrument on the United Nations standards and norms related primarily to the prevention of crime. See ECOSOC Resolution 2006/20, which includes the instrument. A similar exercise could be done again, or on a regular basis to collect data for this indicator.</p> <p>Also, data can be collected by UNODC field offices, PNIs and from regional organizations. For example, the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS) collects information on national crime prevention policies</p>

	<p>in Europe. National crime prevention institutes, criminology institutes, ministries of public security, justice or social affairs should also be able to provide such information.</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>The UNODC Crime Prevention Assessment Tool provides a good methodology to assess national crime prevention strategies (see http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Crime_Prevention_Assessment_Tool.pdf)</p> <p>Data on the quality of these strategies data should include information on whether these strategies are in line with the basic principles set out in the 2002 Guidelines, i.e.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Government leadership - Socio-economic development and inclusion - Cooperation/partnerships - Sustainability/accountability - Knowledge base - Human rights/rule of law/culture of lawfulness - Interdependency

Structural Indicator 3 Degree of civilian and parliamentary oversight of security institutions	
Definition	<p>An effective system of democratic controls is characterised by the following elements: civilian control; democratic governance; civilian expertise; non-interference in domestic politics; ideological neutrality; minimal role in the national economy; effective chain of command; and respect for the rights of military personnel. Democratic control norms are implemented through clear legal frameworks, institutional mechanisms and education measures.</p> <p>To assess the degree of oversight the following elements should be taken into account:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. constitutional and legal framework b. role and capacity of civil society, including women’s groups c. existence and capacity of independent oversight institutions and mechanisms d. capacity of institutional system of governance e. existence and effectiveness of a management system and internal oversight <p>“Security sector” or institutions refers to the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country.” It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances also included. Furthermore the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered as part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.</p>
Current applicability and measurability	<p>Indicator is applicable to national and in some regions, to regional contexts. Civilian and parliamentary oversight over security institutions is an integral part of democratic reforms and post-conflict reconstruction. As such it is a global indicator.</p>

<p>Why is it relevant?</p>	<p>Security is a precondition for achieving economic and social development and can only be assured if there is effective civilian and parliamentary control of the security institutions. If such control does not exist, or is not effective, the use of force or intelligence-gathering may be exercised arbitrarily by one or more groups within society, which may lead to insecurity and conflict. Democratic control of armed forces is a precondition for ensuring that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the political supremacy of the democratically elected civilian authorities is respected; • the rule of law and human rights are safeguarded; • the security forces serve the interests of the population and enjoy popular support and legitimacy; • the policies and capabilities of the military are in line with the country's political objectives and commensurate with its resources; and • the security institutions are not misused for political purposes.
<p>International, regional, and national data sources and availability</p>	<p>Data sources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ICCPR reports from Member States to the Human Rights Committee <p>Reports (annual) from national parliaments/parliamentary commissions/oversight bodies</p> <p>Reports of bodies such as DCAF, OSCE, OCDE, OHCHR</p>
<p>Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement</p>	<p>Through surveys, data could be collected on:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Oversight functions that parliament is afforded by law with respect to the security sector (e.g. responsibility for overseeing the budget for the sector) 2. Existence of a National human rights institution and/or ombudsman who can deal with complaints (receive, investigate, follow-up). <p>Tools to be used include the UNODC Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit (tools on the Integrity and Accountability of the Police: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/cjat_eng/2_Integrity_and_Accountability_Police.pdf)</p> <p>The SSR interagency group Integrated Technical Guidance Note on SSR - Democratic Governance of SSR.</p>

Structural Indicator 4 Average number of months of basic police training for new recruits	
Definition	Average number of months spent in full-time training within a police academy or similar institution upon recruitment as police officer.
Current applicability and measurability	Indicator applicable in national contexts. In all countries police officers receive some sort of basic training before starting to work. While the duration of the training is not a proof of quality it does provide a basic benchmark that can be used to assess the quality of the police forces.
Why is it relevant?	Sustainable development is difficult to achieve in the absence of functioning institutions. Well-governed and accountable institutions can ensure peace and security, enforce the rule of law, deliver effective public administration, guard against corruption and provide transparent markets. Without these, governments cannot serve their citizens, and business will not have the confidence to invest. Therefore, enhancing the capacity, professionalism and accountability of the police is key for sustainable development.
International, regional, and national data sources and availability	Data sources include records of national police training institutes.
Tools, methodologies and standards for measurement	There is a lack of international standards for this indicator

Structural Indicator 5 Existence of a national Anti-Money Laundering and Counter- Terrorism Financing Strategy	
Definition	Existence of the national Anti-Money Laundering and Counter- Terrorism Financing Strategy
Current applicability and measurability	Indicator nationally applicable and relevant
What does it measure?	It measures whether the country has in place a National AML/CFT Strategy
Why is it helpful?	Existence of the National AML/CFT Strategy indicates the high-level political will to combat money laundering and implies that national AML/CFT interagency coordination mechanisms are in place
International, regional and national data sources and availability	At national level, the existence of AML/CFT Strategy is verified by checking the relevant legislation. At the international level the mutual evaluation reports by FATF and FATF-style regional bodies can be consulted.
Applicable international standards	Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 2 requires <i>“Countries should have national AML/CFT policies, informed by the risks identified, which should be regularly reviewed, and should designate an authority or have a coordination or other mechanism that is responsible for such policies”</i> .
Tools and methodologies for measurement	Simple legislation check